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SUMMARY 
 
Arbitration as a mode of dispute settlement has been growing steadily all over the 
world.  The momentum for commercial arbitration in particular was provided by the 
1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (“the Model 
Law”). Legislation based on the Model Law has been enacted in many countries.  The 
arbitration laws of three of these countries, Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe, are 
selected for consideration in this dissertation because of their common origins, similar 
statutes, similar problems, shared experiences, and their regional distribution.  As the 
writer’s arbitration practice is based in Kenya, that jurisdiction is the primary, albeit 
not the only, source and foundation for this work, the focal point of reference and the 
citations from the law and practice incorporated in this research. 
 
The work consists of three chapters.  Chapter one is a brief introduction and an 
overview of arbitration. This is followed by the statement of the research question, 
the justification for the research, methodology and the structure and content of the 
dissertation.  Chapter two describes the legal and contextual framework for the 
investigation of the research questions in the selected jurisdictions of Kenya, Nigeria 
and Zimbabwe. Customary Law arbitration is included as a significant feature of 
African arbitration law. The UNCITRAL Model Law, the Arbitration Act, 1995 
(Kenya), the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1988 (Nigeria), the Arbitration Act, 
1996 (Zimbabwe), the Arbitration Act, 1996 (England), and the South African Draft 
Arbitration Bill are all used as legislative or statutory points of reference in the 
discussion of the research questions. 
 
Chapter 3 contains the main focus of the dissertation in which six recurrent arbitration 
problems in Kenya are discussed in the context of domestic arbitration. The research 
investigates (i) the illusiveness of consent as the basis for consensual arbitration (ii) 
jurisdictional challenges (iii) the procedural powers of the arbitral tribunal (iv) the 
disruptive effect of adjournments and postponements on the arbitral process (v) 
constraints on the granting of interim relief and (vi) the enforcement of the arbitral 
award.  Original, creative and innovative proposals in response to these problems 
include: the express legislative recognition of the manifestation of consent in both the 
verbal and written forms of the arbitration agreement, the use of the constructive 
dispute resolution technique, statutory recognition of customary law arbitration, the 
use of an expedited arbitration procedure, the award of exemplary and punitive 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 iv 
damages in arbitration, a code of sanctions to facilitate the arbitration process, and a 
simplified method of enforcement and execution of the arbitral award.   
 
The dissertation concludes with reflections on the future of arbitration in Africa, and 
the need for modernization and harmonization of arbitration laws for peaceful 
resolution of disputes and serious conflicts across Africa. 
 
The aim of this study is best illustrated by a short story: In the early nineties there was 
a man, untrained in any known discipline, who strutted court corridors, trade centres 
and market places, carrying a placard advertising himself to lawyers, traders and 
marketers as “An Arbitrator and Private Judge”.  He attracted business, charged a 
handsome percentage fee on the value of the claim, was duly paid, until officialdom 
caught up with him and put paid to his burgeoning career as “Arbitrator-Judge”.  But 
the reckless enthusiasm spawned by his wit and imagination, and the idiosyncratic 
practices in dispute resolution persisted and are manifest in Kenyan arbitration culture 
today.  The need to remove bad practices, avoidable impediments, and inefficiency in 
the arbitration culture of Kenya in order to make its procedures and processes more 
efficacious, is the heart of this study. 
******* 
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OPSOMMING 
 
Arbitrasie as ‘n wyse van geskilbeslegting is wêreldwyd aan die toeneem. Die 1985 
UNCITRAL Modelwetgewing insake Internasionale Kommersiële Arbitrasie het die 
momentum hiervoor gebied. Talle lande het vervolgens gereageer deur wetgewing 
geskoei op hierdie model te promulgeer. Die arbitrasiereg van drie lande, tewete 
Kenia, Nigerië en Zimbabwe, is vir doeleindes van hierdie proefskrif gekies op die 
basis van gemeenskaplike geskiedenis, soortgelyke wetgewing, soortgelyke 
probleme, gedeelde ervaringe en regionale verspreiding. Aangesien die skrywer se 
arbitrasie-praktyk in Kenia gebaseer is, word hierdie jurisdiksie as die primêre, 
alhoewel nie die enigste, bron en basis vir die navorsing gebruik.  
 
Die werk beslaan drie hoofstukke. Hoofstuk een verskaf ‘n kort inleiding tot en oorsig 
van die reg rakende arbitrasie. Dit word gevolg deur die navorsingsvraag, die 
rasionaal vir die navorsing, metodiek en die struktuur en inhoud van die proefskrif. 
Hoofstuk twee bied die regs- en kontekstuele raamwerk vir die ondersoek in die 
gekose jurisdiksies, nl. Kenia, Nigerië en Zimbabwe. ‘n Bespreking van 
gewoonteregtelike arbitrasie word ingesluit, aangesien dit ‘n belangrike deel van 
Arbitrasiereg in Afrika uitmaak. Die UNCITRAL Modelwetgewing, die Wet op 
Arbitrasie 1995 (Kenia), die Wet op Abitrasie en Konsiliasie 1988 (Nigerië), die Wet 
op Arbitrasie 1996 (Zimbabwe), die Wet op Arbitrasie 1996 (Engeland) en die Suid-
Afrikaanse Konsepwet op Arbitrasie word gebruik as die statutêre basis vir die 
bespreking van die navorsingsvrae.  
 
Hoofstuk 3 handel met die hooffokus van die proefskrif. Ses probleme wat telkemale 
opduik in die konteks van plaaslike arbitrasies in Kenia, en wat as die navorsingsvrae 
geïdentifiseer is, word vervolgens bespreek. Hierdie probleme is (i) die 
ontwykendheid van toestemming as basis vir arbitrasie deur ooreenkoms; (ii) 
jurisdiksionêre uitdagings; (iii) die proseduele magte van ‘n arbitrasie tribunaal; (iv) 
die onderbrekende effek van verdagings en uitstelle van arbitrasie-verhore;  (v) 
beperkinge op die verlening van tussentydse regshulp, en (vi) afdwinging en 
uitvoering van die arbitrasie-toekenning. Oorspronklike, kreatiewe en innoverende 
voorstelle as antwoord op hierdie probleme sluit in: die uitdruklike statutêre 
erkenning van toestemming tot arbitrasie in beide mondelinge en geskrewe vorms; 
die gebruik van konstruktiewe dispuutoplossingstegnieke; statutêre erkenning van 
gewoonteregtelike arbitrasies; die gebruik van ‘n versnelde arbitrasie-prosedure; die 
verlening van  skadevergoeding in die vorm van ‘n strafbedrag; ‘n kode van sanksies 
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om die arbitrasie proses te fasiliteer; en ‘n vereenvoudigde wyse waarop arbitrasie-
toekennings afgedwing en uitgevoer kan word.   
 
Die proefskrif sluit af deur die toekoms van arbitrasie in Afrika te bespreek, asook die 
behoefte aan modernisering en harmonisering van arbitrasiereg ten einde geskille 
dwarsoor Afrika op ‘n  vreedsame wyse te kan besleg.  
 
 
*********** 
 
Nota: Hierdie proefskrif weerspieël die reg soos in 2008.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
  
THE ORIGINS 
 
 
“Arbitration has a long Past, but scarcely any History. Over the years there 
have been treatises, and recently a torrent of articles, seminar papers, case 
digests, together with quite a number of books. But almost all of these are 
snapshots, slides, cross-sections of the contemporary worlds of dispute 
resolution, localized by time and space. There are none of the grand 
perspectives in which modern arbitration could be viewed as the inheritor of a 
continuous process of change.”1 
 
1.1 The Foundation 
 
The law develops slowly, alas and oftentimes, too slowly. But what the law also 
stubbornly refuses to do, is to stand still. Inevitably therefore, a sense of legal history2 
is a compelling aid to the comprehension of new law.3 
 
This discourse is on modern arbitration law in three representative regions of Africa.  
The history is embedded in antiquity.  Roebuck4 provides fascinating glimpses of the 
early life of arbitration through the ages: from Aeschylus’s Athens and ancient city 
states in which arbitration was already an established system of dispute resolution; the 
transition from Greek influence to Rome where arbitration was known from the time 
of the Twelve Tables and the use of the formulaic compromissum by which parties 
                                                 
1 Mustill MJ, Foreword to Roebuck D “Sources for the History of Arbitration” (1998) 14(3) Arbitration 
International 235. 
2 See generally Visser DP (ed) Essays On the History of Law (1989); Midgley TS “The Role of Legal 
History” (1975) 2 British Journal of Law and Society 153 155 et seq; Nader L The Life of the Law 
(2002) ch 1 and 2; Edgeworth B Law, Modernity, Postmodernity (2003); Handler JF Social Movements 
and the Legal System (1978). 
3 A broad but functional definition of law is that it is a set of rules people accept as binding, particularly 
where the rules emanate from an authoritative source (such as a legislature) and are enforced by the 
organs of state (such as a judiciary and police authority). See Redgment J Introduction to the Legal 
System of Zimbabwe 2nd ed (1981). See also para 2.3.1 below.  
4 Roebuck D “The Myth of Judicial Jealousy” (1994) 10 Arbitration International 395 – 406 reprinted 
in Disputes and Differences (2010) 300 – 311; Roebuck D “A Short History of Arbitration” in Kaplan 
H, Spruce J and Moser MJ Hong Kong and China Arbitration: Cases and Materials (1994) XXXIII – 
IXV.   
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submitted their dispute to an arbitrator of their choice and entered into a penal bond 
which the praetor enforced; the laws of Hlothere and Eadric of Anglo-Saxon England 
by which the dispute was referred to a third party who helped the parties to a 
compromise; and then into the Middle Ages when parties took advantage of the 
benefit of arbitration to solve their own problems and those of others.  Of the three 
categories of arbitration that then already existed,5 the first was created by the 
agreement of the parties, the second, from the parties’ membership of a community 
(such as a merchant or trade guild) whose rules bind the parties to submit their 
disputes to community-appointed arbitrators, and the third, was court-sponsored 
arbitration, either suo moto or at the request of one or both parties, during or instead 
of litigation.6 
 
The common law court and its tradition, as inherited in Africa, allowed an arbitration 
or an award to be pleaded in bar to an action and the Curia Regis Rolls and Year 
Books attested to the popular use of arbitration throughout the 13th and 14th centuries.  
Then, as now, the law courts acted in some ways as arbitrator or sponsor of forms of 
alternative dispute resolution.7  Throughout the ages there was always the comforting 
constancy, even during change, of the advantage arbitration offered for reconciliation 
through compromise and the restoration of peace as its aim, instead of an objectively 
just solution - a core essence inherited and transferred with embellishments into 
modern arbitration practice worldwide and in Africa, as evident in the discussion of 
the legal framework of arbitration in Chapter 2. 
 
This study investigates problems in Kenyan arbitration law and practice.  The 
research question, consisting of six selected problems of common occurrence in 
Kenyan arbitration, are set out in paragraph 1.3 and discussed in Chapter 3.  The 
concept, rationale and justification for the research are stated in paragraph 1.4 and the 
method by which the work is undertaken is described in paragraph 1.5 wherein the 
                                                 
5 Other sources cited by Roebuck are: Hogg QW The Law of Arbitration; Aristotle Athenian 
Constitution para 53;  Bonner RJ The Jurisdiction of Athenian Arbitrators 408; Watson A Roman 
Private Law around 200 BC  2; Attenborough FL The Laws of Earliest English Kings 20 – 21. Adams 
H The Anglo-Saxon Courts of Law 26, 53, and Vinogradoff P Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence 1 
345 – 354. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
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reasons for the comparative study involving Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe are also 
elaborated.  The structure and content of the study is explained in paragraph 1.6.   
 
This study draws on the writer’s own field work and wide consultations and 
interviews with eminent scholars and specialists in the study field from Africa and 
beyond.  It is aided also by insights from discussions with fellow participants at 
international arbitration seminars and workshops.  It is a modest beginning intended 
as a contribution to knowledge and scholarship in Africa.  Its uniqueness is twofold: 
first, it is a study that has not been specifically undertaken so far from a Kenyan 
perspective.  Secondly, it is work to whose outcome the importance and uniqueness of 
the writer’s inside knowledge of the reality of the problems in Kenya, is intended to 
contribute, perhaps not only for Kenya but for Africa. 
 
Modern arbitration law, with its long past, is no exception to the common 
evolutionary pattern of refusing to stand still.  On the contrary and notwithstanding 
the fission lines that run through arbitration, such as those between theory and 
practice, domestic and international arbitration, customary and statutory arbitration, 
and the idiosyncratic patterns in the civil and common-law arbitral traditions, 
arbitration is firmly established as a distinctive means of resolving disputes. The 
difficulties that still remain, hold out the challenge and prospects for study, and 
stimulate new perspectives, through which modern arbitration could justly claim to be 
the beneficiary of a continuous process of change and, consequently, progress. 
 
1.2 Arbitration in Crisis: An Overview of the Nature, Definition and Form of 
Arbitration 
 
1.2.1.  The Crisis of Nature and Definition 
 
In its simplest formulation arbitration is a means for disputing parties themselves to 
settle their dispute.8  They do so by agreeing to appoint someone else to determine 
                                                 
8 A Dispute can simply mean a quarrel, debate or argument. See Davidson GW, Seaton MA & Simpson 
JA Chambers Concise 20th Century Dictionary). It can also mean conflict or controversy or a conflict 
of claims or rights; an assertion of a right, claim or demand on one side, met by contrary claims or 
allegations on the other (see Black’s Law Dictionary 6th ed (1990)).  See also Iwara AU “Nature, 
Sources and Causes of Disputes” unpublished paper delivered at an ADR Conference in Abuja, 
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their differences.  The person they appoint, the arbitrator, makes the decision the 
parties will not make but does so on their behalf.   
 
Despite the modern trend towards harmonization there is no single uniform definition 
of arbitration.  The writer would describe arbitration as a procedure by which the 
disputing parties resolve their dispute by choosing an arbitrator or a tribunal or 
through a method to which they have consented, corresponding with the Chartered 
Institute of Arbitrators’ definition that: 
 
“[a]rbitration is the process whereby the parties in dispute 
appoint or have appointed on their behalf an independent 
neutral person to resolve the dispute.”9 
 
Some writers admit the difficulty in defining arbitration10 but nevertheless offer 
illustrative definitions.11 
 
The authors of Russell on Arbitration12 explain that although arbitration has been used 
in England and elsewhere for centuries the need for a definition has always been 
subsidiary to its purpose as a means for resolving a dispute. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Nigeria, July 2007, who states: “we may say that by dispute, we mean a debate or a situation of 
interaction involving two or more parties in which actions in pursuit of incompatible objectives or 
interests result in varying degrees of discord. There are several words commonly used to refer to it. 
Some are conflict, war, violence, crisis and fight.” Gabi M, Van der Merwe HW & Kawa W Conflict 
Accommodation: Towards Conceptual Clarification Centre for Intergroup Studies, Conflict and Peace 
Studies Series no 1 (1986) 3 state that conflict is “the assertion of contrary claims of right, which is 
latent when those claims of right are not asserted. When those claims of right are asserted, conflict 
develops into a dispute.” See also Halsbury’s Laws of England 4th ed Vol 2 para 602 for the distinction 
between “dispute” and “difference”. Regarding arbitration clauses that require a “dispute” or 
“difference” see Mustill MJ & Boyd SC Law and Practice of International  Commercial Arbitration 
2nd ed (1989) 122. 
9 Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Consumer Arbitration Scheme for the Financial Intermediaries, 
Managers and Brokers Regulatory Association (FIMBRA) England (2000). 
10 Brown & Marriot ADR Principles and Practice 2nd ed (1999) 49. The authors say that defining 
arbitration is not so easy and that no statutory definition is available in English law. Definitions of 
“arbitration” in arbitration statutes are usually of a formal nature and do not explain what arbitration 
actually is.  For example, the UNCITRAL Model Law, under Article 2(a) states merely that 
“arbitration means any arbitration whether or not administered by a permanent arbitral institution.” 
11 See Bernstein R, Tackaberry J & Marriot AL Handbook of Arbitration Practice 3rd ed (1998) 13; 
Orojo JO and Ajomo MA Law and Practice of Arbitration and Conciliation in Nigeria (1999) 3.  That 
the dispute is resolved without resort to court is emphasised in the definition of international 
commercial arbitration by Redfern A & Hunter M Law and Practice of International Commercial 
Arbitration 4th ed (2004) 1. 
12 Sutton D, Gill J & Gearing M Russell on Arbitration 23rd ed (2007) 5 para 1-008. 
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It seems that one of the difficulties in defining arbitration stems from the fact that its 
various definitions are not unique to arbitration and could also apply to other forms of 
dispute resolution.13 Nevertheless, and despite the difficulty in identifying the exact 
combination of features which sets arbitration apart from other methods of dispute 
resolution, the features usually found in consensual arbitration are “the need for [an 
agreement] referring the dispute to arbitration, the privacy of the proceedings, a 
determination of the dispute and the finality of the decision.”14 
 
The existence of a dispute15 is therefore a prerequisite for arbitration with a tendency 
to render the procedure adversarial. 
 
But it is perilous to take the “consensual basis of arbitration” and “party autonomy” at 
face value because these fundamental principles do not operate in isolation but within 
the constraints of public policy and their practical implications are commonly played 
out in arbitration practice necessitating the aid of principles of interpretation to 
determine the existence or otherwise of legally valid consent or the valid exercise of 
party autonomy in the choice of procedure, where these are contested or denied.  
 
The question why such a seemingly simple process of private arbitration can become 
controversial and sometimes turns rancorous or degenerates to a point where the 
parties depart from their preferred procedure to a court procedure they had initially 
avoided, is inherent in the nature and crisis of arbitration. 
 
Lord Roskill offers an assuagement with the observation that “[S]o long as human 
nature is what it is, there will always be disputes.  And those disputes, whatever their 
character, must be resolved – if society is to live in a civilized way – as quickly, as 
cheaply and as satisfactorily as possible.”16 
 
                                                 
13 See Russell on Arbitration 5 para 1-008 at n 45 with reference to the definition in Collins v Collins 
(1858) 26 Beav. 306 at 312 quoted in the text above.  They also refer to a discussion of the problems of 
definition in Mustill & Boyd Commercial Arbitration 38-50. 
14 Russell on Arbitration 5 para 1-008. 
15 The word “difference” is used interchangeably with “dispute” and for practical purposes they mean 
the same thing.  The point is that unless there is a dispute, there is nothing to refer to arbitration and the 
denial of genuine dispute ought to be determined by the arbitral tribunal, not the court. See Mustill & 
Boyd Commercial Arbitration 122-123. 
16 In a paper delivered in 1978 to the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators. 
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Resort to court is unavoidable because it is available to dissatisfied arbitral parties and 
litigation will continue to thrive at the expense of arbitration for a number of reasons 
that include the poor performance of some arbitrators, the pivotal position of lawyers 
in the dispute resolution processes and the ambivalent attitude of some judges towards 
arbitration.17 
 
But the fact that arbitration is a private process that has a public effect and is 
implemented with the support of public authorities of each state as stipulated by its 
national law does not support the proposition that arbitration is a derogation of the 
sovereign power.18 This is because far from being a derogation of sovereign power 
arbitration stems from an agreement between parties and that agreement is no 
derogation from any sovereign power; furthermore it is an agreement individuals have 
the freedom to make and parties are not compelled to arbitrate.19  They do so 
voluntarily and in the majority of domestic arbitrations the award is implemented 
voluntarily without state intervention.  The fact that arbitration legislation emanates 
from the state legislature and some awards sometimes require the assistance of state 
courts to enforce them should mislead no one into believing that legislation creates 
consensual arbitration.  It does not; it merely regulates it.  
 
The notorious cases in which the award of a tribunal has been set aside in the place it 
was made but is enforced in another jurisdiction20 do not support the theory of 
derogation because if the process were a derogation from sovereign power then the 
declaration of nullity or setting aside of the award by a state court of competent 
jurisdiction would completely annihilate the award leaving nothing for enforcement 
by a foreign court.21 
 
                                                 
17 Rutledge P B “Whither Arbitration?” (2008) 6(2) Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy 549. 
18 See Marriott A “The Categorical Imperatives of Pateley Bridge” (1999) 65 Arbitration 278. 
19 See too Lufuno Mphaphuli & Associates (Pty) Ltd v Andrews [2009] ZACC 6 paras 198, 212 and 
217. 
20 Such as Chromalloy Aeroservices v Arab Republic of Egypt 939 F Supp 907 (DDC 1996). 
21 The structure of the UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 36, by which recognition or enforcement of an 
arbitral award may be refused, irrespective of the country in which it was made, at the request of the 
party against whom it is invoked, is powerful evidence that the arbitral process is something sui generis 
and not a derogation from the Sovereign Power 
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As arbitration continues to evolve the notion that any natural person acceptable to the 
parties can be an arbitrator22 holds out a fascinating but critical challenge to aspirant 
arbitrators; but alongside the fascination is a bundle of rigorous requirements which 
include, principally, the need to be suitably qualified and recognized as a competent 
and skilful arbitrator with the ability and experience to attract appointments.  These 
are no mean attributes and requirements and their fulfilment may well be at the climax 
and culmination of a lifetime of effort and achievement.23 The qualifications and 
requirements of skill and competence are valid for both domestic and international 
arbitrations.  Good arbitrators get to be known and recognized by their peers and 
arbitration institutions to an extent where their frequent reappointments as arbitrators 
do not escape the criticism of cliquishness and elitism and, for their collegiality, they 
are even likened to a “mafia”.24  In recognition of this criticism with particular 
reference to international arbitration Paulsson responds that: 
 
“[i]ndividual reputations in this field grow only by the slow accretion of evidence of 
independence and fair mindedness in numerous instances when it really matters.  
Elitism is no sin, the ambition to work at the highest possible level is surely a healthy 
one.  The building of a reputation in this challenging context is a lengthy process, 
which offers no assurance of success.  However it creates a depth of confidence 
which can never be achieved by self-serving declarations.”25 
 
Be that as it may, the clubbism of international arbitration is openly recognized as 
creating cozy relationships amongst international arbitrators, which, compounded by 
the lack of transparency can lead to a lack of credibility. Arbitration specialists must 
                                                 
22 Mustill & Boyd Commercial Arbitration 9-10. See also para 3.2.1 below on the qualifications of an 
arbitrator. 
23 Dezalay Y & Garth BG Dealing in Virtue: International Arbitration and the Construction of a 
Transnational Legal Order (1996) 10. 
24 Dezalay & Garth Dealing in Virtue 10 add the following footnote to their observation that 
international commercial arbitration was replete with “grand old men” deemed a “mafia” or “club” by 
outsiders: “In the words of a well informed New York partner: ‘The more you see of international 
arbitration, the more you know the people who are involved, and they tend to be repetitively involved.’ 
” Another expert noted that “especially in the ICC, it’s a club of friends with the same names coming 
up all the time.” According to another insider, “[i]t is a club. They nominate one another.  And 
sometimes you’re counsel, and sometimes you’re arbitrator”. Another very successful arbitrator put it 
even more strongly “it’s a mafia because people appoint one another.  You always appoint your friends 
– people you know.” 
25 Paulsson J “Ethics, Elitism, Eligibility” (1997) 14(4) Journal of International Arbitration 13; but see 
Notaras A “Best in Show” 2006 Legal Business Arbitration Report  33, which states: “There are a lot 
of people who profess to be specialists but they are buttering each other up, and it becomes a bit too 
clubby.” 
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therefore take care that an “old mafia” is not replaced by a “new mafia” of younger 
arbitrators with the same characteristics as the old. Ultimately the arbitration 
profession needs to be credible and this it cannot be if it is seen as an exclusive club. 
 
The adversarial nature of arbitration making it sometimes indistinguishable from 
litigation remains.  Therefore the great variation in how arbitrations are conducted, the 
contemplation of a fair process and the need for a just result are challenges that 
necessitate the appointment of good and competent arbitrators. Parties who ignore this 
fundamental requirement risk an unsatisfactory outcome and the possibility of the 
award being challenged and set aside. Again therefore, the problems in the practice of 
arbitration perhaps relate less to its definition or the lack of uniform definition than to 
how the arbitral procedure is used by the particular arbitrator or arbitrators who 
manage the process and conduct the proceedings.26 
 
1.2.2  The Crisis of Form and Identity 
 
Arbitration,27 as a system of justice, is in crisis.28 This perception synthesizes the 
writer’s experience in arbitration practice.  But it is primarily a reflection on the 
nature, form and malleability of the arbitral procedure that makes it readily adaptable 
not only to the variety of disputes referred to a sole arbitrator or to an arbitral tribunal 
composed of persons from different disciplines and backgrounds but also to the 
diversity of techniques and skills drawn upon for managing the disputes to a 
settlement or an award.  On the one hand arbitration may emulate litigation.29 In this 
vein arbitration has almost all the trappings of litigation with such formalities as 
pleadings, interlocutory applications and orders, discovery of documents, formal 
reception of oral and documentary evidence and on to the delivery of an enforceable 
award similar to a judgment of court on the issues in dispute.  On the other hand 
                                                 
26 See particularly paras 3.3-3.5 below. 
27 Arbitration is a private method, alternative to the public state court system, for resolving disputes.    
28 The Chambers Concise 20th Century Dictionary defines crisis as “a crucial or decisive moment; a 
turning point; a time of difficulty or distress: an emergency.” For the challenges facing international 
arbitration see Kaplan N “Arbitration in Asia – Development and Crises” (2002) 19 Journal of 
International Arbitration 163-170 and 245-260. 
29 Litigation is the process for resolving disputes publicly by the state courts and tribunals (see 
Bernstein et a Handbook of Arbitration Practice 3rd ed 3-4. It has been said that although arbitration 
presents an alternative to the judicial process in offering privacy and procedural flexibility to the 
parties, it is nonetheless fundamentally the same in that the role of the arbitrator is judgmental: see 
Redfern & Hunter  International Commercial Arbitration 37. 
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arbitration is in essence and by definition distinct from litigation. In this respect 
arbitration arguably belongs to the cluster of alternatives to litigation commonly 
known as “ADR”30 (or Alternative Dispute Resolution). But even within this group 
arbitration asserts a distinctiveness quite unlike the other competing procedures in this 
group for being able to produce a binding and enforceable award and to bring finality 
to a dispute.31  Consequently arbitration is not just an alternative to litigation but also 
an alternative to the alternatives in the ADR group for solving disputes. 
 
Then again at other times arbitration assumes a hybrid character with mediation to 
form what has come to be known as “med-arb”32 or “arb-med”33 or “medaloa”.34 
These designations have earned arbitration the dubious epithet of being “chameleon-
like” and “protean”35 and prompted essays such as “Whither Arbitration?”36 and 
“Where do you come from, Arbitration?”37 
 
A picture then emerges of arbitration in a crisis of identity.  But that is not all.  In 
considering the various methods for resolving disputes it is not inconceivable that 
there may be disputes on facts and in circumstances in which the most desirable and 
effective technique for solving the specific dispute cannot be easily classified, 
                                                 
30 An elaborate list of ADR techniques is provided by Brown & Marriott ADR Principles and Practice 
17-19; see also Merkin R. Arbitration Law (1991); Redfern & Hunter International Commercial 
Arbitration 22 – 23; Orojo & Ajomo Arbitration and Conciliation in Nigeria 41; Boule L. & Rycroft 
A. Mediation: Principles Process, Practice (1997) 63; Pettifer BWB May 1998 Chartered Institute of 
Arbitrators Newsletter 1. 
31 An exception to this statement is the ADR technique known as expert determination. An expert’s 
decision is only binding contractually, and when not an arbitrator he is not bound by the Arbitration 
Act. 
32 In “med-arb” the mediator first assists the parties to settle their differences but if unsuccessful then, 
with the parties’ consent, he conducts an arbitration and publishes an award.  See Oghigian H “The 
Mediation/Arbitration Hybrid” (2003) Journal of International Arbitration 75-80. 
33 In “arb-med” the arbitrator conducts the arbitration to an award which he puts aside to await the 
outcome of his efforts as mediator to assist the parties to reach a settlement.  If that fails the award is 
published but if a settlement is reached the award is not disclosed and has no further purpose. 
34 Medaloa is an abbreviation of “mediation and last offer arbitration”. The mediator first attempts to 
settle the dispute, but if this fails the mediator then proceeds to arbitrate the dispute, but is limited to 
choosing between the final offers of each party during the mediation phase. This motivates the parties 
to moderate their demands during the mediation phase. See Coulson R “MEDALOA: a Practical 
Technique for Resolving International Business Disputes” (1994) 11(2) Journal of International 
Arbitration 111-114. 
35 Park WW “Arbitration’s Protean Nature: The Value of Rules and the Risks of Discretion” (2003) 19 
Arbitration International 279, 280-281. 
36 Rutledge P B “Whither Arbitration?” (2008) 6(2) Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy. 
37 Werner J “Where Do you Come from, Arbitration? Some Reflections on Quo Vadis Arbitration?” 
(1999) 16(4) Journal of International Arbitration 185-188. 
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particularly in advance. “Constructive Dispute Resolution”38  is this writer’s 
innovative term for the technique or a combination of techniques a decision-maker39 
may adopt which defies conventional classification. The technique is recognised in 
dispute settlement in Kenya and other African traditional societies.40 
 
One can envisage a serious conflict situation or a critical emergency in which the very 
fabric of social, economic or political order is threatened by serious conflict;41 or 
where the factual circumstances of the conflict or dispute have substantially altered 
after the commencement of arbitral proceedings through circumstances beyond the 
control of the parties, who then request a review of the circumstances with the 
assistance of the arbitrator; or a situation where parties who were originally not on 
speaking terms with each other subsequently request the arbitrator’s participation in 
restructuring the way forward. It is also conceivable that disputants appoint a person 
as an arbitrator and subsequently agree that such person must decide their dispute not 
as an arbitrator but as an expert and is therefore not subject to the requirements of 
arbitration legislation.42 It is submitted that in situations involving changed 
circumstances, or demanding urgency and the like, an arbitrator or decision-maker 
(“constructive arbitrator”, for short) ought to be able to adopt an innovative approach 
or technique which, while sacrificing arbitral form for a speedy solution, may not 
                                                 
38 The technique can be used by a decision-maker (arbitrator, mediator or adjudicator) with party 
agreement. 
39 The decision-maker in arbitration is the arbitrator or arbitral tribunal: see Russell on Arbitration 8 par 
1-016. 
40 The phenomenon of overlapping techniques is acknowledged by Chukwuemerie A “The 
Internationalization of African Customary Law Arbitration” (2006) 14(2) African Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 143-175. He advocates the internationalization of customary law 
by the inclusive interpretation of Article 7 of the Model Law regarding the definition of “arbitration 
agreement”. 
41 When Mr. Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary General, intervened in the disputed Kenyan presidential 
election results of December 2007, he publicly disclaimed a formulaic approach to a solution, 
preferring instead a constructive engagement of the Kenyan people in finding a solution. His mediation 
team thereafter morphed into the “National Dialogue and Reconciliation Committee”. See Torgbor E 
“Constructive Dispute and Conflict Resolution: A Technique for Resolving Serious Conflicts in 
Africa” (2009) 25 Arbitration International 121 at 122. See further Kindler HS Managing 
Disagreement Constructively: A Practical Guide for Constructive Conflict Management; Crawley J 
Constructive Conflict Management (1995); Nordlinger EA “Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies 
Harvard” University Centre for International Affairs – Number 29 January 1972; Barsky AE Conflict 
Resolution for Helping Professions, 2nd ed (2007). See also Davies JE Constructive Engagement?” 
(2007). 
42 The extent of the court’s power to review the decision of such an expert is uncertain.  Schuldes v 
Compressor Valves Pension Fund 1980 4 SA 576 (W) is cited as authority that the court would 
interfere where the expert’s decision was not bona fide or honest. 
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compromise the procedural safeguards and other fundamental considerations that 
ensure a just and binding result.43 
 
Constructive dispute resolution is arguably therefore either an ADR technique or an 
arbitration hybrid. As stated above it could arise from an appointment as arbitrator, or 
through a person being approached to act as arbitrator.  
 
The precise role to be played by a constructive decision-maker depends on the stage 
before or after the commencement of the arbitration, at which the technique is to be 
used. Prudence suggests that the role be agreed upon in writing by the parties and duly 
recorded as part of the terms of reference.  Effectiveness of the technique is enhanced 
if the parties would also agree for the outcome to be binding and enforceable.44 
 
Similarities are apparent between the constructive dispute resolution technique and 
others such as “settlement facilitation”,45 “neutral listening”,46 “amiable 
composition”, “conciliation” and “negotiation”.  It should suffice to observe that 
conciliation and negotiation are the commonest and most extensively used forms of 
                                                 
43 This can be aided by the provisions Art 19(2) of the Model Law and its national derivatives.  Art 
19(1) allows the parties the freedom to agree on a procedure (unspecified) to be followed by the 
tribunal, and in the event of disagreement, Art 19(2) allows the tribunal itself to conduct the 
proceedings in a manner (again unspecified) it considers appropriate.  Both paragraphs are subject to 
the mandatory provisions of Arts 18 & 24(2) and (3) to ensure due process. 
44 For ground rules, the institutional rules offer some guidance. For example the ICC Rules of 
Arbitration empower the tribunal to assume the powers of an amiable compositeur or to decide ex 
aequo et bono but only with the agreement of the parties. Article 1(2) of the UNCITRAL Conciliation 
Rules (1980) emphasizes the primary role of party autonomy.  The Nigerian Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act of 1988, s 22(3) and s 47(4), and art 33(2) of the Arbitration Rules in the First 
Schedule of that Act, like the Model Law art 28(3), as well as the ICC Arbitration Rules of 1998 art 
17(3) referred to below, all make it clear that the arbitrator may only act as amiable compositeur with 
the agreement of the parties. 
45 For a discussion of this technique see Plant DW “The Arbitrator as Settlement Facilitator” (2000) 
17(1) Journal of International Arbitration 143-146 and the authorities cited. 
46 See Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 40 par 1-83 and para 1 – 84. 
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dispute resolution in Africa.47  One bears in mind that approaches to negotiation differ 
according to the subject matter as well as the skills drawn upon for its success.48 
 
On occasion one comes across a contract that provides for the parties in dispute first 
to attempt settlement “amicably” or “by negotiation” prior to arbitration or 
litigation.49   
 
Procedural dilemmas fostered by procedural flexibility may manifest early and 
sometimes from the very beginning of an arbitration.  In ad hoc arbitrations the 
appointment of the tribunal is not always straightforward or free from controversy “as  
any party that considers an arbitration as contrary to its interest can capitalize on 
every opportunity to obstruct the appointment process, or to challenge a tribunal once 
appointed”.50 For example, a party may refuse to appoint an arbitrator in order to 
obstruct the process, or a party-appointed arbitrator might refuse to cooperate to 
appoint the third arbitrator.51 In such instances the crisis of arbitration is the ironical 
situation whereby parties who have consciously chosen arbitration in preference to 
litigation have often first to resort to litigation for court assistance to constitute the 
arbitral tribunal. In this connection arbitrators may be rightly envious but can hardly 
justify any hostility to judicial intervention if, at one end of the spectrum arbitration 
needs court assistance to launch the arbitral process, and at the other end, to enforce 
its awards, not to mention other support, assistance and even supervision in between. 
                                                 
47 Sempasa SL “Obstacles to International Commercial Arbitration in African Countries” (1992) 41 
KLQ 387 and (1992) 41 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 408; see also Sobek (1994) 
1(1) Negotiation & Dispute Resolution Journal 29-39; Nader L “From Legal Processing to mind 
processing” (1992) 30 Family and Conciliation Courts Review 468 – 473; Gadzama JK “Integration of 
Arbitration, Mediation and Conciliation in Dispute Resolution Management” a paper delivered at ADR 
Conference, Sandton, Johannesburg, 14th June 2006; Asouzu AA “Conciliation Under the 1988 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act of Nigeria” (1993) 5 African Journal of International and 
Commercial Law 825, 829; Genn H Mediation in Action (1999) 15 – 20; Dana D Managing 
Differences (2006) 47 – 76. 
48 Avruch K Culture and Conflict Resolution (1998) 39. Negotiation between States goes by the special 
name, diplomacy. See Albert J Negotiation Skills A Handbook, Conflict and Peace Studies Series No. 2 
(1986). 
49 See for example Cable & Wireless plc v IBM (United Kingdom) Ltd [2002] EWHC 2059 (Comm), 
where clause 40 of the contract between the parties contained elaborate provisions for referring any 
dispute to negotiation before resorting to mediation and, as a last resort, litigation.  The court 
nevertheless apparently accepted that an agreement to negotiate is not enforceable under English law, 
citing Courtney & Fairbairn Ltd v Tolaini Brothers (Hotels) Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 297(CA). 
50 Landau T “Composition and Establishment of the Tribunal” (1998) 9 American Review of  
International Arbitration 45. 
51 Akseli O “Appointment of Arbitrators as Specified in the Agreement to Arbitrate” (2003) 20(3) 
Journal of International Arbitration 247-254. 
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Furthermore, it is an adjunct to its deference to the courts that although arbitration 
inspires and contributes directly to the development of arbitration law, judicial 
intervention is necessary to transform that contribution into arbitration case law 
precedent.52 
 
The malleability of the arbitral procedure is revealed not only by external 
comparisons with other dispute resolution mechanisms but also manifested by the 
internal manipulations of the arbitral procedure and the ferment of tensions, if not 
conflict, through the interaction of doctrines such as “party autonomy” and the 
freedom it gives to the arbitral parties to adopt a procedure of their preference and 
“the autonomy of the arbitrator” that ostensibly makes him master of the procedure.  
On the one hand and within the limits of mandatory provisions of arbitration 
legislation, 
 
“the parties are free to concoct their own procedural recipe.  They can 
‘legislate’ for liberality of procedure or for traditional methods: they can 
choose great formality or great informality: they can give to the tribunal a 
very wide jurisdiction or a very narrow one.”53 
 
On the other hand, and within the limits of the arbitration agreement54 and the 
governing statute, the arbitrator 
 
“controls the procedure of the arbitration … [and is able] to tailor the 
procedure to the needs of the particular dispute, rather than to take off the peg 
a procedure (e.g. litigation procedure) designed to cater for widely differing 
situations.”55 
                                                 
52 Indeed the arbitral tribunal is not a direct source of arbitration law as each tribunal is private, 
completely isolated and accountable only to the parties; and law making is not the primary function of 
the arbitral tribunal anymore than it is that of the courts. Nevertheless, notable publications of 
arbitration experts and scholars are subsidiary sources of arbitration law and, on the international plane, 
Article 38 (1)(d) of its Statute enjoins the International Court of Justice to apply, inter alia, judicial 
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists as subsidiary means for determining 
the rules of international law. 
53 Bernstein, Tackaberry, & Marriott Handbook of Arbitration Practice 90. 
54 Thus the powers of the arbitrator are subject to party autonomy. 
55 Bernstein, Tackaberry, & Marriott Handbook of Arbitration Practice 90. It must also be noted that 
the two autonomies (of parties and arbitrator) do not necessarily harmonise and collisions occur 
requiring the master of the procedure to be flexible in accommodating the wishes of the parties but also 
remaining firm and decisive. 
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While some practitioners laud this arbitral flexibility others see a trail of uncertainties 
in the wake of such flexibility that sometimes leads to frustration and puts into 
question the effectiveness of the arbitral process. Park56 poignantly exposes the crisis 
of arbitration by arguing that the absence of procedural constraints on the arbitral 
tribunal creates more problems than it solves, often giving the impression of an “ad 
hoc justice” that can only debase the perceived value and legitimacy of arbitration. 
Arbitrations show enormous variation in the mechanisms used to establish fact and 
law,57 partly because the spectrum of arbitrable matters is so large and the moral 
flavour of arbitration so dramatically different from context to context. Park therefore 
rightly points out that the public image and aura of arbitration depends on one’s 
perspectives and that while in Western Europe arbitration stands on a high moral 
ground,58 in developing countries it is viewed with suspicion.59  
 
Skepticism about the benefits and attractiveness of arbitration is even found amongst 
some of its most prominent teachers and ardent exponents. Cato has observed: 
 
“There is a tendency for arbitration, notwithstanding the influence of the 1996 
[English] Arbitration Act, to mimic the processes involved in full-blown litigation. It 
is rarely, it seems, a quicker or cheaper expedient than litigation for major disputes. 
There is evidence that clients are being advised not to select arbitration as a means for 
dispute resolution in contracts because of perceived drawbacks involving, principally, 
lack of compulsory joinder possibilities and the lack of control over arbitral 
nominees. For the first time in JCT contracts there is the requirement now to make an 
express choice between arbitration and litigation; previously the express forum, by 
default, was arbitration.”60  
 
                                                 
56 Park (2003) 19 Arbitration International, especially at 283-284. 
57 For example a “documents only procedure” can be used to arbitrate a straightforward dispute 
involving a letter of credit; but a more protracted procedure involving disclosure of documents and an 
oral hearing may be used in a construction dispute. 
58 By being treated as an exercise in self-governance by the commercial community. 
59 Domestic arbitration is frequently used in Africa but international arbitration is distrusted: see Park 
(2003) 19 Arbitration International at 280-281. 
60 Cato M unpublished paper on Role of Judges at Judges Conference, Mombasa, 2000. “JCT” stands 
for “Joint Contracts Tribunal” an English regulatory body that produces standard form contracts for the 
construction industry. Cato is a leading arbitrator, tutor at the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, 
London, and currently Professor of Law in China. 
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Preferring predictability to flexibility and arbitrator discretion, Professor John Uff 
challenges the benefits of discretion by noting that arbitrator discretion results in 
uncertainties of both costs and the length of proceedings; that in most cases it is a 
matter of pure chance whether arbitral parties end up with what might be called a 
good resolution of their dispute and so urges that fundamental procedural decisions 
should be made when the arbitration agreement is concluded.61 
 
The two extreme positions that encapsulate the crisis of arbitration with regard to its 
relationship with the courts appear from the following statement by Lord Saville: 
 
“It can be said on the one side that if parties agree to resolve their disputes through 
the use of a private rather than a public tribunal, then the court system should play no 
part at all, save perhaps to enforce awards in the same way as they enforce any other 
rights and obligations to which the parties have agreed. To do otherwise is 
unwarrantably to interfere with the parties’ right to conduct their affairs as they 
choose.  The other extreme position reaches a very different conclusion. Arbitration 
has this in common with the court system; both are a form of dispute resolution which 
depends on the decision of a third party. Justice dictates that certain rules should 
apply to dispute resolution of this kind. Since the state is in over-all charge of justice, 
and since justice is an integral part of any civilized democratic society, the courts 
should not hesitate to intervene as and when necessary, so as to ensure that justice is 
done in private as well as public tribunals.”62  
 
But, despite the potential pitfalls inherent in its flexibility, arbitration, because of its 
versatility, is growing in strength and popularity63 as a favoured and preferred 
procedure for dispute resolution. That, indubitably, is an encouraging development for 
                                                 
61 Uff J “Predictability in International Arbitration” in Berkeley A & Mimms (eds) International 
Commercial Arbitration: Practical Perspectives (2001) 151. 
62 Saville M “The Denning Lecture 1995: Arbitration and the Courts” (1995) 61 Arbitration 157. 
63 See Sorieul R “UNCITRAL’s Current Work in the Field of International Commercial Arbitration” 
(2005) 22(6) Journal of International Arbitration 543 544. The popularity of arbitration is also 
demonstrated by the growth of literature on the subject, the increasing numbers of arbitrators and 
arbitration institutions and centres. See also Bernstein, Tackaberry & Marriot Handbook of Arbitration 
Practice 6 para 1-08; Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 1 n 1 and 2 n 4.  
Arbitration’s progress and popularity can also be measured by (i) modernization of legislation in many 
countries; (ii) development of institutional arbitration; (iii) increased accessions to international 
conventions; and (iv) judicial support – see Russell F, Sutton D, Gill J & Walton A Russell on 
Arbitration 21st ed (1997) 31. 
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the proponents, enthusiasts and reformers of arbitration who desire the removal of the 
deficiencies in arbitral practice to render it more efficacious. 
 
Crises provoke change.  Consequently if arbitration is truly in crisis then it is a timely 
and opportune crisis of identity and evolution, necessitated by transformation.  There 
is also the need for modernization and improvement in the face of competition and 
challenges  arbitration must overcome, through legislation and good practices, not 
merely to enhance private resolution of disputes, but also by the delivery of improved 
arbitral services and, ultimately, arbitral justice. 
 
1.3  The Research Question  
 
The dissertation is prompted and motivated by the need to investigate selected 
recurrent problems in arbitration practice in Kenya. As such, and for that reason, a 
conversance with Kenyan arbitration culture and environment, and some insight into 
and experience of how the arbitration process unfolds in that jurisdiction, are 
advantages brought into the investigation. 
 
Kenya is therefore the primary, though not the only, jurisdictional source and 
foundation for this research and the focal point of reference. It is apparent from the 
title, and later substance, that the core of the dissertation is the discussion in Chapter 3 
on the selected problems introduced here and formulated below as six research 
questions: 
 
i. The quest for genuine consent: how genuine is the consensual basis of 
arbitration? 
ii. Frequent challenges to arbitrators and to the arbitral jurisdiction: how can 
these be curbed? 
iii. The powers of the arbitral tribunal: are they adequate for the effective 
management and conduct of the arbitral proceedings and efficient disposal of 
disputes? 
iv. Frequent adjournments, postponements and delays: how can these be 
minimized? 
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v. Constraints on the granting of interim measures by the arbitral tribunal: are 
they a help or hindrance to arbitration? 
vi. Enforcement of the arbitral award: what improvements can be made to 
facilitate the speedy enforcement and execution of arbitral awards? 
 
These problems and questions are frequently encountered in arbitration proceedings, 
with a tendency to cause or contribute to frustration, uncertainty, delay and expense in 
arbitration practice in Kenya. They can be seen as impediments and disadvantages 
that ought to be removed in order to shorten arbitration time, save costs, alleviate the 
unnecessarily heavy burden on both arbitral tribunals and courts in dealing with them, 
reduce procedural obstacles and the uncertainties attendant to them, facilitate the 
achievement of finality, and ultimately the speedy enforcement of the award. The 
problems persist, partly because they are either only partially regulated by national 
legislation or not at all; and while some of them can be addressed by improved 
legislation, others seem to defy easy solution. Arbitrators with diverse educational and 
professional training, cultural backgrounds and differing levels of practical 
experience, differ in their approaches to these issues. This often leads to controversial 
rulings and decisions, a result that does not promote consistency in arbitration practice 
or the development of sound arbitration norms and standards.  
 
The selection of these problems for scrutiny is based on, and informed by, the writer’s 
experience of arbitration practice. They may not be unique to Kenya but their frequent 
recurrence in Kenyan arbitration practice requires and justifies close examination and 
the search for possible solutions that can be a unique contribution to scholarship and 
the practice of arbitration in Africa. This is what this dissertation attempts to achieve. 
The writer’s selection and formulation of the research questions were also informed 
by Stellenbosch University’s published doctoral research criteria with a requirement 
for “the motivation  and study objective” (the term “research question” is not used in 
the published criteria) to be satisfactorily formulated. This is done by the clear and 
concise formulation of the six research questions and the methodology in paragraph 
1.5 and the justification for the research in paragraph 1.4 below. 
 
It must be emphasised from the onset that the field of study is domestic arbitration 
law and practice in an African context as distinct from international commercial 
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arbitration. In the search for solutions to the research questions there are frequent 
comparative references to the selected kindred jurisdictions of Nigeria and Zimbabwe 
which, together with Kenya, can be described as the three earliest African states that 
adopted or adapted the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration (“the Model Law”) to their national arbitration statutes: The Arbitration 
and Conciliation Act 1988 of Nigeria, The Arbitration Act 1995 of Kenya and The 
Arbitration Act of 1996, Zimbabwe.  The three jurisdictions are therefore referred to, 
interchangeably either, as “selected”, “kindred”, “counterpart” or “UNCITRAL” 
jurisdictions.  The reasons for their selection are elaborated in paragraph 1.4.  The 
experience of other jurisdictions such as England and South Africa are also 
highlighted for reasons that become apparent in the discussions.  The UNCITRAL 
Model Law of 1985, in relevant parts, is brought into the discussion and used both as 
a point of reference and departure for this study. There are references also to the 
literature on international arbitration where pertinent and relevant to the discussion of 
the six research questions in the context of the domestic or national arbitration laws 
under consideration, as such laws are to some extent calibrated by international 
arbitration principles, standards and instruments.64  Such references also demonstrate 
the writer’s conversance with the literature available and accessible in the chosen 
study field in the period of investigation between 2005 and 2008. 
 
1.4 The Concept, Rationale and Justification for this Research 
 
Arbitration is increasingly used in Africa for solving various disputes in a rapidly 
changing world. This dissertation seeks to investigate recurrent problems and the 
causes of avoidable inefficiency in the arbitral process.  If the purpose of arbitration is 
understood to be the achievement of the right solution to a dispute with least cost and 
expense,65 then the underlying causes and problems that induce or contribute to 
procedural rigidity, inordinate delays and frustration, all of which render arbitral 
justice expensive, must be identified and expunged. 
                                                 
64 For example, section 35 of the Nigerian arbitration statute allows arbitral parties to an international 
commercial agreement to refer their dispute to arbitration conducted under the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules. The 1958 New York Convention, an international instrument governing the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, is specifically incorporated by reference in the three national 
statutes of Nigeria (preamble and section 54(1)), Kenya (section 36(2), Arbitration Amendment Act),  
and Zimbabwe (preamble to the 1996 Arbitration Act). 
65 Compare the object of arbitration in s 1(a) of the English Arbitration Act of 1996. 
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Apart from those selected for closer scrutiny in this dissertation there are several other 
common procedural problems in arbitration such as the failure of formalized and 
traditionally structured pleadings to identify and define the real issues in dispute, the 
frequent abuse of the discovery process, excessive emphasis on oral testimony and 
lengthy debate by lawyers in final submissions and argument. The failure of the 
arbitral tribunal to address these problems effectively, either from the lack of adequate 
arbitral powers, or the inadequate use of existing powers,66 or the lack of will, is a 
contributory factor that keeps the door open for frequent judicial intervention which in 
turn diminishes the confidence and authority of the arbitral tribunal to assume the 
fullest control of the proceedings.  The same factor exposes the arbitrator in Kenya to 
intimidation by legal representatives and makes the arbitrator unwilling to be assertive 
or to intervene to prevent delay and other procedural abuses, for fear of affording 
grounds for applications to set aside the eventual award.  Applications of this kind are 
not infrequent in Kenya.  This may be described as the arbitrator’s dilemma.  That this 
phenomenon, if no longer its frequency, is not confined to Kenya, is reflected in the 
words of Lord Roskill: 
 
“[I]n matters like this an arbitrator has for all practical purposes both first and 
last word and I often think he fears that if he is firm someone may thereafter 
accuse him in the courts of ‘misconduct’,67 that dreadful word.  I can 
understand the fear though I sincerely believe it to be unjustified.  It has, I 
think, an historic basis and stems from the days when the courts were hostile 
to arbitrations … but I do not believe that any court would presume to 
criticize an arbitrator who was firm in dealing with disobedience to his 
orders, so long as he acted fairly.”68 
 
Individual African judges may share these encouraging sentiments; but generally, 
African courts appear too ready to assume jurisdiction in arbitral matters, both from 
                                                 
66 Existing legislation such as Art 19(2) of the Model Law and its corresponding provisions in the 
national arbitration statutes of Kenya (the Arbitration Act of 1995 s 20(2)), Nigeria (the Arbitration Act 
of 1988 s 15(2) and (3)), and Zimbabwe (the Arbitration Act of 1996 sch 1 Art 19(2)) contain 
procedural powers that, it is submitted, do not clearly address these problems in addition to the fact that 
party autonomy can limit these powers. See further para 2.4.4.5(vii) below for a discussion of these 
provisions. 
67 See the clarification of “misconduct” in para 2.5.3 below.  
68 Lord Roskill “Third Alexander Lecture, March 8, 1977” (1977) 44 Arbitration 4 6.  
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insufficient appreciation of the dynamics of arbitration and a lack of familiarity with 
arbitration law and practice,69 and an African arbitrator may also not be persuaded 
that arbitrators have “both [the] first and last word” in arbitrations due to the 
frequency of challenges to arbitral decisions that end up in court.70 
 
Therefore, in the African context, it is submitted that effective sanctions are necessary 
for the effective management and conduct of arbitral proceedings.71 This 
recommendation is taken up and pursued in chapter three.  The way forward must 
perforce include strengthening the existing laws and empowering arbitrators and 
others concerned with arbitration to play their proper roles to ensure better services 
for willing users.  While the arbitral process must be freed from unreasonable 
apprehension of excessive court intervention, it must widen its reach and strengthen 
its outcomes for arbitration to be seen as a truly effective and respected alternative to 
litigation and other competing dispute resolution techniques. 
 
Some benefits claimed for both domestic and international arbitration such as speed, 
cost reduction and finality of the award are often not readily realizable or realizable at 
all because of recurrent problems that require attention and reappraisal.  Constraints 
abound which, in their diverse manifestations, can and do adversely affect the 
outcome of proceedings and consequently the integrity of the award.  Pre-hearing 
constraints include: 
(i) improper and doubtful challenges to the arbitral jurisdiction that in 
practice quite commonly delay the proceedings and increase costs; 
(ii) unmerited complaints about the suitability of the appointed arbitrator; 
(iii) preliminary objections being taken as to the arbitrability of the subject 
matter in dispute; and 
(v) the hearing and determination of questions as to the appropriate forum 
and choice of procedure. 
                                                 
69 See Okekeifere AI “Salient Issues in the Law and Practice of Arbitration in Nigeria” unpublished 
conference paper, arbitration symposium at Senate House, University of London, June 2003. 
70 In Kenya recalcitrant parties commonly succeed in obtaining court orders to stay arbitration 
proceedings and then do nothing to proceed in court with a full hearing of the complaint for which the 
stay was granted by the court.  Epco Builders Limited v Marjan and United States International 
University Civil Suit no 274/2004, in which the Kenya Chief Justice dismissed an application 
challenging an arbitral ruling, was hailed as a “landmark decision” by the Kenyan Branch of the 
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators. 
71 See para 3.7 below. 
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At and during the hearing other procedural and evidential issues emerge that severely 
test and reveal the inadequacy of the powers and competence of the arbitral tribunal to 
determine such issues. Examples are the lack of arbitral power to issue a witness 
summons to compel the attendance of a particular witness without court assistance 
and the inability to deal with contempt committed in the face of the tribunal. Although 
recourse to court in some instances may neither be justified nor beneficial, it is 
nevertheless available to recalcitrant parties and their representatives who may not be 
keen on the expeditious disposal of the dispute.  After all that, at the end of the 
proceedings the award may be challenged, or set aside by the court, or be undelivered 
and so never see the light of day if the hapless arbitrator is compelled to exercise a 
lien for non-payment of his fees.  These problems can be addressed by the role players 
in arbitration and with legislation that can make arbitration more attractive to users.  
Arbitral justice cannot be delivered by a procedure so hobbled and beset by 
constraints that diminish its efficacy and blunt its cutting edge.  The goal is not the 
achievement of perfection but an efficient arbitration regime for the delivery of 
arbitral justice particularly in the context of domestic arbitration, taking into account 
the principles of the equality of the parties, economy, proportionality and 
expedition.72 
 
1.5  Comparative and Compatible Methodology  
 
The term “comparative and compatible methodology” has been coined by the writer 
to describe the methodology adopted for this study.  Research methodology is not 
static but variable.  The choice may be influenced or determined by the subject matter 
and the intended purpose or objective.  In considering the choice of methodology it is 
emphasised that the investigation of the six problems in Chapter 3 is the heart of this 
dissertation.  It does not therefore set out to test a thesis or a proposition as may be 
expected in the investigation or debunking of an “idea” or “theory”, for example, in 
jurisprudential, philosophical, theological or doctrinal research. That may be a 
traditionalist approach but not the only method for researching a “problem” in all 
                                                 
72 These principles were enunciated by Lord Woolf in the report “Access to Justice” HMSO, London 
(1996). The Woolf Report was perhaps the first, firm and official indication that the English courts 
would, in future, encourage other more creative ways for resolving disputes. There was a suggestion 
from this eminent member of the judiciary that parties might be “ordered” to participate in mediation 
before coming to court. 
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academic fields because a “proposition” differs from a “problem”.  A proposition 
typically asserts something that is either true or false, whereas one asks a question or 
poses a problem that is neither an assertion nor a denial and therefore cannot be 
judged to be true or false.73 An in depth investigation of a problem - whether legal, 
social, economic or clinical - in search of a solution (say for the prevention or cure of 
a disease) is therefore a legitimate academic exercise and process that can contribute 
to knowledge, which is a core requirement of a doctoral dissertation.74  Methodology 
is therefore not cast in stone. 
 
The study is comparative only to the limited extent and purpose of opening up the 
field of investigation to compatible arbitration jurisdictions, to afford the opportunity 
for useable comparisons as well as contrasts for purposes of the conclusions drawn in 
chapter 3. A choice of compatible systems (as opposed to incompatible or disparate 
systems) is preferred because the compatibles are similar, familiar and so rendering 
the investigation results readily cognisable, perhaps even attractive and more 
amenable to ready acceptance. 
 
There is also the fact that, in the African context and as elaborated in paragraph 2.4.3 
below, the Francophone OHADA system of arbitration, a major alternative system in 
operation in Africa, is not yet an established reference point for law reform in either 
the Common Law or the Southern African Development Community (SADC) regions 
of Africa; and that the OHADA Uniform Act on Arbitration (“UAA”) is clearly 
intended to apply only in countries which become members of OHADA involving the 
acceptance of other OHADA laws. Additionally, the high degree of compatibility 
between the popular UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
is a clear advantage over OHADA because of the international standing of the 
UNCITRAL Rules and their general acceptance and use in international arbitration. 
The comparative and compatible approach adopted here does not require resort to a 
method that involves the investigation of disparate laws or legal systems. Again, the 
compatibility approach is not confined to Africa and, outside the continent, it enables 
the use of the advanced and well established English arbitration system as a point of 
                                                 
73 See Copi IM and Cohen C Introduction to Logic 9th ed (1994) 2. 
74 See the published Stellenbosch University criteria for a doctoral thesis, and seminar lectures on “The 
Changing Landscape of Academic Research” 10th May 2011, Stellenbosch. 
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reference. The dissertation is restricted in time, scope, purpose and substance, and is 
not intended as an investigation of every aspect of arbitration laws either in the 
comparable jurisdictions or worldwide. 
 
Although Kenya remains throughout the primary jurisdictional source and foundation 
for this study, the legal framework of arbitration discussed in Chapter 2 contextualises 
and extends the discussion where appropriate and relevant to the selected kindred 
jurisdictions in Africa. The limitation commends itself as the continent is a huge 
terrain of diverse and disparate systems of arbitration traditions and systems. The 
selective approach is therefore deliberate with a concentration on arbitration practice 
in Kenya relative to the counterpart jurisdictions. Nigeria offers an expansive, rich 
and relevant arbitration literature and jurisprudence. Zimbabwe’s arbitration tradition 
and experience, drawn from African customs, Roman-Dutch Law and Common Law, 
attractively expands the comparative space and dimension within a convenient single 
jurisdiction.75  
 
The reasons for the restrictive selection of the three African states are manifold but 
can be summarized broadly as – common origins, similar problems, shared 
experiences and similar statutes. The reasons can be elaborated. The three states were 
among the earliest sub-Saharan African states to domesticate the UNCITRAL Model 
Law - Nigeria in 1988, Kenya in 1995 and Zimbabwe in1996 - spawning a not 
inconsiderable combined period of some twenty two years of modern arbitration 
literature, jurisprudence  and experience that make the selection and comparison of 
these states both attractive and compelling. Further, and in view of their regional 
distribution these states may be considered representative examples of African 
jurisdictions with modern arbitration statutes in their respective regional areas of the 
continent. Related to this is the fact that their geographical locations and continental 
spread are also indicative of the breadth of acceptance accorded to the Model Law in 
the mainly Common Law jurisdictions of Eastern, Western and Southern Africa. The 
three states are also inspired, and to an extent, bonded by their colonial experience 
that places them within the same Commonwealth legal tradition. This paves the way 
                                                 
75 The writer is grateful to the former Chairman of the Zimbabwe Chartered Institute of Arbitrators 
(Mr. Muchadeyi Ashton Masunda, now mayor of Harare), who introduced him to some sources of 
Zimbabwean arbitration material. See Donovan IA, McMillan AR and Masunda MA Sourcebook of 
Arbitration Materials (1996). 
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for a comparative/compatibility approach that also contrasts the divergent 
developments in respect of colonial arbitration ordinances and post-independence 
statutes from common English sources. This common legal tradition no doubt 
facilitated and influenced the incorporation in their national statutes of the Model Law 
that had been designed primarily for international commercial arbitration. This 
provides a further template for comparison between the approaches of the legislatures 
in the three countries. The Common Law heritage furthermore enables a resort to the 
English Arbitration Act of 1996 as a benchmark for a critical evaluation of the 
arbitration laws of the three jurisdictions. 
 
However the limited purpose, scope and function of the comparisons must be borne in 
mind. It is therefore clarified that neither the title of the dissertation nor its substance 
calls for the discussion of all problems in arbitration practice or all aspects of the laws 
of Nigeria, Kenya and Zimbabwe. It is certainly not intended that the comparison of 
the Kenyan version of the Model Law with its Nigerian and Zimbabwean 
counterparts, by itself, should necessitate or require a full discussion of the 
counterpart jurisdictions or result in detailed recommendations for substantial changes 
to the arbitration statutes of all three states. It is rather intended to demonstrate that 
the conclusions reached in Chapter 3 regarding the six recurrent problems are equally 
applicable to arbitration in the two jurisdictions selected because of their similar 
legislation. This is entirely in line with the methodology preferred and adopted for this 
study. It is emphasised therefore that aspects of the arbitration laws of Nigeria and 
Zimbabwe (the main African comparators) are referred to only in so far as they relate 
to or are relevant to the six research issues investigated and discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
The same limitation by purpose, scope and function applies to the references to the 
UNCITRAL Model Law and the English Law provisions or indeed other national or 
institutional provisions that are introduced as reference points, where relevant to the 
Chapter 3 issues on which the Nigerian, Kenyan and Zimbabwean arbitration 
provisions are either silent or inadequate.  
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1.6  Structure and Content 
 
 
The work consists of three chapters.  The first is mainly introductory with an 
overview of arbitration.  The Research Questions and the Methodology for their 
exploration are stated.  The Concept, Rationale and Justification for the study are 
elaborated, preceded by the Structure and Content of the dissertation.  As a 
contribution to originality and knowledge the writer offers his definition of arbitration 
and introduces a system of dispute resolution the writer terms “Constructive Dispute 
Resolution”.  The field of study being domestic arbitration, a distinction between it 
and international arbitration, is provided as relevant foundation for the further 
distinction drawn between the enforcement of domestic and international awards 
which is one of the problem areas discussed in Chapter 3.  A study in African 
arbitration cannot be complete without reference to Customary Law Arbitration.  The 
term is clarified with reference to judicial authorities and the recognition of its 
valuable contribution to dispute resolution in Africa.  The chapter concludes with a 
reflection on the crisis of arbitration as a dynamic for reform and modernization of 
arbitration law and practice in Kenya and elsewhere in Africa and with a vision of 
arbitration as a free-standing system of dispute resolution. 
 
The second chapter focuses on the legal framework of arbitration in Africa.  It 
includes a review of the progress of arbitration law and practice in Kenya and to a 
relevant extent the comparables of Nigeria and Zimbabwe, including an elaboration of 
customary arbitration and the development of current modern legislation. The three 
states, it has been noted, represent common-law jurisdictions in the Eastern, Western 
and Southern regions of the African continent. The UNCITRAL Model Law, which 
purports to set universal standards with the potential of harmonizing national 
arbitration laws regionally and internationally, receives considerable attention as the 
foundation of the modern arbitration statutes of the three African states. The 
arbitration experience of other jurisdictions, like Ghana, South Africa and England are 
drawn upon where relevant, and instructive on the research problems. The discussion 
in this chapter is therefore foundational to the consideration of the research questions 
in chapter three. 
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The third and core chapter examines six recurrent problems in arbitration practice 
primarily in the context of domestic arbitration.  These problems, as noted, relate to 
(i) the illusiveness of consent as the basis for consensual arbitration; (ii) challenges to 
the arbitral jurisdiction with regard to the existence, validity and scope of the 
arbitration agreement and the suitability, competence and impartiality of the 
arbitrator; (iii) the procedural powers of the arbitral tribunal; (iv) the disruptive effect 
of adjournments and postponements on the arbitral process; (v) constraints on the 
granting of interim relief pending an award on the merits; and (vi) the enforcement 
and execution of the arbitral award.  The benefits of combating these problems 
successfully have been stated in paragraph 1.3. The proposed remedies include a Code 
of Sanctions and the introduction of punitive damages in arbitration. 
 
The concluding section of chapter 3 contains reflections on the future of arbitration in 
Africa with particular reference to the need for modernization and harmonization of 
arbitration laws and the removal of avoidable inefficiency in arbitration. The potential 
contribution of the arbitral parties themselves, their lawyers, the arbitrators, judges 
and arbitration institutions for the enhancement of arbitration in Africa, is 
emphasized. At the national level, addressing the problems highlighted in this 
research can enhance arbitration practice with the potential of promoting peaceful 
settlement of disputes and better economic relations across the continent. 
 
1.7  Conclusion 
 
In the foregoing introductory paragraphs, an attempt is made to delineate the rubric of 
arbitration with reference to its nature, purpose and varied forms that distinguish and 
define its uniqueness from other procedures. The conceptual foundations of 
arbitration are outlined at this stage first, as essential introduction for the substantive 
discussions in the ensuing chapters. But a second and perhaps deeper reason is to 
establish a basis for exploring the connection between concept, form and the 
philosophical unifying core essence of arbitration, that is the delivery of a complete 
and final arbitral justice outside the court system.76 The expectation from this is to be 
                                                 
76 The courts nevertheless have a supportive and corrective role in arbitration.  See generally Boyd SC 
The Role of National Law and the National Courts in England in Lew JDM (ed) Contemporary 
Problems in International Arbitration (1986) 149-163. 
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better equipped to assess the cumulative potential of arbitration for dealing effectively 
with the diverse practical challenges to be discussed in this dissertation.77 
 
Arguments drawn only from the purpose78 of arbitration to combat its practical 
problems have limitations. They are neither enough nor always of much value. For 
example, it cannot be enough to say with Lane that: 
 
“[i]t is our function as participants in the process of arbitration not to lose sight of the 
goal posts, namely dispute resolution in an efficient and cost effective fashion.”79 
 
It is necessary also to explore and investigate the effectiveness of the methods of 
reaching the goal posts. Nor can one simply concur with Varady that: 
 
“[s]ince arbitration has established itself as the main vehicle of settling international 
trade disputes, it has become a framework for a wide variety of contests and 
contestants, and it is increasingly difficult to identify traits which are fitting for all 
cases (or even for the majority of them).”80 
 
The investigation cannot be abandoned here because of the difficulty of identifying 
common traits that fit all arbitrations. After all, the diversity of form can provide the 
potential for reform and the momentum for uniformity.81 
 
The drive for reform may have been prompted mainly by the UNCITRAL Model Law 
and its unifying promise for both international and domestic arbitration. But the 
defining challenge still remains regarding the extent to which the Model Law, an 
incomplete law, can be perceived to capture or reflect the ethos of arbitration or its 
common essence as a better option for dispute resolution in African cultures 
                                                 
77 See particularly ch 3 below. 
78 On the function and purpose of arbitration, see Bernstein, Tackaberry & Marriott Handbook of 
Arbitration Practice 3-4. 
79 Lane P “Cost-effective arbitration” (1997) 63 Arbitration 5 7. 
80 Varady T “The Courtesy Trap: Arbitration if no amicable settlement can be reached” (1997) 14(4) 
Journal of International Arbitration 5. 
81 Leahy E & Bianchi C “The Changing Face of International Arbitration” (2000) 17(4) Journal of 
International Arbitration 19-61; Alvarez G & Park W “The New Face of Investment Arbitration” 
(2003) 28 Yale Journal of International Law 365. 
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dominated by traditional modes of dispute settlement.82 Lord Wilberforce provides a 
visionary insight into the core philosophical-practical essence of arbitration with this 
statement: 
 
“I would like to dwell for a moment on one point to which I personally attach some 
importance.  That is the relationship between arbitration and the courts. I have never 
taken the view that arbitration is a kind of annex, appendix or poor relation to court 
proceedings. I have always wished to see arbitration, as far as possible, and subject to 
statutory guidelines no doubt, regarded as a freestanding system, free to settle its own 
procedure, and free to develop its own substantive law, yes, its substantive law. I 
have always hoped to see arbitration law moving in that direction.”83 
 
The conclusion is that the crisis of arbitration is a dynamic for the adaptation and 
modernization of the arbitral system. Its diversity of form but unity of essence are 
important potentialities that in careful balance and combination would endorse what 
arbitration already is: a procedure that allows parties to keep private the details of 
their dispute; to choose their own rules of procedure with scope for minimising 
acrimony and keeping costs down; to appoint a “judge” with expert knowledge of the 
field of dispute and skills not commonly shared with judges of state courts.  The 
arbitrator has the opportunity to establish a rapport with the parties and so obtain 
greater insights than ordinarily possible for a state court judge. The vision of 
arbitration as a freestanding system and developing its own substantive law is an 
attractive proposition.  Indeed, in the Kenyan and African context generally, it would 
be equally attractive for arbitration law to incorporate and internationalize the 
traditional systems of dispute resolution.84 
                                                 
82 The complexities (for example, in the characterization of the arbitration agreement) the tensions 
between doctrines (for example, party and tribunal autonomies) and the sometimes troublesome 
relationships between arbitral tribunal and court are explored in Chapter 2. 
83 Hansard, 18 January 1996, col 778, cited with approval by Lord Steyn in Lesotho Highlands 
Development Authority v Impregilo SpA and Others [2005] UKHL 43 para 18. Lord Wilberforce, a 
former senior English judge, is credited with playing a major role in the enactment of the English 
Arbitration Act when the Bill was considered by the House of Lords. 
84 Chukwuemerie (2006) 14 (2)  African Journal of International and Comparative Law 143-175. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE LEGAL AND CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE  
DISCUSSION OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
“[W]here two parties to a dispute voluntarily submit their matter in 
controversy to arbitration according to customary law, and agreed expressly 
or by implication that the decisions of the arbitrators would be accepted as 
final and binding, then once the arbitrators reach a decision, it is no longer 
open to either party to subsequently back out of such a decision.”1 
 
“People do not have to go to court if there are better ways to solve their 
problems”2 
 
2.1  Introduction  
 
This chapter sets out the legal framework and contextual environment within which 
consensual arbitration in Kenya operates, with particular reference to the chapter three 
research questions. Its focus is on domestic arbitration law in Kenya with comparative 
references to the selected and compatible African states that have adopted the 
UNCITRAL Model Law. The discussion covers Kenya (East Africa), Nigeria (West 
Africa) and Zimbabwe (Southern Africa) Commonwealth countries that                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
are currently using the UNCITRAL Model Law with varying degrees of 
modification.3 Their selection is explained in paragraph 1.4 of chapter one. 
 
The chapter starts with an overview of the legal framework of arbitration as a basis 
for the examination of the Chapter Three problems. This will be followed by a 
discussion of customary-law arbitration and the pertinent aspects of the arbitration 
statutes of Nigeria (1988), Kenya (1995) and Zimbabwe (1996). Customary 
arbitration, as known in Nigeria, Kenya and Zimbabwe, is governed by principles and 
                                                 
1 [1992] 6 NWLR Part 249, 561 at 586-587; compare Ikpeazu J in Phillip Njoku v Felix Ekeocha 
(1972) 2ECLR 199 cited below at p. 58fn 111. 
2 Per Lord Irvine, The Lord Chancellor, White Paper, Modernizing Justice, December 1998. 
3 “The special strength of the Commonwealth lies in the combination of the diversity of its members 
with their shared inheritance in language, culture and the rule of law”: see the Harare Commonwealth 
Declaration 1991 of 20 October 1991. The focal point for the discussion law in Kenya, based on the 
writer’s experience of arbitration practice in Kenya. 
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practices of dispute resolution that have evolved with some assistance of the courts 
and recognized over the years through common application and usage by the African 
societies in these jurisdictions. Although the main focus of this discussion is on 
consensual arbitration governed by the current statutory laws drawn from the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, it is important for the reader to appreciate that the legal 
environment in which consensual arbitration operates in Africa comprises both 
customary and statutory arbitration. Consequently a review of the legal framework for 
arbitration would be incomplete without reference to customary arbitration, involving 
conciliation and negotiation, by which most African societies settle their differences. 
The principles of customary arbitration law are well developed, particularly in West 
Africa where Nigeria is located.4  There are also significant focal points at which 
some of the fundamental principles of both statutory and customary arbitration law 
converge.  
 
At this stage it suffices to state that a major difference between statutory and 
customary arbitration law is that, unlike the former, the latter does not require an 
arbitration agreement to be in writing; and that this is a throw back to the African past 
and the rarity then of the written form of communication. It follows that today an 
arbitration agreement written in an African language would be amenable to both 
statutory and customary arbitration.5 
 
The chapter then reviews the development of arbitration legislation in Africa from the 
colonial era leading to the present broad classification of African states with modern 
arbitration legislation into the OHADA6 and UNCITRAL Model Law groups. Only a 
brief distinguishing comment on the OHADA system of arbitration is intended. Being 
a system designed for mostly Francophone African states, OHADA does not appear to 
have attracted states with a common-law background, for which the UNCITRAL 
                                                 
4 Duru L “Fundamentals of Arbitration Law and Practice In Nigeria” unpublished presentation at the 
Professional Foundation Course on ADR, Abuja, April 2006 stated: “Customary arbitration, which is 
rarely written, is the type of arbitration imperceptibly resorted to by a great majority of people in our 
local communities, clubs, mosques, churches and so on. In all parts of Nigeria, the colonialists met 
societies that had their own essential machinery for maintenance of law and order, their rights and 
duties obligations, prohibitions and sanctions.” 
5 Owonyin v Omotosho (1961) 1 All NIR 304; Rotibi v Savage (1944) 17 NLR 77; Boniface Ofomata v 
E. Anoka (1974) 4 ECSLR 21. These cases concerned the writing of customary arbitration agreements 
and are cited by Okekeifere AI “Salient Issues in the Law and Practice of Arbitration in Nigeria” 
unpublished paper, Univ. of London, Senate House, June 2003. 
6 See para 2.4.3 below for explanation of OHADA.  
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Model Law is probably more attractive.7  Indeed Kenya and the kindred jurisdictions 
in this study are selected because they all share a common tradition and foundation in 
the Model Law and, as noted, their geographical placement and regional spread is 
indicative of the breadth of acceptance accorded to the Model Law in mainly 
common-law jurisdictions in the Western, Eastern and Southern regions of the 
African continent. 
 
The chapter continues with a discussion of the aims, the guiding principles and 
relevant aspects of the UNCITRAL Model Law and the derivative arbitration statutes 
of the selected African jurisdictions indicating the extent of their respective 
modifications to the Model Law. 
 
References will also be made to examples of arbitration law and judicial decisions 
from other jurisdictions such as Ghana, South Africa and England where relevant. The 
jurisprudential tradition and experience shared by these countries are not only of 
historical and comparative relevance but are also illustrative and instructive on the 
topics discussed in this study. As background to the references to modern English 
case law, the principles underlying the English Arbitration Act of 1996 are briefly 
discussed.8 Again, where appropriate, there will be references to Rules9 and 
Institutions10 used in international commercial arbitration, which have stimulated 
cross-fertilization with domestic arbitration and have calibrated and harmonized 
arbitral practices and standards in jurisdictions across the continents of the world. 
 
The chapter concludes with the progression towards the modernization of arbitration 
law in Kenya and Africa and the move towards harmonization and unification through 
the impact of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 See further para 2.4.3 below. 
8 See para 2.6 below. 
9 Such as the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976) and the LCIA Rules (1998). 
10 Such as the ICC International Court of Arbitration and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).  In 
the case of the latter institution, one of the parties involved must be a state. See Redfern A & Hunter M 
International Commercial Arbitration 4th ed (2004) 59. 
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2.2 The Legal Framework of Arbitration 
 
The legal framework of domestic arbitration comprises the substantive and procedural 
laws of arbitration in the relevant state and the interlocking relationships between 
those laws, the arbitration agreement and the rules of arbitration practice.  For 
international arbitration it may be expected that bilateral treaties and multi-lateral 
conventions will form part of the legal framework.11 
 
A country’s arbitration legislation can be classified as “monistic” or “dualistic”. 
Under the “monism” approach the same arbitration law applies to both domestic and 
international arbitrations, as in Kenya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and England. Under the 
“dualism” approach domestic and international arbitrations are subject to separate 
regimes, as in Canada, Australia, Singapore and Mauritius.12 
 
Arbitration depends upon the existence of an agreement between the parties that 
disputes which already exist or which may arise between them in future will be 
submitted for the final and binding decision of an arbitrator instead of a national 
court.  In many instances this simple accord is all there is between the parties to start 
an arbitration; but it should take no time to realize that this is not enough and so in 
practice, it becomes necessary to augment this agreement by a further and more 
detailed agreement specifying, for example, how an arbitrator is to be appointed if the 
parties fail to do so, the place of arbitration, the language of the proceedings and other 
essentials of effective arbitration.  The parties may also agree on a set of arbitration 
rules to govern the proceedings.  Therefore as important as the initial agreement is in 
setting the process in motion, other subsequent agreements are often needed to guide 
the process through to its conclusion. Such agreements are permissible in accordance 
with the principle of party autonomy.13 
 
                                                 
11 See for example the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (1958). 
12 See Berger KP “International Economic Arbitration in Germany: A New Era” (1992) 8 Arbitration 
International 101 at 109. See SA Law Commission Report Arbitration: A New Arbitration Act for 
South Africa (July 1998) 14 n 4 and the Mauritius International Arbitration Act of 2008 regarding the 
examples in the text of monistic and dualistic systems. 
13 See also para 3.1.1 below. 
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Arbitration institutions, chambers of commerce, trade and professional associations 
and similar entities have established sets of arbitration rules for this purpose and so 
arbitral parties have at their disposal a choice of rules and procedures to adopt or 
adapt for their purposes.  When adopted by incorporation or reference such rules 
become legally part of the parties’ contract and assist in clarifying the operation of the 
chosen procedure within the legal framework of arbitration.  The law facilitates and 
enables parties to agree a procedure for arbitration but does not normally 
predetermine or impose any rules of procedure.14  Therefore the use of arbitration 
rules is voluntary rather than compulsory; but once adopted the rules assume 
contractual force and effect under the governing arbitration laws.15 National 
arbitration law such as the 1995 Kenyan Arbitration Act therefore supports arbitration 
practice in important respects.  For example, the Act enables the parties to opt for 
arbitration rather than resort to court.  But it does not create their arbitral agreement or 
process any more than it creates their dispute. The Act also requires national courts to 
recognize and enforce arbitration agreements and awards.  The same Act also delimits 
the extent of court intervention in arbitration and establishes the mandatory 
procedural requirements that must be observed in order to satisfy the concepts of 
equal treatment of parties, fairness and the public policy of Kenya.16 
 
The relationship between national laws and arbitration rules is exemplified by the 
UNICITRAL Arbitration Rules under Article 1(2) which provides: 
 
“These Rules shall govern the arbitration except that where any of these Rules is in 
conflict with a provision of the law applicable to the arbitration from which the 
parties cannot derogate, that provision shall prevail.” 
 
It is abundantly clear therefore that the arbitration rules and procedures are 
subordinate to the mandatory provisions of the governing arbitration laws of the state. 
                                                 
14 See however the Nigerian Arbitration Act of 1998 s 14 and the Rules in the First Schedule, discussed 
in para 2.5.2 below, by which procedural rules for a domestic arbitration in Nigeria are prescribed. 
15 See Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 46-47 on the choice of rules and the 
UNCITRAL Model Law Article 19(1) on the interaction between the chosen rules and the mandatory 
provisions of the applicable arbitration statute. 
16 The key principles recognised by the Act are: party autonomy, non-intervention by court, kompetenz-
kompetenz, neutrality and equality, flexibility, finality of awards, and recognition and enforcement of 
the award.  See para 2.4.4 (v) below regarding Article 18 of the Model Law and see para 2.6 below 
regarding the relevant provisions of the English Arbitration Act. 
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In general, domestic arbitration awards are implemented voluntarily; if not, the state 
law provides the machinery for enforcement.17  On the international plane, national 
laws, the arbitration agreement, procedural rules, and the relevant treaty or convention 
combine to determine the mode of enforcement. 
 
A unified framework for arbitration that includes the national laws, the arbitration 
agreement and rules of procedure is in fact recognized by UNCITRAL as reflected in 
the 1979 Commission Report18 and the legislative history of the Model Law, which 
showed that a national arbitration law does not stand alone but is a closely related part 
of the unified legal framework including contracts, arbitration rules and enforcement 
conventions.  The drafters of the Model Law therefore took care to ensure that the 
Model Law would synchronise with this interrelated legal system.19 
 
Arbitration in Kenya and Africa is deeply rooted and age-old; but despite the long 
history of domestic arbitration in Africa, African states have continued to be 
suspicious of international commercial arbitration as a product of Western conspiracy 
represented by multi-lateral corporations operating in the African continent.  
Although some progress has been made to allay these fears by the harmonization of 
arbitration systems through OHADA and the UNCITRAL Model Law, the suspicion 
still lingers as evidenced by the comparatively slow acceptance of the Model Law in 
Africa.20 This underscores the need for Africans to evolve and improve their own 
systems and mechanisms for conflict and dispute resolution in harmony with 
universally accepted national and international norms and standards. 
 
One paradoxical reason for the sluggish growth of international commercial 
arbitration law in Africa is the distrust of African national courts harboured by foreign 
                                                 
17 See the Model Law Articles 35 and 36 and the detailed discussion in para 3.6. 
18 A/34/17 para 81; see also Holtzman HM and Neuhaus JE A Guide to The UNCITRAL Model Law On 
International Commercial Arbitration 6-9. 
19 See Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to The UNCITRAL Model Law 6, who refer to the fourth 
paragraph of the UN General Assembly Resolution of 11 December 1985 approving the Model Law 
(quoted in Holtzmann & Neuhaus 1236-1237) as recognizing that the Model Law, the New York 
Convention and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules together contribute significantly to the 
establishment of a unified legal framework for the fair and efficient settlement of international 
commercial disputes. 
20 According to UNCITRAL’s website (www.uncitral.org) ten African states as at 2008 have adopted 
the Model Law, namely Egypt (1994), Kenya (1995), Madagascar (1998), Mauritius (2008), Nigeria 
(1988), Rwanda (2008), Tunisia (1993), Uganda (2000), Zambia (2000) and Zimbabwe (1996). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 35 
investors and traders who prefer arbitration and other ADR mechanisms to African 
courts.  The point is poignantly made by Asouzu that: 
 
“[w]hile some African states are parties to the multilateral treaties on arbitration and 
have enacted specific laws dealing with international commercial arbitration and 
foreign investment, these same states have misgivings about the international 
commercial arbitral process.  They feel that arbitration runs counter to their interests, 
undermining national judicial sovereignty and generating considerable expense. 
Often, cities in these states are not chosen as venues for international arbitral 
proceedings, nor are their nationals frequently appointed as international 
arbitrators.”21 
 
Oduntan, an African jurist, dispels the notion that arbitration is European with no 
contribution to its development by Africans.22 These brief observations on 
international commercial arbitration are deemed appropriate in this study as 
international commercial arbitration law is, to an extent, domesticated in arbitration 
law of Kenya and elsewhere in Africa, where for example the New York Convention 
is incorporated in the arbitration statute of Nigeria (preamble and section 54(1)), 
Kenya (section 32(2) of 1995 Act as amended) and Zimbabwe (preamble to the 1996 
Arbitration Act). 
 
2.3 Arbitration in Africa 
 
Observations about arbitration in general or relating to Africa apply to Kenya as an 
African country or where Kenya’s experience is sparsely documented or not at all or 
again where there are parallels with, or lessons to be drawn and shared with Kenya.   
 
Dispute resolution by means other than courts has existed from time immemorial.23 It 
is said to predate written history and was practiced by almost all societies.24 Evidence 
                                                 
21 Asouzu AA International Commercial Arbitration and African States (2001) 1.  See also Torgbor E., 
Arbitration & Alternative Dispute Resolution in Africa (2007) 28 – 37. 
22 Oduntan G “Africa Before the International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of Arbitration: 
The Generational Gap in International Adjudication and Arbitration.” Unpublished conference paper, 
University of London (June 2003). 
23 By a quirk of English Law, “time immemorial” dates back to 1189, being the first year of the reign of 
Richard I and the start of the Plea Rolls. See Redgment J Introduction to the Legal System of Zimbabwe 
(1981) 20. 
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of the historical origins and use of arbitration and adjudication appear in the Bible and 
the Quran.25 Roebuck asserts that the earliest substantial body of evidence of the way 
a community resolved disputes by arbitration is in the Greek language; but he is also 
quick to acknowledge earlier sources from other civilizations which point to the use 
of arbitration in ancient Mesopotamia, where Assyrian merchants regularly used 
arbitration and mediation in the nineteenth and eighteenth centuries BC and similar 
processes were applied to family disputes.26 Settlement of private or communal 
conflicts by negotiation and arbitration was not unknown in Kenyan and African 
customary life and many instances exist of resort to African customary arbitration.27  
 
Domestic arbitration law in Africa, as noted, comprises customary and statutory 
regimes.  Consequently the law and practice of arbitration in Africa has evolved two 
apparently separate but coterminous systems, with some interaction. An African 
writer acknowledges the position in traditional societies that preceded the modern 
nation states with the observation that in these early societies customary law 
arbitration and ADR were in much more frequent use than customary litigation; and 
that arbitration and ADR were generally conciliatory and aimed at preserving existing 
relationships rather than the mere declaration of rights and liabilities that did not 
necessarily achieve enduring justice.  Scholars on African culture and traditions will 
have no difficulty in agreeing that arbitration, conciliation and negotiation are more in 
consonance with African cultural life, disposition and beliefs than adversarial 
litigation.28  Again, there can be no disagreement that the old customary pre-colonial 
                                                                                                                                            
24 Tiewal SA & Tsegah FA “Arbitration and Settlement of Commercial Disputes” (1975) 24 
International Commercial Law Quarterly 393 cited by Powell Smith V in “Settlement of Disputes by 
Arbitration under Sharia and at Common Law” (1995) 34 Islamic Studies Quarterly Journal 5. See also 
Bukar BA & Adamu MA “Legal Framework for the Resolution of International Commercial Disputes” 
(1999) 16(1) Journal of International Arbitration 47-53. 
25 For example: Isaiah ch 2:4; the Quranic basis of arbitration is found in 4:35 and 49: 9-10. 
26 Roebuck D Ancient Greek Arbitration (2001). 
27 For Kenya see the text to footnotes 69, 70 and 71 below.  Other African examples are cited below at 
footnote 69 from the West African Court of Appeal Reports (WACA). See also Azouzu AA 
International Commercial Arbitration and African States (2001) 15-16. See further generally 
Gluckman M Ideas and Procedures in African Customary Law (1969); Chanock M Law Custom and 
Social Order Cambridge University Press 1998; Comaroff J & Roberts S Rules and Processes: The 
Cultural Logic of Dispute in an African Context (1981); Roberts R and Mann K (eds) Law in Colonial 
Africa (1991); Snyder F “Colonialism and Legal Forms: the Creation of Customary Law in Senegal” 
(1981) 19 Journal of Legal Pluralism 49-90. 
28 Okekeifere AI “Salient Issues In the Law and Practice of Arbitration in Nigeria” Paper delivered at 
Arbitration Colloquium, London University (June 4 – 5, 2003); Van Velsen J “Procedural Informality, 
Reconciliation, and False Comparisons” in Gluckman M (ed) Ideas and Procedures in African 
Customary Laws (1969) 137-149; Harvey WB Introduction to the Legal System in East Africa 
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societies had constant recourse to arbitration, mediation, conciliation and 
negotiation29 (today’s ADR techniques) for resolving domestic, commercial, political, 
land and boundary disputes; and that the communal, extended family, age grade and 
village lifestyle ensured less litigation than is the position today.30 
 
2.3.1 Customary-Law Arbitration 
 
2.3.1.1 Customary-Law Arbitration 
 
Customary-law arbitration, is a distinct form of arbitration in traditional African 
societies, particularly in West Africa.  Concerning the significance and centrality of 
“tradition” a distinguished scholar has written: 
 
“The stress on the constraining power of the ‘traditional’ can be found in colonial 
conceptions of the ‘customary law’ of subject peoples, and is deeply embedded in 
Durkheim’s (1961) vision of … ‘the elementary forms of social unanimity’.   It is 
also found in Weber’s (1978: 226 – 40) conception of ‘traditional authority’.  This 
view is reiterated in some of Habermas’s (1979: 78 – 84, 157) evolutionary writings 
about law and society.  A powerful version of the cultural argument is found in 
Geertz’s (1983: 232 – 3) commentary on law.  Tradition also looms large in 
Rouland’s (1988) textbook overview.”31  
 
                                                                                                                                            
K29MIH37: comment on arbitration 348-352, reconciliation 385-390, native law and custom 425-428; 
Wilson R “Reconciliation and Revenge in Post-Apartheid South Africa” (2000) 41(1)Current 
Anthropology 75-98; Avruch K Culture and Conflict Resolution (1998). 
29 On culture and negotiation see Avruch K Culture and Conflict Resolution (1998) 39-41; Chanock M 
Law Custom and Social Order; Moore SF “History and the Redefinition of custom on Kilimanjaro” in 
Starr J & Collier J (eds) History and Power in the Study of Law (1989) 277-301; Nader L “From Legal 
Processing to Mind Processing” (1992) 30 Family and Conciliation Courts Review 468-473; Chase OG 
Law, Culture and Ritual: Disputing Systems in Cross-Cultural Context (2007). 
30 Kellor FA in American Arbitration: Its History, Functions and Achievements (1948) states that “the 
arbitral process has roots deep in history.  Resolving disputes by agreeing to be bound by the decision 
of a third party trusted by the disputants existed long before law was established or courts were 
organized or judges had formulated principles of law.” 
31 Moore, SF Law and Anthropology: A Reader (2005) 347.  The sources referred to are Durkheim E 
The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life Collier, New York (1961); Weber M Economy and Society 
University of California Press, Berkeley (1978); Habermas J Communication and the Evolution of 
Society Beacon Press, Boston (1979); Geertz C Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive 
Anthropology Basic Books, New York (1983); and Rouland N Anthropologie Juridique Presses 
Universitaires de France, Paris (1988) translated as Legal Anthropology, Stanford University Press 
(1994). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 38 
It cannot be far fetched to assert that all human societies, by culture and experience, 
have evolved their ways, means and methods of resolving societal conflicts and 
disputes and their terminologies for describing such phenomena.32  African societies 
could not have originally called or described such methods and procedures by 
European or foreign names. That is a reason why non-Africans experience difficulties 
in comprehending the complexities of the variable African concepts and techniques 
for dispute resolution.33 Conversely, it must be for the same reason that Africans also 
struggle with non-African concepts imposed by colonialists.34 It is therefore a tragedy 
for the evolution of African culture, concepts and experience, that unless their 
practices and procedures are recognised by colonialist language or nomenclature, they 
are either condemned or ignored.35 At best the development and evolution of such 
procedures are stunted or, sadly, even unacknowledged by some Africans themselves. 
Consequently, the African contribution to human knowledge, advancement and 
experience, in the global context, is either unrecognized, minimized, marginalized or 
devalued.36  
 
It seems however that while including the African traditional proceedings among the 
forms of arbitration it is, paradoxically, the informality of such proceedings that 
distinguish them from both domestic and international arbitration. 
 
“African traditional legal and social systems are replete with informal mechanisms 
for settling disputes which have been characterized as arbitration.  African customary 
arbitration in Ghana, for example, has the following basic ingredients: (a) a voluntary 
submission of the dispute by the parties to a third party for the purpose of having the 
                                                 
32 In the Ga language (of Ghana) the word for a dispute or quarrel is “bei” and the word for its solution 
or repair “saamo”. Other examples are available in the Akan language of Ghana, the Kamba, Kikuyu or 
Luo languages of Kenya and indeed in the diverse languages of Nigeria, Zimbabwe and elsewhere on 
the African continent. 
33 Chukwuemerie A “The Internationalization of African Customary Law Arbitration” (2006) 14 
African Journal of International and Comparative Law 143-175. He asserts that: “Arbitration and ADR 
were certainly not called these English names and in several places may not even have had names 
distinguishing one from the other. Their characteristics (such as between arbitration and conciliation) 
were also no doubt overlapping. That is why those trained in the British and other European or 
American systems have often had difficulties distinguishing between them”. 
34 For example the distinction between civil and criminal offences was unknown in Kenya and other 
early African societies. 
35 Armah AK “Remembering the Dismembered Continent” February 2010 (No. 492) and March 2010 
(No. 493) New African pt 2. 
36 Armah “Remembering the Dismembered Continent”. 
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dispute decided informally, but on the merits; (b) prior agreement by both parties to 
accept the award of the arbitrators; (c) publication of the award.37 
 
Asante asserts that: 
 
“[t]he accent here is on the informality of the traditional proceeding.  This ingrained 
idea of the essentially informal character of traditional African arbitration collides 
sharply with the modern concept of international arbitration.  It comes as a surprise to 
many African lawyers and executives to realize that a party to international 
commercial arbitration has to navigate through a bewildering and complex maze of 
arbitration institutions, rules and procedures with rigid formalities and set deadlines, 
which can only be breached to the great detriment of the unwary party.  Modern 
international commercial arbitration has all the characteristics of formal adjudication, 
a far cry from the informality associated with traditional customary arbitration.  The 
highly technical nature of this process again reinforces the idea of an alien system.”38 
 
What must be clarified here is that it is not the arbitral process that is alien to Africa.  
It is the nature and degree of its informality that set African customary arbitration 
apart from others, because in general the informality of arbitration is a universal 
characteristic that distinguishes any arbitration from, for example, litigation. The 
additional observation is that the informality of customary-law arbitration does enable 
the arbitrator to assume decision-making roles which, as noted above,39 contribute to 
constructive resolution of disputes in complex and sometimes awkward cases 
encountered in customary African societies for which the more rigid and formalized 
arbitration procedures are not necessarily suited. 
 
2.3.1.2 Integration of Customary-Law and Statutory Arbitration 
 
It has been noted that customary law arbitration is an integral part of the arbitral 
regime in Africa.  There are focal points of convergence between it and statutory 
arbitration. Some fundamental principles and basic elements that reflect this 
convergence and indeed the integration and interaction of customary and statutory 
                                                 
37 Asante SKB “The Perspectives of African Countries on International Commercial Arbitration” 
(1993) 6 Leiden Journal of International Law 331. 
38 Asante (1993) 6 Leiden Journal of International Law 331. 
39 See para 1.9.1 above. 
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arbitration are firstly, that both systems of arbitration though distinct, are consensual; 
secondly, any one can be an arbitrator in both systems, a principle that opens 
customary arbitrations to non-Africans;40 and thirdly, parties to a commercial 
arbitration dispute may opt for either system of arbitration. Therefore and 
significantly, the Model Law which recognizes the integration and interaction 
between it and other national laws governing arbitration41 cannot and should not be 
given an interpretation that would exclude or negate the application and use of 
customary arbitration in African arbitral jurisdictions. 
 
The terms “African”, “custom” and “law” may be used in differing senses depending 
on the user’s intent and approach. One has to bear in mind that the term “African” 
embraces a diversity of the inhabitants of the African Continent who do not live 
within the same territorial or jurisdictional boundaries or necessarily share the same 
social ties, habits and practices.42  Custom usually describes the distinctive practices 
and conventions of a people, community or locality. Law, as an embodiment of rules 
of a community, therefore shares that sense of established usage also inherent in 
custom.43 The juxtaposition and integration of custom and law into customary law 
therefore emphasise the fact that both custom and law embody recognizable and well-
established rules of action and conduct with enforceable sanctions.44   
 
A judicial description of customary law was given in Oyewunmi v Ogunesan as 
follows: 
 
“Customary law is the organic or living law of the indigenous people of Nigeria, 
regulating their lives and transactions. It is organic in that it is not static. It is 
regulating in that it controls the lives and transactions of the community subject to it. 
                                                 
40 Obodo v Oline SCNLR 298; M. Ifeanyi Ojibah v Ubaka Ojibah (1996) NWLR 86. 
41 Article 1(5). 
42 One observation is that most African states are “multi-tribal confections, many with fissiparous 
tendencies” The Economist, 10 April 2010, Leaders, 13. 
43 Chambers Concise 20th Century Dictionary;  Nader L The Life of the Law (2002) 18. 
44 This is distilled from the writer’s judicial experience in Kenya and in the use and interpretation of 
customary law in African societies; see also Ajayi FA “The Interaction of English Law with Customary 
Law in Western Nigeria” (1960) 4 Journal of African Law 98 108; and regarding the integration of law 
in culture 326-353; Nader The Life of the Law 18-71 and 72-116. 
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It is said that custom is a mirror of the culture of the people. I would say that 
customary law goes further and imports justice to the lives of all those subject to it.”45 
 
For the Bantu46 peoples of Africa, 
 
“Bantu Law is that evolved by custom, and its expounders are the old men who have 
learnt it by precedent and the experience of age.”47 
 
Various descriptions of customary law appear in African legislation and inter-
disciplinary literature 48 on legal pluralism,49 anthropology, culture and, in context, 
dispute resolution.  An example of a statutory definition is: 
 
“‘Customary Law’ means any rule or body of rules whereby rights and duties are 
acquired or imposed, established by usage in any Tanganyika African community and 
accepted by such community in general as having the force of law … .”50 
 
The well-established status of customary law in the developing legal systems of 
African states therefore is not in doubt. In many colonial African territories the 
governing powers recognized that, side by side with the general law introduced by 
                                                 
45 Per Obaseki JSC (1990) 3 NWLR (pt 137) 182 at 207. 
46 The name given to a large group of African languages and the people speaking them in Southern and 
Central Africa. 
47 Dundas, cited by Harries CL The Laws and Customs of the Bapedi and Cognate Tribes of the 
Transvaal (1929).  See also Schapara  S “A Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom” in Moore SF (ed) 
Law and Anthropology (2005); Gluckman M “The Judicial Process Among the Barotse of Northern 
Rhodesia” reprinted in Moore SF (ed) Law and Anthropology (2005) 84-86, and Bohannan P “Justice 
and Judgment Among the Tiv” in Moore SF (ed) Law and Anthropology (2005) 87-94. 
48 Examples of legislation: Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance s 2(1) (Tanganyika, as 
amended by the Magistrates Courts Act 1963, 6th schedule, Tanzania); Interpretation Act 1960 s 18(1) 
and (2) (Ghana); Magistrates Courts Act 1964 (Uganda); and Magistrates’ Courts’ Act s 2 (ch 10 of the 
Laws of Kenya).  Moore (ed) Law and Anthropology 347 states regarding law and culture: “Culture is 
simply a label denoting durable customs, ideas, values, habits and practices.  Those who treat law as 
culture mean that law is a particular part of that package, and that the combined totality has internal 
systemic connections.” For further literature see Caplan P (ed) Understanding Disputes Oxford 1995; 
Avruch AK Culture and Conflict Resolution;  Chase OG Law, Culture and Ritual: Disputing Systems 
in Cross-Cultural Context (2007); Rosen L Law as Culture (2006); Brace DH Exploring Law and 
Culture (2006).  
49 Legal pluralism, in a narrow sense is the co-existence of various officially recognized State Laws.  In 
a wider sense it includes religious and unofficial indigenous laws.  See Griffiths J “What is Legal 
Pluralism?” (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 1-55.  See also Van Niekerk GJ 
“Legal Pluralism” in Bekker JC, Labuschagne JMT & Vorster LP Introduction to Legal Pluralism in 
South Africa (2002) 3-18.  
50 Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance s 2(1) (Tanganyika). 
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these powers, there also existed local rules regarded as enforceable where such local 
norms were infringed. One writer observed that 
 
“[a]lthough we have no native paramount chief in the Transvaal now in the strict 
sense in which there is one in Basutoland and other native territories, yet there are 
chiefs of considerable importance with large followings and many petty or sub-chiefs 
and indunas under their jurisdiction. According to native law, they are subject to no 
authority higher than their own, and as far as their respective tribes are concerned 
they claim to be paramount chiefs. For example, the chief Sekukuni claims to be the 
paramount chief of Bapedi.”51 
 
The local or customary courts were commonly established to administer such law and 
integration occurred because these courts were generally authorized to apply part of 
statute law of the country in addition to customary law.52 In the result, whilst 
customary law as a body of unwritten rules recognized by communities continued to 
exist, there also emerged law in the form of adjudications and decisions of recognized 
courts. Customary law therefore developed along two routes: through the decisions of 
the courts and through the interpretation of a folk system of social control. Whilst 
lawyers would readily recognize the former route, others such as anthropologists may 
be expected to prefer the latter route. For present purposes, it is this writer’s view that 
customary law in the former sense would involve rules regarded as legal rules which 
the courts will uphold and that customary arbitration is founded on such recognized 
rules and principles. 
 
Customary law remains part of the “common law” of African jurisdictions. This 
statement is anything but simple. It is laden with dichotomies and not a little 
complexity.53 As with the differing senses in which the terms “custom” and “law” are 
                                                 
51 Harries CL The Laws and Customs of the Bapedi and Cognate Tribes of the Transvaal. 
52 See White CMN “African Customary Law: The problem of Concept and Definition” (1965) 9 
Journal of African Law 86-89; Koyana DS & Bekker JC “The Courts: Application of Indigenous Law 
and the Repugnancy Clause” in Bekker et al Introduction to Legal Pluralism 152. 
53 Bekker et al Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa: “There is in South Africa a vast field of 
official customary law, that is, legislation and case law.  It is part of the law of the land, but it has not 
been integrated into what is called the common law.  The South African Law Commission is engaged 
in various projects to harmonise customary law and common law.”  They also explain that there is no 
consistency in the use of terminology, for example, a tribe is a community, but all communities are not 
tribes.  There may even be different communities within a tribe.  A chief is a traditional leader, but all 
traditional leaders are not chiefs. 
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used, there are at least two major senses in which the term “common law” is applied. 
In the first sense, common law is the law common to a whole country consisting of 
rules and principles that form the basic law of that country in areas not covered by 
legislation. In this sense it is contrasted with statutes and customs observed in 
particular localities and communities. In a second sense, the contrast is with civil law. 
Continental European countries (such as France and Germany) with codified laws 
based on Roman law typify civil law. England, the United States and Commonwealth 
African countries with legal systems developed from court decisions consider 
themselves members of the “common-law family”.54 
 
The evolution of the common law of Zimbabwe, formerly Southern Rhodesia, is an 
interesting example of the integration of differing laws in a legal system. Section 13 
of The High Court Act of Southern Rhodesia provided that: 
 
“[s]ubject to the provisions with regard to Native law and custom contained in the 
Native Law and Courts Act. Cap 73, the law to be administered by the High Court 
and by the Magistrates’ Courts shall be the same as the law in force in the Colony of 
the Cape of Good Hope on the tenth day of June, 1891, as modified by subsequent 
legislation having in this Colony the force of law.”55 
 
With that, the Roman-Dutch law of the Cape Colony became the common law of the 
Colony of Southern Rhodesia,56 a fact of history that introduces the legal history of 
the Cape into the evolution of Zimbabwean law. It is acknowledged that the influence 
of the Cape was strong in the first half of the twentieth century and that, even after the 
establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910, the Cape Supreme Court dealt 
with appeals from Southern Rhodesia.57 For these reasons the common law inherited 
                                                 
54 Redgment Introduction to the Legal System of Zimbabwe. 
55 High Court Act of Southern Rhodesia s 13. 
56 Redgment Introduction to the Legal System of Zimbabwe; Christie RH Rhodesian Commercial Law 
(1961). 
57 Christie Rhodesian Commercial Law and Redgment Introduction to the Legal System of Zimbabwe 
trace the development of the Rhodesian common law: from the Twelve Tables – a short record of the 
existing customary law of Early Rome – to the Classical Age of Roman Law and the importation of the 
Corpus Juris Justinianus to the Netherlands; and then from the writers of Holland including, notably, 
Grotius (Hugo de Groot) the renowned international-law jurist, Johannes Voet whose Commentary 
remains a classic work and Simon van Leeuwen said to be the first to use the term “Roman-Dutch” in 
1652, to the Cape Articles of Capitulation in 1806 that secured to the inhabitants the Laws as then 
existed, to the sweeping changes introduced by the Charters of Justice of 1827 and 1832; and finally 
from the Cape to Southern Rhodesia and Zimbabwe. 
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by Zimbabwe is said to be, in its basic principles, much the same as that in South 
Africa.58 It has therefore been customary to regard Southern Rhodesian or 
Zimbabwean common law as Roman-Dutch, in the first sense in which the term 
common law has been explained. The influence of the inherited laws and the need to 
adapt customary law to modern needs would justify the classification of that law as 
“mixed”.59 
 
Nevertheless, despite the influence of Justinian’s Code, the writings of the Dutch 
jurists of the classic period of Roman-Dutch law, the system of law carried by the 
seafarers of the Netherlands to Guiana, Ceylon, the East Indies and to the Cape 
Colony, and from there to Rhodesia, Zimbabwe today categorically belongs to the 
common-law fraternity rather than to the civil-law tradition, especially as regards its 
law of civil procedure and much of its commercial law. Two plausible reasons are 
that, although the Roman law is basic to Zimbabwean law, Zimbabwean law was 
never codified. In addition, the Cape was a British colony for just over a century. 
Without a Code, and with English influence, Zimbabwean law has developed in the 
courts in the tradition of the common law-system.60 The vectors of Roman law 
influence in the Netherlands can nevertheless be said to be the ancestral agents of the 
importation of Roman-Dutch law to Zimbabwe. 
 
Granted that in modernized African jurisdictions such as Kenya, Nigeria and 
Zimbabwe the customary law may have been assimilated into common law and even 
been legislated into statutes: the fact still remains that the common law was neither 
abrogated nor repealed. In Nigeria and Zimbabwe for example, the introduction of 
arbitration legislation based on the English Arbitration Act of 1889 did not repeal the 
common law of arbitration,61 and in South Africa the colonial arbitration legislation 
did not repeal the Roman-Dutch common law so that even today, an oral reference to 
arbitration pursuant to an oral arbitration agreement is regulated only by the Roman-
Dutch common law as adapted in South Africa.62 Moreover, as part of the interaction 
between the common law and statutory arbitration law, the court’s statutory powers 
                                                 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid 
61 Orojo JO & Aromo MA Law and Practice of Arbitration and Conciliation in Nigeria (1999) 12; 
Donovan IA “Zimbabwe” in Cotran E & Amissah A (eds) Arbitration in Africa (1996) 179. 
62 Cotran & Amissah (eds) Arbitration in Africa 195 and 201-202. 
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under the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 are supplemented by the court’s powers relating 
to arbitration under the South African common law. 
 
With particular reference to Nigeria it is acknowledged that expatriates and 
companies now enter into commercial relationships concerning pieces of land held 
under customary land tenure which are routinely acquired for commercial ventures. It 
is a point of interest that the Nigerian arbitration statute of 198863 is restricted to 
“commercial arbitration”. Commenting on the definitions of “commercial”, “party”, 
“arbitration” and “arbitral tribunal” under section 57 of the Nigerian Act, Okekeifere 
correctly asserts that these definitions do not in any way exclude customary law 
principles, that therefore a party to a commercial arbitration before a tribunal under 
customary law has the same status as any other party in an arbitration under the Act.64 
His point of emphasis is that parties to a customary arbitration agreement65 can, if 
they so elect, avail themselves of the practices and procedures under the Act and their 
award can be enforced in a customary court and, should the need arise, with a right of 
appeal to the High Court for the recognition and enforcement of the award. 
 
It is submitted that this is an acceptable view of the integration between customary 
and statutory arbitration as is Okekeifere’s further and firm opinion that the Model 
Law as enacted in Nigeria recognizes customary law arbitration and is capable of 
enhancing and promoting customary-law arbitration. This ought also to be true and 
applicable to Kenya.  Even on the crucial requirement of “writing” for the validity of 
the arbitration agreement it seems that UNCITRAL was not averse to the recognition 
of arbitral proceedings based on an oral agreement that initiated the proceedings and 
was not objected to by any party or where an original defect in form was cured by 
waiver or submission.66 It is submitted that a liberal interpretation of “writing” that 
extends beyond the formal written agreement to terms like “the reference”, 
“submission” and “statements of claim and defence”67 would be favourable to the use 
                                                 
63 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, Cap 19 s 57(1). 
64 Okekeifere “Salient Issues in the Law and Practice of Arbitration In Nigeria”; see also Okekeifere AI 
“The Recent Odyssey of Customary Law Arbitration and Conciliation in Nigeria’s Apex Courts (1998) 
1 Abia State University LJ 41; 
65 Whether this agreement takes the form of a clause in a contract or a separate agreement. 
66 Seventh Secretariat Note Analytical Commentary on Draft Text A/CN 9/264, Article 35 n 91. 
67 See Article 7(2) of the original version of the Model Law (1985) which also regards an arbitration 
agreement as being in writing if it is contained “in an exchange of statements of claim and defence in 
which the existence of an [arbitration] agreement is alleged by one party and not denied by another.” 
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of customary law arbitration. In 2006, UNCITRAL issued a revision of Article 7 of 
the original Model Law. One of the two options for a definition of “arbitration 
agreement” approved by UNCITRAL reads: 
 
“‘Arbitration agreement’ is an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or 
certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a 
defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not.”68 
 
It will be noted that there is no reference in this definition to the requirement of 
writing.69 This new optional definition therefore follows the approach of the New 
Zealand Arbitration Act, by recognizing an oral arbitration agreement.70 The point of 
significance is that an oral arbitration agreement of the type common in customary 
arbitration could now fall within the ambit of UNCITRAL’s revised definition of 
arbitration agreement. However, the revised optional definition will only apply if 
adopted by legislation in Kenya and other African states.71 
 
For present purposes it may be mentioned that neither the Kenyan Arbitration Act of 
1995 nor the Zimbabwe Arbitration Act of 1996, which are identically worded on this 
point, and define arbitration as “any arbitration whether or not administered by a 
permanent arbitral institution”72 excludes customary arbitration from its purview. 
Moreover, neither of these statutes is restricted to commercial arbitration.73 The 
existence of a plurality of arbitration laws and the development of multiple arbitral 
jurisprudence within a unitary domestic arbitral jurisdiction like Kenya is therefore a 
tenable proposition. It is suggested that customary arbitration, traditionally concerned 
with land and boundary disputes, trespass, succession and inheritance issues, is today 
also a viable dispute resolution procedure for commercial disputes and available 
                                                 
68 This is the second option.  The first option retains the requirement of an arbitration agreement in 
writing, but the concept of a written agreement has been widened.  The basic requirement of either 
signature or an exchange of documents by the parties, derived from the New York Convention, has 
been omitted. 
69 See the Report of the UNCITRAL Working Group, 39th session 19 June – 7 July 2006 (UN doc 
A/61/17). See further para 2.4.4.5(ii) below. 
70 See the New Zealand Arbitration Act of 1996, Schedule 1, Article 7(1), which reads in part: “An 
arbitration agreement may be made orally or in writing.” 
71 See para 2.4.4.5(ii) below. 
72 See the Kenyan Act s 3(1) and the Zimbabwean Act 1st Schedule Article 2. 
73 See para 2.4.4.5(ii) below. 
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together with statutory arbitration to parties in dispute.74  The alternative conclusion 
would be that the Acts do not apply to customary arbitration. It is submitted however 
that there is no express indication of such an intention and no necessity to adopt such 
an interpretation. 
 
2.3.1.3 Customary-Law Arbitration in Operation 
 
Customary arbitration systems existed in East Africa before the advent of colonialism. 
Anthropological and juridical studies show that the area now called Kenya was 
inhabited by acephalous communities known as the Kikuyu, the Masai, the Luo, the 
Kalenjin and others75 and that these communities resolved their conflicts either  at the 
family level or at clan conclaves. The procedure was informal with no formalized 
concepts or distinction between crimes and civil wrongs because all social conflicts 
were treated in the same way. The aim in such social and political systems was the 
need for harmony and mutual accommodation. A crucial factor in the traditional 
conflict settlement was the making of amends and this required the wrongdoer to 
make good the loss caused to the complainant.  The emphasis was on the settlement of 
claims and reparation of damages rather than the punishment of the offender and 
compensation was payable to the complainant in cases such as assaults, homicide, 
theft, adultery and so on.  
 
There were four broad categories of disputes: (i) those arising from counterclaims to 
assets, (ii) those arising from personal injuries, (iii) those based on breaches of 
general communal norms, and (iv) those caused by intra-family differences.  In all 
these cases the informal tribunals deliberated and passed verdicts which were binding 
on the parties. The detailed rules for solving such disputes sometimes differed from 
one ethnic community to another. Relying on his interviews with tribesmen, Ojwang 
records that among the Luo and Kikuyu a cattle thief, if found guilty, was ordered by 
the tribunal to return the animal plus an additional one as punishment; but the two 
                                                 
74 Duru “Fundamentals of Arbitration Law and Practice in Nigeria”; Usman I “Domestic Arbitration 
Practice and Procedure” unpublished presentation at an ADR Seminar, Balalaika Hotel, Sandton 
Johannesburg, August 2007.  
75 Fortes M & Evans-Pritchard EE African Political Systems” (1970); Ojwang JB “Rural Dispute 
Settlement in Kenya” (1975/1977) Zambia Law Journal 7-9; Wagner G The Changing Family among 
the Bantu Kavirondo (1939). 
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communities applied different rules in, for instance, land disputes and homicide 
cases.76  
 
The legal basis of Kenya’s formal conflict resolution system was prescribed by 
various laws such as the East Africa Native Courts Amendment Ordinance of 1902, 
the Village Headman Ordinance of 1902, and the Penal Code and Evidence Act of 
1932. It will suffice to state that the legal history of colonial Kenya was characterized 
by an increase in social conflict as colonialism introduced a new phase of institutional 
life and recourse to state tribunals; but this did not signal the end of customary and 
traditional procedures for settlement of disputes, as practically all matrimonial 
disputes and land cases were still settled by the informal customary processes. As 
noted by Ojwang: 
 
“Informal procedures were sufficient to cope with virtually all social conflicts. With 
the advent of colonialism a new society was introduced which changed the character 
of dispute settlement by increasing the frequency of human interactions and the areas 
of potential conflict.”77 
 
In West Africa, particularly in the tribal societies of Nigeria and Ghana for example, 
chiefs, elders and trusted individuals were constituted as dispute settlers in which 
capacity they played the role of arbitrators or courts. As arbitrators, mediators or 
conciliators, the same individuals received a party’s complaint, summoned the other 
party, heard their evidence and gave an opinion which the parties were entitled 
mutually to accept or reject.  If either party rejected the opinion of the arbitrator, that 
would be the end of the process. When they sat as a court they conducted customary 
litigation, as distinct from the customary arbitration.  They had coercive powers and 
persons summoned before them were bound to appear.  They could impose fines in 
both criminal and civil matters under the existing customary law rules and practices.78 
 
                                                 
76 Ojwang “Rural Dispute Settlement in Kenya”. 
77 Ojwang “Rural Dispute Settlement in Kenya”. 
78 Chief Kweku Assampong v Kweku Amuaku & Others (1932) WACA 192; Kobina Foli v Akese 
(1930) 1 WACA 1; Essie Gyesiwa v Kobina Mensah (1947) WACA 45; Opanin A Kwasi v Joseph 
Larbi 13 WACA 7; also (1952) WACA 76. Okefeifere “Salient Issues in the Law and Practice of 
Arbitration In Nigeria” 5 puts forward the interesting view that the UNCITRAL Model Law as enacted 
in Nigeria covers customary-law arbitrations and is capable of enhancing and promoting customary-
law arbitration resulting in the Model Law being a greater asset than many have acknowledged. 
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Asouzu emphasizes this fact with regard to the existence and status of customary 
arbitration by stating that before the conquest or annexation and consequent 
colonization of most African societies by alien powers, those societies had their 
informal dispute resolution methods which they have retained. Each community had 
unique rules and norms for the resolution of controversies over property and other 
rights. In centralized communities, the chief or a central political authority maintained 
a traditional court over which he presided, or delegated judicial powers to a 
specialized officer. However acephalous societies79 had a community-based means of 
dispute settlement anchored to the council of elders, heads of families and traditional 
social groups and institutions. In either society the customary dispute resolution 
processes were governed by customary law rules.  Asouzu affirms that the basic aims 
of customary-law dispute resolution are reconciliation, peaceful co-existence and 
assuagement of feelings in order to avoid the dislocation of social cohesion and to 
promote communal solidarity.80   
 
In Southern Africa, the distinction in the arbitral and judicial roles and functions of 
Chiefs, Headmen and Kraal Elders was recognised by the early writers on African 
customary practices.81 Harries observed: 
 
“The powers and functions (of chiefs et cetera) were sanctioned or curtailed by 
legislation or by the Supreme Courts. For example, legislation in 1885 changed the 
chief’s position and limited his jurisdiction to the hearing and determination of civil 
disputes between natives of their tribes or locations. Only chiefs appointed in terms of 
this law were entitled to such jurisdiction.”82 
 
With particular reference to Southern Rhodesia, as modern Zimbabwe was known, 
Goldin and Gelfand state that: 
 
“Africans usually endeavour to settle their disputes by themselves peacefully or, 
failing to do so, they resort to arbitration by a tribal ruler or respected elder of the 
                                                 
79 I.e. societies without a head or chief. 
80 Asouzu International Commercial Arbitration 115-117. 
81 The distinction with regard to West Africa was noted in para 2.3.1 above. 
82 Harries CL Laws and Customs of the Bapedi Chapter VI. 
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tribe. If a dispute arises between members of the same family, they expect the head of 
the family to restore harmony by resolving differences.”83 
 
Conciliation, as an integral part of the process towards reconciliation of the disputing 
parties, was commonly used.84 Disputes, minor or serious, but likely to disturb the 
communal peace were settled by the Chiefs or Headmen informally and privately and 
in a manner akin to arbitration. Goldin and Gelfand assert that the existence of this 
“arbitrative system” explains the survival of the “dare” among the Shona or the 
“enkundeleni” of the Ndebele before the tribal courts were established by law in 
about 1937 and is a system that has subsisted concurrently with but as an alternative 
to the tribal court system established by legislation. The point therefore is that while 
Chiefs and Headmen exercised judicial functions under legislation85 they also settled 
disputes as arbitrators. The consensual basis of customary arbitration and ADR was 
given statutory recognition by a proviso to section 28 of the African Law and Tribal 
Courts Act 1969 to the effect that “nothing in this section shall be deemed to prohibit 
any arbitration or like settlement in any matter with the consent of the parties 
thereto.”86 
 
Holleman uses two extensive case reports as comparative material on dispute 
settlement in tribal societies of Southern Rhodesia.87 From his personal experience of 
rural societies such as the Mashona, Holleman deduced that the life of the African 
individual was wrapped up in the life of the community such that a legal dispute of 
any consequence was not confined to the individual parties. Therefore, the indigenous 
administration of justice, in contrast to the European system of justice, aimed at 
                                                 
83 Goldin B & Gelfand M African Law and Custom in Rhodesia (1975). 
84 Allott AN African Law cited by Goldin & Gelfand African Law and Custom in Rhodesia 119; Nader 
L “From Legal Processing to Mind Processing” (1992) 30 Family and Conciliation Courts Review 468-
473. 
85 Such as statutory recognition through their appointment by the Minister of Internal Affairs under the 
African Law and Tribal Courts Act 24 of 1969 ss 6 and 28. 
86 S v Madhliwa Khumalo, unreported High Court judgment dated 16 November 1972. 
87 Holleman JF Issues In African Law (1974). The cases are “The Case of the Troublesome Father” 
Case Report, 1946 and “The Case of the Irate Headman” Case Report, 1951. On the question whether 
the native system or the British system was better Holleman says: “If you ask an Engineer, ‘which is 
better, Tungsten Steel or Chromium Steel’, he will likely tell you it is really a silly question because it 
all depends on the particular purposes for which you want to use the steel.” 
Other early works on customary law and on the administration of justice in tribal societies include 
Holleman JF Shona Customary Law (1952) and Holleman JF Chief, Council and Commissioner 
(1969); Goldin & Gelfand African Law and Custom in Rhodesia; Child HF The History and Extent of 
Recognition of Tribal Law in Rhodesia (1976); Khumalo JAM Civil Practice & Procedure of All 
Courts for Blacks in Southern Africa 3rd  ed (1984). 
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solving the conflict between the parties rather than deciding its legal aspects in terms 
of law, so that justice, instead of the rational and impartial application of abstract rules 
of law, was a process of persuasion with the accent on reasonable behaviour of all 
concerned in a spirit of give and take. The African tribal court or tribunal convened at 
any suitable place, usually outdoors, under a shady tree in summer time, or on a warm 
flat rock in winter time. It was a public affair with always a fair number of people 
from nearby villages in attendance.  The presiding officer was the chief or headman, 
assisted by two or more assessors and an intermediary between the parties inter se 
who was also the intermediary between the parties and the tribunal. The process of 
presentation of each party’s case and cross-examination with the participation of the 
attendant public led to a final decision which the parties accepted or were eventually 
persuaded to accept.  
 
As to whether there was a sanction of law behind the indigenous process, Holleman 
asserts that the party who had agreed to a decision or solution which seemed fair to 
the majority of the people will subsequently not lightly refuse to fulfill his 
commitments; and further that the closely interwoven life of an individual with that of 
the community, the interdependence of its social, ritual and economic life and the fear 
of losing the goodwill and support of one’s neighbours were very effective sanctions.  
 
With particular reference to Zimbabwe it has been said that: 
 
“[t]he traditional emphasis on the community means that the object of the law is a 
restoration of group solidarity: an example of this is that compensation rather than 
punishment is important in criminal law.”88 
 
From the perspective of arbitration and ADR, Holleman’s comment on the goal of 
indigenous justice as “reconciliation” is pertinent. He acknowledged that for the 
Shona peoples, reconciliation meant something more specific: “a distinct, 
unequivocal, overt act, which dramatizes the end of the ‘hatred’ between two parties 
which had threatened social peace and unity and the resumption of their friendly 
relationship as a solvent of social poison.” Reconciliation involved the use of words to 
indicate its purpose of making estranged parties “live well together”, “see each other” 
                                                 
88 Redgment Introduction to the Legal System of Zimbabwe 17. 
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or “return to each other” again. The resonance with the declared goals of modern 
ADR and arbitration practice is unmistakable. 
 
The historical connection between South Africa’s legal history and evolution of 
Zimbabwean law is explained in paragraph 2.3.1 above.  In describing the recognition 
and application of customary law and courts for Blacks in the period before the Union 
of South Africa came into being, Khumalo states that before the advent of white 
people in Southern Africa the various tribes had their own social traditions inherited 
from past generations. The Chief or King was the leader in times of peace and war, in 
whom all judicial and legislative powers vested. His counselors were drawn mainly 
from the heroes and elders of the community and as these were pre-literate 
communities their laws were unwritten but nevertheless known to most members of 
the community. Conflict resolution was usually conducted under a tree in a procedure 
presided by the Chief. Such courts were of first and final instance in pre-colonial 
times and the remedy granted was usually compensation although the courts also 
attempted to reconcile the parties through a process that led to a more amicable 
solution to the dispute.89  
 
Traditional leadership has been central to the lives of African people for centuries and 
pivotal in dispute resolution in rural South Africa.  As an institution it was influenced 
by both colonisation and the apartheid systems of government.90  One of the most 
important pieces of legislation applicable to traditional leadership was the Black 
Administration Act91 until the Traditional Leadership and Government Act92 was 
passed in 2003 to deal more comprehensively with and transform the institution of 
traditional leadership in line with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.93  
Therefore customary law as known today in South Africa is a hybrid of African 
practices and aspects of the Western system of law94 and the administration of justice 
                                                 
89 Khumalo JAM The Civil Practice of All Courts For Blacks In Southern Africa cites other 
informative writers on the subject such as Koyana DS Customary Law in a Changing Society 128; 
Goldin B & Gelfand M African Law and Custom in Rhodesia (1975) 23 and Kaunda K A Humanist In 
Africa: Letters to Colin Morris 25. 
90 See Boyana T Traditional Justice in Practice: A Limpopo Case Study (2005). 
91 Act 38 of 1927. 
92 Act No. 41 of 2003. 
93 Boyana Traditional Justice in Practice 9. 
94 Boyana Traditional Justice in Practice 13. 
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in rural South Africa is predominantly carried out by chiefs’ courts which administer 
justice largely on the basis of customary law.95 
 
In its discussion paper on Community Dispute Resolution Structures the South 
African Law Reform Commission observed that: 
 
“[i]n contrast to the Roman-Dutch legal system based on retributive justice, where the 
object is to establish blame and administer punishment, the informal structures 
attempt to promote healing and enforce community values by using social pressure. 
Restorative justice and reiterative shaming are two of the most important tools of the 
enforcement process. The approach and reasoning used are elements which echo 
indigenous African procedures.” 96 
 
The discussion paper acknowledged further that these African procedures also 
reflected the practices known as makgotla, tinkundla, ibunga and imbizos where 
community members participate directly through questions and decisions; and that 
these popular justice systems have evolved and their practices have been adapted to 
urban circumstances.97 
 
It can be concluded that the processes of dispute settlement in Eastern, Western and 
Southern Africa represented in this study by Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe in pre-
colonial times were akin to each other in approach if not in form, substance or detail. 
 
Of interest and relevance is the argument of Woodman98 that customary law is by 
nature well known to those who are subject to it and that the lack of access to 
knowledge of customary law and especially lack of access to written information 
                                                 
95 Boyana Traditional Justice in Practice 19. 
96 Discussion Paper 87 (1999) 4 para 1.2.5.  See also Harries The Laws and Customs of the Bapedi. 
Chapter VI on Native Courts is particularly informative and instructive. Harries describes the laws and 
customs of other tribes including principally the Zulu tribe, and the Bavenda under Venda Law (85-88) 
with several illustrative cases (88-89) on the powers and functions of “paramount chiefs” whose 
powers were either sanctioned or curtailed by legislation or the Supreme Courts between 1885 and 
1927. 
97 Discussion Paper 87 4 para 1.2.5. See also Koyana & Bekker “The Courts: Application of 
Indigenous Law and the Repugnancy Clause” in Bekker et al Introduction to Legal Pluralism ch 9 
“The Courts” regarding Makgotla (“Community Courts”) para 9.3.1; Peoples Courts, para 9.3.2 and the 
application of Indigenous Law and the Repugnancy Clause, para 9.4. 
98 (1994) 34 Journal of Legal Pluralism.  Uwaizee EE “Model of Indigenous Disputing and Legal 
Interactions Among the Ibos of Eastern Nigeria (1994) 34 Journal of Legal Pluralism 87. 
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about it was a problem mainly for the colonial administrators from outside the 
community. Consequently, modern writers on the subject owe much to existing 
sources of the law and practice of customary dispute resolution such as (i) 
transmission by oral history, (ii) the knowledge and experience of those who 
participated in the making of such history, (iii) unreported but informally recorded 
cases of customary dispute settlement and (iv) reported court decisions.99 
 
The acknowledgement of this unsatisfactory situation has prompted action by some 
states to review their arbitration laws with relative degrees of urgency and success.100 
 
2.3.2 The Progress of Customary Arbitration through the Cases: the West African 
Experience 
 
The dearth of documentation on customary arbitration cases in Kenya and East Africa 
generally necessitates the exemplary reference to the West African experience for 
purposes of this study.  The jurisprudence of customary arbitration in Africa has been 
developed with the assistance of the courts. Judicial decisions on customary 
arbitration in West Africa are abundant.101  They turned on issues such as challenges 
to the existence of the arbitration agreement, the consent to arbitrate and voluntary 
submission to arbitration, arbitrability, the binding effect and enforcement of the 
award and on the very concept of arbitration under customary arbitration law and 
practice. Because the core of this study relates to recurrent problems in arbitration law 
and practice, the historical contribution, as well as the attitude, of the state courts in 
taking on and dealing with these challenges through customary law arbitration are of 
particular interest and relevance in this research. A few of the leading judicial 
decisions are used as examples. 
 
                                                 
99 Asouzu International Commercial Arbitration 118. 
100 Allott A “Arbitral Proceedings in Customary Law: Suggestions for a Model Ordinance” (1957) 2 
Journal of African Administration 96 is an attempt to elaborate a Model Ordinance for Arbitral 
Proceedings in Customary Law. Ghana has been planning a proposed Arbitration Act of Ghana since 
1988 intended to codify separately customary and statutory arbitration law: 13th Annual Report of the 
Law Reform Commission of Ghana, Accra, Govt. Printer 1988. 
101 Kolajo AA Customary Law in Nigeria through the Cases (2000). 
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One of the early Gold Coast cases was Kwabena Mensah v Ernestina 
Takyiampong.102 The plaintiff claimed the recovery of two pieces of land, mesne 
profits and an injunction. The decision turned on whether or not the dispute between 
the plaintiff and defendant had already been determined by the voluntary submission 
of the same parties to arbitration and an arbitral award, as alleged by the defendant. 
The trial judge found as facts that there was indeed an arbitration in accordance with 
native customary law, that both parties agreed to the arbitration and the award and to 
the subsequent demarcation of boundaries, but ruled that the award had no legal 
effect. The appellate court upheld the findings of fact and allowed the appeal, but 
disagreed with the lower court that the award had no legal effect.  In the opinion of 
the appellate court there was nothing cited in the Ordinances before the court that 
could alter the binding effect of the arbitration upon the parties inter se. 
 
Two points of jurisprudential interest can be made on the findings and conclusions of 
the appellate court. The first concerns whether or not a land dispute affected by a 
written testamentary will was arbitrable under native law and custom. On this point 
the court found that the sole question for decision was “which of the properties were 
family property” – a question eminently suitable for decision either by a Native 
Tribunal or by a native or natives in an arbitration held in accordance with native law 
and custom. The existence of a will concerning the land did not make the matters in 
dispute such as could not be submitted to arbitration in accordance with native law 
and custom. 
 
The second juridical point is that the court drew a distinction between the validity of a 
customary arbitration award and its enforcement, by acknowledging the validity of a 
customary arbitration between the parties, but declined to lend support for its 
enforcement.  In the words of the court: 
 
“The award is not such that it will be enforced by the Supreme Court in the sense that 
the successful party can invoke the aid of the Court to proceed to execution upon it, 
but this is very different from holding it to be invalid in the sense that it is not binding 
upon the parties.  In our opinion it is as binding upon the parties as such decisions 
upon arbitration in accordance with native law and custom have always been, that the 
                                                 
102 1940 6 WACA 118. 
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unsuccessful party is barred from re-opening the question decided, and that if he tries 
to do so in the Courts the decision may be successfully pleaded by way of estoppel.” 
 
A further pertinent observation is the fact that customary arbitration in the Gold Coast 
was in common use long before the judgment in this case was delivered in Accra on 
21 May 1940 by the West African Court of Appeal, on an arbitration award that was 
made on or about 15 September 1932. Of historical interest too is the reference by the 
court to the headnote to Ekua Ayafie v Kwamina Banyea,103 which read: 
 
“Where matters in difference between two parties are investigated at a meeting, and 
in accordance with customary law and general usage a decision is given, it is binding 
on the parties, and the Supreme Court will enforce such a decision.” 
 
If that was then the true position under customary law, the later decision of the 
Supreme Court that restricted recognition of a customary arbitration award to 
questions of validity but not to enforcement was a vestige of colonial judicial  
ambivalence and sophistry.104 
 
Opanin Asong Kwasi & Ors v Joseph Richard Obuadabang Larbi
105 is a historical 
cause célèbre on the principles of customary arbitration concerning the validity of 
arbitral proceedings before Elders, the distinction between negotiation for a settlement 
and a formal arbitration and the issue of consent to arbitration.  The plaintiff claimed 
against the defendant a declaration of title to certain land and an injunction. The 
“Findings of Special Arbitration” were recorded in a formal document setting out the 
arbitral proceedings “with great clearness and considerable detail”. The West African 
Court of Appeal found that the proceedings before the Elders were not a mere 
negotiation for a settlement but a formal arbitration and so dismissed the contention 
that the award was not under customary law binding on the appellants, who had 
withdrawn from the proceedings at the time of the inspection of the land. The Privy 
Council agreed with the appellate court and opined that in native customary law the 
Elders have a recognized judicial function and are in fact a tribunal before which 
                                                 
103 (1884) Sarbah’s Fanti Law Reports 38. 
104 Other decisions of historical interest mentioned in this case were Asiedu v Kwamena Ofori & 
Another decided on 6 December 1932; Benasko v Andoh decided in 1930; and Adejatu Tomole v Ilugbo 
Aru decided in 1933 and cited from Divisional Court Judgments, 1931-1937. 
105 (1952) 3 WACA 76. 
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natives could bring their disputes for judicial decision.106 Moreover, the proceedings 
had no resemblance to negotiations for a settlement but had all the marks of a well 
conducted formal arbitration, and “it would be unfortunate if so convenient a 
procedure were prohibited”. 
 
On the question whether the native customary law recognized the right to resile from 
arbitral proceedings, the Privy Council concluded there is no such right after the 
award, and no authority was cited to it on the question of the right to resile before the 
award.  On the issue of consent to arbitration, the Privy Council stated that “since it is 
established that the parties gave their consent to the submission of the dispute to the 
Elders without any express reservation of a right to resile, and there is no right to 
resile after the award is made, and the appellants had failed to satisfy the Board that a 
right so contrary to the basic conception of arbitration is recognized by native 
customary law, the appeal should be dismissed.” 
 
The concept of arbitration, the issue of voluntary submission to arbitration and the 
very status of customary arbitration in the regime of arbitration laws in Africa came 
under consideration and close scrutiny in the leading case of Raphael Agu v Christian 
Ozurumba Ikewibe.107 The plaintiff claimed against the defendant a declaration of title 
to a piece of land and damages for trespass. Interestingly it was submitted by the 
appellant that the concept of arbitration at customary law was unknown to the 
Nigerian legal system.108 In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court firstly 
acknowledged customary arbitration as founded on the voluntary submission of the 
parties to the decision of arbitrators who are Chiefs or Elders of their community, 
with the additional clarification that customary arbitration is not an exercise of the 
judicial power under the constitution, because it is not a function undertaken by the 
courts. Secondly, customary law, by virtue of the Nigerian Constitution109 is an 
“existing law” being a body of rules in force immediately before the coming into 
force of the 1979 Constitution; and customary law includes customary arbitration.  
The Court elaborated further that one of the many African customary modes of 
                                                 
106 The Privy Council quoted with approval a relevant passage from Danquah Akan Laws and Customs, 
London (1928) 83. 
107 (1991) 3 NWLR (pt 180) 385. 
108 This was in reliance on Okpuruwu v Okpokam (1988) 4 NWLR (pt 90) 554. 
109 S 274(3) and (4)(b). 
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settling disputes is to refer the dispute to the family head or an elder or elders of the 
community for a compromise solution based upon the subsequent acceptance by both 
parties of the suggested award, which becomes binding only after such signification 
of its acceptance, and from which either party is free to resile at any stage of the 
proceedings up to that point. The court was categorical that this is a common method 
of settling disputes in all indigenous Nigerian societies and of the kind considered in 
Chief Kweku Assampong v Kweku Amuaku & Ors.110 
 
In demonstrating that the selection of arbitrators was not restricted to only Chiefs or 
Elders the Supreme Court accepted the following exposition of customary-law 
arbitration by Ikpeazu J in Phillip Njoku v Felix Ekeocha:111 
 
“Where a body of men, be they chiefs or otherwise, act as arbitrators over a dispute 
between two parties, their decision shall have a binding effect, if it is shown firstly 
that both parties submitted to the arbitrators, secondly, that the parties accepted the 
terms of the arbitration, and thirdly, that they agreed to be bound by the decision, 
such decision has the same authority as the judgment of a judicial body and will be 
binding on the parties and thus create an estoppel.” 
 
The court deduced from the numerous authorities it cited that Nigerian law recognized 
arbitration at customary law which is distinct and different from arbitration under 
statute if the following conditions are satisfied: 
 
“(a) if the parties voluntarily submit their dispute to a non-judicial body to wit, their 
Elders or Chiefs as the case may be for determination; and 
(b) the indication of the willingness of the parties to be bound by the decision of the 
non-judicial body or freedom to reject the decision where not satisfied; and 
(c) that neither of the parties has resiled from the decision so pronounced.”112 
 
                                                 
110 (1932) 1 WACA 192. 
111 (1972) 2ECLR 199. 
112 These conditions were present, according to the Supreme Court, in the following cases: 
Assampong v Amuaku supra; Mbagbu v Agochukwu (1973) 3 ECSLR (Pt 1) 90; Phillip Njoku v 
Ekeocha supra; Ofomata v Anoka (1974) 4ECSLR 251; Inyang v Essien (1957) 2F.SC39, (1957) 
SCNLR 112; Idika v Erisi (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt 78) 573; Mensah v Takyiampong (1940) 6 WACA 118; 
Kwasi v Larbi (1952) 3 WACA 76 but not in Foli v Akese (1930) 1 WACA 1 where the arbitration 
was not conducted by an Elder, Chief or community member, but by a Judge of the Supreme Court. 
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The majority decision concluded that customary arbitration was governed by rules of 
customary law and has maintained its flexibility.113 
 
In his dissenting judgment Nnaemeku-Agu JSC opined with reference to old English 
Chancery and Exchequer cases that the common-law principles of arbitration entered 
the African concept of customary arbitration law “from the very beginning” through 
the West African Court of Appeal decisions114 and that although “most of these were 
Gold Coast cases”, they derived from the same common-law principles and the trend 
continued also in Nigeria even after the split-up of the West African Court of Appeal.  
He deduced four ingredients which led him to the conclusion that there was in this 
case no arbitration that complied with these ingredients or established an estoppel. 
 
These ingredients of customary arbitration are: 
(i) voluntary submission by the parties to an arbitrator; 
(ii) agreement by the parties expressly or impliedly to accept the 
arbitrator’s decision as final and binding; 
(iii) the arbitration was in accordance with the custom of the parties or of 
their trade or business, and  
(iv) the arbitrators reached a decision and published their award. 
 
According to the dissenting judge these ingredients were neither pleaded on well 
established principles nor proved by acceptable evidence, for which reason he 
disagreed with the majority and would have allowed the appeal. 
 
The judicial recognition of customary arbitration has come a long way since Ekua 
Ayafie v Kwamina Banyea in 1884, Kwasi v Larbi in 1952 and Agu v Ikewibe in 1991.  
Since then there have been reappraisals, reaffirmations, refinements and restatements 
of the principles and elements of customary arbitration in numerous subsequent cases 
in West Africa.115 
                                                 
113 The Court cited with approval the decision to that effect by Osborne CJ in Lewis v Bankole (1909) 
1NLR 100-101. 
114 The learned judge cited in support: Ankrah v Darba (1956) 1WALR 89; Gyesiwa v Mensah (1947) 
WACA 45. 
115 These include Eugene Nnaekwe Egesimba v Ezekiel Onu Zuruike (2002) 15 NWLR 466; Afada 
Ehoche v Abu Ijegwa (2003) 7 NWLR 139; Sunday Ufomba & Ors v Wosu Ahuchaogu & Ors (2003) 8 
NWLR 130 and Linus Okereke & Another v Chinyere Nwankwo & Another (2003) 9 NWLR 592. 
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It seems therefore that the problem is no longer whether or not customary arbitration 
exists or is recognized as part of modern African arbitration law but whether its well 
established ingredients or elements, in a disputed case, are proved to the satisfaction 
of the court.   
 
Judicial insights on related arbitral issues have been provided by the Supreme Court 
of Nigeria. On whether or not the findings of native arbitrators and those of the High 
Court qualified as concurrent findings, Tobi JSC in Ufomba v Ahuchaogu commented 
as follows: 
 
“A customary arbitration does not qualify as a court of law within the Constitution.  It 
is not even an inferior court outside the Constitution, as for example, the magistrate’s 
court. … Decisions of magistrates in Nigeria do not come within the purview of stare 
decisis, not to talk of decisions of native or customary arbitration. A customary 
arbitration is essentially a native arrangement by selected elders of the community 
who are versed in the customary law of the people and take decisions which are 
mainly designed or aimed at bringing some amicable settlement, stability and social 
equilibrium to the people and their immediate society or environment.  Native or 
customary arbitration is only a convenient forum for the settlement of native disputes 
and cannot be raised to the status of a court of law! ... 
 
While I concede … that a customary arbitration could be binding on the parties when 
certain ingredients are fulfilled, the decisions of such body do not qualify as 
‘concurrent findings’ with those of the High Court.”116 
 
The question of the constitutionality of customary-law arbitration in Nigeria was 
raised in Okpuruwu v Okpokam,117 in which a majority of the Court of Appeal held 
that Nigerian law did not recognize arbitration dealing with customary law, further 
that the vesting of the constitutional judicial powers in the courts rendered ineffective 
and incongruous any other exercise of judicial powers. Although it is now a settled 
principle in Nigeria that customary-law arbitration (and for that matter statutory 
arbitration under the Arbitration Act of 1988 or under Nigeria’s international treaty 
                                                 
116(2003) 8 NWLR 130 at 160. 
117(1988) 4 NWLR (pt 90) 554. 
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obligations) is not an exercise of judicial powers,118 the constitutional validity of 
customary-law arbitration is upheld by the Nigerian courts and is no longer in 
doubt.119 
 
A long line of authoritative judicial decisions has established the pre-conditions for a 
valid and binding customary-law arbitration that can raise and sustain the plea of 
estoppel. These are: 
(i) that there has been a voluntary submission of the matter in dispute to 
the arbitration of one or more persons; 
(ii) that it was agreed by the parties either expressly or by implication that 
the decision of the arbitrator(s) would be accepted as final and binding; 
(iii) that the said arbitration was in accordance with the custom of the 
parties or of their trade or business; 
(iv) that the arbitrator(s) reached a decision and published their award; and 
(v) that the decision or award was accepted at the time it was made.120 
 
 
Anything short of these requirements, it seems, will make it difficult for a customary 
arbitration award to receive recognition by the Nigerian courts.  
 
The following critical observations may contribute to knowledge on the subject.  First, 
the statement in Ufomba v Ahuchaogu (supra) that a customary arbitration is 
essentially a native arrangement by selected elders of the community and that native 
or customary arbitration is only a convenient forum for the settlement of native 
disputes reflects colonial terminology in the pejorative sense in phrases like “native 
arbitration” and “native disputes” in common use in colonial administrative laws and 
regulations prescribed for Africans.  That a Supreme Court judge of a modern state of 
                                                 
118 Ahiwe Okere v Marcus Nwoke (1991) 8 NWLR (pt 209) 317, 347. 
119 Agu v Ikewibe, (1991) 3 NWLR (pt 180) 385 per Karibi-White JSC. See further Asouzu AA 
“Arbitration and Judicial Powers in Nigeria” (2001) 18(6) Journal of International Arbitration 617-
640. 
120 Okereke v Nwanko 9 NWLR (2003) per Edozie JSC citing with approval Agu v Ikewibe (1991) 3 
NWLR (pt 180) incorporating a large number of West African Court of Appeal decisions such as 
Assampong v Amuaku (1932) WACA 192; Gyesiwa v Mensah (1947) WACA 45; Kwasi v Larbi; 
(1952) WACA 76; Mensah v Takyiampong 6 WACA 118.  Afada Enoche v Abu Ijegwa (2003) 7 
NWLR 139 per Uwaifo JSC, citing with approval Duruaku Eke & Others v Udeozor Okwaranyia & 
Others (2001) 12 NWLR (pt 726) 181 at 208; and (2001) 86 LRCN 1403 at 1428-1429; Egesimba v 
Onuzuruike (supra) per the dissenting judgment of Tobi JSC at 529-530. 
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Nigeria can condescend to the use of such terminology to demean a system of dispute 
resolution that has served African communities for so long is questionable and 
inappropriate.  Such statements ought to be discountenanced and disavowed in the 
judicial pronouncements in relation to practice of modern arbitration.  It may be added 
that even the term “custom” is not uncommonly used by writers who wish to demean 
it by relying on colonial superiority rather than any understanding.  Secondly, the 
impression conveyed in Afada Enoche v Abu Ijewa and other cases121 that an award 
must be accepted at the time it was made before its recognition by the courts must be 
corrected.  The writer does not share or support this view of customary arbitration 
award for being both inaccurate and undesirable in modern practice.  It is not 
supported by practice in other African states like Kenya, Uganda and Zambia.  The 
undesirability is based on the following submissions: First, to require party agreement 
before court recognition will place the arbitration from which the award emanated in 
the category of mediation.  Secondly, an award, customary or statutory, that is valid 
and binding is, in the majority of instances, voluntarily implemented, without more, 
by the parties without judicial involvement.  In the relatively fewer instances that the 
award is not accepted by a party or is challenged, the challenge provisions and 
procedures of law do not require prior acceptance of the award by the parties before it 
can be countenanced by the court; and the court’s jurisdiction and power to determine 
the challenge does not depend on a pre-condition of the acceptance of the award by 
the parties before the determination, recognition or enforcement of the award.  
Thirdly, the dichotomy, intentional or inadvertent, introduced by the court between 
the recognition of a customary law award and other awards has no basis in law and is 
undesirable.  The problem of award enforcement is a research question discussed in 
Chapter 3.  It should suffice to submit here that the requirement of acceptance of the 
award before recognition is unsatisfactory and the rectification of this situation should 
not be left to judicial speculation or ambivalence but to legislation. 
 
As a further clarifying contribution to knowledge on the subject it needs to be added 
that the tendency of African judges looking down on African customary law and 
procedures is an inherited colonial legacy that traces back to a colonial sense of 
superiority that reduced customary law to a status inferior to that of inherited law and 
                                                 
121 See cases listed in footnote 115 above. 
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procedures and the failure of the African judicial officer to innovatively outgrow that 
legacy.  But that is not all.  There is also an insufficient appreciation of customary law 
and a misunderstanding of the true essence of arbitration and its timeless role and 
efficacy for achieving a complete settlement and social equilibrium for the 
community to which the disputing parties belonged. 
 
The reference to community is noteworthy because customary law included the law of 
a different kind of community from a state, ancient or modern.  That community was 
and is not primarily concerned with rights but with the restoration of harmony.  
Communities other than the state provided means of resolving disputes.  They 
included the church and the separate religious communities and trade organizations or 
associations similar to the craft and merchant guilds of early England.  When 
members of such communities were involved in differences in the nature of a serious 
dispute that required external intervention the community itself became interested in 
its resolution by arbitration rather than litigation.  As it was never doubted that the 
solutions found satisfactorily and effectively disposed of the dispute, it is neither 
persuasive nor necessary for a court to look down on the outcome or refuse to 
recognise it because of an unwarranted pre-condition for its prior acceptance by the 
disputing parties at the time the award was made.  It ought to be sufficient for 
purposes of recognition and enforcement that the parties chose a system of arbitration 
that resolved the dispute.  The pre-conditions for arbitration, if needed, must precede 
the arbitration process not after it. 
 
2.3.3 Conclusion 
 
It can be concluded and recognised that as customary-law arbitration was and is an 
important segment of arbitration law in Africa, and in frequent use in the settlement of 
disputes under customary law, its practices and evolution should not be ignored in the 
development of modern arbitration laws in Africa and in a jurisdiction such as 
Kenya’s.  Indeed, the argument has been advanced that the Model Law recognizes 
existing arbitration laws in national jurisdictions that adopt it, which laws by 
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implication include customary arbitration law.122 Furthermore, it is also apparent that 
judicial intervention in arbitral matters and the assistance and contribution of the 
courts in resolving challenges to the arbitration agreement, the arbitral jurisdiction and 
its processes demonstrate that these challenges have long historical and evolutionary 
roots in the forms and procedures of both customary-law arbitrations and those 
conducted under national arbitration statutes.123  The fact that these challenges and the 
related problems raised by the Chapter 3 questions have persisted for so long is good 
reason for seeking solutions with the aid of modernized legislation and appropriate 
practice rules where the existing statutes like the Kenya Arbitration Act of 1995 are 
inadequate. 
 
Through modern scholastic effort to understand, reappraise and reconstruct African 
customary-law practices, the literature is truly large as reflected in the treatises, essays 
and commentaries.124 There is also the fact that Africa today is not one homogeneous 
whole but an amalgamation of diverse cultures.  Therefore what is needed to harness 
the energy of this diversity is the marshalling of creative thought and initiative to 
reinterpret African customary practices more accurately and add on to it the results 
and outcomes of vigorous research and intelligent reappraisal of the customs, 
traditions and institutions of Africa today for the benefit of Africa tomorrow.  If in 
                                                 
122 See Okefeifere “Salient Issues in the Law and Practice of Arbitration In Nigeria” and Holtzman & 
Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 39 who explain, citing 4th Secretariat Note 
A/CN9/WGII/WP50 para 4 that Article 1(5) was included in the Model Law partly to clarify that the 
Model Law is not a self-contained and self-sufficient legal system “which would exclude the 
application of all other national provisions of law dealing with arbitration.” 
123 See para 2.4.1 below for a discussion of the development of statutory arbitration in Kenya, Nigeria 
and Zimbabwe. 
124 For sample literature on the subject see:  
Nigeria: Igbokwe VC “The Law and Practice of Customary Arbitration in Nigeria” 1997 Journal of 
African Law 41; Kolajo AA Customary Law in Nigeria through the Cases (2000); Ezejiofor G The Law 
of Arbitration in Nigeria (1997); Ehiribe I “The Validity of Customary Law Arbitration in Nigeria” 
(1996) Comparative Law Yearbook of International Business Law 18; Allot A Essays In African Law 
(1960); Park AEW Sources of Nigerian Law (1963 &1975). 
Kenya: Ojwang JB “Rural Dispute Settlement in Kenya” (1975-1977) Zambia Law Journal 7-9. 
Southern Africa: Chomba FM “Zambia: Alternative Forms of Adjudication.” unpublished paper 1990 
Meeting of Commonwealth Law Ministers and Senior Officials; Tshehla B Traditional Justice in 
Practice ISS Monograph Series no 115 April 2005; Goldin & Gelfand, African Law and Custom in 
Rhodesia. 
Other works: Ghana: 13th Annual Report of the Law Reform Commission of Ghana, Accra, Govt 
Printer 1988; Cotran & Amissah Arbitration in Africa 113-119; Kom ED “Customary Arbitration” 
(1987) 16 Review of Ghana Law 148. 
Tanzania: Cole JSR and Denison WN Tanganyika: The Development of its Laws and Constitution 
(1964). 
Uganda: Allen APJ An Introduction to the Law of Uganda (1968); Morris HF& Read JS Uganda, The 
Development of its Laws and Constitution (1996). 
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that endeavour some of Africa’s most cherished traditional values,125 including 
amicable methods of conflict resolution, are revived and strengthened then it will not 
have been an exercise in futility.  
 
2.4 Arbitration Legislation in Africa 
 
2.4.1 The Experience of Nigeria, Kenya and Zimbabwe 
 
The unwritten form of African customary laws in general including arbitration law 
hindered the recognition of such laws and the dispute resolution processes as well as 
the tribal courts in the colonial period. Written arbitration law was introduced in 
Africa by the former colonial powers. As the three African jurisdictions in this study 
underwent similar colonial experiences under the United Kingdom the influence of 
English legislation and the impact of the colonial administrators in these jurisdictions 
on arbitration and dispute resolution are noteworthy. For purposes of this study a 
summary of the main historical landmarks in the colonial administration of Nigeria, 
Kenya and Zimbabwe and the enactment of their respective arbitration legislation is 
appropriate. 
 
Nigeria, a British colonial creation, came into being in January 1914 with the 
amalgamation of the Colony of Lagos which was annexed in 1861, the Southern 
Protectorates which were established between 1885 and 1894, and the Northern 
Protectorates which had been pacified and subdued by 1903. The three entities had 
hitherto been administered separately by the UK. The Project Niger Company which 
had been given a Royal Charter in 1886 to administer the Niger River and Northern 
Nigeria proved ineffective and on 31 December 1899 its charter was terminated. 
British forces under Frederick Lugard then began a period of conquest into the 
northern reaches of the territories which by 1906 came under British control and the 
                                                 
125 There has been a tendency to overlook these values, particularly in the arbitration of commercial 
disputes, in view of the dominance of the arbitration legislation introduced during the colonial era.  On 
the wider subject of the recovery of lost history and culture in the period of antiquity see Armah A 
“Remembering the Dismembered Continent” New African IC Publication no 492, February 2010, 26-
31.  
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process was completed in 1914 when, as noted, Lagos Colony and the two 
Protectorates were amalgamated into the unitary state of Nigeria.126 
 
Colonial Lagos was a busy cosmopolitan port. Although local rulers continued to 
administer their territories, consular authorities assumed jurisdiction for the equity 
courts established earlier by the foreign mercantile communities. It is not surprising 
that it was in the same year that Nigeria was created that the first arbitration statute of 
1914 was promulgated. 
 
The 1914 statute was promulgated as the Arbitration Ordinance 1914 and came into 
force on 31 December 1914.127 It was based on the English Arbitration Act of 1889 
and was applied to the whole country, which was then administered as a unitary State. 
In 1954 when Nigeria was divided into Regions and later a Federation, the Ordinance 
became the law of the Regions and the States of the Federation. Nigeria achieved 
independence from the UK on 1 October 1960. The Ordinance was designated the 
Arbitration Act in 1963 and was the governing statutory arbitration law until March 
1988 when the Arbitration and Conciliation Decree of that year came into force. 
Among the Decree’s achievements is the implementation of the New York 
Convention to which Nigeria acceded in 1970.128 Before then, it was apparent that the 
limitations of the 1914 Act had made it unsuited for modern arbitration.129 It will 
suffice to acknowledge here that while the 1914 Act was based on the English Act of 
1889, the 1988 Decree was in turn based on the UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985. The 
salient contents of both the Decree130 and the Model Law will be discussed below.131 
 
                                                 
126 Source: British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, www.infoplease.com and US Library of 
Congress. 
127 Orojo JO & Ajomo MA Law and Practice of Arbitration and Conciliation in Nigeria (1999) 13. 
128 See Ajibola B “Nigeria” in Cotran E & Amissah A (eds) Arbitration in Africa 108-111, on the 
regimes for recognising and enforcing arbitral awards, as well as provisions implementing the New 
York Convention in s 54(1) and the Second Schedule to the Act. 
129 Assouzu International Commercial Arbitration 122 and 125. 
130 In 2007 the Nigerian National Assembly passed an Act repealing the 1990 Laws of the Federation 
of Nigeria (Nigerian Guardian 14 August 2007 16). The writer understood from interviews with 
Nigerian lawyers that there is now an Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 2004 in Nigeria (Federal 
Laws of Nigeria 2004 Cap 18) containing the same provisions as the 1988 Decree (Federal Laws of 
Nigeria 1990 Cap 19.) 
131 See paras 2.4.4 and 2.5 below. 
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Colonial rule came to Kenya in 1886 with the partition of East Africa between the UK 
(which took most of Kenya), the Germans and the Sultan of Zanzibar.132 The Order in 
Council of 1897 that established the Protectorate of Kenya applied the common-law 
doctrines of equity and statutes of general application in force in England on 12 
August 1889 to the Protectorate. The Order in Council that subsequently established 
the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya in 1920 and the Judicature Act of 1967 
contained the same provisions. As in Nigeria, the Arbitration Ordinance of 1914 that 
was promulgated for Kenya was based on the English Arbitration Act of 1889. 
However, after Kenya gained independence from the UK in 1963, the subsequent 
Arbitration Act of 1968 was taken from the English Arbitration Act of 1950,133 and an 
Arbitration (Foreign Awards) Ordinance that had been passed in 1930 to facilitate 
enforcement of certain foreign awards also became part of the 1968 Act,134 which was 
amended in 1992 to provide for the application of the New York Convention of 
1958.135 The 1968 Act (Cap 49 of the Laws of Kenya) was repealed136 and replaced 
by the Arbitration Act of 1995 based on the UNCITRAL Model Law.137  
 
Most arbitrations in Kenya occurred in tribal communities and were conducted by 
tribal elders. The disputes related mostly to land, succession and livestock. This is 
because few Africans in tribal areas made wills and the Law of Succession Act 
excluded from the rules of intestacy agricultural land and livestock in most tribal 
areas. The disputing parties usually agreed on the arbitrating elders and to their award. 
Where a party filed a claim in the magistrate’s court in land cases it was common 
practice for magistrates to refer the case to arbitration by elders. Each party appointed 
two elders presided over by the local District Officer or an umpire appointed by him. 
Commercial arbitration increased considerably over the years, due to the 
shortcomings of the court system such as the use of inexperienced judicial officers, 
                                                 
132 Ojwang “Rural Dispute Settlement in Kenya” (1975-1777) Zambia Law Journal 7-9. 
133 See Couldrey J “Kenya” in Cotran E & Amissah A (eds) Arbitration in Africa 51 at 52. 
134 This part of the Act provided for the recognition of arbitration agreements in certain prescribed 
countries pursuant to the Protocol on Arbitration Clauses adopted by the Assembly of the League of 
Nations in 1923. A Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, made in Geneva in 1927 
was also adopted in the 1968 Act. 
135 See Couldrey “Kenya” in Cotran & Amissah (eds) Arbitration in Africa 52. 
136 See s 42(1).Kenya Arbitration Act 1995  
137 The Bill adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law for both domestic and international arbitration: 
Couldrey “Kenya” in Cotran & Amissah (eds) Arbitration in Africa 51.  See also the discussion of the 
wording of the long title in para 2.5 below. 
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delay and the perceived advantage of having technical disputes arbitrated by technical 
experts (engineers, architects and the like) rather than the courts.138 
 
British annexation and occupation of Rhodesia139 started with the incorporation of the 
British South Africa Company by Royal Charter on 29 October 1889. Matabeleland 
and Mashonaland were the main regions that constituted the area that came to be 
known as Rhodesia before 1898. The territory was officially designated Southern 
Rhodesia by the Southern Rhodesia Order in Council of 1898.140 It seemed that 
following a rebellion by the tribesmen of Mashonaland in 1896 the UK colonial 
administration became more concerned with security and the political and economic 
control of the tribespeople. Subsequently however, the preservation of customary laws 
and tribal courts received scant attention until 1937 when the Native Law and Native 
Courts Act was introduced.141 This Act, which provided for the establishment of tribal 
courts, was repealed by the African Law and Tribal Courts Act 1969,142 by which 
customary law was given wider application generally and the jurisdiction of the tribal 
courts was extended.143 The declared and acknowledged aim of the statute was to 
enable the tribal court to arrive at decisions that reconciled the litigants.144 Southern 
Rhodesia attained independence from the UK on 18 April 1980 and was renamed 
Zimbabwe. 
 
In the intervening period an Arbitration Act of 1928145 was implemented in Southern 
Rhodesia, which was derived from the English Arbitration Act of 1889. After 
Zimbabwe attained independence, the 1928 Act was repealed and replaced by the 
                                                 
138 Ojwang “Rural Dispute Settlement in Kenya” (1975-1977) Zambia Law Journal 7-9; Couldrey 
“Kenya” in Cotran & Amissah (eds) Arbitration in Africa 53-54. 
139 It appears that the Charter of 1889 was granted in respect of a territory without a name but described 
as “the region of South Africa lying immediately to the north of British Bechuanaland and to the north 
and west of the South African Republic and to the west of the Portuguese Dominions” However in 
honour and recognition of Cecil John Rhodes who was primarily responsible for procuring the charter 
of 1889 and the establishment of a newly created geographic and political state, Mashonaland and 
Matabeleland and other territories came to be known by popular use as “Rhodesia”. See Goldin & 
Gelfard African Law and Custom in Rhodesia 7. 
140 Goldin & Gelfard African Law and Custom in Rhodesia 1-2, citing the case of In re Southern 
Rhodesia 1919 AC 211, in which Lord Sumner summarized the historical background and beginning of 
Rhodesia. 
141 Act 33 of 1937. 
142 Act 24 of 1969. 
143 Goldin & Gelfard African Law and Custom in Rhodesia 21. 
144 Goldin & Gelfard African Law and Custom in Rhodesia 23. This was acknowledged in the so-called 
Robinson Commission Report, 1961, 180-181. 
145 Act 8 of 1928. 
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Arbitration Act of 1996, based on the UNCITRAL Model Law.146 The two most 
significant departures of this Act from the Model Law are the following. Firstly, the 
Act is not restricted to international arbitrations but applies to all arbitrations in 
Zimbabwe irrespective of the nationality or places of business or residence of the 
parties to the arbitration.147 Secondly, the Act is not restricted to commercial disputes 
but applies to the arbitration of any matter capable of being determined by 
arbitration.148 A further important observation is that the 1996 Arbitration Act does 
not repeal the common law of arbitration which is the Roman law as developed by the 
Roman-Dutch commentators.149 The common law, as noted above,150 therefore 
continues to apply where the agreement to arbitrate is verbal and the arbitrator’s 
award can be made an order of court and enforced as such. A further relevant factor is 
that Zimbabwe is a party to the New York Convention without any reservations and 
also a party to the ICSID Convention both of which have been legislatively 
implemented domestically.151 The Commercial Arbitration Centre, Harare, and the 
Zimbabwe Arbitration Association are actively functioning arbitral institutions in 
Zimbabwe today. 
 
It has been said that the enactment of arbitration legislation in Africa, a legacy of 
colonialism, was partly necessitated by the inability of the colonial administrators to 
appreciate the nature and philosophy of the African customary traditions for the 
settlement of disputes.152 Most African states like Kenya attained statehood after the 
colonial era and for such states that underwent colonialism, the first arbitration 
legislation was enacted by their colonial administrators. The distinctive feature of 
such colonial arbitration legislation included the fact that it applied only to domestic 
disputes based on written arbitration agreements. But it also at least by implication 
recognized and preserved African native customs, traditions and institutions, subject 
                                                 
146 Donovan IA “Zimbabwe” in Cotran & Amissah (eds) Arbitration in Africa 177-180. 
147 S 3. There was therefore no definition of an “international” arbitration which is omitted from Article 
1. 
148 S 4(2) specifies matters not capable of determination by arbitration or which first require leave of 
the High Court. 
149 Johannes Voet is considered the most important Roman-Dutch authority: see Donovan  
“Zimbabwe” in Cotran E & Amissah A (eds) Arbitration in Africa 179; See also para 2.3.1 above. 
150 See para 2.3.1. 
151 Regarding the former see the long title to the Arbitration Act of 1996.  Regarding the latter see the 
Arbitration (International Investment Disputes) Act 16 of 1995 (ch 7:03). 
152 Goldin & & Gelfard African Law and Custom in Rhodesia 22 with reference to Rhodesia, and 
Asouzu International Commercial Arbitration 119 with reference to Africa generally. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 70 
to statutory and judicial limitations. In particular, the validity of customary dispute 
resolution processes was preserved,153 hence the opportunity for the integration of 
customary and statutory arbitral traditions in Africa. 
 
Asouzu conveniently and innovatively categorises the arbitration legislation of 
African states into first, second and third generation arbitration laws.154 The first 
category spanned the period 1898 to 1960 and in the British colonies, was influenced 
by the English Arbitration Act of 1889. The second category occupied the period 
between 1960 and 1984 and was influenced by the English Arbitration Act of 1950, 
which has now been largely repealed.155 The notable features of such legislation were 
their retention, as in previous laws, of the case-stated procedure, their non-recognition 
of the specific requirements of the international commercial arbitral regime and 
institutional arbitration, the absence of provisions for conciliation and the retention of 
wide judicial powers for reviewing arbitral decisions and for intervention in 
arbitration.156 The third generation arbitration laws were those enacted after 1984, 
which specifically provided for international arbitration. It is said that this 
development was neither consistent nor uniform. This was because of the divergent 
legislative techniques adopted by various countries. Some African countries adopted 
the UNCITRAL Model Law wholly or partly.157 Nigeria (1988), Kenya (1995) and 
Zimbabwe (1996) fall into this category. Three French speaking countries reformed 
their arbitration laws in this period and incorporated provisions on international 
arbitration, namely Togo (1989), Cote d’Ivoire (1993) and Senegal (1998). This 
development has since been overtaken by the OHADA Uniform Act on Arbitration of 
1999 in those and other OHADA member states.158 
 
                                                 
153 Cotran & Amissah Arbitration in Africa 186; Allott AN Essays in African Law (1960) 142-144. 
Although Asouzu International Commercial Arbitration 121 states that customary law was expressly 
recognised by the colonial powers, this express recognition was not necessarily in the colonial 
arbitration statutes. 
154 Asouzu International Commercial Arbitration 120-124. 
155 See the Arbitration Act 1996 s 107(2) read with sch 4. 
156 By way of example, the South African Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 was described by the South 
African Law Commission in 1998 as an arbitration statute that was widely perceived as totally 
inadequate for international arbitration (see SA Law Commission Report on Arbitration: an 
International Arbitration Act for South Africa (1998) para 1.3; Asouzu International Commercial 
Arbitration 123-124. 
157 See the list of countries in n 159 below. 
158 Asouzu International Commercial Arbitration 125-126. 
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Consequently African states with modern arbitration legislation such as Kenya can be 
classified basically in one of two groups, the OHADA group and those countries with 
statutes based on or influenced by the Model Law (including Mozambique).159 
Because the OHADA system of arbitration was designed by and for mainly French-
speaking African states and has not attracted the Anglophone African states to that 
system, a brief discussion of the OHADA system will be a sufficient prelude to the 
discussion of the Model Law and the law of the three jurisdictions inspired by it. 
 
2.4.2 Modern Arbitration Statutes 
 
In context, modern arbitration statutes in Africa are those that came into force after 
the UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985. On this basis the three arbitral jurisdictions of 
Nigeria, Kenya and Zimbabwe whose statutes were enacted in 1988, 1995 and 1996 
respectively can be regarded as having modern arbitration statutes. 
 
The three jurisdictions are selected for this study because of their common foundation 
in the UNCITRAL Model Law and a discussion of their interaction with the Model 
Law is the main focus of this part of the dissertation. Before that, however, a brief 
sketch of the OHADA system of arbitration is deemed appropriate and offered here, 
first to distinguish it from the UNCITRAL system and, second because it is also in 
operation in Africa and like the UNCITRAL Model Law, it is conceived and aimed at 
the modernization, harmonization and unification of arbitration laws in the countries 
that have embraced it. It appears however that, although OHADA membership is open 
to any member of the African Union,160 it has not so far attracted the English-
speaking African jurisdictions based on the common-law traditions and systems of 
arbitration law and practice. 
 
                                                 
159 The African states which have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law are, in alphabetical order, 
Egypt, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius (for international arbitrations only), Nigeria, Rwanda, Tunisia, 
Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  For a complete list of jurisdictions which have adopted the Model 
Law see UNCITRAL’s website at http://www.uncitral.org.  Mozambique, although not a Model Law 
jurisdiction, has an arbitration law compatible with the Model Law.  Five of the African jurisdictions 
which have adopted the Model Law have a French civil-law tradition, at least as regards arbitration and 
civil procedure, namely Egypt, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda and Tunisia (see regarding Egypt and 
Tunisia, Cotran & Amissah Arbitration in Africa 233 and 261). 
160 See Martor B, Pilkington N, Sellers DS & Thouvenot D Business Law in Africa: OHADA and the 
Harmonization Process 2 ed (2007) 3 n 14. 
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2.4.3 The Uniform Act on Arbitration and Arbitration under the OHADA Treaty161 
 
The harmonization of arbitration laws as in English-speaking Africa is also in 
progress in the French-speaking countries of Africa and therefore it is a development 
that is noteworthy in this study. The post-1985 arbitration legislation in most French-
speaking African countries is not based on the UNCITRAL Model Law but consists 
of the Uniform Act on Arbitration adopted by the OHADA Council of Ministers on 
11 March 1999 within the framework of the OHADA Treaty. Aspects of the Tunisian 
Arbitration Code on international arbitration which reflect the Model Law are 
therefore exceptional.162 
 
OHADA is an international organization formally created by the treaty signed in Port-
Louis, Mauritius on 17 October 1993 by fourteen African states.  It now has sixteen 
members.163 Except Guinea all OHADA members are members of the Franc Zone; 
again except Equatorial Guinea and Guinea-Bissau where Spanish and Portuguese are 
spoken, and the English-speaking provinces of Cameroon, all OHADA member states 
are French-speaking.164  The principal aims of OHADA from its Treaty are to unify 
business law throughout the member states and to promote arbitration as a means of 
settling contractual disputes.165  The Uniform Acts provide an overall legal framework 
based, in general, on civil law; but the declared aim of OHADA is to reach beyond the 
original members and embrace other African countries. To that end the OHADA 
Treaty166 provides that any of the member states of the Organization for African 
                                                 
161 OHADA is the French acronym for Organization pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des 
Affaires (Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa) and therefore occasionally 
referred to in English as “OHBLA”); see Martor et al Business Law in Africa 1; Douajani GK  
“OHBLA Arbitration” (2000) 17(1) Journal of International Arbitration 127-132; Douajani GK 
“Recent Developments in OHADA Arbitration” (2006) 23(4) Journal of International Arbitration 363. 
162 Asouzu International Commercial Arbitration 125. However, although Tunisia is exceptional in the 
context of former French colonies in North and West Africa, as noted above, there are also four other 
African states with a French orientated code of civil procedure which have adopted the Model Law (see 
n 159 above.) 
163 The member states are, in alphabetical order, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, the Federal Islamic Republic of Comoros, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. In February 2006 the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo expressed its intention to accede to the treaty (see Martor et al Business Law in 
Africa 2.) See also OHADA’s website http://www.ohada.com. 
164 Martor et al Business Law in Africa 2. French is the working language of OHADA in terms of the 
OHADA Treaty article 42, but Martor et al Business Law in Africa 14 state that an amendment of the 
Treaty to provide for greater flexibility in this regard is being considered. 
165 See the OHADA Treaty Article 1. 
166 Article 53. 
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Unity, now the African Union since July 2002, and also non-members of the African 
Union, if so invited unanimously by the OHADA member states, may join OHADA 
by acceding to the Treaty.167 
 
OHADA as an international organization has its own juristic personality and enjoys 
privileges and immunities with regard to its property and employees.168  Its 
institutions are: a Council of Ministers as the legislative arm,169 a Common Court of 
Justice and Arbitration (CCJA) which is supranational and based in Abidjan,170 a 
Permanent Secretariat in Yaoundé171 and a Regional Training Centre for Legal 
Officers (ERSUMA).172  
 
OHADA has introduced a situation whereby it is now possible for parties to a contract 
to include an arbitration clause that provides for arbitration proceedings in any of the 
member states under a modern arbitration law.173 
 
OHADA has created two sets of legislation for arbitration. The first is the OHADA 
Treaty, which provides for institutional arbitration under the CCJA Rules of 
Arbitration.174 The second is the Uniform Act on Arbitration with basic rules 
applicable to any arbitration where the seat of arbitration is in one of the member 
states.175 
 
The implication is that if a contractual arbitration clause simply provides for 
arbitration under the Uniform Act, there will be no institutional framework as the 
Uniform Act will govern certain matters relating to the proceedings. But if the clause 
stipulates arbitration under the OHADA Treaty or under the CCJA Rules then this 
will establish an institutional framework for the arbitration. But where a clause 
                                                 
167 Martor et al Business Law in Africa 3. 
168 OHADA Treaty Articles 46-49. 
169 Articles 3 and 27-30. 
170 See Article 31 and Martor et al Business Law in Africa 8. 
171 See Article 3 and Martor et al Business Law in Africa 6-8. 
172 See Article 3 and Martor et al Business Law in Africa 12-13. 
173 Martor et al Business Law in Africa 259. 
174 See Martor et al Business Law in Africa 271-283 for a brief discussion of arbitration under the 
CCJA Rules.  They note that the CCJA Rules are very similar to the ICC Rules of Arbitration of 1988, 
although there are also some fundamental differences. 
175 See Martor et al Business Law in Africa 260 and 262, who point out that the Uniform Act makes no 
distinction between domestic and international arbitration. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 74 
provides for arbitration in one of the member States in accordance with institutional 
rules other than CCJA Rules, then the Uniform Act would apply to matters not 
governed by such institutional rules.176 
 
The Uniform Act on Arbitration was signed on 11 March 1999, entered force 90 days 
later and is applicable to arbitrations that had not commenced before its entry into 
force.  Few of its provisions are mandatory.  The Act supersedes the existing national 
laws on arbitration but subject to any provisions of such national laws that do not 
conflict with the Uniform Act.177  A Uniform Act has direct application and enjoys 
supremacy in the territory of a contracting state.178  Article 1 of the Uniform Act on 
Arbitration applies to all arbitrations where the seat of arbitration is located in one of 
the member states.179 Individuals and corporate bodies as well as States and other 
territorial public authorities may submit to arbitration under the Uniform Act.180 
A Cameroonian commentator and member of the ICC International Court of 
Arbitration, writing on OHADA arbitration in 2000, concluded: 
 
“OHBLA arbitration is thus composed of two bodies of rules (the Uniform Act 
conceived essentially for ad hoc arbitration and the CCJA Rules of Arbitration, an 
institutional arbitration system) comparable to international standards and conceived 
with the purpose of serving the potential users of arbitration in the OHBLA area. For 
a long time, Africa was nearly a desert for arbitration. The two texts presented above 
are likely to create in Africa an area for the development of international arbitration 
full of promise for the future.”181 
 
It can be appreciated from a comparison of the UNCITRAL and OHADA arbitration 
systems why Common Law and Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
jurisdictions in search of a common arbitration law for international commercial 
                                                 
176 See Martor et al Business Law in Africa 260. 
177 See Martor et al Business Law in Africa 261. 
178 See the OHADA Treaty Article 10 and Martor et al Business Law in Africa 18. 
179 See also Martor et al Business Law in Africa 261. 
180 See the Uniform Act Article 2.  Compare the OHADA Treaty Article 21 and Martor et al Business 
Law in Africa 272 regarding parties who may submit disputes to institutional arbitration under the 
CCJA Rules. 
181 Douajani (2000) 17(1) Journal of International Arbitration 131. Other informative articles are 
Leboulanger P “Arbitration under the OHADA System”, IBA Conference Paper Durban, South Africa  
22 October 2002 and Douajani GK “The Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in OHADA 
Member States” (2003) 20(2) Journal of International Arbitration 205-210. 
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arbitration in Africa would prefer the Model Law to the OHADA Uniform Act on 
Arbitration (“UAA”).  Firstly, because the Model Law is in several respects inherently 
superior to the UAA as regards, for example, the powers of the court exercisable both 
before and after the award; the arbitral powers for conducting the arbitration 
proceedings effectively even where a party does not co-operate, and the arbitral 
powers to grant enforceable interim measures. The travaux préparatoires of the 
Model Law are available as interpretation aids to users in both the common-law and 
civil-law traditions of arbitration. In contrast the official text of the UAA is in French 
with a noticeably substantial influence of French law on the UAA. 
 
Secondly, four members of SADC have already adopted the Model Law.182 A third 
reason is that the Model Law has been adopted by a number of major SADC trading 
partners in Europe, the Pacific Rim and also in Africa.183 Fourthly, the OHADA 
system is not yet an established reference point for law reform in the SADC region 
and OHADA law-making is less transparent as the laws are passed by the OHADA 
Council of Ministers. 
 
 A fifth reason is the high degree of compatibility between the popular UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules and the UNCITRAL Model Law, which is a clear advantage over 
OHADA because of the international standing of the UNCITRAL Rules and their 
general acceptance and use in international arbitration.184 Lastly, the UAA is clearly 
intended to apply only in countries which become members of OHADA involving the 
acceptance of other OHADA laws as well.185 
 
A cautionary note must however be sounded. The Model Law is not an easy piece of 
legislation. Some twenty four years after its approval by the UN General Assembly, 
                                                 
182 Zimbabwe, Zambia, Madagascar for domestic and international arbitration and Mauritius for 
international arbitration only. See n 155 above.  However, one SADC member, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, is apparently committed to becoming a member of OHADA.  See n 159 above. 
183 Examples include European countries like Germany, Spain, Ireland, Scotland, and the Russian 
Federation; nations in the Pacific Rim like India, Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong as a special 
administrative region of China, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Canada; and in Africa Nigeria, 
Tunisia, Egypt, Kenya and Uganda. 
184 A relevant example in an African context is the Africa ADR Rules for the Conduct of Arbitrations 
which rules are clearly based on those of UNCITRAL.  Africa ADR is a recently launched Southern 
African private-sector initiative promoting international arbitration and ADR in the region.  See 
http://www.africaadr.com. 
185 The writer adopts these arguments that were advanced and canvassed in discussion papers at 
International Arbitral Workshop in Mauritius, 12 April 2007.  
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only ten African states have adopted it. As aptly observed by the South African Law 
Commission: 
 
“The Model Law’s provisions sometimes represent a compromise between different 
legal traditions and its wording differs from that customarily used by some 
legislatures. Therefore courts, arbitrators, parties to arbitrations and their legal 
advisers may have some difficulty in interpreting some of its provisions. Moreover, 
the choice of wording for the English text was sometimes influenced by the need to 
facilitate translation without ambiguity into all six languages used by 
UNCITRAL.”186 
 
Neither the French-influenced OHADA systems nor the Western-influenced Model 
Law, however useful, should be adopted, particularly for domestic arbitration, without 
giving careful thought to integration and interaction with customary arbitration law of 
the relevant jurisdiction.187 In Africa the pitch for reform of arbitration law ought, of 
practical necessity and essence, to include express provisions for the recognition of 
the customary forms of dispute resolution. 
 
2.4.4 The UNCITRAL Model Law 
 
2.4.4.1 Introduction 
 
The following observations provide a foundation and background to the discussion of 
the Model Law. Firstly, although the Model Law was crafted for international 
commercial arbitration its ambit has been extended by many states adopting it for 
domestic arbitration as well and has greatly influenced the legislative practices of both 
developed and developing states188 and also the commercial activities of their 
nationals, particularly when drafting dispute resolution clauses.189 Secondly, the 
impact of the Model Law in the jurisprudence and case law of countries that have 
adopted it would be apposite and relevant in the evaluation of arbitration 
                                                 
186 Report Arbitration: an International Arbitration Act for South Africa (1998) para 2.52. 
187 The extent to which foreign-oriented legislation captures or reflects the ethos and common essence 
of arbitration as a better option for dispute resolution for African users ought to be a paramount 
consideration. 
188 African states such as Kenya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. See n 155 above. 
189 Asouzu AA “Arbitration In Africa: Agenda for Reform” (1997) 6 Arbitration and Dispute 
Resolution Law Journal 377. 
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jurisprudence in Africa.190 Furthermore, although England did not adopt the Model 
Law, very close attention was paid to the Model Law when drafting the English 
Arbitration Act of 1996 and both the structure and the content of the Act owe much to 
the Model Law.191 The English courts have dealt with many cases192 involving the 
English Arbitration Act 1996 and have considered issues that have not yet arisen for 
consideration in the three African jurisdictions.193 English judicial precedents are not 
only routinely cited in Kenyan and African courts and tribunals of the common-law 
tradition but are also persuasive sources of authority on the same or similar issues in 
disputes between African parties.194 
 
Thirdly, because the Model Law is a partial law and not a comprehensive code there 
is scope for domestic arbitration law in Africa to fill the gaps. This means that for the 
time being significant areas of arbitration practice that are either not covered at all or 
not adequately covered by the Model Law will be governed by the existing domestic 
or common law on arbitration.195 Alternatively, jurisdictions adopting the Model Law 
for domestic arbitration as well, may decide to supplement its provisions for that 
                                                 
190 For a review of decisions from other jurisdictions between 1985 and 2001 see Alvarez HC, Kaplan 
N & Rivkin DW Model Law Decisions (2003). Even in a non-Model Law jurisdiction like South 
Africa, the Constitutional Court in Lufuno Mphaphuli & Associates (Pty) Ltd v Andrews 2009 4 SA 529 
(CC), [2009] ZACC 6 paras 225-232 recently and carefully considered the approach of the Model Law 
regarding the setting aside of awards to inform the court on how the grounds for setting aside in s 33 of 
the South African Arbitration Act should be properly and constitutionally interpreted. 
191 See Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law (DAC) 1996 Report on the Arbitration 
Bill para 4. 
192 An important example is the judgment in Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v Impregilo 
SpA and others [2005] UKHL 43. 
193 See also Shackelton S “Annual Review of English Judicial Decisions on Arbitration – 2000” (2001) 
4 International Arbitration LawReview 178-201. 
194 Orojo & Aromo Law and Practice of Arbitration and Conciliation in Nigeria 12. It is stated in 
Cotran & Amissah (eds) Arbitration in Africa 200 that “[b]ecause of the influence of English 
legislation on the South African statute [the 1965 Act] and because of the wealth of English case law 
on arbitration, South African courts tend to refer to English cases in the absence of South African 
authority.” The same applies in Kenya.  In Lufuno Mphaphuli & Associates (Pty) Ltd v Andrews 2009 4 
SA 529 (CC), [2009] ZACC 6 paras 225-232 the SA Constitutional Court referred to the English 
Arbitration Act in addition to the Model Law to determine the constitutionally correct interpretation of 
s 33 of the SA Arbitration Act regarding the grounds on which a court can set aside an award. 
195 As noted earlier the common law applies where the arbitration agreement is oral (see para 2.3.1.1 
above). It may also be added that while acknowledging that England’s initial outright rejection of the 
Model Law was a mistake, Lord Mustill also acknowledged the value of the Model Law first as 
providing confidence that international arbitration can be conducted in any state that has adopted the 
Model Law; secondly that acceptance of the Model Law will make it easier for developing countries to 
attract international arbitration to their territories: see Asouzu “Arbitration in Africa: Agenda for 
Reform” (1997) 6 Arbitration and Dispute Resolution Law Journal 373 377. 
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purpose.196 Fourthly, because the Model Law applies to both international and 
domestic arbitration in the three selected African jurisdictions it will be beneficial to 
start with a brief historical background, followed by a statement of its aims and 
guiding principles. There will then follow a general overview of its content before 
proceeding to a discussion of its interaction and correlation with the legislation of the 
selected jurisdictions.  
 
Quite obviously the adoption of the Model Law cannot guarantee the achievement of 
the objectives sometimes attributed to it such as an increased flow of trade and 
investment in the adopting state. The hope may nevertheless be expressed that the 
acceptance of the legal framework of the Model Law could lead to the development 
and improvement of an active arbitration environment in the adoptive African states. 
 
2.4.4.2 The UNCITRAL Model Law: The Background 
 
UNCITRAL is the acronym for the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law.  This body was established by the United Nations General Assembly in 
December 1966 to work on the harmonization and unification of international trade 
law.197 UNCITRAL was active in the field of arbitration long before the Model Law 
was crafted.198  For example, after its establishment, UNCITRAL promoted accession 
to the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards199 and drafted the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976) and in 1986 
it published recommendations to assist arbitral institutions and other interested bodies 
with regard to arbitrations under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.200  
 
In view of attempts to show that the Model Law pays insufficient regard to the 
interests of developing countries, it is important to note that the decision to undertake 
                                                 
196 See for example the Kenya Arbitration Act s 39, which contains contract-in procedures for referring 
a question of law to the court for an opinion and for taking a question of law in an award on appeal to 
the court; and the New Zealand Arbitration Act 99 of 1996 sch 2. 
197 General Assembly Resolution 2205 of 17 December 1966. 
198 On the functions of UNCITRAL within the UN see Holtzman & Neuhaus A Guide to the 
UNCITRAL Model Law 4-5; Binder P International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation in 
UNCITRAL Model Law Jurisdictions 2 ed (2005) 8-9. 
199 UN A/CN 9/168. 
200 UN A/34/17 para 81. On the drafting of the Model Law by the Working Group on International 
Contract Practices, see UN. A/36/17 para 70. See also Davidson F Arbitration (2000) 35-39. 
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the drafting of the Model Law was made pursuant to an initiative of the Asian-African 
Legal Consultative Committee.201 The Model Law went through five drafts as at 
March 1984 before the analytical compilation of comments from governments and 
interested international organizations was produced.202 This was followed by the 
UNCITRAL secretariat’s own analytical commentary203 and the approval of the final 
text by UNCITRAL on 21 June 21 1985 culminating on 11 December 1985 with the 
resolution of the UN General Assembly approving the Model Law and requesting the 
UN Secretary General to transmit the text of the Model Law to governments, arbitral 
institutions and interested bodies to be considered for adoption in national law.204 The 
records of the various drafting sessions form part of the travaux préparatoires.205 
 
The travaux préparatoires tell the drafting story of the Model Law and are a useful 
tool for interpretation of the articles of the Model Law.  The extent, if any, to which 
the Model Law travaux can be used to interpret articles of domestic law adaptations 
of the Model Law must be a matter for national practice and legislation.  The travaux 
préparatoires are voluminous and comprise the material that emerged from the 
drafting process.206 They represent the various drafts of the Model Law and 
accompanying notes, the working group reports, the reports and notes of the 
secretariat, the analytical compilation of government comments, the analytical 
commentary on the draft by the secretariat, the summary record of the session of 
UNCITRAL in June 1985 to consider the draft text, and the report following that 
session.  UNCITRAL itself thought that only the travaux préparatoires of the session 
at which the Model Law was adopted should be forwarded together with the text of 
the Model Law as an interpretative aid to governments and other interested parties,207 
                                                 
201 See the SA Law Commission’s Report Arbitration: an International Arbitration Act for South 
Africa (1998) para 2.7 citing Sornarajah M“The UNCITRAL Model Law: a Third World Viewpoint” 
(1989) 6(4) Journal of International Arbitration 7-20. On the idea behind the Model Law and the 
contribution of the African-Asian Legal Consultative Committee (AALCC) see UN A/32/17 para 39 
and Binder International Commercial Arbitration 9. 
202 UN A/CN 9/ 263. 
203 UN A/CN 9/364. 
204 See further Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 9-15; Binder International 
Commercial Arbitration 9-10. 
205 General Assembly Resolution 40/72. See also Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL 
Model Law 9. 
206 Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 15-16, 19-20; Binder International 
Commercial Arbitration 11; Broches A Commentary on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration (1990). 
207 See the 1985 Commission Report A/40/17 para 333. 
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and this recommendation was adopted by the General Assembly.208 Quite obviously 
notes and guidelines that have come into existence after the adoption of the Model 
Law209 will also be useful aids to the better understanding and acceptance of the 
Model Law and states may well take cognizance of that fact by appropriate legislative 
provisions in their national laws. There is however a lack of uniformity by states 
adopting the Model Law in specifying what constitutes the travaux préparatoires that 
may be used as an interpretative aid.210 
 
A primary goal of the Model Law is acknowledged to be the promotion of uniformity 
of national laws applying to international commercial arbitration. Uniform 
interpretation of the Model Law is therefore desirable. To that end it will be helpful if 
those interpreting that law have access to the travaux préparatoires and indeed 
several Commonwealth countries expressly permit reference to the travaux by 
adopting one of two methods, either a reference to specific documents211 or a general 
reference to the travaux préparatoires.212 In recommending that South Africa should 
implement the Model Law, the Law Commission also recommended that the enacting 
legislation should authorize reference to an expanded but specified list of documents 
as an interpretation aid.213 
                                                 
208 Binder International Commercial Arbitration 11. 
209 Such as the Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the Model Law (1986) and the 
updated version (2008) published with the original and amended versions of the Model Law.  These 
Explanatory Notes have a disclaimer in a footnote to the effect that the relevant note is for 
informational purposes only and is not an official commentary on the Model Law. 
210 See the text below. 
211 Two such specific documents are: The Analytical Commentary on Draft Text of a Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration; and The Report of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law on the Work of its Eighteenth Session (3 – 21 June, 1985). 
212 See the SA Law Commission’s Report Arbitration: an International Arbitration Act for South 
Africa (1998) para 2.56-2.57. For example, the Canadian (Federal) Commercial Arbitration Act of 
1986 s 4(2) permits reference to only two specific documents, whereas the Zimbabwean Arbitration 
Act s 2(3) makes only a general reference to the travaux préparatoires that may be consulted. 
213 See the SA Law Commission’s Report Arbitration: an International Arbitration Act for South 
Africa (1998) para 2.58-2.59. The list is as follows: 
(a) Report of the Secretary-General: possible features of a model law on international 
commercial arbitration (A/CN9/207 of 14 May 1981); 
(b) Report of the Working Group on International Contract Practices on the work of its third 
session (A/CN9/216 of 23 March 1982); 
(c) Report of the Working Group on International Contract Practices on the work of its fourth 
session (A/CN9/323 of 10 November 1982); 
(d) Report of the Working Group on International Contract Prices on the work of its fifth session 
(A/CN9/233 of 28 March 1983); 
(e) Report of the Working Group on International Contract Practices on the work of its sixth 
session (A/CN9/245 of 22 September 1983); 
(f) Report of the Working Group on International Contract Prices on the work of its seventh 
session (A/CN9/246 of 6 March 1984) 
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In addition the Law Commission’s own report was recommended to be sanctioned as 
an interpretation aid for the Model Law and the implementing legislation. The 
justification for relaxing the ordinary rules of statutory interpretation214 to 
accommodate this recommendation was said to be the twin goals of promoting 
harmonization and the desirability of the Model Law being applied in South Africa in 
a way compatible with the intention of its drafters.215 It is nevertheless perhaps 
surprising that the Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat, prepared 
subsequent to its adoption and published with the Model Law, as a guide to its 
adoption, was not included by the Law Commission on its list. 
 
With regard to the internationality of the Model Law, it has been observed by the 
UNCITRAL Secretariat in its Analytical Commentary that: 
 
“In accordance with the mandate of the Commission, the Model Law is designed to 
establish a special regime for international cases. It is in these cases that the present 
disparity between national laws creates difficulties and adversely affects the 
functioning of the arbitral process. Furthermore, in these cases more flexible and 
liberal rules are needed in order to overcome local constraints and peculiarities. 
Finally, in these cases the interest of a State in maintaining its traditional concepts 
and familiar rules is less strong than in a strictly domestic setting. However, despite 
this design and legislative self-restraint, any State is free to take the model law, 
whether immediately or at a later stage, as a model for legislation on domestic 
arbitration and, thus, avoid a dichotomy within its arbitration law. … Unless a State 
opts for such unitary treatment, the test of “internationality” set forth in article 1(2) is 
of utmost importance and crucial for the applicability of ‘this Law’.”216 
 
                                                                                                                                            
(g) Analytical compilation of comments by Governments and international organizations on the 
draft text of a model law on international commercial arbitration: report of the Secretary-
General (A/CN9/263 of 19 March 1985), including the three addenda dated 15 April 1985, 
21 May 1985 and 31 July 1985); 
(h) Analytical Commentary on draft text of a Model Law on international commercial arbitration 
(A/CN9/264 of 25 March 1985); and 
(i) Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the work of its 
eighteenth session (A/40/17 of 21 August 1985). 
214 The Commission (para 2.53 n 53) also pointed out that relaxation of the traditional rule in any event 
permitted reference to parliamentary material to clarify ambiguities, citing S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 
391 (CC) 405C-E and Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart 1993 AC 593 (HL) 634D-E:  
215 See the SA Law Commission’s Report Arbitration: an International Arbitration Act for South 
Africa (1998) paras 2.59 and 2.61. 
216 A/CN9/264 para 22, quoted in Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 71. 
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The Model Law is expressly subject to other laws of the adopting state by which 
certain disputes may not be submitted to arbitration, as well as to treaty obligations of 
the adopting state.  Each of these will be briefly discussed. 
 
Article 1(5) states that the Model Law shall not affect any other law of the adopting 
state pursuant to which certain disputes may not be arbitrable or can only be arbitrated 
under other laws. As the Model Law does not itself deal with what disputes are 
arbitrable, some countries in adopting the Model Law have, in the interests of greater 
certainty, included a definition of arbitrability in their version of the Model Law.217 
Article 9 of the Model Law adopts a similar approach insofar as it leaves the extent of 
the court’s powers to grant interim measures in support of arbitration to be determined 
by domestic law.218 UNCITRAL also considered the situation where the Model Law 
conflicts with other laws dealing with arbitration procedure. In such cases it must be 
deemed implicit that the Model Law, as lex specialis, prevails within its sphere of 
application.219 This appears logical in jurisdictions where the Model Law is adopted 
for international commercial arbitration only, but the position is more complex when 
the Model Law is adopted for domestic arbitration as well.220 
 
Under Article 1(1) the Model Law applies subject to any agreement in force between the 
adopting state and any other state or states. Examples of multi-lateral treaties covered by 
this provision include the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses (1923), the Geneva 
Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1927), the New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958) and 
the Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of other States (1965).  The provision is wide enough to cover treaties devoted 
to other subject-matters but which contain a provision on arbitration. The travaux 
préparatoires, for example, mention Article 22(3) of the Hamburg Convention on the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978), which provides for the place of arbitration to be 
                                                 
217 See Binder International Commercial Arbitration 26-27 and see para 3.2.3 below regarding the 
Zimbabwe Arbitration Act s 4. 
218 The position is not fundamentally altered by Article 17J of the 2006 amendments: the extent of the 
court’s power to grant interim measures is still determined by legislation or rules outside the Model 
Law. 
219 Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 38; Binder International Commercial 
Arbitration 26. 
220 See para 2.4.4.5(i) for a discussion of relevant ambiguities in the arbitration legislation in the three 
African states giving effect to the Model Law and para 2.4.4.4 for the interaction between the Model 
Law and customary arbitration law in the three jurisdictions. 
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determined at the option of the claimant and is thus inconsistent with Article 20 of the 
Model Law which allows the parties to determine the place of arbitration.  The former 
provision as a treaty obligation would clearly override the latter.221  
 
The provision in Article 1(1) of the Model Law also clearly applies to dispute resolution 
clauses in bilateral investment treaties. 
 
Another important provision regarding the scope of application of the Model Law is 
Article 1(2), in terms of which most of the provisions of the Model Law apply only if 
the place of arbitration is in the adopting state. This territorial scope of application is 
subject to the exceptions created by Articles 8, 9, 35 and 36. Article 8 requires the 
court before which an action in a matter subject to a valid arbitration agreement is 
brought to refer the parties to arbitration.222 It is submitted that this provision’s extra-
territorial application reflects the recognition that an arbitration agreement cannot be 
fully effective unless it prevents a party from taking the arbitral dispute to the court of 
any state. Article 9 provides that it is not incompatible with an arbitration agreement 
for a party to request and a court to grant an interim measure of protection.223 The 
inference is that although a court of an adopting state may not permit a party to 
litigate an arbitral dispute in that state, that court may nevertheless entertain and grant 
a request from such party for an order, for example, to preserve a crucial piece of 
evidence for purposes of the arbitration, as was done by the High Court of Hong Kong 
in The Lady Muriel.224 The powers granted by Articles 8 and 9 were so conferred, it 
would seem, on the courts of the adopting state irrespective of the place of arbitration 
or the law under which the arbitration was conducted.225 It can be seen therefore that 
the Model Law recognizes the need for interaction between the Model Law and 
domestic arbitration laws and the need for the state courts to respect the integrity of 
the arbitral process even if the arbitration is not being conducted in that particular 
state. The other two provisions with extra-territorial application are Articles 35 and 
                                                 
221 Analytical Commentary (on Article 1), A/CN9/264 para 11; Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the 
UNCITRAL Model Law 69-70. 
222 See para 2.4.4.5(i) below. 
223 Article 1(2) of the Model Law was amended in 2006 so that the new provisions regarding court 
involvement with interim measures, including enforcement of interim measures granted by the tribunal 
also have extra-territorial application.  These provisions are Articles 17H, 17I and 17J. 
224 The Lady Muriel [1995] 2 HKC 320 – a case in which the Hong Kong High Court granted an order 
to permit the inspection of a ship in Hong Kong waters.  See further para 3.5 below on interim 
measures. 
225 UN A/40/17 para 75. 
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36, which provide for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards by the court 
of the adopting state, irrespective of the jurisdiction in which the arbitration took 
place.226 
 
The territorial criterion under Article 1(2) is also of particular practical importance 
because the functions of arbitration assistance and supervision set out under Articles 
11, 13, 14, 16 and 34 are to be provided by the national court of the state in which the 
arbitration takes place.227 
 
The objective of UNCITRAL in adopting the Model Law for international 
commercial arbitration was the development and harmonization of arbitration law.228 
This is because UNCITRAL, through its global survey of national laws on arbitration, 
found domestic law to be disparate and unsuitable for international cases in particular. 
This is not entirely surprising as in general, national laws are primarily designed for 
national purposes. The form of the Model Law was preferred to the form of treaties or 
conventions because it afforded states more flexibility for adaptation.229 As such the 
Model Law held out the promise of facilitating the goals of improving and 
harmonizing national arbitration laws. As noted by Fleischhauer,230 the advent of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration constituted a most 
remarkable development and influential accomplishment in the field of commercial 
arbitration. 
 
The declared aims of the Model Law are the liberalization of international arbitration 
by emphasizing party autonomy and allowing the parties the freedom to choose how 
their disputes should be determined while also reducing the role of the national courts 
in arbitration; establishing a defined core of mandatory provisions to ensure fairness 
and due process; providing a framework for conducting an international commercial 
arbitration so that if the parties failed to agree on the procedure the arbitration could 
                                                 
226 See para 3.6.3 below. 
227 For purposes of articles 11, 13 and 14, the adopting state may designate another competent authority 
instead of a court to perform the relevant function. 
228 See the Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the Model Law and Commentary in 
A/CN9/264; UNCITRAL Yearbook Vol XVI, 1985. 
229 See Binder International Commercial Arbitration 11-12. 
230 The Legal Counsel and Head of the Office of Legal Affairs of the UN Secretariat that serviced and 
assisted UNCITRAL’s work on the Model Law in his foreword to Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the 
UNCITRAL Model Law v. 
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nevertheless proceed to completion; and providing for the recognition and 
enforcement of the award.231 
 
2.4.4.3 The Model Law and Domestic Arbitration 
 
Although the Model Law is specifically designed for international232 commercial 
arbitration, the drafters recognized that states were free to adopt the Model Law for 
domestic arbitration as well.233  Thus the application of the Model Law will depend 
on the wording of the national legislation adopting it.234 Where a jurisdiction adopts 
the Model Law for international commercial arbitration only, the legislature may 
nevertheless also include an “opt-in” provision, giving the parties the choice to apply 
it to a domestic arbitration as well. Therefore in Scotland, for example, it is open to 
parties to arbitrations which are international but not commercial or vice versa or 
neither international nor commercial to invoke the Model Law.235 
 
The principles and individual solutions adopted in the Model Law are aimed at 
reducing or eliminating the disparities between national laws and the problems and 
undesirable consequences created by uncertainties in national arbitration laws.236 It is 
necessary to bear in mind that although the Model Law is adaptable by national 
legislation to domestic arbitration, its core essence was dictated by the drafters’ 
concerns with international commercial arbitration.237 This fact therefore reinforces 
the need for national legislators not simply to take the Model Law on face value in 
deciding to apply it to domestic arbitration, but to be careful to ensure that the 
                                                 
231 See the SA Law Commission’s Report Arbitration: an International Arbitration Act for South 
Africa (1998) para 2.7. See also the Report of the Secretary-General: Possible Features of a Model Law 
on International Commercial Arbitration A/CN9/207, 14 May 1981 paras 16-27; Merkin R Arbitration 
Law (1991) 1-11. 
232 See particularly Article 1(1) and the definition of “international” in article 1(3). 
233 See Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 28. 
234 Note the earlier comments on monistic and dualistic arbitration legislation in para 2.2 above. 
235 See Davidson Arbitration 40, citing s 66(4) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
(Scotland) Act, which states: 
“The parties to an arbitration agreement may, notwithstanding that the arbitration would not be 
an international commercial arbitration within the meaning of article 1 of the Model Law as set 
out in Schedule 7 to this Act, agree that the Model Law as set out in that Schedule shall apply, 
and that in such a case the Model Law as so set out shall apply to that arbitration.” 
The SA Law Commission in its Report Arbitration: an International Arbitration Act for South Africa 
(1998) paras 2.271-2.276 in recommending that South Africa adopt the Model Law for international 
commercial arbitration only, concluded that an opt-in provision was not desirable. 
236 See UNCITRAL’s Secretariat’s Explanatory Note (1986) para 7. 
237 Article 1(1). 
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modifications intended or desired for domestic purposes are such as will best serve 
the ends of domestic arbitration law. 
 
2.4.4.4  A Brief Overview of the Model Law and its Enactment in the Three 
Jurisdictions 
 
The Model Law, as originally adopted in 1985, has eight chapters.238  The first 
Chapter contains General Provisions under Articles 1 to 6.  The remaining chapters 
follow the chronology of an arbitration, starting with the definition and enforcement 
of an arbitration agreement (Chapter II); then the composition of the arbitral tribunal 
including the procedures for the appointment of arbitrators (Chapter III); the 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal (Chapter IV); the conduct of the arbitral 
proceedings (Chapter V); the requirements of an arbitral award and the termination of 
the proceedings (Chapter VI); the procedure for challenging an award in the courts 
(Chapter VII) and finally the recognition and enforcement of the award by the courts 
(Chapter VIII). 
 
Because of the controversies revealed by its legislative history the consensus reached 
by the drafters of the Model Law on the principles and major issues of international 
arbitration practice is a substantial achievement. The brevity and succinctness of the 
Model Law may have been intended to enhance its worldwide appeal and acceptance. 
 
As already noted however the Model Law is not comprehensive as there are certain 
important areas in practice that it does not cover. These will be identified later in this 
chapter, also with reference to the 2006 amendments to the Model Law.239 
 
It has also been noted that there are no official criteria for deeming any state a Model 
Law state240 and none were set by UNCITRAL.  Redfern and Hunter241 have 
published a list of countries that have adopted arbitration legislation based on the 
                                                 
238 As part of the 2006 amendments to the Model Law, a new chapter, Ch IV A “Interim Measures and 
Preliminary Orders” was added.  This chapter only applies in Model Law jurisdictions which 
specifically adopt it.  The three African states under consideration have yet to do so.  These 2006 
amendments are discussed in para 3.5.3 below. 
239 See Para 2.4.4.6 below. 
240 See Binder International Commercial Arbitration 12. 
241 Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 633. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 87 
UNCITRAL Model Law.242 Kenya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe are included in the list. The 
criteria for inclusion are stated by Redfern and Hunter as firstly, that the legislation 
must give the impression of having taken the Model Law as a basis with amendments 
and additions without just taking the Model Law as one from various models or 
following only its principles; secondly that about 70 to 80 per cent of the Model Law 
provisions are included; and thirdly, that the legislation contains no provisions 
incompatible with modern international commercial arbitration.243 
 
The arbitration statutes of Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe qualify as “Model Law 
jurisdictions” by the stated criteria. However, the legislatures of these states adopted 
the bulk of the Model Law through differing legislative techniques. Kenya’s 
Arbitration Act of 1995244 substantially enacts the provisions of the Model Law under 
eight Parts which correspond to the eight Chapters of the Model Law under the same 
or similar headings. The Act which came into force on 2 January 1996245 repealed the 
previous arbitration law under Chapter 49 of the Laws of Kenya. An important 
difference between the Act and the Model Law is that the Act applies to both 
domestic and international arbitrations246 unlike the Model Law, which applies to 
international commercial arbitration.247 
 
The Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act,248 while enacting all the substantial 
provisions of the Model Law, differs in structure from that law and those of Kenya 
and Zimbabwe. The Act is in four parts. Part I deals with arbitration under thirty-six 
sections, Part II covers conciliation, and Part III contains additional provisions 
relating to international commercial arbitration and conciliation. The Act concludes 
with miscellaneous provisions under Part IV. 
 
                                                 
242 For the full current list of jurisdictions that are recognized by UNCITRAL as Model Law states see 
http://www.uncitral.org. 
243 Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 633; Binder International Commercial 
Arbitration 12-13. 
244 Act 4 of 1995. 
245 By Legal Notice 394 of 1995 pursuant to s 2 of the Act. 
246 S 2. 
247 Model Law Article 1(1). 
248 Decree 11 of 1988; subsequently Chapter 19 of the Laws of Nigeria (1990) and Chapter 18 of the 
Laws of Nigeria (2004). Orojo & Ajomo Law and Practice of Arbitration and Conciliation in Nigeria 
refer to this enactment as a “Decree” and not as an “Act” in conformity with the Revised Edition (Laws 
of the Federation of Nigeria)(Amendment) Decree 55 of 1992. Reference to the 1988 Decree as the 
1988 Act would now seem acceptable. 
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The long title states that the Act is “to provide a unified legal framework for the fair 
and efficient settlement of commercial disputes by arbitration and conciliation and to 
make applicable the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral 
Awards [The New York Convention] to any award made in Nigeria or in any 
contracting State arising out of international commercial arbitration.”249 Although the 
order of presentation differs from that of the Model Law, there is no doubt that the 
Act has borrowed heavily from the provisions of the Model Law, for which reason 
Nigeria is listed by UNCITRAL as a Model Law state. For purposes of comparative 
study we are concerned mainly with the provisions of Parts I and III.250 
 
Zimbabwe is another African country that has embraced the Model Law for both 
domestic and international arbitration and the manner of its adoption in Zimbabwe is 
both simple and exemplary. The Arbitration Act 1996251 is an enactment under seven 
brief sections into which the Model Law, with minor modifications,252 is incorporated 
under the First Schedule to the Act. In this way the Zimbabwe adoptive technique of 
the Model Law differed from that of Kenya which, as noted, in its 1995 Act 
substantially re-enacted the provisions of the Model Law for both domestic and 
international arbitration and also from the Nigerian Decree of 1988 which expanded 
the Model Law to provide specifically for domestic and international arbitration as 
well as for conciliation. 
 
The territorial scope of application of the Zimbabwean Act follows that of the Model 
Law and is subject to the same exceptions,253 but the Model Law definition of 
international arbitration is omitted from the Zimbabwean statue which applies in any 
event to both domestic and international arbitration.254 
 
                                                 
249 The Nigerian statute is therefore mainly monistic. 
250 It seems that the structure of this Act has confused even distinguished jurists and provoked 
controversy. See Idornigie PO “The Relationship between Arbitral and Court Proceedings in Nigeria” 
(2002) 19(5) Journal of International Arbitration 443 446. 
251 Act 6 of 1996. 
252 For example under sch 1 Article 10(2), the number of arbitrators, failing determination by the 
parties shall be one in a domestic arbitration in contrast to three under Article 10(2) of the Model Law. 
253 See the Zimbabwe Act s 3 and compare the Model Law Article 1(2), discussed in para 2.4.4.2 
above. 
254 See the long title of the Act. This makes the arbitration legislation in Zimbabwe monistic, subject to 
the exception in sch 1 Article 10(2), referred to in n 249 above and para 2.4.4.5 (i) below. 
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UNCITRAL includes Scotland in the list of Model Law jurisdictions. England and 
Wales are however intentionally omitted, because the English Arbitration Act 1996 
does not satisfy the first criterion referred to above.255 Nevertheless, it has been 
acknowledged that the English Act took several provisions directly from the Model 
Law256 and “follow[s], as far as possible, the structure and spirit of the Model 
Law”.257 The English response to the Model Law is discussed in more detail below.258 
 
The relevance of the English Act for purposes of this study is that although the Act 
follows the Model Law in many respects, in some ways it represents an advance on 
the Model Law.259 It deals with common issues in domestic arbitration as do the 
monistic statutes of Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe. Compared to previous English 
Arbitration Acts, there is in the 1996 Act a distinct shift away from judicial 
supervision of the arbitral process towards an increased party and tribunal 
autonomy.260 Powers to order parties to take certain steps to advance the arbitral 
proceedings are conferred on the tribunal rather than on the court.261 In Part I of the 
Act dealing with arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement, its drafters 
attempted to restate within a logical structure the basic principles of English 
arbitration law, but without providing an exhaustive code.262 Part I of the Act is based 
on three fundamental principles.263 
 
The English example of a shift from judicial supervision is instructive for Kenya as 
the English arbitration law upon which Kenyan arbitration tradition is based was 
traditionally suspicious of arbitration.  Whereas the earlier English legislation 
differentiated between domestic and international arbitration in some respects264 the 
                                                 
255 See the text to n 235 above. 
256 See the Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law (“DAC”) Report on the Arbitration 
Bill (1996) para 4. 
257 See the DAC Report on the Arbitration Bill (1996) para 2, quoting the DAC’s Interim Report of 
April 1995. 
258 See para 2.6 below. 
259 Davidson Arbitration 7; Davidson F “The New Arbitration Act - A Model Law” 1997 Journal of 
BusinessLaw 101; Merkin Arbitration Law 1-11.  Compare too Kerr M “International Commercial 
Arbitration – Worldwide” in Cotran E & Amissah A (eds) Arbitration in Africa 15 at 20, who states 
that England’s formal rejection of the Model law was a mistake and that prior to the reforms of 1996, 
English arbitration law provided too many opportunities for court intervention. 
260 For important differences between the English Act and the Model Law see Merkin Arbitration 1-11. 
261 See for example s 38. 
262 See the DAC Report on the Arbitration Bill (1996) para 9. 
263 See s 1, the DAC Report on the Arbitration Bill (1996) para 18 and para 2.6 below. 
264 See for example the Arbitration Act 1979 ss 3 and 4. 
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1996 Act makes no such distinction with both systems of arbitration now governed by 
the same flexibilities and freedoms.265 Therefore if the English Act is seen as 
exemplifying a modern system of arbitration law it can in that sense be a pattern for 
the development of Kenyan arbitration law. 
 
2.4.4.5 The Core Provisions of the Model Law 
 
It is not intended to discuss the Model Law provisions in full. In what follows the 
salient features of the Model Law are identified and elaborated upon insofar as they 
are relevant to this dissertation. 
 
(i) Scope of Application 
 
Although the Model Law, as noted, applies to international commercial arbitration,266 
it is relevant for this dissertation because its provisions also set out the basic 
requirements of domestic arbitration law267 such as, for example, the form of the 
arbitration agreement, the composition of the arbitral tribunal, the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal, the basic procedural rules governing the conduct of an arbitration, the 
making of the award and its enforcement. These important provisions of the Model 
Law are substantially replicated in the statutes of the three jurisdictions in this study. 
 
Article 1(1) delineates the scope of application by providing that the Model Law will 
apply to international commercial arbitration. In terms of Article 1(3), an arbitration is 
“international” if it falls into one of five categories. The first is where the parties have 
their place of business in different states. It is recognized that the majority of 
international arbitrations will fall into this category.268 In addition arbitration is also 
                                                 
265 Ss 85-87 concerning domestic arbitration agreements were not brought into effect with the rest of 
the Act, because they were perceived as being a restriction on the freedom to provide services and 
therefore incompatible with European Community law (see the DAC Supplementary Report on the 
Arbitration Act 1996 (1997) paras 47-50. 
266 See Article 1(i).  
267 Herrmann G “The Role of the Courts under the UNCITRAL Model Law Script” in Contemporary 
Problems in International Arbitration (1986) 164 167. Herrmann, an authority on the Model Law, 
argues that it would be suitable also for any advanced system of domestic arbitration. See also Binder 
International Commercial Arbitration 23 who states that 23 of the first 61 jurisdictions to adopt the 
Model Law applied it to domestic arbitration as well. 
268 Explanatory Note by UNCITRAL Secretariat para 10; Binder International Commercial Arbitration 
25. 
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international if, secondly, the place of arbitration or, thirdly, the place of contract 
performance or, fourthly the place with which the subject-matter of the dispute is 
most closely connected, is situated in a state269 other than that where the parties have 
their place of business. The fifth category is where the parties have expressly agreed 
that the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement relates to more than one 
country.270 In summary, arbitration is international if either the parties have their 
places of business in different states or when they are located in the same country, if 
the contract is to be performed or any dispute resolved in some other country. 
Consequently the parties or their dispute will determine the internationality of the 
arbitration.271 
 
The fifth category of international arbitration, referred to above, as defined in Article 
1(3)(c) appears as if it is an “opt-in” provision. It has drawn the criticism that such 
exercise of party autonomy would enable parties to evade mandatory provisions of 
law including those providing for exclusive court jurisdiction;272 and further that even 
parties from the same state may want to avoid the application of inconvenient 
provisions of their domestic law and rules which prevent the arbitration of certain 
disputes by choosing to arbitrate outside their state. 
 
Holtzmann and Neuhaus respond to this provision and its criticism with the argument 
that: 
 
“the opt-in party autonomy provided by the Law in Article 1(3)(c) is merely the 
power to select, for the sake of certainty, either of two systems adopted by the State’s 
legislature in cases in which the parties wish to arbitrate in their home State. It is not 
the power to choose a system that is unjust. Moreover the courts of the State maintain 
a measure of control in cases regarded as egregious because they have the power to 
                                                 
269 For example, where the parties conduct normal business in Nairobi, Kenya but one party was to 
deliver goods to Kampala, Uganda, as the place of contract performance or where the subject-matter of 
dispute is most closely connected with Kampala. 
270 Article 1(3)(c), discussed below. 
271 Merkin Arbitration Law para 1.9; see also SA Law Commission Report Arbitration: an 
International Arbitration Act for South Africa (1998) para 2.107, which describes the definition in 
Article 1(3) as using a “dual criterion”, one of which must be met. 
272 UN A/40/17 para 28; Gaillard E & Savage J (eds) International Commercial Arbitration 52-53 para 
103 criticise these criteria used in Article 1(3)(b)(i) and (c) for being entirely in the control of the 
parties. See also the SA Law Commission Report Arbitration: an International Arbitration Act for 
South Africa (1998) paras 2.273-2.274. 
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set aside or refuse enforcement of an award that is contrary to public policy. They 
also may be able to refuse to refer such cases to arbitration under Article 8.”273 
 
This explanation is not at all convincing as Article 1(3)(c) does indeed provide an 
escape route and an opportunity for national parties to evade inconvenient provisions 
of domestic law, especially as parties could include a foreign seat for an arbitration 
that according to the other criteria would be a domestic arbitration.274 
 
In context, the three jurisdictions deal with the problems of definition differently. 
Unlike the Model Law that understandably contains no definition of domestic 
arbitration, the monistic Kenyan Arbitration Act of 1995 that applies to both domestic 
and international arbitration, defines both systems of arbitration275 and the definition 
of international arbitration substantially replicates the Model Law provisions of 
Article 1(3). Therefore both the criticisms and responses to Article 1(3)(c) are 
apposite in the Kenyan context.276 
 
The Nigerian arbitration statute of 1988277 contains a definition of international 
arbitration which replicates the Model Law provisions278 with an additional paragraph 
that provides: 
 
“the parties, despite the nature of the contract, expressly agree that any dispute arising 
from the commercial transaction shall be treated as an international arbitration.”279 
 
                                                 
273 Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 32. See too Binder International 
Commercial Arbitration 26. Holtzmann & Neuhaus explain further that domestic arbitration laws tend 
to provide protections that are not needed by the sophisticated parties likely to use the opt-in provision.  
Obviously legislatures that object to this opt-in provision need not adopt it and may design their own. 
274 S 57(2)(d) of the Nigerian arbitration statute of 1988, discussed below, lends some weight to this 
criticism. 
275 S 3(2) and 3(3) respectively.  In addition to other requirements, an arbitration can only be domestic 
if the arbitration agreement provides expressly or by implication for arbitration in Kenya. 
276 The distinction between domestic and international arbitration is important in the context of s 39 of 
the Act, concerning the reference of a question of law to the court for an opinion and the possibility of 
an appeal against an award on a question of law, which only applies in a domestic arbitration.  See 
cross-ref regarding s 39. 
277 The definition is particularly relevant for ss 43-54 in Part III, which apply only to international 
commercial arbitration. 
278 See s 57(2)(a)-(c), which correspond to Article 1(3) of the Model Law. 
279 See s 57(2)(d). 
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Therefore the nature of the parties’ contract is not determinative on internationality280 
under the Nigerian statute and the parties enjoy greater freedom in deciding whether 
or not their arbitration is international. 
 
As the Zimbabwean Arbitration Act is monistic, the definition of “international” is 
omitted from Article 1 of the Model Law in the First Schedule to the Act. A minor but 
noteworthy point of detail concerning the composition of the arbitral tribunal is that 
although Article 10 of the Model Law and the Zimbabwe statute are in pari materia in 
providing for a tribunal of three arbitrators unless the parties otherwise agree, the 
Zimbabwean Article 10 introduces an exception for domestic arbitration by providing 
for a single arbitrator unless the parties otherwise agree. For this purpose, an 
arbitration is domestic if both parties have their principal place of business in 
Zimbabwe. 
 
As mentioned above the Model Law only applies to “commercial” arbitration.281 
Generally a commercial contract may be understood as the kind of contract concluded 
in the course of business by and between merchants and traders. The term 
“commercial” is undefined in the text of the Model Law. The literature282 on this 
subject reveals that the UNCITRAL working group on the Model Law did not reach 
consensus on a definition of “commercial” or on its inclusion in the text of that law. 
They settled instead on an illustrative list of commercial relationships in a footnote to 
Article 1.283 Although the New York Convention allows states adopting it to make the 
so-called commercial reservation, confining its application to “legal relationships … 
which are considered as commercial under the national law” of the adopting state,284 it 
was decided that this wording was inappropriate.285 It was thought that the inclusion 
of the illustrative list in the text of the Model Law might offend against the legislative 
                                                 
280 Under French law the determining feature is the nature of the transaction: Article 1492 of the French 
New Code of Civil Procedure provides that “an arbitration is international when it involves the interests 
of international trade”. 
281 See Article 1(1). 
282 First Working Group Report, A/CN 9/216 45-46 para 19,; Second Working Group Report A/CN 
9/232  48-49 para 32; Third Working Group Report A/CN 9/233 51-52 para 53, 56; Holtzmann & 
Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 32-35; Davidson Arbitration 48-50. 
283 According to the Secretariat’s Explanatory Note (1986) para 11, the illustrative list emphasizes the 
width of the suggested interpretation, and indicates that the test is not based on what the national law 
may regard as “commercial”. 
284 See Article I(3). 
285 UN A/CN 9/207 para 31. 
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techniques of some states by the list being construed by some legislatures as complete 
and by others as either too wide or too vague.286 UNCITRAL itself recommended that 
the term be given a wide interpretation to cover matters arising from all relationships 
of a commercial nature whether contractual or not. Primarily therefore claims in 
contract and tort would be within the ambit of the term “commercial”.287 On this basis 
it would seem that a relationship could qualify as commercial even where one or both 
parties were not commercial individuals or institutions, the emphasis being on the 
nature of the transaction rather than on the status or designation of the parties.288 
 
The legislative history also provided examples of relationships that were not 
considered commercial such as labour and employment disputes, ordinary consumer 
claims despite their relation to business289 and family-law matters.290 
 
Both the Kenyan291 and Zimbabwean292 statutes omit the word “commercial” when 
determining the application of the Act,293 but under the Zimbabwean statute a matter 
concerning a consumer contract is not arbitrable unless the consumer has, by a 
separate agreement, agreed to arbitration.294 In effect, additional formalities are 
imposed for a valid arbitration agreement relating to a particular type of non-
commercial matter.295 In contrast, for purposes of the Nigerian arbitration statute of 
                                                 
286 Third Working Group Report, supra. A United Kingdom recommendation to define commercial in 
general terms in the text with an explanatory commentary was rejected in preference for the footnote 
under Article 1 which was in the nature of an “incipient agreed commentary”. See Holtzmann & 
Neuhaus, Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 74. 
287 The footnote to Article 1 urges the term to be widely interpreted. Professor Sornarajah criticises the 
description of “commercial” as too wide, arguing that it would work to the detriment of developing 
countries which would not be able to retain control over foreign trade and investment if this wide 
definition was adopted. In other words the public interest laws that are intended to protect the weaker 
party would be frustrated if these disputes are resolved by private arbitration. See Sornarajah M “The 
UNCITRAL Model Law: A Third World Viewpoint” 6 Journal of International Arbitration (2002) 
19(2) p.130. He acknowledges that the Model Law footnote on “commercial” is not binding but merely 
recommendatory. 
288 UN/A/40/17 paras 21-26 quoted in Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 94-
95. See also the Ontario case of Carter v McLaughlin (1996) 27 O R (3d) 792. 
289 UN Analytical Commentary on Article 2; A/CN 9/264 para 18. 
290 UN A/CN9/207 para 31. 
291 See s 2. 
292 See the First Schedule, Article 1. 
293 Note the use of the phrase “commercial relationship” in s 3(2)(c) and 3(3)(b)(ii) of the Kenyan 
Arbitration Act is probably an error as the application of the Act is not confined to only commercial 
relationships. Compare the SA Law Commission Report Arbitration: an International Arbitration Act 
for South Africa (1998) paras 2.101-2.105.  The Commission favoured the retention of “commercial” in 
Article 1(1), but without the term being defined. 
294 See s 4(2)(f). 
295 See SA Law Commission Report on Domestic Arbitration (2001) paras 3.283 and 3.285. 
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1988, “arbitration” in Nigeria means a commercial arbitration whether or not 
administered by a permanent arbitral institution, and the definition of “commercial” 
without more replicates all the relationships exemplified in the footnote to Article 1 of 
the Model Law, referred to above.296  It appears that the application of the entire 
statute is confined to commercial arbitration.  The definition of “commercial” is also 
relevant for Part III of the statute, which only applies to cases relating to international 
commercial arbitration.297 
 
Because “arbitration”, the third word of the phrase “international commercial 
arbitration”, is indeed the core subject-matter and the very activity covered by the 
Model Law the omission of its definition is remarkable.298 Instead what the Model 
Law offers is a clarification of arbitration under Article 2(a) by which arbitration 
means “any arbitration whether or not administered by a permanent arbitral 
institution”. The Kenyan and Zimbabwean provisions are in the same terms.299 As 
noted, the Nigerian statute confines arbitration to “commercial” arbitration whether or 
not administered by a permanent arbitral institution.300 Therefore both institutional 
and ad hoc arbitrations are governed by the Model Law and the statutes of the three 
jurisdictions. 
 
Before leaving the scope of application of the Model Law defined under Article 1, it 
is relevant to observe that Article 1(2) confines the territorial scope of application to 
the territory of the enacting State, subject to the exceptions referred to above.301 The 
provision is replicated in the Zimbabwean statute,302 but there appears to be no 
corresponding provision in the Nigerian and Kenyan statutes.  
 
(ii) The Arbitration Agreement 
 
Article 7(1) of the Model Law defines “arbitration agreement” as an agreement of the 
parties “to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may 
                                                 
296 S 57(1). 
297 S 43. 
298 See too the discussion of this point by Binder International Commercial Arbitration 30-32. 
299 S 3(1), Kenya; First Schedule Article 2(a), Zimbabwe. 
300 S 57(1). 
301 See the text above. 
302 S 3. 
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arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship whether contractual or 
not.” An existing dispute (compromis) and a future dispute (clause compromissoire) 
are therefore both covered.303  Article 7(2) of the Model Law, as originally approved 
in 1985,304 requires the arbitration agreement to be in writing and it is in writing if: 
 
(a) “it is contained in a document signed by the parties or in an exchange of 
letters, telex, telegrams or other means of communication which provide 
a record of the agreement, or in an exchange of statements of claim and 
defence in which the existence of an agreement is alleged by one party 
and not denied by another” or 
 
(b) there is a reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration 
clause provided the contract is in writing and the wording of the 
reference is sufficient to incorporate the provision.305 
 
The Kenyan statute omits the definition of an arbitration agreement provided by the 
Model Law but repeats the requirements regarding form.306 The Zimbabwe statute 
adopts the Model Law formulation on the definition and form of an arbitration 
agreement without modification. The Nigerian statute omits Article 7(1) of the Model 
Law in its entirety,307 but adopts the wording of Article 7(2) in describing the form of 
an arbitration agreement.308 Subject to this minor modification in the case of Nigeria, 
it can be said that the three jurisdictions have adopted the substantive contents of the 
provisions of the Model Law as to the form of an arbitration agreement. 
 
The provisions of Article 7 demonstrate UNCITRAL’s attempt to unify national 
arbitration statutes by enabling an arbitration agreement to embrace both existing and 
                                                 
303 See Binder International Commercial Arbitration 61. 
304 See para 3.1 below regarding the 2006 amendment to Article 7, first option. 
305 On the inadequacy of this definition see Kaplan N  1996 “Is the Need for Writing as Expressed in 
the New York Convention and the Model Law Out of Step with Commercial Practice?” 12 Arbitration 
International 27.  The author suggests the inclusion of an arbitration agreement evidenced in writing 
but not necessarily signed by the parties and agreements made orally but by reference to terms that are 
in writing. 
306 Compare s 4 of the Kenyan Act with Article 7(1) of the Model Law.  The definition of an arbitration 
agreement, referred to above, is set out in the first sentence of Article 7(1). 
307 Thus not only the definition is omitted but also the provision to the effect that the arbitration 
agreement may take the form of either an arbitration clause or a separate agreement. 
308 See s 1(1) and (2) of the Nigerian arbitration statute. 
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future disputes and so eliminating the distinction that still exists in some jurisdictions 
that deny effect to the latter category of agreements (clause compromissoire).309 
Curiously the fact that Article 7(1) is permissive but Article 7(2) is restrictive 
demonstrates an inconsistency on the part of UNCITRAL. This may be due perhaps to 
UNCITRAL’s reluctance to depart from the New York Convention’s requirement 
(under Article II(2)) of a written form of agreement; apart from which UNCITRAL’s 
own global survey revealed that most legal systems require a written form of 
agreement.310 The relatively strict formal requirements are arguably indicative of an 
intention of ensuring that there is indeed consent to arbitration by both parties.311 
 
It is submitted as an additional point of clarification that as the Model Law does not 
outlaw arbitration under other arbitration laws,312 an oral arbitration agreement of the 
kinds encountered in customary-law arbitration are nationally enforceable.  
Furthermore, with regard to arbitration under Model Law regimes, any objection to 
such oral agreement may be deemed waived (pursuant to Article 4) by the failure to 
raise the objection timeously. In other words an oral agreement is enforceable to the 
extent that the requirement of writing may be deemed waived by the application of 
Article 4.313 This interpretation would be of particular significance in the African 
jurisdictions in which customary arbitration law is recognized and enforced as such. 
 
Kenya has added provisions to its version of the Model Law on the effect of the death 
or bankruptcy of a party to the arbitration agreement,314 whereas the Nigerian statute 
has an addition regarding the effect of the death of a party.315  The Zimbabwean Act 
has no such additions. 
                                                 
309 An explanatory commentary on Article 7 appears in UNCITRAL’s Explanatory Note on this article; 
and Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 258. 
310 First Secretariat Note, A/CN9/207 paras 40-41 and Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL 
Model Law 260. 
311 See the Commission’s Report para A/40/17 para 84 quoted in Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the 
UNCITRAL Model Law 300. However, UNCITRAL’s Working Group in 2006, when revising Article 
7, regarded the purpose of writing as being to ensure that there is clarity as to the content of the 
agreement, rather than as ensuring that there is indeed consent.  See Report of the Working Group on 
the work of its 44th session (New York 23-27 January 2006, UN Doc A/CN9/592) paras 57, 59 and 61-
62.  See too UNCITRAL’s Report on its 39th Session (19 June – 7 July 2006 UN doc A/61/17) para 
153.  Compare too the revised Article 7(3) (option 1) “An arbitration agreement is in writing if its 
content is recorded in any form …” (emphasis added). 
312 See Article 1(5) and Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 38. 
313 See Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 260-261. 
314 See the Arbitration Act s 8 and s 38. 
315 See the Nigerian arbitration statute s 3. 
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(iii) The Arbitration Agreement and the Courts 
 
The relationship between the arbitration agreement and the role of the courts is 
regulated in part by Article 8 of the Model Law dealing with the arbitration agreement 
and a substantive claim before the court and Article 9, which deals with the effect of 
the arbitration agreement on interim measures by the court.316  The statutes of all three 
African jurisdictions contain modifications to Articles 8 and 9 of the Model Law. 
Some of the implications of these Articles and their modification will be elaborated in 
Chapter Three.317 
 
Article 8 obliges the court to refer the parties to arbitration when seized with a claim 
on the same subject-matter unless the court finds that the arbitration agreement is null 
and void, inoperative or incapable of performance.  The court action notwithstanding, 
the arbitration may commence and proceed to an award.318 It is contemplated that 
simultaneous proceedings may prompt a quick resolution of the arbitration.319 
 
The debatable question is the standard to be applied by the courts in deciding whether 
the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of performance. 
More specifically are the courts required to inquire into the merits of the existence and 
validity of the arbitration agreement or must they restrict their inquiry to a prima facie 
verification that the arbitration agreement exists and it is valid for purposes of 
conducting the arbitration? It is submitted that by virtue of the principle of 
“competence-competence” which empowers the arbitral tribunal to rule on its own 
jurisdiction including the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement the courts 
should limit their inquiry under Article 8(1) to a prima facie determination that the 
agreement is not null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed in order 
not to negate the tribunal’s power to rule on that issue. In other words, the courts must 
                                                 
316 The Model Law also refers to the validity of the arbitration agreement in the context of court 
applications for the setting aside or enforcement of the award (see Articles 34(2)(a)(i) and 36(1)(a)(i)). 
317 See paras 3.1 and 3.5 below. 
318  Article 8 (2). 
319 Commission Report A/40/17 paras 91-93; Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model 
Law 306. 
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normally refrain from hearing substantive arguments on the arbitrator’s jurisdiction 
until the tribunal has had the opportunity to do so.320 
Section 6(1) of the Kenyan statute substitutes the word “proceedings” for “action” in 
the Model Law Article 8(1) and a party “applies” not “requests”, not later than the 
time when that party enters appearance or files any pleadings or takes any other step 
in the arbitration, for the court to “stay” the proceedings and refer the parties to 
arbitration. An additional ground to those of the Model Law for refusing the 
application is if there is not in fact any dispute between the parties.321 
 
The Zimbabwean statute similarly substitutes “proceedings” for “action” but, in line 
with the Model Law provisions, the proceedings may be stayed and the parties 
referred to arbitration by request (Article 8(1)). This was done, for example, in the 
Zimbabwe cases of Bitumah Ltd v Multicom Ltd322 and Zimbabwe Broadcasting 
Corporation v Flame Lily Broadcasting (Pvt) Ltd.
323
 In Bitumat the plaintiff sued the 
defendant for money owed. The defendant sought and was granted a stay of 
proceedings and a reference to arbitration in accordance with the parties’ agreement 
pursuant to Article 8 of the First Schedule to the Arbitration Act. The same Article 
was relied on to refer a dispute to arbitration in the ZBC and Flame Lily case. 
However, the court found that there was no dispute to refer to arbitration in the case 
of Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank (PTA) v Elanne (Pvt) 
Ltd and R.G. Paterson and M.E. Paterson
324 as the defendant had not alleged that 
there was an actual dispute. Consequently Article 8 did not apply and the special plea 
was dismissed. 
 
                                                 
320 See Gaillard E “Prima Facie Review of Existence, Validity of Arbitration Agreement” in (2005) 225 
New York Law Journal  The author discusses this issue with supportive reference to the Indian 
Supreme Court Case of Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd v Aksh Optifibre Ltd and Another (2005) 7 SCC 
234. 
321  S 6(1)(b). 
322 Zimbabwe: Harare High Court Judgement N0. HH144 – 2000, 24 and 31 May 2000: CLOUT Case 
N0. 370. 
323 Harare High Court Judgement N0. HH249 – 99; 15 December 1999; CLOUT Case N0. 322 
Yearbook Comm Arb XXV (2000). 
324 Harare High Court Judgment N0. HH19 – 2000; CLOUT Case N0. 324; Yearbook Comm Arb XXV 
(2000). 
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A stay of proceedings and public policy were considered in Waste Management 
Services v City of Harare.
325 Here the plaintiff, a contractor, had sued the defendant 
municipality for payment for refuse collection services. The defendant asked for a 
stay of the proceedings and a reference to arbitration. The plaintiff challenged the 
arbitration clause for being contrary to public policy because it conferred discretion 
on an official of the defendant party to determine the dispute contrary to the principle 
that “nobody should be a judge in his own cause”. The court held that, were the 
official’s decision to be final it would be contrary to public policy. But here it was 
saved by the plaintiff’s right to refer the matter to arbitration if dissatisfied with the 
official’s decision. The court found Article 8 to be applicable and, since the defendant 
had so requested, the court granted the stay of proceedings and referred the dispute to 
arbitration.  The statutes of Zimbabwe and Kenya, like the Model Law, confer power 
on the arbitral tribunal to commence and continue with the arbitration to the making 
of an award while the application is pending before the court.326 
 
In Nigeria, the power of the court to stay proceedings is granted by section 5 upon the 
application of any party; and the application is granted if the court is satisfied that 
there is no sufficient reason to bar the reference to arbitration, and the applicant had 
been ready and willing at all material times to do all things necessary for the proper 
conduct of the arbitration.  This provision therefore departs from the Model Law and, 
reminiscent of older English legislation and the current South African Arbitration Act, 
gives the court a wide discretion not to enforce the arbitration agreement if a 
sufficient reason is furnished.327  Section 5 is difficult to reconcile with section 4 
based on Article 8 of the Model Law, which requires a court to stay an action that is 
subject to an arbitration agreement, if a party so requests.  Section 4 differs from 
Article 8, in that the circumstances in which the court is not required to refer the 
                                                 
325 Zimbabwe: Harare High Court Judgement No HH20-2000, 18th and 26th January 2000, CLOUT 
Case 321. 
326 S 6(2) of the Kenyan Statute conferring this power is not faithfully applied by the Kenyan courts 
which tend to stay arbitral proceedings until the application is heard and determined however long it 
takes. This writer is not aware of any instance in which an arbitration has proceeded to an award while 
an application under Section 6(1) is pending.  
327 Compare s 5(2) with the English Arbitration Act of 1950 s 4(1) and the South African Arbitration 
Act of 1965 s 6(2).  S 5 of the Nigerian statute, unlike its counterparts in Zimbabwe and Kenya, also 
confers no discretion on the arbitral tribunal to proceed with the arbitration while the court application 
is pending. 
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matter to arbitration are omitted.328 It therefore appears that sections 4 and 5 should be 
read together, so that the Nigerian court may decline to enforce an arbitration 
agreement if there are compelling reasons for such refusal.329  As in Kenyan and 
Zimbabwean statutes, the arbitral tribunal may proceed with the arbitration while the 
court application is pending.330 
 
Article 9 of the Model Law331 reinforces two principles: first, that a party does not 
forfeit or waive the right to arbitrate merely by requesting and obtaining an interim 
measure of protection from the court and second, that a national court is not prevented 
by the arbitration agreement from granting such measures. Interim measures of 
protection by a national court are therefore deemed compatible with arbitration.332 
 
Article 9 of the Model Law is replicated in the Kenyan and Zimbabwean statutes and 
confers the power on the High Court.333 Article 9(2) of the Zimbabwean statute is new 
and defines the scope of the High Court’s powers to grant measures to include an 
order for the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods in dispute, an order 
for securing the amount in dispute or the costs of the arbitral proceedings and an 
interdict.334 
 
Under the Nigerian statute the power to order interim measures of protection is, unless 
otherwise agreed by the parties, given to the arbitral tribunal under section 13, which 
is based on article 17 of the 1985 version of the Model Law.335  The Nigerian 
Arbitration Act inexplicably omits any equivalent to Article 9 of the Model Law, with 
the result that the extent of a Nigerian court’s power to grant interim measures in the 
context of an arbitration does not appear from the Nigerian Arbitration Act. 
 
                                                 
328 Namely if the arbitration agreement is “null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed”. 
329 See Asouzu International Commercial Arbitration 46 n 162. 
330 The Nigerian Arbitration Act s 4(2). 
331 Article 9 reads: “It is not incompatible with an arbitration agreement for a party to request, before or 
during arbitral proceedings, from a court an interim measure of protection and for a court to grant such 
measure.” 
332 First Working Report A/CN 9/216 para 33. 
333 See the Kenyan Act s 7(1) and the Zimbabwe Act sch 1 Article 9(2).  
334 Under Article 17(2) it seems the tribunal’s power to grant an interdict or an interim measure of 
protection is subject to the parties’ agreement otherwise. Also under Article 31(5) the costs and 
expenses of an arbitration are as fixed and allocated by the arbitral tribunal in its award. 
335 The Kenyan Arbitration Act s 18 and the Zimbabwean Arbitration Act sch 1 Article 17 contain 
comparable provisions. 
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(iv) The Basis for and Overview of the Powers of the Court 
 
Several interlocking provisions of the Model Law concerning the powers of the court 
demonstrate the degree of complexity involved and necessitate recourse to its 
legislative history. A “court” under the Model Law means a body or organ of the state 
judicial system.336 Article 5, with the heading “Extent of Court Intervention”, fulfills 
an important object of the Model Law in delimiting national court involvement in 
international arbitration by providing: 
 
“In matters governed by this Law no court shall intervene except where so 
provided in this Law.” 
 
The word “intervene” incorporated by Article 5 may be deemed crucial and 
controversial in the national jurisdictions that have adopted a provision designed for 
international arbitration law without alteration, in so far as they purport to delimit the 
extent of judicial intervention by the national court in domestic arbitration.337 
 
The drafters of Article 5 urged that the provision should not be construed as showing 
hostility to court intervention or assistance but as ensuring a measure of certainty as to 
the circumstances when court intervention is appropriate and permissible. As a 
consequence, the drafters of statutes adopting the Model Law were obliged to state the 
instances in which judicial control is justified so as to exclude any general or residual 
powers of the court other than those which are conferred by the Model Law.338 Again 
the meaning of the word “intervene” is deemed to include “assistance” to, rather than 
just intervention in, the arbitration;339 while the phrase “in matters governed by this 
Law” is to be understood as determining whether a court’s power to intervene is 
governed by the Model Law or by other provisions of domestic law including general 
and residual powers to supervise arbitrations.340 It seemed that its drafters intended 
                                                 
336 Model Law Article 2(c). 
337 The Law Commission of South Africa has expressed the view that, “bearing in mind the desirability 
of promoting uniformity in Model Law jurisdictions no other powers are necessary in the context of an 
international commercial arbitration.” Report July 1998 para 2.117.  
338 The Seventh Secretariat Note A/CN 9/264 para 2. See also Christie RH “Arbitration: Party 
Autonomy or Curial Intervention” International Commercial Arbitration (1994) 3 South African Law 
Journal at 362 – 365:  
339 Summary Record, A/CN 9/309, para 40. 
340 Holtzmann & Neuhaus A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 216. 
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Article 5 to embrace only matters that were in fact governed by or regulated in the 
Model Law either expressly or impliedly.341 
 
As the substance of Article 5 is reproduced in the statutes of the three African 
jurisdictions it may be taken that the meaning and interpretation of the provisions of 
that Article as urged by the drafters would apply mutatis mutandis in all the three 
jurisdictions.342 A further point of detail in connection with the phrase “no court shall 
intervene” is that all three jurisdictions use the word “shall” in line with the Model 
Law. Other jurisdictions use different wording, for example, the corresponding 
provision of the English Arbitration Act states “in matters governed by this Part, the 
court should not intervene … .”343 Insofar as the word “should” could be deemed 
“recommendatory” or “advisory” the implication is that the court might possibly 
intervene in situations other than those specifically provided for in the Act despite the 
strong general principle against intervention.344 It would nevertheless be unfortunate 
if Article 5 which is intended to provide uniformity in international arbitration law is 
given different interpretations by national jurisdictions which have adopted the Model 
Law.345  
 
In light of this analysis it can be concluded that the impression of hostility to court 
involvement given by Article 5 is superficial as the provision is not intended to oust 
the jurisdiction of the court but to prescribe the maximum extent of judicial 
intervention, which embraces the supportive and supervisory roles of the national 
courts in matters governed by the Model Law.346 A non-exhaustive list of matters not 
governed by the Model Law was provided by the Working Group and the Secretariat 
to which further reference will be made later in this chapter.347 
 
                                                 
341 Holtzmann & Neuhaus A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 217. 
342 See s 10, Kenyan Arbitration Act; s 34 Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation statute and Article 5 
Zimbabwean Arbitration Act. 
343 S 1(c), italics added. 
344 In contrast South African Draft Arbitration Bill (s 2(c)) uses the phrase “the court must not 
intervene except as provided by this Act” The implication is that the prevention is absolute. 
345 Christie (1994) South African Law Journal 365. This commentator notes that “it would be disastrous 
if the court came to the conclusion that the jurisdiction to set aside an arbitration agreement for good 
cause shown (under s.3(2)(a), S.A. Arbitration Act 42 of 1965) was a matter not governed by the 
Model Law and therefore not excluded by Article 5”. 
346 Holtzmann & Neuhaus A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 228-229 and 237-239. 
347 Holtzmann & Neuhaus A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 218. 
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Article 6 empowers a designated national court or other competent authority to 
perform the various functions referred to in Article 11(3) and (4) (appointment of 
arbitrators), Article 13(3) (deciding challenges), Article 14 (termination of the 
mandate of an arbitrator), Article 16(3) (ruling on the jurisdiction of the arbitral 
tribunal), and Article 34(2) (deciding on an application for setting aside an arbitral 
award). All these Articles apply only when the arbitration takes place within the 
territory of the adopting state.348 It is apparent that Article 6 does cover all functions 
involving a court under the Model Law.349 Moreover, the Analytical Commentary350 
shows that whereas only a “court” as defined in Article 2(c) could decide on the 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal under Article 16(3) and on applications for setting 
aside the award under Article 34(2), a non-judicial authority may be designated to 
discharge the functions of the court or other competent authority under Articles 11, 
13, and 14 regarding the appointment and removal of an arbitrator. A further 
observation is that each of the Articles referred to in Article 6 contains provisions 
governing the procedure before the designated national court or authority. Each 
Article specifies who may make an application to the designated court or authority 
and, with the exception of Article 34 each Article bars an appeal from the decision of 
the court or other competent authority. It seems that the functions listed under Article 
6 may only be performed in an arbitration to which the relevant Articles apply in an 
adopting state. Therefore the appointment of arbitrators and challenges to them in an 
arbitration in which the place of arbitration has not yet been selected are matters not 
governed by the Model Law and are therefore not referred to in Article 6. 
 
It should also be noted that Article 6 does not mention Article 8 (referral of matters to 
arbitration) and Article 9 (request for interim measures) because, it seems, these 
provisions apply irrespective of the seat of the arbitration and are addressed to all 
courts of the adopting state. Finally because each of the Article 6 functions is assigned 
to a court or other authority connected to the arbitration, Article 6 does not mention 
Article 27351 (court assistance in taking evidence) or Articles 35 and 36 (recognition 
and enforcement of awards). These provisions relate to functions that must be 
                                                 
348 Compare Article 1(2). 
349 See, for example, the text below regarding Articles 8, 9, 27, 35 and 36. 
350 Holtzmann & Neuhaus A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 240. 
351 It is likely that the competent court under Article 27 whose assistance would be requested for taking 
evidence would in most jurisdictions, be identified by another law of the state concerned; hence the 
omission from Article 6 of any reference to Article 27. 
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performed by a competent state court depending, for example, on the location of 
evidence or witnesses in the case of Article 27352 or of the assets of the losing party.353 
 
There is no equivalent provision to Article 6 in the statutes of the three African 
jurisdictions. It is apparent from various provisions that the court to which arbitral 
matters are referred for determination in Kenya is the High Court.354 Under section 57 
of the Nigerian statute “court” means the High Court of a state, the High Court of the 
Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, or the Federal High Court. Model Law Article 6 is 
deleted in the Zimbabwe version of that law but under Article 2 court means “a body 
or organ of the judicial system of a state.” The several specific references in the 
Zimbabwe statute to the High Court suggest the predominance of the High Court in 
matters governed by that statute.355 
 
The complexities of Articles 5 and 6 with particular reference to international 
commercial arbitration aside, other significant provisions of the Model Law with 
reference to domestic arbitration are Article 8 that confers powers on the court to 
enforce the arbitration agreement and Article 9 regarding the power to order interim 
measures of protection.356 The court’s powers concerning the appointment of an 
arbitrator and challenge or termination of the arbitrator’s mandate appear under 
Articles 11, 13 and 14. The power to review an arbitral tribunal’s ruling on its own 
jurisdiction in certain circumstances is granted by Article 16(3). Other powers are for 
affording assistance in taking evidence under Article 27; and express powers for the 
setting aside and the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award are granted 
under Articles 34, 35 and 36. Therefore the availability of the court’s powers of 
intervention and supervision is more prominent after an award has been made.357 For 
this reason these provisions are briefly revisited later in this Chapter.358 
                                                 
352 In terms of Article 1(2), Article 27 is not one of the provisions that have extra-territorial application. 
353 Holtzmann & Neuhaus A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 241. 
354 For example, under ss 7, 2(2)(d), 12(4)(c), 15(3), 17(6), 18(3), 35 and 36.  See however s 14(3), 
which provides for a challenge of the arbitrator under certain circumstances to be referred to a 
competent authority designated by the Attorney-General. 
355 Articles 9, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 27, 34, 35 and 36. 
356 See para 2.4.4.5(iii) above. 
357 Christie (1993) Arbitration International 153 – 65. Gaillard & Savage 631 – 632 state generally that 
although courts will sometimes assist in setting up the arbitral tribunal, once the tribunal is constituted, 
the courts are expected to refrain from interfering in the arbitral proceedings until brought in to enforce 
or set aside an award. See also Hwang M & Muttath RC, “The role of courts in the course of arbitral 
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The position on appeals against decisions of the court under the Model Law is not 
entirely consistent. Where the Model Law allows judicial intervention during the 
arbitral proceedings, there is usually no right of appeal against the court’s decision.359  
The right of appeal can be abused as a delaying tactic and these restrictions are no 
doubt intended to prevent the possibility of a right of appeal being abused as a 
delaying tactic, at least until the tribunal has made an award.  Nevertheless the Model 
Law does not provide for an appeal from a decision of the court regarding the 
enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate or regarding interim measures.360  There is 
moreover no bar to the right to appeal from a court decision regarding the setting 
aside of the award under Article 34 or regarding the recognition and enforcement of 
an award under Articles 35 and 36 of the Model Law.361 In a recent decision of the 
Kenya Court of Appeal,362 the court upheld the appellant’s right of appeal against the 
decision of the High Court denying the appellant’s general right of appeal against a 
decision by the court under section 35 of the Kenyan Act, 1995.363 However the 
Appellate Court dismissed the Notice of Appeal on the ground that the appeal itself 
had no chance of success under the limited grounds of section 39 of the Kenyan 
Act.364 In this writer’s opinion the position on appeals under section 35 of the Kenyan 
statute can be clarified by the amendment of the section to allow or not to allow 
appeals from a decision of the High Court. 
 
However when the Model Law permits a court to intervene in an arbitration before the 
award as under Articles 8(2), 13(3) and 16(3) it is the arbitral tribunal, and not the 
court, which is given the discretionary power to continue with the arbitral proceedings 
                                                                                                                                            
proceedings: Singapore and Other Asian Perspectives” (2002) 68 Arbitration 223 – 237; see also 
Closter E “Attempts to Thwart the Arbitration Process” (2007) 73 Arbitration 4. 
358 See para 2.4.4.5(viii) below. 
359 See Articles 11(5), 13(3), 14(1) and 16(3). 
360 See Articles 8 and 9, but see further the addition to the Zimbabwe Arbitration Act as sch 1 Article 
9(4), whereby a decision by the High Court on a request for interim measures is not subject to appeal. 
361 As a further safeguard against abuse of arbitration, the court of first instance may raise issues of 
arbitrability and public policy on its own initiative.  See Articles 34(2)(b) and 36(1)(b). 
362 Kobil Petroleum Limited v Kenya Shell Limited, Civil Application no NAI 57 of 2006 (30/2006 
UR). 
363 The equivalent of Article 34 of the Model Law regarding applications to court for setting aside an 
award. 
364 Section 39 enables questions of law in domestic arbitration to be taken on appeal to the court on a 
contract-in basis and this decision may be taken on appeal as provided by s 39(3). 
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to the making of an award while the court proceedings are still pending.365 In practice 
Kenyan parties do not hesitate in seeking the intervention of the court to stay the 
arbitral proceedings and frustrate the exercise of the arbitral discretion until the court 
application is heard and determined.366 
 
(v) Composition of the Arbitral Tribunal 
 
Party autonomy receives particular prominence and emphasis in the provisions of the 
Model Law regulating the composition of the arbitral tribunal and the choice of 
procedure. Under Article 10 the parties can determine the number of arbitrators, 
failing which there shall be three arbitrators. Article 11 enables the parties to agree on 
the procedure for appointing the tribunal, failing which the court may do so. 
 
In Kenya upon the parties’ failure to determine the number of arbitrators the 
Arbitration Act provides for one (and not three) arbitrators.367 In similar 
circumstances the Nigerian statute follows the Model Law in providing for three 
arbitrators.368 Although the Zimbabwean statute also follows the Model Law in 
providing for a tribunal of three arbitrators this applies in international arbitrations, as 
there is an exception in domestic arbitrations which provides for a single arbitrator 
unless the parties otherwise agree.369 
 
The use of a single arbitrator in domestic arbitration is common and makes sense by 
saving some expense. Conversely it is acceptable in an international arbitration 
involving large sums of money to have three arbitrators whose combined experience 
may inspire greater confidence in the tribunal as well as promoting greater probity 
                                                 
365 This discretion is expressly conferred on the arbitral tribunal in all three instances in the Kenyan 
version of the Model Law: see ss 6(2), 14(3) and 17(8). 
366 This is from the writer’s personal experience both as judge and arbitrator.  A court ruling on this 
point is clearly contrary to s 10 of the Kenyan Act, corresponding to Article 5 of the Model Law (see 
para 2.4.4.5(iv) above. 
367 S 11(2). 
368 S 6. 
369 See proviso to Article 10(2). 
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and an acceptable award. Ultimately however the parties have the freedom in the first 
instance to determine the composition of their tribunal.370 
 
Article 11(1) of the Model Law, by providing that no party shall be precluded by his 
nationality from acting as arbitrator, aims at removing any obstacle to the 
appointment of foreign arbitrators.371 In terms of party autonomy, the parties may 
nevertheless impose their own restrictions. Article 11 further allows a state adopting 
the Model Law to choose between the court and another body when deciding who 
should have the power of appointment when parties fail to agree or when the default 
appointment mechanism chosen by the parties has failed.372 Regarding Kenya, Nigeria 
and Zimbabwe, in all three jurisdictions the specified appointing authority is the High 
Court.373 
 
Article 12 of the Model Law contains provisions that prescribe the basis and 
procedure for challenging the appointment of an arbitrator for lack of impartiality or 
independence.374 The Model Law imposes an ongoing duty on a prospective arbitrator 
to disclose circumstances likely to affect that arbitrator’s independence and 
impartiality.375 In the event that a challenge under the procedure agreed to by the 
parties is unsuccessful, the Model Law provides for the challenging party to refer the 
matter to court. In permitting this application to be brought immediately during the 
arbitration, it was necessary to guard against the application being used as a delaying 
tactic. The risk of delay is reduced by three factors: a short time of 30 days is 
provided for seeking court review; there is no appeal from the court’s decision, and 
the tribunal has the discretion to continue with the arbitration during the court 
proceedings.376 The effect of a failure to raise the challenge within the stipulated time 
                                                 
370 In recent times the appointment of two arbitrators is becoming noticeable in Kenya as the choice of 
a Sole Arbitrator by one party is often rejected by the opposing party who prefers to have his own 
nominee as second arbitrator. 
371 A/CN. 9/264 and commentary on Article 11 para. 1.  In the Nigerian Act, this provision only applies 
to international commercial arbitration (s 44(10) read with s 43). 
372 See Article 11(4) read with Article 6. 
373 See the Kenyan Arbitration Act s 12; the Nigerian Arbitration Act s 7 read with s 57 and the 
Zimbabwean Arbitration Act sch 1 Article 11. 
374 Articles 12 and 13. 
375 Contrast the English Arbitration Act, section 24(1) requiring an arbitrator to be impartial, and not 
independent and impartial, because the lack of independence is deemed important where it raises 
justifiable doubts of the arbitrator’s impartiality. 
376 Holtzmann & Neuhaus A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 407. 
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limit is not specifically dealt with, but it is likely that such failure will be construed as 
a waiver.377 
 
Whereas Article 12 of the Model Law lays the basis for challenging an arbitrator 
because of his presumed bias or lack of independence, Article 14 provides for an 
arbitrator to be challenged due to his inability to perform his functions.378 The 
grounds and the methods for terminating the arbitral mandate are given under Article 
14. The grounds are (i) de jure or (ii) de facto inability to perform the functions of an 
arbitrator and (iii) any other failure to act without undue delay. The methods are (i) by 
the withdrawal or death of the arbitrator (ii) by agreement of the parties and (iii) by 
the court or designated authority. 
 
Article 15 provides for the appointment of a substitute arbitrator where the arbitral 
mandate is terminated under Article 13 or 14; or an arbitrator withdraws from office 
for any other reason; or the mandate is terminated by the parties’ agreement; or in any 
other case of the termination of the mandate. 
 
In all these cases the substitute arbitrator is appointed under the rules for appointing 
the replaced arbitrator. A helpful clarification is that using the applicable rules of 
appointing the original arbitrator does not mean using exactly the same method; so 
that if a party defaulted in appointing an arbitrator who was appointed by the court 
through a default procedure, the replacement arbitrator can be appointed by the 
defaulting party and not necessarily by the court. 
 
It seems however that arbitral parties enjoy unlimited freedom to terminate the arbitral 
mandate because arbitration is consensual and that an arbitrator likewise also has an 
unlimited freedom to resign as he could not be forced to arbitrate.379 
 
The statutes of the three African jurisdictions substantially adopt the terminology of 
the Model Law in the corresponding provisions governing the appointment and 
challenging of arbitrators, the grounds and procedure for challenge, the termination of 
                                                 
377 See Article 13 read with Article 4. 
378 See Binder International Commercial Arbitration 130. 
379 Holtzmann & Neuhaus A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 464-465. 
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the arbitral mandate and the substitution of arbitrators. So, for examples, the Model 
Law phrases such as the disclosure of “circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable 
doubts” as to an arbitrator’s “impartiality or independence, “the lack of qualifications 
agreed to by the parties” as grounds for challenging an arbitrator, and the restricted 
time limits of 15 days for submitting a written statement of the reasons for the 
challenge and 30 days for the appointment of multiple arbitrators – all these are 
replicated with slight differences of wording in the three statutes.380 
 
In certain particular respects, differences in detail exist in the three jurisdictions and in 
contrast to the Model Law. For example, under section 14(3) of the Kenya statute 
where the challenge in a prescribed manner is unsuccessful, the challenging party may 
apply to “such competent authority as the Attorney General may by notice in the 
Gazette designate to decide on the challenge and the decision of such competent 
authority shall be final and not be subject to appeal.” There is no equivalent provision 
in the other two African jurisdictions. Under section 9(3) of the Nigerian statute the 
challenge ends with the decision of the arbitral tribunal while under Article 13(3) of 
the Zimbabwean statute it is the High Court that decides on the challenge with no 
recourse to appeal.  Section 14(3) of the Kenyan statute is unimaginative and 
unnecessary as the Attorney General is a frequent party in domestic arbitrations and is 
hardly an independent authority. Moreover the process of first approaching the 
Attorney General who in turn will designate a “competent authority” to whom the 
application for a decision is to be made is likely to be protracted and therefore delay 
the arbitral process. Further, the bar on an appeal from the decision of such authority 
is unattractive.381 Perhaps, in line with the general tenor and approach of a modern 
arbitration statute the provisions of Article 13(3) of the Zimbabwean statute are to be 
preferred for being less controversial both in the designation of the High Court as the 
competent authority on challenges and the finality of its decision in the interest of 
expediting the arbitration. 
 
Other useful and similarly worded clarifications in the Zimbabwean and Kenyan 
statutes that are absent from the Nigerian statute and the Model Law relate to the 
                                                 
380 Kenyan statute ss 12-16; Nigerian statute ss 7-11; and the Zimbabwe statute First Schedule Articles 
12-15. 
381 This writer is not aware of any arbitration in which the procedure under s 14(3) has been invoked, a 
fact that perhaps demonstrates its unattractiveness. 
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effect of the substitution of an arbitrator on evidence already received and rulings 
made by the tribunal. These appear under Articles 15(2) and (3), and sections 16(2) 
and 3 of the Zimbabwe and Kenyan statutes respectively. These are to the effect that 
except by agreement of the parties on the replacement of a sole arbitrator or presiding 
arbitrator, any previous hearing shall be repeated; otherwise on the replacement of an 
arbitrator other than a sole arbitrator or a presiding arbitrator any fresh hearing shall 
be at the discretion of the arbitral tribunal; and the mere substitution of an arbitrator 
does not invalidate previous procedural rulings.382 
 
(vi) The Arbitral Tribunal’s Powers to Rule on its Own Jurisdiction and Interim 
Measures 
 
Before discussing the arbitral tribunal’s powers to conduct the arbitration proceedings 
it is necessary to consider its powers to rule on its own jurisdiction and to grant 
interim measures.383 Article 16 empowers the arbitral tribunal to rule on its own 
jurisdiction including objections to the existence and validity of the arbitration 
agreement. This has come to be known in international arbitration literature as the 
principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz,384 although the expression is not used in the 
Model Law385 and other arbitration statutes. This principle is adopted by the three 
African statutes.386 One practical problem in the experience of this writer is whether 
the right of a party to challenge the jurisdiction of the tribunal includes a challenge to 
the constitution of the tribunal. The Model Law Article 16 and the corresponding 
provisions in the African jurisdictions do not specifically deal with this problem. It is 
suggested here that once the tribunal is constituted, the tribunal’s power to rule on its 
                                                 
382 See also the South African Law Commission Report, July 1998, para 2. 178. 
383 See para 2.4.4.5(vii) below.  In the 1985 version of the Model Law jurisdictional rulings and interim 
measures by the tribunal were dealt with in Ch IV of the Model Law.  After the 2006 revisions, the two 
matters are dealt with in separate chapters, namely Ch IV and IV A. 
384 The German expression can be translated into English as Competence/Competence and is a useful 
form of shorthand for the competence of the tribunal to rule on its own competence (see Redfern & 
Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 252).  Compare Gaillard & Savage International 
Commercial Arbitration 395-397 for the view that the expression Kompetenz-Kompetenz was 
traditionally understood as the power of the tribunal to rule finally on its jurisdiction, with no 
possibility of court review.  Such a construction is not accepted today, either in German law or other 
Model Law jurisdictions. 
385 “Kompetenz” is not used in the equivalent to Article 16 in the German Arbitration Act of 1998, 
which is based on the Model Law, namely Article 1040. 
386 See the Kenyan Arbitration Act s 17(1); the Nigerian Arbitration Act s 12(1) and the Zimbabwean 
Arbitration Act sch 1 Article 16(1). 
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own jurisdiction should also include the power to rule on whether the tribunal itself is 
properly and lawfully constituted when the issue is raised.387 
 
Because Kompetenz-Kompetenz is not incorporated in all national laws and was 
thought to be somewhat controversial, UNCITRAL has noted that states that are 
unwilling to adopt this principle might change the Model Law provision.388 Article 
16(3) and its corresponding provisions in the three African jurisdictions show that a 
decision by the tribunal on its jurisdiction is subject to court control. There is a rather 
subtle and minor difference between Article 16(3) of the Model Law and the 
Zimbabwean version.  Under the former if the tribunal rules as preliminary question 
that “it has jurisdiction” then the finding is subject to immediate court review.  As a 
result only a positive jurisdictional finding is subject to immediate court review. 
However under the Zimbabwean provision, immediate court review is available if the 
tribunal rules on “such a plea [as to its jurisdiction] as a preliminary question”. The 
change in wording extends court review to the tribunal’s negative jurisdictional 
finding as well.389 Further, Article 16(3) ensures that the arbitral tribunal may 
continue with the arbitration and make an award while a court review of the tribunal’s 
decision on its jurisdiction is pending. As pointed out above, this is intended to reduce 
the danger of the review process being abused as a delaying tactic. 
 
Article 16(1) also deals with the severability of the arbitration clause.390  It first 
provides that jurisdictional objections may extend to the existence and validity of the 
arbitration agreement and that for this purpose, an arbitration clause forming part of a 
contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of that 
contract.  Moreover, the tribunal’s decision that the contract is null and void does not 
by itself invalidate the arbitration clause. 
 
                                                 
387 A recent case in Kenya illustrates this problem. A representative of the Attorney General contended 
that a challenge relating to the tribunal’s constitution was not a matter for the arbitral tribunal under s 
17 of the Kenya statute.  The arbitral tribunal overruled the contention, proceeded with the arbitration 
and made an award. 
388 Commission Report, A/40/17 para 151; Holtzmann & Neuhaus A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model 
Law 479. 
389 The wording of Article 16 was not altered by the 2006 amendments to the Model Law. 
390 The Model Law deals with the doctrines of Kompetenz-Kompetenz and severability in the same 
paragraph.  However, where the challenge to jurisdiction does not relate to the validity or existence of 
the arbitration clause, Kompetenz-Kompetenz operates without the need for the doctrine of separability.  
The English Arbitration Act therefore deals with them in separate sections (ss 7 and 30-31).   
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Article 17 of the 1985 version of the Model Law, which grants the arbitral tribunal 
the power to order any party to provide an interim measure of protection in respect of 
the subject matter of the dispute as well as appropriate security for such measure, 
brings to mind Article 9, which permits a party to request from a court an interim 
measure of protection.391 The main difference in approach between these two related 
but distinct Articles is that whereas Article 17 actually confers the power on the 
arbitral tribunal to grant certain interim measures of protection, Article 9 merely states 
the principle that a request to a court for an interim measure is not inconsistent with 
an arbitration agreement.392 Furthermore, the tribunal’s power under Article 17 is 
narrower than the court’s under Article 9.393 In any event there was no provision in 
the Model Law of 1985 for court enforcement of interim measures ordered by the 
arbitral tribunal.394 This omission has been dealt with in the 2006 amendments.395 
 
The tribunal’s power to order interim measures and the provision of security for these 
measures is conferred by section 18(1) of the Kenyan statute. The statute departs from 
the standard version of the Model Law by providing additionally that either the 
tribunal or a party with the approval of the tribunal may seek court assistance with 
interim measures but the arbitral proceedings shall continue while the assistance is 
under consideration by the court.396 Section 13 of the Nigerian statute enables the 
tribunal to grant an interim measure and security for such measure at a party’s request 
before or during the arbitral proceedings, but makes no provision for court support as 
exists in Kenya. The Zimbabwean Act contains an expanded version of Article 17 of 
the Model Law.397 The effect of the provisions is that, unless the parties otherwise 
agree, the tribunal has the power to grant an interdict or other interim measure and to 
order the parties to make a deposit for the fees and costs of the arbitration. Further, the 
                                                 
391 See also para 3.5.3.3 below. 
392 See however Article 17 J of the 2006 amendments, which does deal with the extent of the court’s 
powers. See para 3.5.3.3 below. 
393 Compare the wording of Article 17 (1985 version) with the considerably wider definition of 
“interim measure” in Article 17(2) of the 2006 version.  
394 For this reason some jurisdictions have expanded their version of Article 17. The SA Law 
Commission Bill recommended a s 17(3) which states: “The provisions of articles 31, 35 and 36 shall 
apply to an order under paragraph (1) and (2) of this article as if such order were an award.” Other 
examples referred to are s 23 of the Australian International Arbitration Act of 1974; sch 7 of the 
Scottish legislation article 17(2) and s 26 of the Bermuda International Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
1993. (see SA Law Commission Report para 2. 183 and n 200). 
395 See Articles 17 H and 17 I of the 2006 version of the Model Law. 
396 Ss 18(2) and (3).  Note too the restrictions imposed by s 7(2) on court review of interim measures 
ordered by the tribunal. 
397 See the Zimbabwean Act sch 1 Article 17(1)-(4). 
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tribunal or a party with the tribunal’s approval may request executory assistance from 
the High Court for the enforcement of the tribunal’s order. 
 
(vii) The Arbitration Proceedings 
 
A matrix of powers and duties come into play once the tribunal is constituted. The 
freedom of the parties to agree on the procedure for appointing the tribunal and the 
procedure for challenging an arbitrator398 find resonance in the freedom of the parties 
under Article 19(1) to agree on the procedure for conducting the proceedings, subject 
to the mandatory provisions of the Model Law.399 In the absence of agreement and 
subject to the same restriction, Article 19(2) confers the power on the tribunal to 
conduct the proceedings in such manner as it considers appropriate. The integration of 
principle and procedure is apparent in these provisions regulating the conduct of the 
arbitral proceedings. Thus Article 19(1) stresses the principle of party autonomy by 
which in the first place, and subject to the mandatory provisions of the Model Law, 
the parties have the freedom to agree on the procedure for conducting the arbitration. 
Secondly, and only to the extent that they fail to do so, the kindred principle of the 
autonomy of the tribunal, sets in by allowing the tribunal, subject to the provisions of 
the Model Law, to conduct the proceedings in a manner it considers appropriate. The 
third aspect of Article 19 is the power conferred on the tribunal to determine the 
admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence adduced before it.400  
 
Again as a statement of principle, Article 18 enjoins that the parties be treated with 
equality and for each party to be given a full opportunity to present its case.401 
Although this brief statement does not expressly indicate to whom it is addressed the 
analytical commentary shows that the fundamental precepts of Article 18 were 
addressed to actions taken by both the tribunal and the procedural agreements reached 
by the parties.402 Article 18 may therefore be regarded as the “due process” clause of 
                                                 
398 Under Articles 11(2) and 13(1). 
399 In this context, primarily Articles 18 and 24(2) and (3). 
400 Article 19(2). 
401 Compare section 33(1) of the English Arbitration Act that uses the term “reasonable opportunity”; 
also see Uff J Cost-Effective Arbitration (1993) 59 Arbitration 31 33 and comment on “reasonable 
opportunity.” 
402 Holtzmann & Neuhaus A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 550 citing A/CN 9/264 article 19 
para. 1. 
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arbitration, more particularly under the Model Law, by its emphasis on the principles 
of equality, fairness and the right to present one’s case. 
 
Consequently Articles 18 and 19 are considered the “Magna Carta of Arbitral 
Procedure” and possibly the most important provisions of the Model Law.403 Article 
18 is also recognized as a compulsory provision that places fundamental restrictions 
on the autonomies granted to the parties and the tribunal by Article 19.404 It might be 
thought therefore that non-compliance with these principles could lead to the rejection 
of the award for violating public policy. 
 
The Kenyan and Zimbabwean statutes405 follow the wording of the Model Law on the 
equal treatment of parties and determination of rules of procedure. But both statutes 
depart from the Model Law by inserting an additional provision granting the same 
privileges and immunities to witnesses and persons appearing before the arbitral 
tribunal as are accorded to witnesses and advocates in court proceedings.406 
 
The Nigerian statute specifically enjoins only the arbitral tribunal to ensure equal 
treatment of the parties and a full opportunity for each party to present its case.407 The 
statute expressly requires408 the proceedings to be conducted in accordance with the 
procedural rules set out in the First Schedule to the Act;409 and in the absence of 
pertinent rules relating to any matter in the proceedings the tribunal has power to 
conduct the proceedings in a manner it considers appropriate to ensure fair 
proceedings.410 The tribunal’s power to determine the admissibility, relevance, 
                                                 
403 Holtzmann & Neuhaus A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 564. 
404 Holtzmann & Neuhaus A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 564. The Model Law provisions 
regarding procedure and the award deemed compulsory are Articles 18, 23(1), 24(2) and (3); 27, 30(2), 
31(1), (3) and (4), 32, 33(1)(a), (2), (4) and (5): see Holtzmann & Neuhaus A Guide to the UNCITRAL 
Model Law 264 and 583; Binder International Commercial Arbitration 186.  
405 The Kenyan Arbitration Act ss 19 and 20; the Zimbabwe Arbitration Act sch 1 Articles 18 and 19.  
406 The Kenyan Arbitration Act s 20(4); the Zimbabwe Arbitration Act sch 1 Article 19(3). 
407 S 14.  This wording is consistent with Articles 1 and 15(1) of the Arbitration Rules in the 1st 
schedule of the Act 
408 S 15(1) commences: “The arbitral proceedings shall be conducted … .” 
409 The Rules are based on the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules of 1976.  Therefore Article 15(1) of the 
Rules does give the discretion to the tribunal to determine procedure, subject to the Rules and 
mandatory provisions of the statute (see the Rules Article 1).  In effect therefore the Nigerian statute, 
particularly s 15(1), appears to impose severe limitations on party autonomy, rather than tribunal 
autonomy, when compared to the standard version of Article 19 of the Model Law. 
410 S 15(2). 
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materiality and weight of any evidence granted under the Nigerian statute411 is in the 
same terms as those granted by the equivalent provisions of the Kenyan and 
Zimbabwean statutes. 
 
The provisions of the Model Law as to the place of arbitration (Article 20), 
commencement of arbitral proceedings (Article 21), choice of language (Article 22), 
and delivery of statements of claim and defence (Article 23) have been substantially 
adopted in the arbitration statutes of the three African jurisdictions.412 Party autonomy 
and/or the autonomy of the tribunal are therefore reflected in the corresponding 
provisions of the African jurisdictions to the same extent as in the Model Law. On the 
face of it, these provisions create no serious problems for domestic arbitration. 
However, in international arbitration it may, for example, be necessary to apply 
Article 20, regarding the place of arbitration, in relation to other Model Law 
provisions. The place of arbitration may firstly be the factor that determines whether 
the arbitration is international.413 Secondly, the place of arbitration will also determine 
the extent to which the Model Law applies to the arbitration, if at all, primarily 
because most of its Articles apply only if the place of arbitration is in the enacting 
State.414 Again the place of arbitration will determine what state courts will perform 
the functions of assistance and supervision under Articles 6 and 27 and the place 
where the award is made for purposes of its recognition and enforcement.415  
 
Article 21 on the commencement of arbitration proceedings is important in domestic 
arbitration because it provides a mechanism for deciding for purposes of national 
legislation whether an arbitral claim is time-barred.416 The right of the parties to agree 
on the language or languages to be used in the arbitration under Article 22 will 
obviously ensure the appointment of suitable arbitrators who are competent in the 
language or languages chosen. The procedural safeguards for delivery of the 
                                                 
411 See s 15(3). 
412 See the Kenyan Arbitration Act ss 21-24; the Nigerian Arbitration Act ss 16-19 and the 
Zimbabwean Arbitration Act sch 1 Articles 20-23. 
413 See Article 1(3) for the factors to be taken into account in determining whether or not an arbitration 
is international. 
414 See Article 1(2) and para 2.4.4.5(i) above. 
415 See for example Article 36(1)(a)(v); Holtzmann & Neuhaus A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 
593. 
416 See Holtzmann & Neuhaus A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 610. 
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statements of claim and defence are obviously intended to ensure fairness of 
procedure.417 
 
Noticeable modifications and differences of wording emerge between the provisions 
of the Model Law and the corresponding provisions of the three African jurisdictions 
on the conduct of hearings (Article 24), default by a party (Article 25), the 
appointment of experts by the tribunal (Article 26) and court assistance in taking 
evidence (Article 27). 
 
Both the Kenyan and Zimbabwe statutes incorporate provisions in similar wording 
not found in the Model Law or the Nigerian statute enabling parties to appear or act in 
person or to be represented by any other person of their choice.418 In the context of a 
party who is in default, both the Kenyan and Zimbabwean statutes confer an 
additional power not found in the Model Law or the Nigerian statute for the arbitral 
tribunal to dismiss an unprosecuted claim or to give directions for the speedy 
determination of the claim.419 The Zimbabwean and Nigerian statutory provisions 
governing the appointment of experts by the arbitral tribunal replicate those of the 
Model Law.420 The Kenyan statute incorporates an additional provision permitting a 
party to request an expert witness to produce for examination all documents, goods or 
other property provided to him in order to prepare his report.421 
 
A court or judge has power to issue a writ of subpoena ad testificandum or subpoena 
duces tecum to compel the attendance of a witness422 or a writ of habeas corpus ad 
testificandum to produce a prisoner for examination before an arbitral tribunal.423 In 
contrast the Nigerian statute incorporates provisions empowering the arbitral tribunal 
                                                 
417 The provisions of Model Law Article 23 are adopted by all the three African statutes. Note that 
unlike Model Law Article 24(3) that requires statements, documents and other information supplied to 
the tribunal by one party to be communicated to the other party, section 20(3) of the Nigerian statute 
adds the specific clarification that every such document etc supplied by the tribunal (not a party) to one 
party shall also be supplied to the other. Therefore both party and tribunal are obliged to exchange 
documents supplied to or by them. 
418 See the Kenyan Arbitration Act s 25(5) and the Zimbabwean Arbitration Act sch 1 Article 24(4). 
419 See the Kenyan Arbitration Act s 26(d) and the Zimbabwean Arbitration Act sch 1 Article 25(d). S 
21 of the Nigerian statute governing default proceedings, which is akin to the Model Law Article 25, 
does not contain this additional power. 
420 See the Zimbabwean Arbitration Act sch 1 Article 26, the Nigerian Arbitration Act s 22 and the 
Model Law Article 26. 
421 S 27(3). 
422 S 23(1). 
423 S 23(2) and (3). 
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to administer oaths to or take the affirmation of the parties and their witnesses424; and 
any party may take out a writ of subpoena ad testificandum or subpoena duces  
tecum, but without compelling a witness to produce a document he could not be 
compelled to produce in the trial of an action.425 
 
Model Law Article 27 granting the power to a tribunal or party to request court 
assistance in taking evidence is reproduced by section 28 of the Kenyan statute and 
Article 27 is not adopted by the Nigerian statute but perhaps the purposes intended by 
that Article are substantially served by sections 22 and 23 of the Nigerian statute as 
noted.426 
 
Article 27 of the Zimbabwean version of the Model Law expands the original 
provisions of that Law by empowering the High Court to issue a subpoena to compel 
the attendance of a witness before an arbitral tribunal to give evidence or produce 
documents.427 The High Court may order a witness to submit to examination on oath 
before the tribunal or before an officer of the court or any other person.428 The High 
Court again has the power to order discovery of documents or interrogatories,429 to 
issue a commission or request evidence to be taken out of the jurisdiction,430 or to 
make an order for the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing in 
issue in the arbitral proceedings.431 The analytical commentary shows that the drafting 
of Model Law Article 27 involved the task of regulating the interaction of arbitration 
and court procedures. Three particular problems were encountered – integration of 
arbitration with existing court procedures, the possibility of abusing recourse to court 
resulting in delay, and seeking national court assistance for international arbitration; 
and the final text of Article 27 is the solution found by the drafters of that law.432 
 
                                                 
424 S 20(5). 
425 S 20(6). 
426 It is argued that the subpoena duces tecum can be granted under Model Law Article 27 by the court 
if requested by an arbitral tribunal or party with the approval of a court per Kaplan J in the Hong Kong 
case of Vibro Flotatron AG v Express Builders Co. Ltd (unpublished): CLOUT The facts appear in 
Alvarez, Kaplan & Rivkin Model Law Decisions  197. 
427 Article 27(a). 
428 Article 27(b). 
429 Article 27(c)(i). 
430 Article 27(c)(ii). 
431 Article 27(c)(iii). 
432 Holtzmann & Neuhaus A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 734. 
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The Zimbabwean clarification in response to Article 27 confirms that the court can 
only give assistance if approached by the tribunal or a party with the approval of the 
tribunal. To that extent the tribunal can prevent requests for court assistance being 
abused. 
 
(viii) The Award and Termination of Proceedings 
 
Article 28 dealing with rules applicable to the substance of the dispute confers party 
autonomy for the parties to choose the applicable law to govern their dispute, but the 
choice of substantive law shall not include the conflict of law rules applicable under 
that substantive law; and in the absence of a choice by the parties, the tribunal shall 
apply the law determined by such conflict of law rules it considers applicable. The 
freedom of parties to choose their preferred “rules of law” and designate the law or 
legal system of a given state complements the parties’ autonomy in the choice of their 
arbitrator, their procedure and now their law and or rules of law.433 
 
Article 28 (3) introduces the principles of “ex aequo et bono” and the “amiable 
compositeur”.434 The tribunal can only use such principles with the express 
authorization of the parties. The terms “ex aequo et bono” or “amiable compositeur” 
are adopted by the Model Law and its national versions. The notion that they might be 
synonymous terms is suggested by a practice that owes its origin to French law which 
construes the role of the amiable compositeur as that of deciding in equity. But as 
Rubino-Summartano435 explains the power to decide ex aequo et bono is a 
discretionary power conferred on an arbitrator to mitigate strict law in arriving at his 
decision; whereas the amiable compositeur is more of a conciliator who makes 
suggestions to bring the parties to a settlement.  Be that as it might it can be said that 
ex aequo and amiable compositeur are quite distinct conceptually and in practice, the 
former being principles, while the latter is procedure.  They have separate histories.  
An amiable does not adjudicate, perhaps just about “concludes”.  Section 22 of the 
Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 of the Australian State of Victoria exemplifies  a 
                                                 
433 See The Explanatory Note by UNCITRAL Secretariat on Model Law A/CN 0/264; UNCITRAL 
Yearbook Vol. XVI 1985. 
434 These were encountered in the discussion of section 22(3) of the Nigerian statute. 
435 Rubino-Summartano M “Amiable Composition (Joint Mandate to settle) and Ex Bono et Aequo 
(Discretional Authority to Mitigate Strict Law)”; Apparent Synonyms Revisited” (1992) 9(1) Journal 
of International Arbitration 5-16.  
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common-law jurisdiction that allows the arbitrator to determine issues according to 
law unless authorized by the parties to determine “by reference to considerations of 
general justice and fairness”. For examples, the clause conferring the authority may 
provide simply that the arbitrator “is authorized to decide as amiable compositeur” or 
that “in reaching his decision he shall not be obliged to follow the strict rules of law” 
or that “he may determine any question by reference to considerations of general 
justice and fairness”. Grouping the terms “amiable compositeur”, “equity clauses” 
and “ex aequo et bono” together, Redfern and Hunter, while acknowledging that 
arbitration agreements sometimes require arbitrators to use such techniques, associate 
“ex aequo et bono” with agreements drafted by public international lawyers or 
scholars; otherwise the terms are not meant to be mutually exclusive. The authors 
suggest also that the terms are likely to come into frequent use because of the 
influence of the Model Law and national provisions like section 46 of the English 
Arbitration Act that allows parties to agree what “considerations” should govern the 
substance of the dispute. The tribunal is required further to decide in accordance with 
the terms of the contract taking into consideration the usages of trade applicable to the 
transaction.436 Significantly under section 22(3) of the Nigerian Act the tribunal shall 
not decide ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur without express authorization 
by the parties.437 
 
The problem of choosing the rules applicable to the substance of the dispute is less 
pronounced in domestic arbitration than in international arbitration. A domestic 
arbitration tribunal will not usually be faced with a multiplicity of potentially 
applicable rules regulating the choice of the applicable law. A domestic tribunal is 
likely to adopt the domestic conflict rules of the place of arbitration, or automatically 
apply the substantive law of the state in which the parties reside, or the contract was 
to be performed or where the arbitration takes place;  whereas the factors that 
determine whether an arbitration is international, such as the place of arbitration, the 
place of performance, or the country of residence of one party, can be expected to 
introduce a potentially different rule of private international law.438 Section 29 of the 
                                                 
436 Article 28(4) Model Law and the Nigerian statute s 23(4). 
437 The same provision is found under Article 28(3) of the Model Law; also the Nigerian statute s 47(4) 
and the Nigerian Arbitration Rules Article 33(2). 
438 This may explain why s 47 of the Nigerian statute replicating Model Law Article 28 is restricted to 
international arbitration. 
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Kenya statute follows the substantive provisions of Model Law Article 28 and 
substitutes the phrase “considerations of justice and fairness without being bound by 
the rules of law”439 in subsection (4) for the Model Law phrase “ex aequo et bono or 
as amiable compositeur.” Zimbabwe arbitration law follows the exact wording of 
Model Law Article 28 which is not adopted for domestic arbitration in its original 
formulation in the Nigerian statute, although section 47, in substantially the same 
wording as Article 28, applies to international commercial arbitration in Nigeria by 
virtue of the provisions of section 43 thereof. 
 
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties a majority decision is permissible by the 
Model Law and questions of procedure can be decided by the presiding arbitrator 
(Article 29). Where the parties settle their dispute during the arbitration Article 30 
enables them to request the tribunal to make an award in terms of the settlement 
which has the same status as an award on the merits and is enforceable as such. But 
the tribunal has discretion to refuse the request to prevent an abuse of this 
provision.440 
 
An award must be in writing, stating the reasons upon which it is based unless the 
parties have agreed otherwise or the award is on agreed terms (Article 31). The 
termination of proceedings and the process for correction, interpretation or an 
additional award are regulated by Articles 32 and 33. 
 
The Model Law provisions on decision making by the arbitrators (Article 29), 
settlement of a dispute by parties (Article 30), the form and content of the award 
(Article 31), termination of proceedings (Article 32) and correction of errors, 
interpretation of the award and additional awards (Article 33) are substantially 
reproduced in the statutes of the three African jurisdictions. Although these topics are 
in the main non-controversial there are some significant modifications and 
clarifications in the Kenyan and Zimbabwean statutes on the form and contents of the 
award. Both of these statutes unlike the Model Law provide for the costs and 
                                                 
439 For commentary and clarification of “ex aequo et bono” and “amiable compositeur” see SA Law 
Commission Report, para 2.226-2.230 and Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 
770; Rubino-Sammartino (1992) 9(1) Journal of International Arbitration 5-16. 
440 Such as an attempt to obtain an award against public policy or a settlement on illegal terms. 
Otherwise the Model Law provides no guidelines for the exercise of the discretion to refuse to record 
agreed settlement terms. Fraud, illegality and unconscionable terms may be relevant factors for refusal. 
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expenses of the arbitration including the legal and other expenses of the parties, the 
fees and expenses of the arbitral tribunal to be determined and apportioned by the 
arbitral tribunal in the award or additional award in the absence of which each party is 
responsible for his own legal and other expenses and for an equal share of the 
tribunal’s fees and expenses.441 The Zimbabwean statute goes even further and 
incorporates an additional provision enabling the tribunal to award interest at such 
rate and on such sum and for the period it may specify in the award (Article 31(6)). 
Again further, Article 31(7) empowers the tribunal, unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties to make an interim, interlocutory or partial award.442 
 
The Nigerian statute provides for costs to be fixed by the tribunal443 for international 
commercial arbitration which costs include the fees of each arbitrator, travel and other 
expenses of the arbitrators and witnesses, the costs of expert advice and the costs of 
legal representation. Section 50 enables the arbitral tribunal to request from each party 
a deposit of costs in equal amounts in advance. 
 
(ix) Challenging and Enforcing the Award 
 
Recourse against the award is by an application to set it aside on the limited grounds 
prescribed by Article 34(2) which are: 
 
(a) (i) a party to the arbitration agreement was under some incapacity or the 
arbitration   agreement is not valid under the applicable law. 
(ii) a party was unable to present his case. 
(iii) the award deals with extraneous issues. 
(iv) the composition of arbitral tribunal was contrary to the arbitration 
agreement. 
 
(b) The award may also be set aside if the court finds that: 
(i) the subject-matter is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law 
of the state of arbitration. 
                                                 
441 Kenya Arbitration Act s 32(6)(a) and (b); Zimbabwe Arbitration Act First Schedule Article 31(5)(a) 
and (b).  
442 Compare the tribunal’s power to grant an interim order under Article 17(2)(a). 
443 S 49. 
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(ii) the award contravenes public policy of that state. 
 
It is noteworthy that there is no mention of error of law as a ground for setting aside 
the award or for appeal against the award.  It is a gap that can be filled by domestic 
law as desired. 
 
Recognition and enforcement are regulated by Article 35 and the grounds for refusing 
recognition or enforcement are set out under Article 36.  These are in essence the 
same grounds as for setting aside the award under Article 34 plus the further grounds 
that an enforcing state can decline recognition or enforcement if the award has not yet 
become binding on the parties or has been set aside or suspended by a court of the 
country in which the award was made.444 
 
It is the provision that recognition or enforcement may be granted or refused 
irrespective of the country in which the award was made that gives Articles 35 and 36 
their universality beyond the reciprocity reservations taken by states; otherwise the 
fact that the Model Law is not a treaty has enabled states to adopt or adapt its 
provisions at will as done by Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe. 
 
Kenya has adopted the Model Law provisions for setting aside the award, its 
recognition and enforcement and the grounds for its refusal by similar wording under 
sections 34, 35 and 36 respectively of its Arbitration Act. Zimbabwe has done the 
same except for partial definition of public policy by Article 34(5) and Article 36(3). 
By these provisions an award would be in conflict with public policy of Zimbabwe if 
it was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or by breach of the rules of natural 
justice.  
 
Model Law Articles 33 and 34(2)(b)(iii) were relied on in Zimbabwe Electricity 
Supply Commission (ZESA) v Genius Joel Maposa
445
 in which an employer 
suspended employees pending disciplinary hearings into alleged misconduct. The 
employer sought an arbitral award given in favour of an employee to be set aside for 
factual errors in the calculation of back-pay which the employer contended rendered 
                                                 
444 Article 36(i)(v). 
445 ZESA v Genius Joel Mapos, SC114/99. 
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the award contrary to public policy under Article 34. The court found that the error of 
calculation was correctable under Article 33 and that an award that would be contrary 
to public policy would be one that could undermine the integrity of the system of 
international arbitration put in place by the Model Law and that this would include 
cases of fraud, corruption, bribery and serious procedural irregularities; but that in this 
case as no moral turpitude attached to the arbitrator’s conduct the award was not in 
conflict with public policy under Article 34. A commentator laments, with reference 
to some selected decisions, that the Zimbabwe courts are in effect acting as courts of 
appeal against arbitration awards deeming the courts to be out of step and to have 
strayed from the public policy principles for interfering with arbitral awards. He 
discerns a tendency by the Zimbabwe courts to use the power under Article 34 to set 
aside an arbitral award with whose reasoning or conclusions the courts disagree.446 
 
Although the drafters of the Model Law reportedly447 found “public policy” difficult 
to define, no doubt because of the diversities in its national, political and moral 
appraisal, they understood the term not to be equivalent to the political stance or 
international policies of a state but as comprising the fundamental notions and 
principles of law and justice, in substance as well as in procedure. The International 
Law Association (ILA) has also noted that an overly broad interpretation of public 
policy would defeat arbitral finality and the objectives of arbitration.448 
 
For domestic arbitration the Nigerian statute contains modifications to the Model Law 
provisions. The grounds for setting aside the award under section 29(2) are restricted 
to decisions beyond the scope of the arbitral submission and to misconduct by the 
arbitrator under section 30(1). A Nigerian award may be enforced in the same manner 
as a judgment or order of the court449 and, any party may request the court to refuse 
the recognition or enforcement of the award.450 The grounds for refusal are not stated 
                                                 
446 Tannock Q “Public Policy as a Ground for Setting Aside an Award: Is Zimbabwe out of Step?” 
(2008) 74 Arbitration 1, 72-81. Cases referred to include: Pamire v Venture Capital Corporation of 
Zimbabwe, HH36 – 2001; facts outlined in (2007) 73 Arbitration 216, 220; Origen Corporation v Delta 
Operations, HH101 – 2005; facts in (2007) 73 Arbitration 220-221. See also Reid-Rowland J: 
“Arbitration in Zimbabwe: the UNCITRAL Model Law in practice in a Developing Country” (2007) 
73 Arbitration 216- 223. 
447 UNCITRAL Report, 18th Session, 3-21 June, 1985 UN doc A/40/17 para 297. 
448 ILA Interim Committee Report, accessible at http://w.w.w.ila-hg.org/htm layout committee.htm  
449 S 31(3). 
450 S 32. 
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under this section. For international commercial arbitration Nigerian legislation has 
reproduced the wording of the Model Law under section 48 (setting aside an award), 
section 51 (recognition and enforcement) and section 52 (the grounds for refusing 
recognition and enforcement). 
 
Neither the Model Law nor the African jurisdictions lay down the procedural details 
for recognition and enforcement. Contrary to the notion that no practical need exists 
for unifying such procedural details it is this writer’s view that the formulation of an 
enforcement procedure will provide a useful standard guidance for the enforcement of 
domestic awards. 
 
2.4.4.6 Matters Not Covered by the Model Law 
 
The Model Law is partial law and as such does not deal with or fully with certain 
aspects of arbitration law or practice. Matters not covered include: multi-party 
proceedings; arbitrability; the capacity, duties, liability and immunities of arbitrators; 
power to provide security for costs; dissenting opinions, power to award expenses or 
interest; remuneration of administrative staff, and the grant of substantive remedies 
including injunctions. Quite obviously if these omissions persist the courts might be 
tempted or prompted to intervene in arbitral matters not specifically covered by the 
Model Law and its national equivalents. Revision of the Model Law is therefore a  
desirable and continuing challenge. 
 
2.4.4.7 Revision of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
 
UNCITRAL’s work on the Model Law has continued. By a Note from the 
UNCITRAL Secretariat dated 6th April 1999, UNCITRAL assigned thirteen topics for 
consideration and revision by a Working Group.451 Priority was given to three topics: 
Conciliation, Interim Measures of Protection (Article 17) and the Written Form of the 
Arbitration Agreement (Article 7). Pursuant to this a new UNCITRAL Model Law on 
                                                 
451 UN Doc A/CN 0/469. 
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International Commercial Conciliation was completed and approved by the General 
Assembly on 19th November 2002.452 
 
In 2006 UNCITRAL published a revision of Articles 1, 2, 7, 17 and 35.453 Under the 
revised Article 1(2) the exceptions to the territorial scope of the Model Law now 
include new Articles 17H, 17I and 17J in addition to the original Articles 8, 9, 35 and 
36. The new Article 17 is discussed below.454 
 
Revised Article 2A contains provisions under two paragraphs on interpretation of the 
Model Law and a statement of general principles. The first paragraph under Article 
2A requires the international origin of the Model Law, the need to promote 
uniformity, and the observance of good faith to be taken into consideration in the 
interpretation of the Model Law. Under the second paragraph questions on matters 
governed by the Model Law that are not expressly covered by that Law are to be 
determined in conformity with the general principles upon which that Law is based.  
 
The revised Article 7 offers two options for the definition and form of the arbitration 
agreement. The first option, containing six paragraphs, retains the original definition 
of an arbitration agreement and the requirement for it to be in writing and under the 
new sub-paragraph 3 it is in writing, “if its content is recorded in any form, whether or 
not the arbitration agreement or contract has been concluded orally, by conduct or by 
other means.” A signed document is no longer a requirement and the written 
requirement is satisfied by an “electronic communication” and “data messages” as 
defined in sub-paragraph 4. The arbitration agreement may also be contained in an 
exchange of statements of claim and defence (sub-paragraph 5) or by reference in a 
document containing an arbitration clause which makes clear that the clause is part of 
the parties’ contract (sub-paragraph 6). 
 
The second option under revised Article 7 defines an arbitration agreement as an 
agreement to submit all or certain disputes which have arisen or may arise between 
                                                 
452 See a critical appraisal of this Law by Van Ginkel E The UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Conciliation (2004) 21(1) Journal of International Arbitration 1–65.  
453 Report of UNCITRAL on the work of its thirty-ninth session 19 June - 7 July 2006 (UN doc 
A/61/17). 
454 See para 3.5.3 below. 
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the parties in a defined legal relationship whether contractual or not. The UNCITRAL 
revision is commendable both for its succinctness and breadth of scope. As such 
revised Article 7, second option, retains only the first sentence of the original version 
of Article 7(1). Adherents and proponents of customary and common law arbitration 
would welcome this option which should facilitate the integration of those forms of 
arbitration with the Model Law and its African derivatives. As observed under 
paragraph 2.4.4.5 this option replicates the definition of arbitration agreement under 
section 2(1) of the New Zealand Arbitration Act of 1996 which also recognises an 
arbitration agreement made orally or in writing under section 7 thereof. 
 
Revised Chapter 4 of the Model Law introduces Chapter IVA455 headed “Interim 
Measures and Preliminary Orders” with the provisions of the new Articles 17 A – 17 J 
set out under five sections. Section 1 confers powers on the arbitral tribunal to order 
interim measures. It defines an “interim measure” and states the conditions for 
granting such measures. Section 2 governs the applications and the conditions for 
granting preliminary orders as a means for preserving the status quo until the tribunal 
grants an interim measure adopting or modifying the preliminary order. Two 
conditions in the nature of safeguards under Article 17 A are that an irreparable harm 
may result if the measure is not ordered, and there is reasonable possibility that the 
applicant will succeed on the merits of the claim. 
 
Article 17 B allows a party, without notice to any other party, to request an interim 
measure together with a preliminary order directing a party not to frustrate the 
purpose of the interim measure requested; and the Article also permits the tribunal to 
grant the preliminary order if the prior disclosure of the request for interim measure 
risks frustrating the purpose of the measure. These provisions, which are in the nature 
of ex-parte orders but in the guise of preliminary orders, were not available for 
granting interim measures ex-parte in the original version of the Model Law. 
 
Article 17 C contains safeguards requiring the arbitral tribunal to give to the party 
against whom the preliminary order is directed prompt notice of the application and 
the preliminary order itself if made, and an opportunity for that party to present its 
                                                 
455 See UNCITRAL Secretariat Explanatory Note 31. 
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case at the earliest practicable time. The order subsists for twenty days only and it 
binds the parties but does not constitute an enforceable award. 
Section 3 prescribes the rules applicable to both preliminary orders and interim 
measures. Provisions regulating the modification, suspension and termination of the 
interim measure or a preliminary order, the provision of security, disclosure of any 
material change in the circumstances upon which the measure was granted, and on 
costs and damages, are covered under Articles 17 D, 17 E, 17 F and 17 G 
respectively. 
 
Section 4, under its Articles 17 H and 17I ,456 is an innovation that establishes a 
regime for the recognition and enforcement of interim measures modeled on the 
provisions of Article 35 and 36 on the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. 
 
Section 5 contains Article 17 J headed “Court-ordered interim measures” and grants 
the court the same power to issue an interim measure relating to arbitral proceedings 
as it has in court proceedings, “irrespective of whether their place is in the territory of 
the enacting State.” Some tension can be foreseen between the operation of the wider 
powers exercisable by the court under Article 17 J and the limitation of the scope of 
the court’s powers under Article 5. 
 
Revised Article 35 merely requires the party relying on or applying for enforcement 
of the award to supply the original award or its copy in the official language of the 
state in which the application for enforcement is made. Production of the original 
arbitration agreement is therefore no longer a requirement. 
 
In context there would be justification for the African jurisdictions in this study to 
adopt the revisions under Article 1 paragraph 2 (territorial application), and the 
second option of the definition of arbitration agreement under Article 7. Also 
recommended for adoption are Article 17 (the power to order interim measures), 
Article 17 A (the conditions for granting interim measures) and Article 17 B 
(Applications and Conditions, for granting preliminary orders). Article 17 C (the 
                                                 
456 The UNCITRAL Report points out that the condition under Article 17 I are intended to limit the 
circumstances in which the court may refuse to enforce an interim measure and that it is open to a state 
to adopt fewer circumstances in which enforcement may be refused. 
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specific regime for preliminary orders) is more controversial: it can be of some value 
to the expeditious disposal of arbitral disputes, but can impose an onerous burden on 
the arbitral tribunal. The extent to which an arbitral preliminary order that is not 
enforceable by the court can be held to be binding on the parties is uncertain. For 
these reasons revised Article 17C is not necessarily attractive for adoption. 
 
The provisions of Articles 17 D, 17 E, 17 F, 17 G, 17 H and 17 J are matters of 
practical importance in arbitration and are commended for the critical consideration 
and/or adoption by the national jurisdictions in this study. The possible tension 
between Articles 5 and 17 J has been noted. Otherwise there is no serious objection to 
the court having and applying the same powers in relation to arbitration as to litigation 
in dealing with interim measures. There is also no objection to revised Article 35 
paragraph 2 which should facilitate the enforcement process as there is now no need 
to supply the arbitration agreement but only the award.  
 
The other ten topics for revision relate to: (i) Consolidation (ii) Fees and Costs (iii) 
Interest (iv) Liability of Arbitrators and Arbitral Institutions (v) Arbitrability (vi) 
Sovereign Immunity (vii) Confidentiality (viii) Set-Off (ix) Truncated Arbitral 
Tribunals, and (x) Enforcement of An Award Set Aside in the State of Origin. 
 
Full scale consideration of several of these highly controversial subjects is beyond the 
scope of this study. Professor Pieter Sanders457 has applied himself to the task and 
produced an elaborate survey, Article by Article, of the Model Law and the areas of 
revision with his recommendations on (i) topics that may be included in a revised 
Model Law, (ii) topics that should be left for national legislation, (iii) topics that may 
be included in Arbitration Rules and (iv) topics to be left for the determination by the 
court.458 
                                                 
457 Honorary President of the Netherlands Arbitration Institute, Honorary President of the International 
Council for Commercial Arbitration (ICCA) and Professor Emeritus of the Faculty of Law, Erasmus 
University, Rotterdam. 
458 Sanders P “UNCITRAL’s Model Law on International and Commercial Arbitration: Present 
Situation and Future” (2005) 21(4) Arbitration International 443-491.  See also Sorieul R 
“UNCITRAL’s Current Work in the Field of International Commercial Arbitration” (2005) 22(6) 
Journal of International Arbitration 543-568; and his earlier article “Update on Recent Developments 
and Future Work by UNCITRAL in the Field of International Commercial Arbitration.” (2000) 17 (3) 
Journal of International Arbitration 163-184. See also Sekolec J “International Dispute Resolution: 
Areas where Further Research may be Useful” (2003) 20(1) Journal of International Arbitration 35-66. 
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Sanders recommends Consolidation,459 Claims for Set-Off,460 Liability and 
Immunities of Arbitrators and Arbitral Institutions, and Truncated Arbitral 
Tribunals461 for inclusion in a Revised Model Law. With regard to a Truncated 
Tribunal the provision will allow the two arbitrators, at their request to the court, to 
render an award where the third arbitrator refuses or is unable to act; alternatively this 
could also be dealt with by Arbitration Rules. Also to be left for Arbitration rules are 
Fees and Costs and Confidentiality of Information in Arbitral Proceedings such as the 
Rules of the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) which regulates 
confidentiality in detail in relation to intellectual property disputes and the IBA Rules 
on Taking Evidence (1999). In Sander’s opinion Arbitrability should be left to 
national laws noting that countries like Zimbabwe and Zambia have legislated on 
arbitrability; that Interest on Awards and State Immunity are difficult topics and too 
controversial for inclusion in a revised Model Law but that the Enforcement of 
Annulled Awards should be left to the court and not the Model Law. 
 
With greatest respect for his experience and stature in the arbitration world this writer 
does not share Sanders’ views on what may or may not be included in the revised 
Model Law. These topics have been identified for consideration and possible 
inclusion in the Model Law because, despite their obvious importance, they are either 
inadequately regulated or not at all by national laws and the current Model Law. 
There is of course the problem and difficulty of seeking and obtaining consensus on 
the solutions to these problems but in so far as these topics are important and 
recurrent in arbitration practice they deserve effective regulation and the search for 
consensus must continue. In this writer’s respectful opinion all the matters proposed 
for consideration are amenable to regulation by Law in preference to Rules. The 
allocation of topics, some for regulation by laws and others by rules is arbitrary and 
pampers to arbitral conservatism and outmoded predilections instead of authoritative 
regulation of practical problems by effective legislation. It does no good for 
arbitration for arbitral issues emanating from these topics to be constantly referred to 
                                                 
459 The Dutch Arbitration Act 1986 and the English Arbitration Act 1996 provide for consolidation 
although through different routes. 
460 Claims for set-off can be provided for under Article 19(3) in words such as “the Respondent may 
make a counterclaim arising directly out of the same contract or rely on a claim arising out of the same 
contract for the purpose of a set-off” according to Sanders. See also the Swiss Rules of International 
Arbitration (2006) article 21(5). 
461 Where a panel of three arbitrators is reduced to two due to non-cooperation by the third arbitrator. 
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the court which, in terms of pertinent knowledge and technical expertise, is not any 
the better placed without the aid of specific legislation than the expert arbitral tribunal 
to determine such issues. 
 
In the context of this discussion, while the lack of consensus and uniformity on these 
matters persist on the international plane, it is proposed that national legislation from 
the common law traditions should take the initiative to regulate matters not covered 
by the Model Law for international arbitration which after all was and is the main 
focus of the Model Law. Perhaps the dissenters on the international plane may then be 
inspired to follow the examples of national arbitration law and practice. 
 
On the interesting question whether, after the revision exercise, the current Model 
Law of 1985 will be replaced by a revised edition or whether there will be two Model 
Laws living apart together, this writer’s view is that state practice on new legislation 
is a useful precedent whereby the new law may re-enact and retain the desirable 
provisions of the old law and repeal the undesirable or obsolete provisions. This 
writer does not therefore share Professor Sanders’ opinion to present the results of the 
revision in the form of a “Document of Recommendations”. A single revised and 
authoritative Model Law is preferable to a “Document of Recommendations” of 
dubious authority, force and effect. If the problem of lack of uniformity persists 
uniformity may be sacrificed for progress by willing states adopting the revised 
version of the Model Law or enacting the revisions. 
 
Nothing said here underrates the importance of Rules or Courts in arbitration.  This 
writer uses Arbitration Rules frequently and procedurally to facilitate and smoothen 
the conduct of arbitral proceedings. But virtually on any substantive issue including 
those comprised in the Model Law revision exercise this writer, as arbitrator, has had 
always to look for support from existing laws for his rulings and decisions. The 
development of substantive rules of law will be better assisted by provisions of law on 
these arbitral problems. That, in this writer’s submission, is the way to go. 
 
But to demonstrate that it is not arbitration itself that poses the problems or defies 
solutions but the attitude of practitioners from diverse arbitration systems and cultures 
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that exacerbate the problems one need go no further than quote the following remarks 
of another eminent arbitrator:- 
 
“It is well known that the views and reviews of the role which national courts play or 
should play on the arbitration scene differ widely and, it seems, without there being 
hope for consensus. At one end of the spectrum you may find the view that arbitration 
would turn into an unacceptable theatre of the absurd or a tragedy if it is not 
constantly monitored, protected and assisted by a judicial director, stage-hand or, in 
case of emergency, deus ex machina (all courtesy of the local court). At the other end 
you may find the view that arbitration - like any good play – would suffer from 
outside interference and that the artistic freedom of the cast, i.e. parties and 
arbitrators, must not be impeded by local law barriers or benches. It is no secret that a 
certain sympathy with the first view could be detected, for example, in the UK, while 
the second view seems to be prominently represented in the Paris-Geneva connection 
(recently extended to Djibouti). Such strong and divergent views, admittedly 
overdrawn in the above picture, may be rooted in traditional legal concepts, deeply 
ingrained attitudes and well-established practices, often cultured by prevailing 
interests. This may account for the fact that, somewhat surprising to the innocent 
bystander, dramatically opposed views equally claim to present the most advanced 
state of development and, of course, to reflect best the needs of arbitration practice. 
Yet, a closer look at the arbitration scene and its perennial discussion of the proper 
role of courts may help to gain perspective as a possible basis for reconciliation.”462 
 
It is not for nothing that UNCITRAL has commissioned the revision exercise. The 
experience of great arbitrators in the international arena may well incline them to 
caution in proposing and negotiating modest provisions in an international legal 
instrument such as the UNCITRAL Model Law. However, the persistent problems 
encountered in arbitration practice without the aid of supportive legislation, nationally 
and internationally, makes it critically imperative, when the opportunity for revision 
has arisen, to take the arbitral bull by the horns and harness its enormous power and 
force to transform it into the effective working tool that it ought to be. While in no 
way under-estimating or under-stating the immense difficulties the revision exercise 
entails, it is this writer’s submission that the opportunity of revising the Model Law 
                                                 
462 Herrmann G “The Role of the Courts under the UNCITRAL Model Law Script” 1986 
Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration 164.   Herrmann was then Legal Officer of the 
UNCITRAL Secretariat. 
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can be utilized to fill in the yawning gaps in this universally acclaimed Model Law for 
the benefit of all users.  Therefore some twenty years down the line since the Model 
Law came into operation the revision exercise is an opportune moment not to be 
missed through concessions to arbitral conservatism. As the saying goes “nothing 
ventured nothing gained” 
 
2.5 Particular Aspects of the Selected African Arbitration Statutes 
 
Since the Model Law came into force certain requirements may be deemed 
established for the evaluation of arbitration legislation. These are provisions for (i) 
party autonomy, (ii) substantial procedural powers for the arbitral tribunal to the 
extent that these are not provided by the arbitration agreement, and (iii) a balance of 
powers between the arbitral tribunal and the court. In varying degrees of detail and 
elaboration the arbitration statutes of the three jurisdictions in this study fulfill these 
requirements as seen from the preceding integrated discussion of these statutes with 
the Model Law. Each jurisdiction has applied its own national legislative technique to 
introduce substantially the provisions of the Model Law into its national arbitration 
law. Because the relevant provisions of these national statutes dealing with the main 
stages of arbitration proceedings have already been discussed in the context of the 
Model Law, what follows at this stage is an integrated commentary on certain 
characteristic features of the three national arbitration statutes, such as the long title of 
each statute, the mode of adoption of the provisions of the Model Law and the 
differing structures of each statute. Certain incongruities suggestive of tension in the 
provisions of these statutes are also pointed out. 
 
2.5.1 The Long Title 
 
Kenya adopted the substantial provisions of the Model Law through the enactment of 
the Arbitration Act 1995 by its publication in the Kenya Gazette. The long title of the 
Act reads: 
 
“An Act of Parliament to repeal and re-enact with amendments the Arbitration Act 
and to provide for connected purposes.” 
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The words “repeal” and “re-enact” are significant. Section 42(1) of the Act confirms 
the repeal of the previous arbitration statute of 1968.463 But it is questionable whether 
the Model Law-based 1995 Act was a re-enactment of the Common-Law-based Cap 
49 which was different in substance and structure. Because the 1995 Act is 
substantially new legislation, the implication from its long title that the Act was a re-
enactment with amendments to Cap 49 can be misleading. 
 
Nigeria adopted the provisions of the Model Law through the promulgation of the 
Arbitration and Conciliation Decree of 1988 by the military government of the day.464 
 
The long title of this decree which is now also referred to as the Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act (Chapter 19) states: 
 
“An Act to provide a unified legal framework for the fair and efficient settlement of 
commercial disputes by arbitration and conciliation; and to make applicable the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards (New York 
Convention) to any award made in Nigeria or in any contracting State arising out of 
international commercial arbitration.” 
 
Zimbabwe enacted the Model Law with modifications as the First Schedule to the 
Arbitration Act of 1996. The long title confirms that the Act was intended: 
 
“To give effect to domestic and international arbitration agreements; to apply, with 
modifications, the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration adopted by 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the 21st June, 1985, 
thereby giving effect to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards adopted in New York on the 10th June 1958; to repeal the 
Arbitration Act (Chapter 7.02); to amend the High Court Act (Chapter 7.06); and to 
provide for matters incidental to or connected with the foregoing.” 
 
                                                 
463 Cap 49 of the Laws of Kenya. 
464 Because the exact contents of this Decree (Cap. 19) are reproduced in the Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act of 2004 the terms “Decree”, “Act” and “Statute” are used in this study 
interchangeably because of their textual sameness with reference to the progress of arbitration 
legislation in Nigeria. Otherwise it is accurate to refer to the statute as the Arbitration and Conciliation 
Act of 1988.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
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Because the Nigerian statute did not specifically repeal previous legislation and 
applies only to commercial arbitration it can be argued that the 1914 Arbitration Act 
was never repealed and still applied to arbitration in the States within the Nigerian 
federation without restriction to commercial activity. This is in contrast to both the 
Kenyan and Zimbabwean statutes that repealed previous legislation and, without 
restriction to commercial activity, apply to both domestic and international arbitration. 
 
Unlike the Kenyan statute which makes no reference to the New York Convention 
despite the application of the statute to international arbitration, both the Nigerian and 
Zimbabwean statutes acknowledge the New York Convention by specific references 
to it in their long titles. 
 
2.5.2 The Structure 
 
The diversity of legislative techniques in the adoption of the provisions of the Model 
Law is reflected in the differences in the structure of the three national statutes. As 
already noted, Kenya re-enacted the provisions of the Model Law under eight parts 
that resemble the eight chapters of the Model Law and cover all stages of arbitration. 
Part 1, headed “Preliminary” contains the important provisions on the extension of the 
application of the Act to both domestic and international arbitration465 and a definition 
of “domestic arbitration”466 that is not provided by the Model Law. The definition of 
international arbitration which is akin to that of the Model Law needs no repetition or 
further comment here. 
 
The Act characterizes arbitration as domestic  
 
“if the arbitration agreement provides expressly or by implication for arbitration in 
Kenya: and at the time when proceedings are commenced or the arbitration is entered 
into:- 
 
(a) the parties are nationals of Kenya or are habitually resident in Kenya 
                                                 
465 S 2. 
466 S 3(2). 
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(b) in the case of a body corporate, the body is incorporated in or its central 
management and control is exercised in Kenya; or  
(c) the place where a substantive part of the obligations of the commercial 
relationship is to be performed or the place with which the subject-matter of the 
dispute is most closely connected is Kenya.”467 
 
As the Kenyan Act is not restricted to commercial arbitration, as does the Nigerian 
statute or the Model Law, the reference to “commercial” in sub-paragraph (c) above 
may well be an oversight. It is apparent from section 3(2)(c) that domestic arbitration 
includes not only commercial but also other activities as long as the subject-matter of 
the dispute is closely connected to Kenya. Further, as the term “commercial” is not 
defined, the illustrative list provided by the Model Law468 could assist the 
interpretation of that term in the Kenyan context. 
 
The Act also defines an “arbitration agreement”469 and an “international 
arbitration”470 in terms corresponding to Model Law Articles 7(1) and 1(3) 
respectively, which are already encountered and discussed; and the pertinent point is 
that the arbitration agreement as defined by the Kenyan Act and the Model Law is not 
confined to contractual relationships only but extends to other legal relationships such 
as occasioned by tortious acts and omissions.471 
 
Part II of the Act contains “General Provisions” principal among which are those that 
prescribe the form of the arbitration agreement,472 the principle enabling parties to 
request interim measures of protection from the High Court473 and the extent of court 
intervention.474  
 
Part III headed “Composition and Jurisdiction of Arbitral Tribunal” combines under 
sections 11 – 18 the provisions of the Model Law Articles 10 to 17 while Part IV 
deals with the Conduct of the Arbitral Proceedings. It starts with Section 19 which 
                                                 
467 S 3(2)(a), (b) and (c). 
468 See the footnote to Article 1. 
469 S 3(1). 
470 S 3(3). 
471 S 3(1). 
472 S 4. 
473 S 7. 
474 S 10. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 137 
requires equal treatment of the parties, the delivery of statements of claim and defence 
(section 24), the hearing (section 25) and concludes with court assistance in taking 
evidence under section 28. But the provision that the High Court, in executing the 
request, may do so in accordance with its rules on taking evidence is in marked 
contrast to section 2 of the Evidence Act Cap 80 which excludes the application of the 
Evidence Act in arbitral proceedings. 
 
Equal treatment of the parties and affording each one “full opportunity” to present his 
case is considered a cardinal principle in arbitration law and practice. “Full 
opportunity” has the potential of compelling the arbitral tribunal to conduct an 
investigation of its meaning and implications and, if necessary, to hear the parties’ 
submissions on these points. Therefore an arbitrator would need to adopt a firm 
approach in determining how far the investigation of a particular issue should be 
taken in order to avoid an unduly protracted examination of witnesses.475 
 
Sections 20 to 34 under Part V deal with the Arbitral Award and Termination of 
Proceedings, particularly the form and contents of the award. The award of costs and 
expenses are provided for under section 32. 
 
The provisions for challenging and enforcing the award under sections 35, 36 and 37 
of Parts VI and VII correspond to Model Law Articles 34, 35 and 36. Part VIII 
concludes the Act with a Miscellany of Provisions on Bankruptcy and sets out limited 
conditions on which questions of law may be referred to the High Court and appeals 
from it to the Court of Appeal. 
 
Although the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation statute, like the Kenyan and 
Zimbabwean counterparts, is monistic for applying to both domestic and international 
arbitrations, and covers all stages of arbitration, it is structurally different from the 
latter two statutes. A further distinction is that, unlike the two latter statutes, the 
Nigerian statute, as noted, applies only to commercial arbitration disputes. 
 
                                                 
475 The rules of natural justice (to which the phrase “full opportunity” may owe its origin required each 
party to be given a “reasonable opportunity” to present evidence and argument and to test the case 
against him; but it was never taken to confer a right to conduct an interminable examination of 
witnesses. See Mustill & Boyd Commercial Arbitration 299-302. 
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Part I which deals with domestic arbitration sets out General Provisions, not at the 
beginning but under sections 33 to 36 including principally the extent of its 
application476 and the extent of court intervention.477 Section 1 through to section 32 
contain the usual provisions of domestic arbitration, describing the form of the 
arbitration agreement, the composition of the arbitral tribunal and its jurisdiction. The 
proceedings are conducted under provisions akin to those of the Model Law and its 
African derivatives. Again the challenge procedures against the arbitral tribunal and 
the provisions governing the making of the award, the termination of proceedings, the 
challenge and enforcement of the award are similar to the Model Law scheme. All 
these come under Part 1 of the Act. Part II governs Conciliation with which this study 
is not concerned. Part III sets out what is described as “Additional Provisions Relating 
to International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation” under sections 43 to 52. 
Section 43 makes clear that “this part of the Act” applies solely to international 
commercial arbitration and conciliation” but “in addition to other provisions of this 
Act.” A reasonable inference is that the provisions for domestic arbitration under this 
statute together with those specified under this part will also apply to international 
commercial arbitration and conciliation; but that those provisions governing 
international commercial arbitration and conciliation will not apply to domestic 
arbitration and conciliation. 
 
Except for the provisions on costs and deposit of costs under sections 49 and 50 
respectively the remaining sections of Part III replicate the Model Law provisions 
from the appointment of the tribunal to the enforcement of the award. 
 
Two additional provisions under Part III require comment. Section 53 offers arbitral 
parties in international arbitration a choice of rules to govern their arbitration, being 
either the Arbitration Rules set out in the First Schedule to the Act, or the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or any other international arbitration rules acceptable 
to the parties. To an extent therefore this provision brings into contrast the mandatory 
provisions of section 15 of Part I which require domestic arbitration proceedings to be 
conducted, without options, in accordance with the Rules in the First Schedule of the 
                                                 
476 S 35 excludes the Act from applying to other laws by which certain disputes may not be arbitrated, 
or may be arbitrated only in accordance with such laws. 
477 S 34. 
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Act. Section 54 makes applicable the New York Convention to any award made in 
Nigeria or in any Contracting State, subject to reciprocity and only to differences that 
arise out of a contractual legal relationship. 
 
The Miscellany of Provisions under Part IV, the final part, contains principally the 
interpretation provisions of section 57 of the Act. 
 
The Zimbabwean arbitration statute is, in structure, form and presentation the closest 
of all the African statutes to the Model Law already discussed at some length in this 
chapter. Its seven sections include section 4 which prescribes what is arbitrable478 and 
what is not.479 A requirement under any other law for a matter to be determined by 
arbitration is deemed an arbitration agreement and the provisions of that law shall 
prevail if inconsistent with the Arbitration Act.480 Section 6 confirms the repeal of the 
previous Arbitration Act (Chapter 7:02) and, pursuant to section 2, the Model Law 
provisions with modifications, is incorporated as the First Schedule to the Act. 
 
2.5.3 Some Distinctive Features of the Three African Statutes 
 
Certain singularities exist in the law and practice of arbitration in the three African 
jurisdictions. To an extent this is due to the fact that arbitration is regulated by laws 
other than the principal statutes of 1995 (Kenya), 1988 (Nigeria) and 1996 
(Zimbabwe) respectively, the extent of interaction between each of these statutes and 
the other applicable arbitration laws in each jurisdiction and the provisions relating to 
paramountcy contribute to their singularities. 
 
With regard to Kenya the phrase “Except as otherwise provided in a particular case” 
in section 2 prefixing the application of the provisions of the Act to domestic and 
international arbitrations is ambiguous. Because “a particular case” is not the same 
thing as “a particular enactment” the clarification offered by section 5 of the 
Zimbabwean statute on the relationship between that statute and other arbitration laws 
and the paramountcy of such other laws in the event of conflict is preferable. A 
                                                 
478 S 4(1). 
479 S 4(2). 
480 S 5. 
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reasonable inference from the phrase “except as otherwise provided in a particular 
case” is that the Kenyan Arbitration Act would recognize an arbitration conducted 
under other arbitration laws which it is submitted would include customary arbitration 
law and practice. In Kenya disputes involving land have been resolved by panels of 
elders for many years,481 a customary practice that is now enacted in the Magistrates 
Courts Act, Chapter 10 of the laws of Kenya. Although this statute does not import 
the word “arbitration” it is not disputed that the process used by the elders is “arbitral” 
in essentials starting with the consent of the parties to the process and enforcement of 
the outcome with the assistance of the court. An arbitral regime is also embedded in 
the Land Disputes Tribunals Act 1990 which repealed the Magistrates Jurisdiction 
[Amendment] Act 1981 and established a land Disputes Tribunal for every district in 
Kenya to deal with disputes affecting the division of land, claims to occupy or work 
land and trespass to land. This Act in effect transformed the existing Panel of Elders 
into a Tribunal whose decision was filed and entered as a judgement of the magistrate 
court.482 
 
The Civil Procedure Act, Chapter 21 of the Laws of Kenya also provides for 
arbitration by a referral order of court483 enabling parties in a suit by agreement to 
refer a disputed issue to arbitration.484 This option is not imposed by the court but 
warranted by the statute and exercised by the parties’ agreement. After the referral 
order the court ceases to deal with the suit except in the manner and to the extent 
provided by the referral order485 such as fixing the time limit for the delivery of the 
award. Although this procedure is pursuant to the Civil Procedure Act, it is open to 
the parties to obtain a referral order for the arbitration to be conducted under the more 
elaborate Arbitration Act. Some support for this view and the interaction between the 
Civil Procedure Rules and the Arbitration Rules is found in section 11 of the 
Arbitration Rules 1997 made pursuant to section 40 of the Arbitration Act which 
                                                 
481 An elder is a person in the community who, because of his age and experience is recognized by 
custom as competent to resolve issues between disputing parties – see The Magistrates Courts Act, Cap 
10. The ambivalence as to whether this customary practice is “consensual” or “statutory arbitration” 
arises from the fact that what started as a customary arbitration practice is now recognised in statutory 
form by Cap 10 and by implication the 1995 Arbitration Act (s 2). 
482 It is clarified in para 3.6.4 below that in Kenya a judgment entered in terms of an arbitral award or 
decision of a tribunal is treated as a court judgement and enforced as such. 
483 S 59 requires all references to arbitration by an order in a suit to be governed by the prescribed 
Rules under Order XLV. 
484 Order XLV Rule 1. 
485 Rule 3(2). 
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allows the application of the Civil Procedure Rules, “so far as is appropriate”, to all 
court proceedings under the Arbitration Rules. 
 
The intervention of the Magistrates Court in the customary arbitral process created an 
anomalous practice that was recognized and perpetuated by the Court of Appeal of 
Kenya which required arbitral parties in land cases first to file a suit in court and then 
obtain a referral order for arbitration.486 In Nzasu Ndundu v Nzambulo Munyasya487 
the High Court, after reviewing the existing legislation concluded inter alia, that a 
“valid suit” and a “valid reference” were not legal pre-requisites for the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the panel of elders.  The court reasoned that an issue that must be 
resolved without legal technicalities by a panel of elders often with no formal 
education or legal training needed not be framed as a technical lawsuit before being 
referred to the elders.488 
 
It is submitted that the scope of application of the Arbitration Act 1995 is wide 
enough to cover a variety of arbitral disputes including those affecting land provided 
the arbitration is conducted in accordance with this statute.  It is to be noted that the 
1995 Act repealed and re-enacted with amendments the earlier Arbitration Act 
Chapter 49 of the Laws of Kenya which declared itself as an “Act of Parliament to 
make provision in relation to the settlement of differences by arbitration” a phrase 
omitted in the 1995 Act.  Further, the filing of a suit and a referral order of arbitration 
are not prerequisites under the 1995 Act.489 
 
It may be that the frequency of judicial interference in arbitration promoted in no 
small measure by the preservation of judicial control of the arbitration process under 
these various statutory regimes could be curtailed by amendments towards the 
harmonization of arbitration practice and clarification of the relationship between the 
principal Act of 1995 and all other statutory arbitral regimes.490 
                                                 
486 Benjamin Khayadi v Herbert Aganda CA N0. 176 of 1986. 
487 Civil Appeal No 27 of 1989. 
488 To this writer’s knowledge this decision of the High Court has not been reversed by the Court of 
Appeal and therefore still stands. 
489 Under s 6(1) of the Kenya Statute and Article 8(1) of UNCITRAL Model Law the court is enjoined 
to refer arbitral disputes to arbitration but there is no pre-requisite of a valid suit or “valid reference” 
prior to arbitration. 
490 The Magistrates Courts Act, The Land Disputes Tribunals Act 1990, the Civil Procedure Act and 
the Arbitration Act 1995. 
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A final point of detail on the Kenyan Arbitration Act is that section 40 empowers the 
Chief Justice to make Rules of Court for all proceedings in court under this Act. 
Pursuant to this provision the Chief Justice has made eleven Rules known as The 
Arbitration Rules, 1997. These Rules apply only to applications in arbitral matters in 
the High Court but do not apply to the conduct of arbitration or proceedings of any 
sort before an arbitral tribunal.491 The Rules are inadequate for the purposes intended 
and could be expanded to clarify, facilitate and expedite arbitration matters in court 
proceedings. They differ in scope and substance, for instance, from the Arbitration 
Rules of the Chartered Institute of Arbitration (Kenya Branch) or the Arbitration 
Rules comprised in the First Schedule of the 1988 Nigerian statute which govern 
domestic arbitration by virtue of section 15 of that statute. 
 
A concluding observation is that the Kenyan Arbitration Act of 1995 is overdue for 
revision to provide (a) sanctions and remedies for breaches of, and non-compliance 
with, interim orders where only the arbitral tribunal is involved in granting them, (b) 
procedural powers for the tribunal to grant orders for security for costs and (c) on the 
international plane, to empower the courts to enforce foreign interim measures and 
orders. 
 
Arbitration Law in Nigeria includes Customary and Muslim Arbitration Laws, 
Common Law, Doctrines of Equity and Statutory Laws. Customary Law arbitration is 
well established and grounded in the spate of judicial decisions as referenced earlier 
in this study.492 The Common Law basis of arbitration also comprises the case law of 
Nigeria and the principles of English Common Law and Equity applicable in Nigeria.  
The first statute on arbitration in Nigeria was the Arbitration Ordinance 1914 which 
became Chapter 13 of the Revised Laws of Nigeria 1958 and was the Law of the 
Regions and later the States.493 The Arbitration and Conciliation Decree of 1988 
which was in current use at the start of this research is now renamed the Arbitration 
and Conciliation Act of 2004. It first came into force on 14th March 1988 and applies 
                                                 
491 This limitation is a frequent source of confusion for unwary practitioners who have sought to rely on 
these Rules in arbitral proceedings. 
492 Such as Agu v Ekiwibe (1991) 3 NWLR (pt. 180) 385; Okereke v Nwanko (2003) 9 NWLR 592 and 
Igwego v Ezeugo (1992) 6 NWLR Pt 249, 561 at 586 – 587. 
493 Orojo & Ajomo Law and Practice of Arbitration and Conciliation in Nigeria 3. 
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to both domestic and international commercial arbitration but restricted to only 
disputes from commercial transactions.494 
 
Numerically the majority of Nigerians are Muslims and the constitution of Nigeria 
allows them to regulate their civil activities in conformity with Islamic traditions and 
injunctions. Indeed the Quranic basis for arbitration has been noted earlier to be 
enshrined under 4:35 and 49:9 – 10.495 The point of departure from the Model Law 
and indeed the Arbitration and Conciliation statute is that Islamic Laws496 and 
Customary Laws which are part of the Nigerian legal system also offer and provide 
for arbitration as alternative systems of dispute resolution. Customary Law is 
described as “a mirror of accepted usage”.497 
 
The complexity of the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation statute is traceable to its 
diverse origins and influences. The statute incorporated the New York Convention of 
1958, it was largely influenced by the UNCITRAL Model Law and the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules while some of its provisions were also based on the Arbitration Act 
1889.498 It also seems incongruous that the “unified legal framework” intended by the 
statute also created under the same rubric two separate arbitration regimes for 
domestic as well as international arbitration. Tension may therefore be expected not 
only in the interaction between the two systems but also between the Arbitration and 
Conciliation statute and other arbitration laws.  
 
In discussing the relationship between the Arbitration and Conciliation statute and the 
State Arbitration Laws, Orojo and Aromo point out that although the former applies to 
commercial arbitration throughout the Federation the arbitration laws applicable in the 
States of Nigeria (before the 1988 statute) which derived from the 1914 arbitration 
statute were not expressly repealed by the 1988 statute. The authors therefore argue 
that the State Arbitration Laws are still applicable to non-commercial arbitration 
                                                 
494 S 57(1) of the 1988 Decree/2004 Act. The contents of the Decree and Act are the same. 
495 Bukar & Adamu (1999) 16(1) Journal of International Arbitration 47-53. The authors cite para 4. 
35 as follows: “And if you have reason to feel that a breach might occur between a couple, appoint an 
arbiter from among his people; if they both want to set things alright God may bring about the 
reconciliation. Behold, God is indeed all knowing and wise”. 
496 The application of Sharia in family law arbitration is recognised in the Canadian province of 
Ontario. Report of Attorney General Marion Boyd Dispute Resolution in Family Law December 2004. 
497 Bariramian FJ in Owonyin v Omotosho (1961) 1 All NLR 304 AT 309. 
498 Orojo & Ajomo Law and Practice of Arbitration and Conciliation in Nigeria 3. 
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disputes but the 1988 statute being federal law would prevail over State legislation in 
commercial arbitration.499 But the authors also make the interesting but unconvincing 
submission that the 1988 statute will supersede any conflicting legislation including 
the Nigerian Constitution itself because arbitration is a matter within the residuary 
legislative competence of the States.500 In this connection however the 1988 statute 
itself recognizes its own limitation under section 35 which defines and curtails its 
scope of application by providing that the Act shall not affect any other law by virtue 
of which certain disputes (a) may not be submitted to arbitration or (b) may be 
submitted to arbitration only in accordance with the provisions of that or another law. 
 
A possible source of tension is that section 15 (a) of the Act requires proceedings to 
be conducted in accordance with the procedure in the Arbitration Rules set out in the 
First Schedule to the Act. Article 1 of the Rules states that the Rule shall govern any 
arbitration proceedings. The Rules therefore apply to both domestic and international 
arbitral proceedings; but while they are optional in respect of international arbitration 
they are mandatory for domestic arbitration. In consequence the respect for party 
autonomy which is otherwise demonstrated by several provisions of the Act501 is 
curtailed by the interaction of section 15 and Article 1 of the Rules under the Act. 
 
Again section 43 extends Part III of the Act solely to international commercial 
arbitration but “in addition to the other provisions of this Act”. This provision 
demonstrates the incompleteness of the arbitral regime under Part III that purports to 
govern international commercial arbitration but contains only a limited number of 
Model Law provisions, other provisions being contained under Part 1. 
 
                                                 
499 Orojo & Ajomo Law and Practice of Arbitration and Conciliation in Nigeria 25. 
500 Orojo & Ajomo Law and Practice of Arbitration and Conciliation in Nigeria 25. The learned 
authors discuss the doctrine of “covering the field” with reference to the authoritative decisions in 
Attorney-General of Ogun State v Attorney-General of the Federation of Nigeria (1982) NCLR 166, 
and Oseni v Dawodu (1994) 4 NWLR 390. The supercession of the Constitution by the 1988 statute is 
questionable and unconvincing because it is the Federal Constitution that facilitated both Federal and 
State Legislation. 
501 Such as s 16 (choice of place of arbitration); s 17 (commencement of proceedings) and s 18 (choice 
of language of proceedings); s 22(3) (deciding disputes ex aequo et bono only with party’s 
authorization). Of course the restrictions on party autonomy is not unique to the Nigerian Act. The lex 
arbitri (the law of the place of arbitration generally restricts party autonomy as the enforcement of an 
award may be refused where the tribunal’s procedure was not in accordance with the law of the country 
of arbitration. In this respect section 52 of the Act containing the grounds for refusal of recognition and 
enforcement is in line with the Model Law and the New York Convention. See also James Miller v 
Whitworth Street Estate [1920] 1 All ER 196 HL. 
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Presumably therefore the reason why the appointment of the arbitral tribunal is dealt 
with in Part III and not in Part 1 is because in a domestic arbitration the appointment 
would be covered by the Rules in Schedule 1 (by virtue of section 15) which 
otherwise do not apply to an international arbitration (by virtue of section 53). For 
another example there is nothing in Part III governing the time limit for setting aside 
an international award which is provided for domestic arbitration by section 29. 
Further it is not clear for example how section 48 under Part III which contains the 
grounds for challenging an award can be applied in consonance with sections 29 and 
30 of the same Act containing the only provisions relating to the challenge of 
domestic awards in court. 
 
Despite the incorporation and influence of the doctrines of equity in the arbitration 
laws of Nigeria section 22(3) of the Act forbids the arbitral tribunal from deciding a 
dispute ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur (also known as the “equity 
clause”) without the express authorization of the parties and if the law applicable to 
the arbitral procedure permits such arbitration.502 
 
It is therefore not surprising that the structure and complexity of the principal 
Nigerian arbitration statute has provoked some controversy amongst Nigerian legal 
scholars and jurists.503 
 
It may be concluded that in Nigeria a special regime was created for international 
commercial arbitration and conciliation while the general provisions applicable to 
domestic arbitration and conciliation may also apply to international arbitration where 
appropriate; and that the tensions and seeming incongruities noted can be avoided on 
the one hand by judicious and consistent application of these interlocking provisions 
inter se, and on other hand, by the consistent application of the 1988 statute in relation 
                                                 
502 Article 33 (3) Arbitration Rules (First Sch. To the Act). 
503 Idornigie explains that although Part III of the statute relates to international commercial arbitration, 
these provisions are additional to the provisions of Part 1 which deal with domestic arbitration. 
Therefore he does not agree with Justice Akpata that ss 29 and 30 of the statute in Part 1 relate solely to 
domestic arbitration; or with Gaius Ezejiofor that the time for setting aside an international award is not 
stated in the statute (as it is not provided for under Part III) because it is provided for by s 29(1) of Part 
1 being three months: see Idornigie PO “The Relationship Between Arbitral and Court Proceedings in 
Nigeria” (2002) 19(5) Journal of International Arbitration 443 446. The author cites in support Araka 
v Ejeagwu (2000) 15 NWLR (pt 692) 684 wherein the Supreme Court of Nigeria affirmed the three 
month period for setting aside an arbitral award. See Akpata E The Nigerian Arbitration Law in Focus 
(1997) and Ezejiofor G The Law of Arbitration in Nigeria (1997). 
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to other arbitration laws in Nigeria. An innovative addition to the definition of 
international under the statute504 which is not contained in the Model Law is that an 
arbitration is “international” if the parties, despite the nature of the contract, expressly 
agree that any dispute arising from the commercial transaction shall be treated as an 
international arbitration.505 Curiously however, the concept of misconduct which has 
been difficult to grapple with in other jurisdictions has been retained, without 
definition, as a ground for removing an arbitrator506 and for attacking an award. 
 
The Zimbabwean version of the Model Law which corresponds, Article by Article, to 
the UNCITRAL Model Law requires no further analytical comment here as that Law 
is extensively discussed under the proceeding paragraph 2.4.4 with some significant 
cases illustrated in paragraph 2.4.4(5). The simplicity of the Zimbabwean Arbitration 
Act is demonstrated by the fact that the thirty-six Articles of the First Schedule 
incorporating the Model Law makes the schedule longer than the Act of only seven 
Sections. The following observations on Zimbabwean arbitration law are pertinent. 
 
The Zimbabwean Arbitration Act, Chapter 12, derived from the 1889 United 
Kingdom Arbitration Act. It was originally enacted as Act 8 of 1928 and underwent 
minor amendments in 1985 and 1992 with regard to arbitration agreements relating to 
matters under the land acquisition legislation.507 Arbitration legislation in Zimbabwe, 
a former British colony, was therefore not different from other colonial arbitration 
statutes based on English arbitration legislation. However Zimbabwe is among the 
                                                 
504 S 57(2)(d) of the Decree. 
505 See Asouzu Arbitration and African States 166-167. 
506 S 30(2). Although misconduct is not defined in the Act, Idornigie (2002) 19(5) Journal of 
International Arbitration 447-448 points out that case law on misconduct is legion and cites Taylor 
Woodrow (Nig) Ltd v S.E GMBH Ltd (1993) 4 N.W.L.R (Pt 286) 127 where the court quoted with 
approval the definition of Halsbury’s Laws of England, vol 2, 4th Ed at 330-331 that it “includes on the 
one hand that which is misconduct by any standard, such as being bribed or corrupted, and on the other 
hand mere “technical” misconduct, such as making a mere mistake as to the scope of the authority 
conferred by the agreement or reference”. However the refusal by an arbitrator to consider matters 
outside his jurisdiction does not amount to misconduct.  Similarly, a mere error of fact or law, delay of 
the arbitrator and misunderstanding of submissions of counsel, may not amount to misconduct. Other 
cases cited are: KSUDB v Fanz Construction Ltd (1990) 4 N.W.L.R (Pt 142) 1; Araka v Ejeagwu, 
(2002) 15 N.W.L.R (Pt 692) 684; and Savoia Ltd v Sonubi (2000) 7 S.C (pt 1) 36.  Ten examples of 
misconduct are given by Halsbury as referenced and include principally, exceeding authority, 
inconsistent or ambiguous awards, irregularity in the proceedings, infraction of the right to a fair 
hearing, acquisition of interest in the subject matter and delegation of authority to a stranger. In 
England the concept of ‘misconduct”, whether technical or otherwise has now been laid to rest by the 
1996 Arbitration Act and replaced by the term “serious irregularity” as defined in s 68 dealing with 
challenges other than on the grounds of substantive jurisdiction. 
507 See Title IV Administration of Justice, ch 12. 
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few African countries that has moved substantially away from colonial arbitration 
law. The Law Development Commission of Zimbabwe in its interim report of May 
1993 advocated the introduction of the UNCITRAL Model Law for both domestic 
and international arbitrations. The Final Report of January 1994 contained 
recommendations which were accepted and incorporated in the Arbitration Act of 
1996 with minimum modifications.508 
 
The Final Report of the Zimbabwean Law Development Commission had 
recommended that the Arbitration Law to be adopted should cover every subject 
matter that could lawfully be arbitrated and not confined to commercial arbitration 
only.509 This is reflected in the provisions of section 4(1) subject to the exceptions to 
arbitrability listed under section 4(2). A presumption in favour of arbitrability is 
created by section 4(3) in that the fact that an enactment confers jurisdiction on a 
court or other tribunal to determine any matter shall not, on that ground alone, be 
construed as preventing the matter from being determined by arbitration. While it is 
easy to infer a preference for arbitration from this provision it is also easy to see a 
possible source of tension with other enactments conferring jurisdiction on a court or 
other tribunal. The provision does not go as far as stating which law or forum shall 
prevail in the event of conflict but section 5(2) offers an interpretative aid with the 
statement that where an enactment provides for the determination of any matter by 
arbitration those provisions shall prevail to the extent that they are inconsistent with 
this Act. Further, and although Model Law Article 1(5) is omitted in its original form 
in the Zimbabwean version of that law, it is partially contained in section 4(2)(b) by 
which a dispute not arbitrable under any law shall also not be arbitrable under this 
Act. 
 
A final observation is that, unlike the Kenyan Arbitration Act, the Zimbabwe statute 
does not specifically define either “international” or “domestic” arbitration; and 
except for some modifications regarding default provisions on the number of 
                                                 
508 Law Development Commission of Zimbabwe Interim Report on Arbitration, Report No 24, May 
1993; and Final Report No 31, January 1994. 
509 Final Report 5-8. 
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arbitrators for domestic arbitration the Act creates a uniform regime for all 
arbitrations in Zimbabwe.510  
 
2.5.4 The Trend towards Uniformity in African Arbitration 
 
The legislation of each of the three African countries belongs to the cluster of 
arbitration laws that has been innovatively labeled “third generation arbitration 
laws.511 These are arbitration statutes enacted in Africa since 1984, the year 
immediately preceding the coming into force of the UNCTRAL Model Law in 1985 
which purportedly set minimum international standards for modern national laws on 
commercial arbitration. A trend towards uniformity could be set if new arbitration 
legislation after 1985 followed the Model Law whose provisions in relevant parts 
could be adapted for domestic arbitration.512 While the need for uniformity clearly 
existed for international arbitration law, the desire for updating and improving 
arbitration law for non-international cases could be fulfilled as more and more states 
modernize their legislation for both categories of arbitration. 
 
Among those who speculated glowingly about the harmonizing force and effect of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law was Professor Martin Hunter. Writing in 1966 in the wake of 
the English Arbitration Act which, after the initial English resistance to the Model 
Law, had eventually and substantially adopted the core concepts of the Model Law,513 
Hunter opined: 
 
“It is now clear that legislators around the world will not even think about introducing 
new arbitration laws without paying due regard to the structure of the Model Law and 
                                                 
510 Asouzu Arbitration and African States 162-165. In effect Article 10(2) contains a definition of 
domestic arbitration for purposes of the default provision on the number of arbitrators. 
511 Asouzu Arbitration and African States 124. Asouzu classifies arbitration legislation in Africa 
enacted between 1898 to 1960 as “first generation arbitration legislation and those between 1960 and 
1984 as “second generation arbitration legislation.” See also Reid AS “The UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration and the English Arbitration Act: Are The Two Systems Poles 
Apart?” (2004) 21 (3) Journal of International Arbitration 227-238. 
512 Asouzu observes that the International Arbitration Code of Djibouti of 13 February 1984 ushered in 
the third generation arbitration legislation, followed by Nigeria (1988), Togo (1989), Algeria (1993), 
Tunisia (1993), Egypt (1994), Kenya (1995), Zimbabwe (1996), Madagascar (1998), Zambia (1999) 
Uganda (2000) and Ghana (2000) and that South Africa has been working on a new arbitration law 
since 1994. Djibouti, Togo and Algeria are not in the Model Law camp. 
513 Such as respect for party autonomy in the choice of arbitral procedure, reduction of judicial 
intervention in arbitration, fairness and due process in arbitration, and provisions for recognition and 
enforcement of awards. 
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the concepts it contains. This means that the Model Law has already become a potent 
force for harmonization of national arbitration law. Furthermore, 1996 saw the 
adoption by UNCITRAL of its Notes on Organising Arbitration Proceedings which in 
the medium to long term is also likely to become a significant influence for the 
harmonization of procedures practiced by tribunals in international arbitration.”514 
 
Ten years later, despite the gradual recognition of the Model Law globally, the 
evidence on the African ground does not indicate an overwhelming reception of the 
Model Law515. For example, South Africa, a key player in international trade and 
commerce has neither adopted nor adapted the Model Law.516 
 
For present purposes however there is no denying the impact of the Model Law in the 
arbitration statutes of the three African jurisdictions in this study.  In nearly all 
significant respects the Arbitration Acts of Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe replicate 
the substantive provisions of the Model Law.  In that respect all three statutes 
recognize the principle of fair and equal treatment of arbitral parties and their right to 
full opportunity to present their case.  The statutes also recognize party and tribunal 
autonomies in the choice of procedure and the conduct of proceedings characterized 
by flexibility and effective disposal of the dispute.  In essence therefore it is possible 
to commence and complete arbitral proceedings in any of these jurisdictions without 
court interference. 
 
But there is room for revision and improvement in all three statutes, to cover topics 
such as the consolidation of claims and the liability of arbitrators and arbitral 
institutions. 
 
Apart from the Model Law influence these three African countries also share a 
common arbitration heritage as their pre-Model Law legislation derived, inter alia, 
                                                 
514 Hunter M “The Procedural Powers of Arbitrators under the English 1996 Act” (1997) 13 Arbitration 
International 345. 
515 At the date of this research the States listed by UNCITRAL as Model Law states in sub-Saharan 
Africa are: Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. For any new 
additions the reader may refer to the UNCITRAL website www.uncitral.org. 
516 There is no public explanation of the delay in following the recommendations of the South African 
Law Commission for South Africa to adopt the Model Law for international commercial arbitration. 
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from English statutes and jurisprudence.517 Generally, and also because of their 
common law tradition, the principles, the procedures for the hearing and reception of 
evidence in arbitration, are similar in all three jurisdictions. 
 
The fact remains however that the current arbitration law in the three countries is 
neither identical nor uniform; and apart from the divergence of technique in the 
reception of the Model Law there are substantial differences in the stages of 
development of arbitration rules, institutional support and relative orientation to 
arbitration in the three countries. 
 
It can be concluded however that despite their distinctive characteristics as national 
statutes and their contrasting legislative techniques the three statutes substantially 
demonstrate a general trend towards uniformity and a new approach to arbitration in 
line with the standards envisaged and promoted by UNCITRAL towards the 
modernization and unification of arbitration laws globally. If an inspiration is needed 
it is found in the statement that: 
 
“it would be a pity to miss the opportunity to enrich our social and legal culture by 
some imaginative fusion of distinctly African models of, for example, dispute 
settlement. The blind and hegemonic push for uniformity around a non-African 
standard simply increases resentments that have been simmering since colonial times. 
We are dealing with a people who have grounds for being suspicious of the purveyors 
of “modernization”, which in their minds translates into ‘westernization’, a process 
not characterized in the past by too much respect for the African viewpoint.”518 
 
2.6 The English Response to The UNCITRAL Model Law 
 
The common heritage of English arbitration culture shared by the three African 
jurisdictions makes the English response to the Model Law instructive for Kenya. 
Despite its wide acclaim the Model Law was not universally welcomed and England 
was a notable country that resisted the wholesale adoption of the Model Law. This 
                                                 
517 Such as the English Arbitration Act 1889 and the judicial decisions of the English Courts on English 
statutes. 
518 Nhlapo RT “The Status of Customary Law in Africa: From the Age of Law and Modernization to 
the Era of ‘Human Rights and Constitutionalism’ in Ajibola B and Van Zyl D (eds) The Judiciary in 
Africa (1987). 
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fact may well explain UNCITRAL’s exclusion of England (but not Scotland) from its 
list of Model Law countries. Nevertheless the English Arbitration Act 1996 has 
similar provisions to those of the Model Law despite the fundamental distinction 
between the underlying philosophies of the two arbitral regimes.519 
 
The English Act starts with a statement of three general principles upon which 
English arbitration would be based.520 The first states the object of arbitration, that is, 
“to obtain the fair resolution of disputes by an impartial tribunal without unnecessary 
delay or expense.”521 Formal recognition of this principle has been long overdue as, 
despite the need for a just result, an arbitral procedure that is unnecessarily slow or 
expensive, would be a contradiction for being in reality unfair and unjust.522 The 
second principle is party autonomy, subject to those safeguards necessary in the 
public interest. The third principle delimits the extent of Court intervention to those 
instances specifically provided for in the Act.523 
 
In support of the first principle section 33 imposes a twofold statutory duty on the 
arbitral tribunal first to act fairly and impartially between the parties, giving each 
party a reasonable opportunity to put its case and to deal with that of its opponent;524 
and secondly to “adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances of the particular case, 
avoiding unnecessary delay and expense, so as to provide a fair means for the 
resolution of the matters falling to be determined.”525 The first stated duty reflects the 
tenor of Article 18 of the Model Law except the substitution by the Act of the word 
“reasonable” for “full” opportunity used by the Model Law. The second stated duty 
has no equivalent in the Model Law but reflects the tenor of the general principle of 
                                                 
519 For the history of the Act see Saville M: two Reports of 1996 and 1997 published in (1997) 13 
Arbitration International 275 – 330 and (1999) 15 Arbitration International 413-433; Saville “An 
Introduction to the 1996 Arbitration Act” (1996) 62 Arbitration 165, 166. His huge contribution to this 
Act earned Lord Saville the epithet “midwife” of the then new English Arbitration Act of 1996. See 
also Harris B, Planterose R & Tecks J The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary 3rd ed (2003) and 
Hong-lin Yu “Five Years On: A review of the English Arbitration Act 1996” (2002) 19(3) Journal of 
International Arbitration 209-225.  
520 Reid (2004) 21 (3) Journal of International Arbitration 227-238. 
521 This provision and the related ss 33(1)(b), 34(1)(e) & (h), 40 and 65 are an important development 
with no equivalent in the Model Law or previous English arbitration legislation. 
522 See Saville M “An Introduction to the 1996 Act” (1996) 62 Arbitration 165, 166.  
523 Note that Model Law Article 5 uses the expression “no court shall intervene except where so 
provided in this Law” whereas section 1 of the English Act uses the expression “the court should not 
intervene except as provided by this Part” (of the Act). 
524 S 33 1(a). 
525 S 33 1(b). 
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section 1(a) intended to counteract unnecessary delays and expense. As a mandatory 
provision, section 33 cannot be excluded by agreement of the parties and the 
importance of the section is endorsed by the fact that a tribunal’s failure to comply 
with this provision can constitute a serious irregularity empowering the court to set 
aside an award.526 In addition, sections 34, 38 and 41 inter alia, empower the tribunal 
to fulfill the duty imposed by section 33. For the parties, a duty is also imposed by 
section 40 to do everything necessary for the proper and expeditious conduct of the 
proceedings. The tribunal’s power granted by section 65 to limit recoverable costs has 
an implication for the parties to use cost-effective methods to reduce the overall cost 
burden.527 A list of suggested procedures is also given to the tribunal by section 34 for 
disposing of procedural and evidential matters. A degree of innovation in English 
arbitration is introduced by sections 34(2), (e), (f) and (g) enabling the tribunal to 
formulate questions to be answered by the parties to decide whether to apply strict 
rules of evidence as to admissibility, relevance or weight of any material sought to be 
tendered on any matters of fact or opinion, and whether the tribunal itself should take 
the initiative in ascertaining the facts and the law. 
 
It can be said therefore that the powers of the tribunal and the sanctions it may impose 
on defaulting parties or the failure to comply with a peremptory order are perhaps 
more radical and extensive than those of the Model Law. There are important lessons 
therefore from the English Act for Kenya in all the noted areas where the English Act 
is in advance of the Model Law upon which the Kenyan statute is based.528 
 
But followers of the English legal tradition have to be aware of the tensions lurking in 
some of the provisions of the 1996 Act. A major example is that between party 
autonomy and commercial pragmatism which raises the question as to how to 
reconcile the commercial way to justice with the right of parties to choose their own 
way to justice. The tension is between the words “justice” and “commerce”. The party 
                                                 
526 S 68(1) and (2). 
527 It is a departure from English adversarial principles that the tribunal can radically limit costs and 
reduce delay. See Bernstein et al Handbook of Arbitration Practice 27. 
528 The English Arbitration Act is under review to ascertain its effectiveness since coming into force on 
31 January 1997 after a difficult gestation. It is a mark of the breadth of the survey that it is world wide 
involving the participation of this writer under the auspices of the IDRC entitled “Arbitration Act 1996 
Survey” undertaken in 2006. This was under the chairmanship of Bruce Harris. The IDRC Survey 
Committee sent out a questionnaire to “significant players in the world of arbitration” to ask for help in 
reviewing the 1996 Act. 
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autonomy proclaimed by section 1(b) of the Act and the duties imposed on 
participants to proceed with expedition and avoid unnecessary expense express two 
Parliamentary visions of arbitral justice; but they also disclose a dilemma, if not a 
collision, between the right of the parties to choose the method and the right of the 
state to insist that the method shall be workable and efficient. The drafters of these 
provisions who could not have been unaware of this conundrum must have preferred 
to leave it for the English courts to resolve. 
 
It has been observed that: 
 
“with the passage of 10 years since its enactment, the Arbitration Act 1996 continues 
to be interpreted and applied with its intended purpose, i.e., giving primary place to 
the will of the parties and then upholding the authority of the arbitrators to conduct 
proceedings appropriately in the circumstances of the case.”529 
 
The four main areas where reported decisions of the English courts have covered 
important areas of the 1996 Arbitration Act are: (i) the Court’s use of the principle of 
party autonomy to compel parties to adhere to their commitment to arbitrate; (ii) court 
support for arbitration by curbing anti-arbitration injunctions to enable parties to 
submit their differences to arbitration; (iii) a wider recognition and acceptance of the 
doctrine of separability enabling the arbitral tribunal to determine the extent of its 
own jurisdiction;530 and (iv) clarification of the duties of an arbitrator with regard to 
the obligation to “act fairly and impartially as between the parties”, giving each party 
a reasonable opportunity to put his case, and adopting procedures that avoid 
unnecessary delay and expense. 
 
Kenya and other African jurisdictions that historically draw inspiration from English 
law and practice and which have not yet adopted the Model Law have options for 
modernization and harmonization of arbitration law. Apart from the freedom of each 
state to create its own arbitration law as it wishes there are now relatively modern 
                                                 
529 See the Foreword to Russell on Arbitration, 23rd ed (2007) 5  
530 Premium Nafta Products Ltd & Others v Fili Shipping Co. Ltd & Others (the Fiona Trust case) 
[2007] UKHL 40, [2007] 4 All ER 951. 
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options based either on the Model Law approach or that of the English Act531 or a 
combination of the best of both legislative visions. The OHADA system of arbitration 
which is open to all African states is yet another option. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
It can be seen that the Legal Framework of Arbitration in Kenya and the comparable 
jurisdictions of Nigeria and Zimbabwe is a massive terrain of activity embracing 
Customary Law, Common Law, Equity and Statutory arbitral traditions across Africa 
as exemplified by the jurisdictions discussed in this study. Further, that the drive 
towards modernization and harmonization of arbitration laws has extended beyond 
national boundaries to receive and assimilate the developments in arbitration 
introduced by the UNCITRAL Model Law and The Uniform Act on Arbitration 
within the framework of the OHADA (OHBLA) Treaty. 
 
The relatively modern arbitration statutes in Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe 
demonstrate firstly that arbitration law is not static. But the legislatures and drafters of 
arbitration laws in these jurisdictions have more to do to improve these laws and the 
rules of procedure that will not only facilitate the conduct of efficient arbitral 
proceedings but also promote the development of good practices in the arbitral 
traditions across Africa. 
 
The discussion in the preceding and introductory chapters 1 and 2 is intended to set 
the legal foundation and contextual environment of arbitration practice in Kenya from 
which the chapter 3 problems arise and are discussed.  It is not so much that these 
problems are unknown in other jurisdictions or unique to Kenya but that their frequent 
recurrence and negative impact on Kenyan arbitration practice is a particular concern 
for investigation by research. 
 
                                                 
531 For illuminating commentary on the English Act see the sources in n 519 above; Hunter (1997) 
13(4) Arbitration International 345-360.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
RECURRENT PROBLEMS IN ARBITRATION PRACTICE 
 
“It is one of the saving graces of the juridical mind that alongside the interminable circuitry 
of its methods, it has also discovered a short route to settling commercial disputes, the 
arbitration route. … 
It would be a futility of monstrous proportion if the arbitration process instead of ending 
litigation were to commence new litigation or perpetuate it. In that event we will have to say 
with Shakespeare who was so conscious of the ‘law’s delays’:  
  ‘The end crowns all, 
  And that old common arbitrator, Time, 
   Will one day end it.’”1 
 
 
In this chapter six recurrent problems in arbitration are examined. The reasons for their 
selection are stated in paragraph 1.2 of chapter one and need no repetition here. However their 
formulation as the research questions is repeated in this chapter, being the appropriate context 
for their investigation and discussion. They are: 
 
(i) The quest for genuine consent: how genuine is the consensual basis of arbitration? 
 
(ii) Frequent challenges to arbitrators and to the arbitral jurisdiction: how can these be 
curbed? 
 
(iii) The powers of the arbitral tribunal: are they adequate for the effective management and 
conduct of the arbitral proceedings and efficient disposal of disputes? 
 
(iv) Frequent adjournments, postponements and delay: how can these be minimized? 
 
(v) Constraints on the granting of interim measures by the arbitral tribunal: are they a help or 
hindrance to arbitration? 
 
(vi) Enforcement of the arbitral award: what improvements can be made to facilitate speedy 
enforcement and execution of arbitral awards? 
 
                                                 
1 Extract from the speech by Narayonan Shri KR  President of India, at the inauguration of the International 
Council for Commercial Arbitration conference 2000 (2000) 17(5) Journal of International Arbitration 153-155.  
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These problems are encountered at various stages of the arbitral process, from challenges to 
the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement to enforcement of the award.2  It is not 
suggested here that there are easy solutions.  What is intended is an analysis and discussion 
towards recommended solutions, where possible. 
 
3.1 The Consensual Basis of Arbitration: The Quest for Genuine Consent 
 
This discussion investigates the genuineness of consent3 as the basis of arbitration by first 
drawing a distinction between the “consent to arbitrate” and the “arbitration agreement”.  
Thereafter the requirement of consent and the impact of disputed consent are considered, and 
also in relation to clauses incorporated by reference. This is followed by the consideration of 
consent to arbitration in the context of multiple parties and multiple related contracts and the 
extent to which these circumstances are dealt with by national statutes and the UNCITRAL 
Model Law.  Examples from other jurisdictions and a review of existing arbitral jurisprudence 
on these topics are brought into the discussion. 
 
3.1.1 Consent to Arbitrate and the Arbitration Agreement 
 
A fundamental requirement for a valid arbitration agreement, apart from formal requirements, 
is consent.4 Indeed the presence of consent is so readily presumed from the arbitration 
agreement that it can be an uphill task for an arbitral party who subsequently denies his 
consent to arbitrate. In the common-law tradition, consent in the sense of “assent” or more 
technically “consensus ad idem” is an essential element of a contract.5 Therefore if a contract 
or agreement is held out to be validly concluded it is logical to infer from this that the parties 
consent to its provisions including the arbitration provision, if any. Yet a party’s consent to 
arbitrate and the arbitration agreement, if bound together in logic and construction, are not the 
same thing in their practical application and effect. The distinction between them assumes 
greater prominence when the consent to arbitrate, which by implication is an ingredient of the 
arbitration agreement, is hotly contested. This distinction between a component of the 
                                                 
2 See para 1.3 above regarding the research . 
3 See too Rau AS “Arbitral Jurisdiction and the Dimensions of ‘Consent’” (2008) 24 Arbitration International 
199-264, particularly 200-201. See also Torgbor E “Tracking Down Consent and Dissent in Arbitration Law and 
Practice” (2009) 20(3) Stellenbosch Law Review 551-561. 
4 This is clear from any major work on arbitration law such as Russell on Arbitration 23rd ed 28-29 and Mustill 
MJ & Boyd SC The Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration 2nd ed (1989) 4, who comment 
that the arbitration law of England is dominated by the law of contract. 
5 Merkin R Arbitration Law (1991) para 3-17; Clarke v Dunraven (1897) AC 59 (HL); Storer v Manchester City 
Council [1974] 3 All ER 824; see also Treitel GH Law of Contract (2003); Cheshire & Fifoot & Furmston’s 
Law of Contract 14th ed (2001). 
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agreement and the agreement itself must not be blurred because the denial of consent to 
arbitrate (a component) is a different proposition from the denial of the arbitration agreement 
(the complete agreement).  By way of example, the arbitration agreement commonly takes the 
form of a clause in a contract.  Various situations can arise regarding the consent to arbitrate.  
These include where (i) the disputing party rejects the entire contract with the arbitration 
agreement, or (ii) accepts the contract but not the arbitration agreement, or (iii) accepts the 
contract and the arbitration agreement but still maintains he did not consent to arbitrate the 
particular dispute that has arisen,6 or (iv) where consent as declared is said not to represent 
true consent.7 In all these instances the nature, substance and direction of the investigation to 
ascertain the existence or otherwise of a common consent to arbitrate can be expected to vary 
as the issue raised by each instance of denial is different in spite of the physical existence or 
evidence of the arbitration clause or other written agreement. 
 
The distinction between the “consent to arbitrate” and “the arbitration agreement” itself is also 
discernible from domestic arbitration statutes, such as the Kenyan statute, that say nothing or 
make no reference at all to the requirement of consent in arbitration but set out the formal 
requirements of the arbitration agreement. The recognition accorded by such legislation to the 
arbitration agreement but not specifically to the constituent arbitral consent would support the 
statement that arbitration is “contractual” rather than the generally accepted but more arguable 
proposition that arbitration is “consensual”.8 
 
A clearly identifiable document signed by the parties,9 it is submitted, will normally cause 
little or no problem in deciding whether or not the consent to arbitration existed.  But this is 
not invariably so because of the varieties and types of instruments that, in modern times, 
come under the rubric of contractual agreements. 
 
The formal requirements imposed by legislation for an arbitration agreement (essentially “an 
agreement in writing”) may be used in practice by a court or arbitrator to decide that there was 
consent in a legal sense to sustain a valid arbitration agreement. In the main a legally binding 
                                                 
6 In this case he is basically contending that the dispute falls outside the scope of the arbitration clause. 
7 See the discussion of the principle of interpretation in good faith in Gaillard & Savage International 
Commercial Arbitration 257. It can be submitted further that the principles for the discovery of true consent 
differ from those for determining the existence and validity of an agreement. 
8 Commission on International Arbitration Final Report on Multi-party Arbitrations (the Delvolvé Report, Paris 
June 1994): “Arbitration has a contractual basis…”, quoted in Redfern & Hunter International Commercial 
Arbitration 169. 
9 As provided for by s 4(3)(a) of the Kenya Arbitration Act 1995 and Article 7(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
(1985 version). 
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consent for purposes of an arbitration agreement is determined in accordance with the 
ordinary principles of contract law, which in domestic arbitration is normally the law of the 
place of arbitration. But consent inferred from or established through compliance with the 
formal requirements of an arbitration agreement (that is, “legal or technical consent”) is 
frequently contested in Kenyan arbitration practice by parties who have not consciously given 
their consent to arbitrate despite the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. It is submitted 
that in such instances “genuine” consent (in contrast to “legal or technical consent”) can be 
investigated factually from cogent evidence; that the application of the distinction between 
“consent to arbitrate” and the “arbitration agreement” could assist the investigation by setting 
out and narrowing down the direction of inquiry and the nature of the evidence required; and 
further, that legislation that stipulates and provides for express manifestation of consent could 
facilitate the process and the correct decision.  Such legislation is recommended for Kenya. 
 
Arbitration agreements typically assume one of two forms: either a clause in an underlying 
contract or a separate agreement.10 The extent to which such instruments may or may not 
evince the parties’ common arbitral consent depends upon their content and clarity. But the 
elaboration of the forms of arbitration agreement and the requirements of writing11 which, on 
the one hand, have expanded the scope of an arbitration agreement in writing have also, by 
the same token, extended the search for consent to other forms of communication between the 
parties such as ordinary letters, telexes, telegrams and other modern means of 
telecommunication.12 These exchanges of transactional documents which are not necessarily 
signed by either party may still constitute and provide a record of an agreement; but from 
them the consent to arbitrate may nevertheless be illusory or wholly absent. That is an 
indication, if not the full measure, of the problem the arbitral tribunal has to contend with in 
practice where the documents exchanged provide a record of transactions and even 
demonstrate a contractual relationship but not necessarily a conscious assent to arbitrate a 
future dispute under an agreement in respect of which the consent to arbitrate is vigorously 
denied.13 Besides, the expansion of arbitrable disputes in recent years14 has broadened the 
range of disputes and consequently the scope of the investigation15 when consent is contested. 
 
                                                 
10 Kenya Arbitration Act 1995 s 4(1); UNCITRAL Model Law Article 7(1). 
11 Kenya Arbitration Act s 4(2); UNCITRAL Model Law Article 7(2). 
12 Kenya Arbitration Act s 4(3)(b); UNCITRAL Model Law Article 7(2). 
13 Examples are provided under the topic “Incorporation by Reference” below at paragraph 3.1.6. 
14 “Arbitrable” is used here in its normal meaning as capable of being decided by arbitration, as opposed to a 
matter which is under the applicable law reserved for decision by the court. See further para 3.2.3 below. 
15 Compare the problem raised in the text to n 6 above. 
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The lack of genuine consent to arbitrate is frequently encountered in domestic arbitration and 
the over-enthusiastic arbitral tribunal exposes itself to jurisdictional challenges founded not 
only on the assumption of jurisdiction over matters beyond its competence but also for 
ignoring the absence of genuine consent as a fundamental requirement for arbitration.16 
 
Despite the much vaunted consensual basis of arbitration neither the Model Law nor the 
Kenyan statute based on it are explicit17 on the requirement of consent in arbitration.  The 
omission, in a disputed case, contributes to the difficulty of establishing consent. The 
problems created by its actual or alleged absence necessitate the critical quest for consent 
without which there can be no binding agreement and so no valid arbitration or award.18 
 
3.1.2 The Problem of Consent 
 
For purposes of this study the question for consideration is whether, assuming its factual 
existence, the arbitration agreement in a contractual clause or separate document truly reflects 
or embodies the genuine consent of the parties. The question is of particular concern and 
relevance where the agreement was written before the dispute arose and by parties or their 
representatives who did not and could not have consciously applied their minds adequately to 
the kind of dispute that might arise or has arisen or to the scope of the arbitration agreement 
they concluded long ago. 
 
Consider a sample arbitration clause in a contract that states: 
 
“Provided that in case of any dispute or difference between the parties as to the construction of 
this contract or any matter or thing of whatsoever nature or the rights and liabilities of the 
parties herein, then such dispute or difference shall be and is hereby referred to the arbitration 
and final decision of a person to be agreed between the parties or failing agreement (within 14 
days after a request to concur in the appointment of an arbitrator has been duly served) a 
person appointed by the chairman of (a professional society or institute).” 
 
                                                 
16 This risk is particularly acute where the arbitrator proceeds with an arbitration when the respondent is in 
default.  See further para 3.2.5 below regarding proceedings ex parte. 
17 A legally valid consent may be “implied” from Articles 34(2) and 36(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, both 
of which require a valid arbitration agreement without which the award may be set aside or denied enforcement. 
18 Arab Republic of Egypt v Southern Pacific Properties Limited and Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) 
Limited (The Pyramids Case) 12 July 1984, Ct of Appeal, Paris. 
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This clause is plain enough.  It does not and is not expected to set out the permutation of 
differences that can arise between contracting parties or the varieties of procedures available 
for the appointment of an arbitrator or for the conduct of the proceedings.  The point is that 
such a clause in one brief paragraph tucked at or near the end of a lengthy contract of several 
substantive provisions describing the obligations and activities of the contracting parties 
raised no particular concerns for the parties at the time of signing the agreement.  So why do 
parties deny consent under this clause when a dispute arises? Whether the denial of consent 
takes the form of a refusal to concur in the appointment of the arbitrator19 or the withholding 
of consent to arbitrate the particular dispute that has arisen, such denial more often than not 
demonstrates the deficiency and inadequacy of the device of the arbitration clause in a 
contract – the form in common use in Kenya (and international) arbitrations. Furthermore, 
with no demonstrable intervening event that might have varied the terms of the contract in the 
period between its formation and the occurrence of the dispute it might be thought that the 
refusal to arbitrate at the time of the dispute stemmed from the lack of genuine consent from 
the very beginning, which includes the lack of a conscious choice of arbitration as the 
preferred method of settling future differences.  Indeed parties that have signed a contract are 
deemed bound by their signatures; but an arbitration clause or agreement itself even under the 
New York Convention requires no signature20 provided its existence in writing is evidenced 
by an exchange of documents that recognize, incorporate or confirm its existence. This 
extends the quest for consent to other documents. On the other hand the sine qua non for an 
agreement is that the parties be “ad idem” for their agreement to be valid and binding. The 
issue then is not about signature or form of agreement but whether genuine consent to 
arbitrate can be elicited from what constitutes the arbitration agreement. In other words an 
arbitration clause or agreement may meet the formal requirements although there is not true 
consent. That is what the tribunal or court has to decide when consent is disputed and it is 
then an issue quite distinct and distinguishable from the disputed existence of an arbitration 
agreement. 
 
 
                                                 
19 It is not suggested that every refusal by a respondent to participate in the appointment of an arbitrator amounts 
to a denial of consent to arbitrate. Instances where denial is used as a tactical ploy to delay the implementation of 
the arbitration agreement are distinguishable, as evidence in demonstration of a tactical ploy could be different 
from evidence that demonstrates the lack of genuine consent. As the arbitration clause in the text above 
indicates, effective arbitration clauses are usually written so that tactical delays by a respondent concerning the 
selection of an arbitrator cannot prevent the appointment of the tribunal. 
20 See the New York Convention Article II(2); Encyclopaedia of Arbitration Law: EAL Service Issue No 2 31 
December 1985, para 3.1.16; see also Excomm Ltd v Ahmed Abdul-Qawi: Bamaodah (The St. Raphae)l [1985] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 403 CA. 
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An eminent arbitrator in the common-law tradition describes the essence of the problem thus: 
 
“By far the majority of arbitrations, both domestic and international, take place because of an 
arbitration clause in a standard-form contract which the parties did not bother to change, as 
opposed to a deliberate selection of arbitration because of its perceived advantages.”21 
 
In Francophone Africa the problem is acknowledged in the context of OHADA where 
particular vigilance by parties is needed when drafting their arbitration clause, as  
 
“[i]t is a truism that when a contract is negotiated, the parties deal first with all the commercial 
aspects of the transaction, and frequently pay only very cursory attention to the dispute 
resolution provisions.  This often leads to unpleasant surprises when a dispute does arise, with 
the parties finding that the arbitration clause is inoperative, or that it has consequences that 
they had not anticipated.” 22 
 
In similar vein, Redfern and Hunter describe the arbitration clause as a last-minute or 
“midnight clause”: 
 
“Insufficient thought is [therefore] given as to how disputes are to be resolved (possibly 
because parties are reluctant to contemplate falling into dispute) and an inappropriate and 
unwieldy compromise is often adopted.”23 
 
If the majority of arbitrations are not based on a “deliberate selection of arbitration because of 
its perceived advantages” and contracting parties only give “very cursory attention to the 
dispute resolution provisions in their contract” at the time of concluding the contract then 
their consent to arbitration was at best assumed and at worst unfounded and so not genuine.24  
In other words there never was a true consensual basis for such arbitration when the dispute 
actually arose.  Consequently both the integrity of the award and its enforcement may be 
jeopardized. 
                                                 
21 Mustill MJ “Contemporary  Problems In International Commercial Arbitration: A Response” 1989 
International Business Lawyer 161. 
22 See Martor B, Pilkington N, Sellers DS & Thouvenot SBusiness Law in Africa: OHADA and the 
Harmonization Process 2nd ed (2007) 260.  Particular vigilance is needed in the context of OHADA as OHADA 
has two different sets of arbitration legislation: there is the OHADA Uniform Act on Arbitration, or alternatively 
institutional arbitration under the arbitration rules of the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration under the 
OHADA Treaty. See para 2.4.3 above. 
23 International Commercial Arbitration para 3-02. 
24 A decision whether an inadequate or mistaken consent is good enough to sustain a legally valid and 
enforceable arbitration agreement will often turn on the particular facts and circumstances. 
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It has been observed25 that neither the Model Law nor the national statutes in Africa drawn 
from it specifically provide for or deal expressly with consent as an essential prerequisite or 
ingredient of the arbitration agreement; and that consequently investigation of consent is left 
to the arbitral tribunal or court when consent is disputed or the validity of the agreement or the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal is challenged on this basis.  In the light of these considerations the 
consensual basis of arbitration may be more of an illusion than a reality.26  If so the 
assumption that arbitration is consensual is a rebuttable truism. Perhaps it is sometimes 
nothing more than a pragmatic legal fiction, useful but tantalizing. 
 
3.1.3 The Impact of Disputed Consent 
 
But if arbitration is not in all instances truly consensual what is the significance and 
consequence of the failure of genuine consent for the ensuing process?27 
 
The significance and consequence of disputed consent are difficult challenges in arbitration 
and have the potential to undermine important elements or aspects of the arbitration process 
such as: 
(i) the contractual basis of the arbitration;  
(ii) the exercise of the arbitral jurisdiction; and 
(iii) recognition and enforcement of the award. 
 
It may be noted here that the problem and impact of disputed consent are compounded by the 
involvement of multiple parties,28 multiple contracts and non-signatories in arbitral 
proceedings. But these are particular cases which, for neatness of presentation, are considered 
separately below.29 
 
In relation to the first element, the lack of consent is germane to the contractual and legal 
bases of the arbitral process in that the absence of genuine consent not only impinges upon 
                                                 
25 See para 3.1.1 above. 
26 In field study discussions with practising arbitrators in Kenya and abroad for purposes of this study there was 
common cause that the consensual basis of arbitration is often difficult to establish. See also the views of 
Hosking referred to below in para.3.1.6 below regarding consent in multi-party disputes. 
27 On significance of consent see Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 148 and 157; Mustill 
& Boyd Commercial Arbitration 43. 
28 See Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 148; Mustill & Boyd Commercial Arbitration 
132 and 141. 
29 See para 3.1.6 below. 
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but also detracts from the validity of the agreement upon which the contractual and legal 
legitimacy of the arbitration is founded. 
 
The second element flows from the first in that the impact of the lack of genuine consent 
means that without a valid agreement the tribunal has no jurisdiction to embark upon the 
process leading to the making of an award.  Therefore in law and practice the importance of 
consent is such that if one party in arbitration proceedings proves that he was not a party to 
the agreement embodying the arbitration clause then the tribunal cannot exercise jurisdiction 
over that party. The same consequence ensues if a party concedes to the contract but proves 
that the arbitral clause was defective because it lacked his consent. Therefore and because the 
arbitral jurisdiction derives from the parties’ agreement it is in everyone’s interest to ensure 
that the arbitration clause is at least based on what amounts to a legally valid consent.   
 
Although, depending on the facts, the validity of the arbitration agreement and the jurisdiction 
of the arbitral tribunal can be two separate issues, the impact of the absence of consent with 
regard to both the arbitration agreement and the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal reinforces 
the principle that without genuine consent there is no valid agreement and without it there is 
no lawful arbitration. 
 
If there is no lawful arbitration then there can be no valid award and that is the third aspect 
and consequence of the absence of genuine consent.  
 
The three aspects or consequences under discussion are therefore interrelated as they all flow 
from disputed consent. The specific observation with regard to enforcement is that where 
consent was put in issue from the beginning but for some reason the consideration of it was 
postponed or merged with the merits of the dispute as sometimes happens in domestic 
arbitration, then if consent was subsequently adjudicated to be absent, such finding can nullify 
the arbitral proceedings. If an award has been made it may therefore be invalidated or set 
aside by the court.30  The award may also be denied recognition and enforcement.31 
 
                                                 
30 See the UNCITRAL Model Law Article 34(2)(a)(i) and the equivalent s 35(2)(a)(ii) of the Kenyan Arbitration 
Act. 
31 See the UNCITRAL Model Law Article 36(1)(a)(i) and the equivalent s 37(1)(a)(ii) of the Kenyan Arbitration 
Act.  Recognition and enforcement could be withheld on this basis under the provisions referred to even without 
the award having been set aside. (Refusal of recognition and enforcement on the basis that the award has been 
set aside is covered by the UNCITRAL Model Law Article 36(1)(a)(v) and the equivalent s 37(1)(a)(vi) of the 
Kenyan Act.) 
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This may be common knowledge. Nevertheless a shift in perception and the need for change 
in the response to disputed consent and the treatment of the consequences can expedite and 
facilitate arbitration.  It starts with the question whether such retrogressive consequences are 
desirable for parties that have applied or put their energy and resources into a contract already 
running for several months and even years to be confronted, at the time of dispute, with the 
decision by an arbitral tribunal or a court that there never was true consent to arbitrate their 
dispute or that the long awaited award cannot be recognized or enforced. The thrust for 
change is that the parties in a disputed agreement that is already in operation can and must be 
assisted by the law and the arbitral tribunal to resolve their dispute instead of being told they 
have no enforceable arbitration agreement. 
 
This approach is supported by fact, principle and the otherwise positive purposes served by 
arbitration. Firstly, the contractual relationship already subsisting and evidenced by 
performance or part-performance could be utilized to promote a solution rather than having 
the arbitration clause cast aside on apparent technicalities. Secondly, the need to resolve the 
parties’ dispute has arisen from the existing contractual relationship and the purpose of 
arbitration must be to resolve that dispute and not stop with the mere recognition or 
declaration that their agreement is imperfect. Thirdly, the doctrines of acquiescence and 
waiver can be called in aid to elucidate and determine what the parties may be deemed to have 
acquiesced in or waived by their conduct, performance or part-performance of the impugned 
agreement. Finally the process of finding a solution must move forward and not backwards, to 
a conclusion with the assistance of the tribunal. This is in line with the fact that arbitration 
seeks a just result rather than technical perfection.  
 
A separate issue from consent for purposes of creating a valid agreement is whether a party 
can subsequently withdraw its consent unilaterally once it has been given. Neither the Kenyan 
nor the Zimbabwean Arbitration Act is explicit on the revocability of the consent to arbitrate 
and in arbitration practice in general, consent once given is not expected to be revoked 
unilaterally. But revocation of the arbitration agreement by mutual consent or agreement is 
permissible and legislation may impose formalities, in the interest of legal certainty, for the 
cancellation of an arbitration agreement by mutual consent of the parties. An example of 
national legislation on the point is found in the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act 
which provides: 
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“Unless a contrary intention is expressed therein, an arbitration agreement shall be irrevocable 
except by agreement of the parties or by leave of the court or a Judge.”32 
 
Obviously the mutual consent to terminate the arbitration agreement is distinguishable from 
the mutual consent to vary the terms of the agreement. The consensual nature of arbitration 
makes it permissible for the parties to vary the terms of their arbitration agreement at any 
stage by agreement. So for example, they can agree to change their previously agreed method 
of appointing arbitrators, the procedure, the venue or the applicable law in an international 
arbitration.33 
 
On the need for caution as to the effect of consent once given, Asante stated more than a 
decade ago: 
 
“The difficulties posed by the arbitral rules of various arbitration systems are aggravated in the 
African perception, by the somber realization that consent of the parties is not a prerequisite to 
the progression of the arbitral proceedings once the tribunal is properly seized of the case.34 
Unwary African parties have discovered, to their dismay, that after the initial provision in a 
treaty, agreement or legislation accepting the jurisdiction of a particular arbitral system, the 
entire process can be triggered into full operation up to a definitive award even in the absence 
of any explicit manifestation of the respondent’s consent to the various consequential steps in 
the process. Thus, neither delay, default or non-participation by the respondent or defendant 
will prevent most arbitration systems from appointing an arbitrator for the erring party, from 
constituting the full tribunal, from admitting the pleadings of the claimant or plaintiff, from 
hearing the case or from issuing the final award against the respondent. Furthermore by virtue 
of this involuntary process, such an award could be enforced against the respondent in a 
foreign country whether he contests the proceedings or not. An African party, in these 
                                                 
32 See the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act s 2. S 7 of the South African Law Commission’s Draft Bill 
for domestic arbitration provides: “An arbitration agreement is not capable of being terminated except by the 
consent of all the parties in writing, unless the arbitration agreement otherwise provides, and subject to the 
provisions of section 9.” This provision is more specific than s 3(1) of the existing South African Arbitration Act 
of 1965 in that the parties’ consent is required to be in writing.  (The reference to s 9 is to the provision dealing 
with the staying of court proceedings where the dispute is subject to an arbitration agreement.) A party may still 
unilaterally waive its right to rely on the arbitration agreement by participating in the court proceedings without 
relying on the arbitration agreement.  See the Commission’s report Domestic Arbitration (May 2001) para 3.42. 
33 See Orojo & Aromo Arbitration and Conciliation in Nigeria 40. 
34 Generally a party who participates by lodging a Statement of Defence without challenging jurisdiction is 
deemed to have waived the right to do so (see the Kenyan Arbitration Act s 5 and the Zimbabwean Arbitration 
Act First Schedule Article 4). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
166 
 
circumstances, feels victimized by the inexorable progression of an alien process culminating 
in an arbitrary imposition.”35 
 
This feeling of victimization will be accentuated if the African party signed a lengthy contract 
containing an arbitration clause tucked in at the end, without a clear understanding at the time 
of the full implications of the clause.  This is a graphic illustration of a situation where there is 
no genuine consent. 
 
Although Asante’s message is clear enough it is questionable whether the references to 
“unwary African”, “involuntary process” and “arbitrary imposition” are accurate or 
appropriate in African arbitration practice today.  First, there are many more specialist 
Africans in arbitration practice today since Asante’s time.  African states are advised on 
arbitration issues by local and foreign specialists and experts to belie the phrase “unwary 
African”.  Secondly, once the African party is given notice and is aware of the dispute the 
choice of participating or not in the arbitration does not render the process involuntary.  
Thirdly, it follows from the second observation that the award cannot be correctly described 
as an “involuntary imposition” where a party, African or non-African has chosen to ignore 
the arbitration notice or not to participate or co-operate in the proceedings.  Asante’s concerns 
must therefore be placed in time and circumstances that, it is submitted, have considerably 
improved if not completely changed. 
 
The African jurisdictions under consideration and their arbitration statutes do not explicitly 
provide for manifestation of consent in the arbitration agreement as a specific legal 
requirement.36 It is submitted that this situation should be remedied by an appropriate 
amendment to the legislation,37 as it will do no good to the arbitral process and its reputation 
as a preferred and effective method of settling disputes if arbitral tribunals are readily inclined 
to assume jurisdiction and proceed to make awards that can equally and readily be set aside or 
refused recognition and enforcement by the courts for ignoring one of the essentials of a valid 
agreement, namely the existence of genuine consent to arbitrate. The inconsistency of English 
judicial decisions in jurisdictional disputes has been noted,38 and there is no reason to expect 
that African judges or arbitrators in the common-law traditions that have inherited and still 
                                                 
35 “The Perspectives of African Countries in International Commercial Arbitration” (1993) 6 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 331. 
36 See n 17 above. 
37 See the discussion of article 1677 of the Belgian Code Judiciare below. 
38 See Russell on Arbitration 23rd ed para 2-045 and para 3.1.5 below. 
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follow English judicial precedents, albeit persuasively, will act any differently in such 
matters. Even in the well established European systems of arbitration, common-law and civil-
law systems alike, there appears to be no uniformity in the application of the principles that 
govern this aspect of arbitration practice.39 
 
It is therefore proposed that a modern arbitration statute should contain a specific provision 
requiring the manifestation of express consent to arbitrate. A good example of such provision 
is Article 1677 of the Belgian Code Judiciaire which states: 
 
“Every arbitration agreement shall be the subject of a written document, signed by the parties, 
or any other document which binds the parties and in which they have manifested their 
consent to have recourse to arbitration”40 (emphasis added). 
 
Three observations can be made. First, unlike the position under the UNCITRAL Model 
Law,41 Article 1677 of the Belgian Code explicitly regards the function of the writing 
requirement as being to establish the existence of consent, rather than to facilitate proof of 
the content of the arbitration agreement. Second, the explicit statutory requirement for 
manifestation of consent would help to concentrate the minds of the contracting parties on the 
need to ensure that their consent to arbitrate is demonstrated from the very beginning and so 
avoid the kind of disputes and delaying tactics that ensue in the absence of clear provisions in 
the law on the subject. Third, and in line with the distinction drawn above42 between the 
consent to arbitrate and the arbitration agreement the express reference in the arbitration 
clause to consent is preferred to a clause such as “all disputes relating to this contract shall be 
referred to arbitration”, which in essence is directed to the choice of procedure for resolving 
the dispute by arbitration rather than the need for manifestation of express consent. Not only 
the arbitral parties but also arbitrators and judges could benefit from such legislation and thus 
be less disposed to subjective predilections for their preferred principles of interpretation 
                                                 
39 These principles are noted in the discussion of incorporation by reference below. 
40 The translation of article 1677 provided by Cepani (Belgian Centre for the Study and Practice of National and 
International Arbitration), available at www.cepani.be/EN is similar: “An arbitration agreement shall be agreed 
by the parties in writing, or by other documents that are binding on the parties and that reveal their intent to 
resort to arbitration” (emphasis added). The relevant portion of the Dutch text reads “waarin zij blijk hebben 
gegeven van hun wil om het geschil aan arbitrage te onderwerpen”.  
41 See the discussion of Article 7(3), as amended in 2006, in para 2.4.4.5(ii) above. 
42 See para 3.1.1 above. 
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when consent is contested. This will also be of particular assistance to parties to ad hoc or 
one-off contracts.43 
 
With regard to standard-form contracts the option offered by the UK Joint Contract Tribunal 
(JCT) Standard Arbitration Clause, which requires the parties to choose between litigation and 
arbitration at the time of the contract, is a positive step in the manifestation of consent to 
arbitrate or litigate and may usefully be emulated by the drafters of standard-form contracts in 
Kenya and elsewhere in Africa.44  
 
Lastly on this aspect, unlike other preliminary issues relating to the questioned validity of the 
arbitral process that may perhaps best be postponed to or merged with consideration of the 
merits, the issue of disputed consent once raised deserves prompt determination on the 
principle that if consent is non-existent or has failed there can be no arbitration and time and 
expense can be saved.45 Suitable legislative provisions will enable the arbitral tribunal to 
consider the application by hearing arguments on the issue and make a ruling on jurisdiction 
as a preliminary issue before, if need be, proceeding with consideration of other matters or 
taking any further step in the process. Evidence on disputed consent can normally be expected 
to differ from that on the merits of the main dispute.  
 
3.1.4 Principles of Interpretation 
 
It has been noted above that arbitration legislation usually imposes formal requirements for an 
arbitration agreement. Compliance with these provisions does not by itself determine the 
existence of consent to arbitrate. Because consent to an arbitration agreement lies in the 
parties’ common intention to submit disputes to private adjudication, arbitrators often face the 
task of ruling on the existence of the parties’ legally valid consent to the arbitration 
agreement.46  In view of the formal requirements, determining whether a party consented will 
mostly involve considering and interpreting the documentation exchanged between the 
                                                 
43 An arbitration clause could commence “The parties hereby expressly consent that all disputes arising out of 
the contract shall be referred to arbitration …”.  Where, as in the case of a company, the contract is signed by an 
agent, the inclusion of a warranty that the agent has authority to consent to the arbitration clause could also be 
considered. 
44 The danger still exists that the party will mechanically initial the deletion involved in the selection, without 
availing himself of the opportunity to make an informed choice. 
45 An exception will arise where a party disputes the existence of consent on the basis that his agent lacked 
authority to enter into both the main contract and the agreement in the arbitration clause. 
46 Gaillard & Savage International Commercial Arbitration para 471. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
169 
 
parties.47 In that exercise they apply various principles of interpretation to establish the degree 
of certainty required for the parties’ consent to be effective and the scope of that consent.48  
 
The following principles have been proposed to facilitate the determination of consent 
acceptable to the law. Although made in the context of international arbitration in a civil-law 
jurisdiction, it is submitted that they are equally useful in a domestic arbitration in a common-
law jurisdiction. 
 
The first is the principle of interpretation in good faith, which means that a party’s true 
intention should prevail over its declared intention where the two are not the same. It is a less 
technical way of saying one must look for the parties’ common intention instead of the literal 
meaning of the words used.49 
 
The second is the principle of effective interpretation, which is applied where an arbitration 
clause can be interpreted in two ways. The preferred interpretation is that which enables the 
clause to be effective rather than that which renders the clause ineffective, useless or 
nonsensical.50 
 
The third is the principle of interpretation contra proferentem, which involves interpreting an 
ambiguity in the agreement against the party that drafted the disputed clause.51 
 
Two principles not favoured in international arbitration practice are the principle of 
interpretation in favorem validitatis (or in favorem jurisdictionis) and the principle of strict 
interpretation. The former is extensive and the latter is restrictive and both are deemed not to 
express the parties’ true intention.  The rationale is that the existence and extent of true 
consent must be discovered by using the general principles of interpretation of the arbitration 
agreement that are neither unduly extensive nor restrictive.52 Nevertheless, when it comes to 
establishing the scope of an arbitration clause, as opposed to the existence of consent, English 
courts favour a liberal interpretation of the wording used. One of the reasons is a presumption 
                                                 
47 Born G International Commercial Arbitration: Commentary and Materials 2nd ed (2001) 185 para 16. 
48 Gaillard & Savage International Commercial Arbitration para 472. 
49 Gaillard & Savage International Commercial Arbitration para 477. 
50 Gaillard & Savage International Commercial Arbitration para 478. 
51 Gaillard & Savage International Commercial Arbitration para 479.  Although this principle is more likely to 
be used should there be a dispute as to the scope of the arbitration clause, it is conceivable that it could be 
applied to determine whether the parties intended to consent to arbitration.  
52 See Gaillard & Savage International Commercial Arbitration paras 440-481. See also Hanotiau B “Problems 
Raised by Complex Arbitrations” (2001) 18(3) Journal of International Arbitration 251-360.  
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in favour of one-stop adjudication and the consideration that if parties to a commercial 
agreement containing an arbitration clause wanted, for example, to exclude a dispute 
regarding the validity of the contract from arbitration, it would be easy enough to say so.53 
However this liberal approach does not apply to a dispute between the parties as to whether 
there was ever a contract at all, as this would bring in issue the question of whether the parties 
could have consented to arbitration.54 
 
The discussion above indicates the approach to establishing consent in the context of an 
arbitration clause in a contract. However, more problematic cases are those involving 
arbitration clauses or agreements incorporated by reference to a document outside the 
contract. The question that then arises is whether the reference to that document is sufficient 
for the parties to be bound by the arbitration provision on the basis of their legally valid 
consent. This problem is discussed in the next section. 
 
3.1.5 The Quest for Consent in Documents Incorporated by Reference 
 
The terms of a contract will have to be established with reference to more than one document 
where terms are incorporated in a written contract by reference to another document. Russell 
on Arbitration explains that: 
 
“Ascertaining which documents constitute the contractual documents and in what, if any, 
order of priority they should be read is a problem encountered in many commercial 
transactions, particularly those involving shipping and construction.  This issue has to be 
determined by applying the principles of construction and attempting to infer the parties’ 
intentions by means of an objective assessment of the evidence.”55 
 
The investigation of other documents may lead to the discovery of an arbitration clause and 
this commonly occurs when the document incorporated is a standard form of contract 
containing an arbitration clause. 
                                                 
53 See Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation & Ors v Yuri Privalov & Ors [2007] EWCA Civ 20 paras 17-19 
approved on appeal as Premium Nafta Products Ltd & Ors v. Fili Shipping Company Ltd & Ors [2007] UKHL 
40, paras 12-14 (per Lord Hoffmann) and paras 29-32 (per Lord Hope). As the case involved an international 
arbitration Lord Hope referred to the liberal interpretation of the scope of arbitration clauses adopted in 
Germany, the United States and Australia. See too the Zimbabwean decision Bitumat Ltd v Multicom Ltd, 
Zimbabwe High Court Judgment No HH144–2000 CLOUT Case No 370, (2001) XXVI Yearbook Comm. Arb , 
where it was stated that the court should not be astute in trying to reduce the ambit of the arbitration clause. 
54 See the Fiona Trust judgment para 21 and para 34 of the judgment on appeal. 
55 Russell on Arbitration (23rd ed) para 2-044. 
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However, the purported incorporation may be ineffective in whole or in part where the 
standard-form wording is inappropriate for the contract into which the parties seek to 
incorporate the clause.56 Russell on Arbitration points out that the drafters of the English 
Arbitration Act 1996 were asked to provide specific guidance on whether a general reference 
to a document should suffice to incorporate an arbitration clause contained in that document 
or whether a specific reference to the arbitration clause was required, but they preferred to 
leave this to the court.57 The position in English law since 1996 is briefly referred to below. 
 
On the question whether a general reference to an incorporated document with an arbitration 
clause is sufficient for the parties to be bound by the provision for arbitration, Gaillard and 
Savage provide the civil-law perspective by clarifying firstly that the principle of the 
autonomy of the arbitration agreement from the contract is not an obstacle to the validity of an 
arbitration agreement incorporated by reference as the principle is irrelevant to that issue.58 
Secondly, they consider outdated the view of some commentators59 that the requirement of 
writing for an arbitration agreement entrenched in some national arbitration statutes is 
satisfied only where the parties have specifically referred to the arbitration agreement 
contained in the incorporated document.60 In the view of Gaillard and Savage61 arbitration 
agreements incorporated by reference must be analysed in terms of the existence of the 
parties’ consent for their disputes to be resolved by arbitration; and the existence and extent of 
that consent should be interpreted using the general principles of interpretation of arbitration 
agreements, that is, neither extensively nor restrictively. They assert that the only case in 
which a French court has refused to recognize the existence of an arbitration clause 
incorporated by reference was when the factual circumstances left genuine doubt as to the 
existence of consent.62 
 
It seems that the question of the validity of the arbitration agreement incorporated by 
reference stemmed from the application of the requirement of writing in Article II of the 1958 
                                                 
56 For example where parties to a sub-contract purport to incorporate the arbitration clause in a main contract by 
reference without sufficient regard to the effect of the change of parties: compare Russell on Arbitration para 2-
044. 
57 See Russell on Arbitration para 2-044 and the Saville Report (1996) para 42. 
58 Gaillard & Savage International Commercial Arbitration para 492. 
59 Gaillard & Savage International Commercial Arbitration para 494 n 154 cite Van den Berg AJ The New York 
Arbitration Convention of 1958 (1981) at 172; and Sanders P “A Twenty Years’ Review of the Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Awards” (1979) 13 International Law 269. 
60 See also Gaillard & Savage International Commercial Arbitration para 495.1. 
61 Gaillard & Savage International Commercial Arbitration para 496. 
62 Gaillard & Savage International Commercial Arbitration para 496 at 279. 
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New York Convention63 as adopted by the national arbitration statutes based on that 
Convention.  Gaillard and Savage argue that “the UNCITRAL Model Law underlines that it is 
outdated to construe the New York Convention as requiring a specific reference to the 
arbitration clause itself” and that, while requiring a document in writing, the Model Law 
“nevertheless allows an arbitration agreement incorporated by reference”.64  
 
The UNCITRAL Model Law states in this regard: 
 
“The reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration clause constitutes an 
arbitration agreement provided that the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to 
make that clause part of the contract.”65 
 
This provision has been adopted in the arbitration legislation of Kenya, Nigeria and 
Zimbabwe with only one very minor amendment.66 Gaillard and Savage rightly criticize the 
language of this provision as being somewhat obscure.67 However, it was not intended by its 
drafters as requiring a specific reference to the arbitration clause, as long as there was the 
intention to incorporate the general conditions, including the arbitration clause, into the 
contract.68 
 
The language of the Netherlands Code of Civil Procedure is perhaps more explicit in this 
regard. It provides: 
 
“The arbitration agreement shall be proven by an instrument in writing.  For this purpose an 
instrument in writing which provides for arbitration or which refers to standard conditions69 
                                                 
63 Gaillard & Savage International Commercial Arbitration para 494. 
64 Gaillard & Savage International Commercial Arbitration para 495.1 referring to the UNCITRAL Model Law 
(1985) Article 7(2). 
65 Article 7(2), as originally adopted in 1985.  UNCITRAL clarified the wording slightly in the 2006 amendment 
of Article 7, option I, Article 7(6): “The reference in a contract to any document containing an arbitration clause 
constitutes an arbitration agreement in writing, provided that the reference is such as to make the clause part of 
the contract.” 
66 See the Kenyan Arbitration Act of 1995 s 4(4), the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act 11 of 1988 s 1(2) 
and the Zimbabwean Arbitration Act of 1996, Schedule, Article 7(2).  All three substitute “if” for “provided 
that” in the original. 
67 Gaillard & Savage International Commercial Arbitration para 495.1. 
68 See Holtzmann & Neuhaus A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 264. 
69 The Dutch is “algemene voorwaarden”.  “Standard conditions” therefore appears unnecessarily restrictive and 
the phrase appears to cover “general conditions”, whether standard or not. 
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for arbitration is sufficient, provided that this instrument is expressly or impliedly accepted by 
or on behalf of the other party.”70 
 
This provision makes it clear that a specific reference to the arbitration clause in general 
conditions is not required, and, in circumstances where the written instrument emanates from 
one party, the emphasis is correctly placed on the need to establish acceptance of the 
instrument by the other. 
 
Again, and from the European perspective, Hanotiau has noted that: 
 
 “such incorporation by reference seems to be generally admitted by statute or case law in 
Western European countries.  The requirement that an arbitration clause be in writing, whether 
by effect of a local statute or by application of article II.2 of the New York Convention has 
been recently interpreted by most courts, including in Switzerland, in a more relaxed fashion. 
The issue has rather become whether the party against whom the clause is invoked was aware 
of the incorporation of the related conditions or documents containing the clause in the 
original agreement and had a real opportunity to know their contents. When deciding the 
issue, the courts take into consideration various elements, whether the contract is an isolated 
one or whether there was an ongoing relationship between the parties, and whether the clause 
accords or not with trade usages.”71 
 
As noted above, the concept of incorporation by reference is firmly entrenched in the national 
arbitration statutes of Kenya and the other African jurisdictions via the UNCITRAL Model 
Law. Any interpretation of consent in relation to documents incorporated by reference into the 
party’s contract ought to be in conformity with the intention of such legislation; and where 
necessary and appropriate, should take into account the relevant trends in leading 
jurisdictions. 
 
                                                 
70 Netherlands Code of Civil Procedure, Article 1021, as translated in Gaillard & Savage International 
Commercial Arbitration para 495.1. 
71 Hanotiau B “Problems Raised by Complex Arbitrations Involving Multiple Contracts – Parties – Issues” 
(2001) 18(3) Journal of International Arbitration 268. Other commentators cited by Hanotiau are: Van Houtte V 
“Consent to Arbitration through Agreement to Printed Contracts: The Continental Experience” (2000) 16 
Arbitration International 1, 14; De Boisseson M & Clay T “Recent Developments in Arbitration in Civil Law 
Countries”, 1998 International Arbitration Law Review 150, 152. Other contributions on the topic are Di Pietro 
D “Incorporation of Arbitration Clauses by Reference,”  (2004) 21(5) Journal of International Arbitration 439, 
452; Van den Berg The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958 172; Kaplan N New Development on Written 
Form, in Enforcing Arbitration Awards Under the New York Convention (1998) 17; Landau T “The Written 
Form Requirement for Arbitration Agreement: When ‘Written’ Means ‘Oral’” (2003) 11 ICCA Congress Series 
19. 
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Some caution is however necessary in applying English decisions. The motivation behind the 
equivalent English legislation has been mentioned in the text above.72 As in the case of the 
Model Law it is necessary to determine whether the reference to the general conditions 
(including the arbitration provision) is such as to make the arbitration clause part of the 
contract.73 The English courts struggled to find a consistent approach before 1996 but a more 
consistent approach has now emerged.74 It appears that English law will in principle accept 
incorporation of standard terms by the use of general words, “particularly so when the terms 
are readily available and the question arises in the context of dealings between established 
players in a well-known market”.75 In so-called “two-contract cases”,76 a specific reference to 
the arbitration clause in the other document is required, particularly as the other party may 
have no actual knowledge or ready means of knowledge of the relevant terms.77 While the 
English approach in “two-contract” cases is out of line with the jurisdictions which accept a 
general reference in those cases as well, the underlying principle seems to be the same: the 
court or arbitrator ought to investigate whether the other party, in the absence of actual 
knowledge, had a reasonable opportunity to become aware of the arbitration provision.78 
 
The subtleties of older English case law appear from the following two examples. In 
Secretary of State For Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs v Percy Thomas Partnership and 
Kier International Ltd
79 Judge Bowsher QC said “where the arbitration clause is one of a set 
of standard conditions written especially for the purpose of incorporation in contracts of a 
certain type, general words in a contract of that type incorporating those terms as a whole will 
usually bring the clause into that contract so as to make the arbitration clause applicable to 
                                                 
72 See n 57 above.  Based on Article 7(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law (1985), s 6(2) of the English 
Arbitration Act reads: “The reference in an agreement to a written form of arbitration clause or to a document 
containing an arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration agreement if the reference is such as to make that 
clause part of the agreement.”  It has rightly been said that “this provision begs the question when is the 
reference such as to make the clause part of the agreement” Russell on Arbitration 23rd ed para 2-045). See also 
Sea Trade Maritime Corp v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd [2006] EWHC 2530 (Comm) 
para 77. 
73 See Article 7(6) of the Model Law (2006), quoted in n 65 above. 
74 See Russell on Arbitration para 2-045. 
75 Sea Trade Maritime Corp v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd supra para 65. 
76 Particularly where a bill of lading refers to a charterparty, and possibly in construction cases where a 
subcontract refers to a main contract and in reinsurance cases: see Sea Trade Maritime Corp v Hellenic Mutual 
War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd supra para 62 and Russell on Arbitration para 2-049. 
77 Sea Trade Maritime Corp v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd supra paras 65 and 81.  A 
second reason given is that the terms of the arbitration clause may require adjustment to apply to the parties to a 
different contract. 
78 Compare however Sea Trade Maritime Corp v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd supra 
para 87, where the court stated that once the arbitration clause was held to have been incorporated by a general 
reference, the question as to whether the other party actually knew or was deemed to know of the arbitration 
clause became academic. 
79 (1998) 65 Con LR 11. 
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disputes under that contract.” But in Stanstead Shipping Co Ltd v Shenzen Nantian Oil Mills 
Co. Ltd
80 Thomas J ruled that referential incorporation could not be presumed where there 
was uncertainty as to what was incorporated.  The court upheld an arbitrator’s decision that he 
had no jurisdiction where the reverse side of a computer-generated bill of lading that usually 
set out general conditions of carriage, including an arbitration clause, was left blank. 
 
It is submitted that as what matters is the true intention of the parties, there ought not to be 
any serious divergence in arbitration practice in the use and application of the concept of 
incorporation by reference as long as the intention to arbitrate is apparent or can be gleaned 
from the incorporated clause or document; and that it is not particularly helpful to adopt an 
approach that is neither strict nor extensive as propagated in some European jurisdictions.81 In 
this writer’s view the arbitrator (or court) in a disputed consent case, must endeavour 
objectively to discover the true intention of the parties and their consent to arbitrate from the 
contract and incorporated documents and other admissible evidence.82  This writer had 
adopted this approach and applied the concept of incorporation by reference in arbitral awards 
that have been upheld by the High Court of Kenya.83 
 
3.1.6 The Problem of Consent in Multi-Party Disputes 
 
It was noted above84 that the problem of consent required separate consideration in 
arbitrations involving multiple parties and non-signatories to the arbitration agreement who 
may have a legal or beneficial interest in the outcome of the arbitration. Multi-party 
arbitrations may involve several parties to one contract or several contracts with different 
parties that have an interest or bearing on the matters in dispute. Two separate issues need to 
be distinguished. A simple example of the first is a multi-party dispute involving A, B and C, 
where there is an arbitration agreement between A and B. The issue could then be whether or 
                                                 
80 Commercial Court, 21 August 2000 (unreported). 
81 Per Gaillard & Savage International Commercial Arbitration para 496. As Gaillard & Savage remark in para 
495.1: “Ultimately, what matters is the parties’ true intentions.  There is therefore no reason to take a hostile 
position towards arbitration clauses incorporated by reference.” 
82 In contrast, there are English decisions at the highest level in support of a liberal interpretation of dispute 
resolution mechanisms: see Sudbrook Trading Estate Ltd v Eggleton [1983] AC 444; The Queensland Electricity 
Generating Board v New Hope Collieries Pty Ltd [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 205 (PC). 
83 Telkom Kenya Ltd and Postal Corporation of Kenya v Kamconsult Ltd Civil Suit Nos 262 & 207 of 2001(OS) 
consolidated; Thara v Ministry of Health of Government of Kenya, HCCC; 7 August 2001. 
84 See para 3.1.3 above. 
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not C could participate in the arbitration of the dispute. C’s consent to participation, if any, 
would have to be established on a legally acceptable basis.85 
 
The second issue concerns the consolidation of separate arbitration proceedings between A 
and B and B and C based on separate arbitration agreements, but with some of the issues in 
dispute in both arbitrations being the same. The main question here is the extent to which the 
court or tribunal can order consolidation by a power conferred by a statute86 or rules, even 
where not all the parties have consented, in the interests of justice and procedural efficiency.87 
Fundamentally, the first issue raises the question “who is bound by the arbitration 
agreement?” The question is answered in Halsbury’s Laws of England as follows: 
 
“An arbitration agreement is binding on the parties thereto and on persons claiming through or 
under them. Such derivative parties include an assignee, a successor by operation of law, for 
example, a personal representative, a trustee in bankruptcy who adopts the contract containing 
the arbitration agreement, and a statutory transferee of rights against insurers. The derivative 
party is obliged and entitled to arbitrate any claim, and can take advantage of any claim 
already advanced in pending arbitration proceedings by the original party so as to defeat any 
time bar arising before assignment or transfer.”88 
 
Under the English Arbitration Act 1996,89 a “party to an arbitration agreement” includes “any 
person claiming under or through a party to the agreement”. In the Kenyan Arbitration Act a 
party means “a party to an arbitration agreement and includes a person claiming through or 
under a party”.90 The Nigerian Act contains a similar provision.91 Describing the same 
phenomenon with particular reference to the need for consent, Hosking states: 
 
                                                 
85 In that exercise several principles and doctrines may be drawn upon such as assignment, subrogation, third 
party beneficiary, novation, incorporation by reference, agency, estoppel, assumption of obligation, succession, 
“group of companies” doctrine, “single economic transaction” doctrine, and general reliance on “equity”. See 
Hosking JM “Non-Signatories and International Arbitration in the United States: The Quest for Consent” (2004) 
20 Arbitration International 289, 291. 
86 Such as the New Zealand Arbitration Act, Second Schedule; see the South African Law Commission Report 
on Domestic Arbitration 43-45, read together with the discussion at 35-36. 
87 The South African Law Commission Report favours strict application of the principle of consent. 
88 Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th ed Re-Issue, Vol 2 para 610. 
89 S 82(2). 
90 S 3(1). This provision is an addition to the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
91 S 57(1) of the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act defines “party” as “a party to the arbitration 
agreement or to conciliation or any person claiming through or under him”. Under s 1 of the South African 
Arbitration Act 1965 a party includes a successor in title or an assign of such party or a representative recognised 
by law of such party, successor or assign. 
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“For many years arbitration practitioners have grappled with the problem of what to do with a 
‘non-party’ – or more particularly a ‘non-signatory’ – to the arbitration agreement that is 
nevertheless integral to the resolution of the dispute that has arisen. To take a simple example, 
what of the corporate affiliate that has been assigned certain rights and obligations under a 
subsequently disputed contract: can the affiliate assignee be compelled to arbitrate; can it 
commence arbitration itself and can it somehow intervene in an arbitration initiated between 
the original contracting parties? At the heart of these questions lies the widely accepted 
principle that arbitration is by its nature consensual.  However, in the absence of an agreement 
containing an arbitration clause bearing the affiliate assignee’s signature, where does one look 
to find evidence of such consent to arbitration?”92 
 
This writer respectfully shares Hosking’s view93 that far from being merely theoretical these 
questions are in fact highly relevant to the contemporary practice of commercial arbitration. 
Disputes involving non-signatories are inevitable in the context of business transactions 
involving multiple agreements and the intermingling legal obligations of numerous 
interrelated corporate and other entities. Although the non-signatory problem has long been 
associated with bills of lading and construction sub-contract disputes, it is now also found in 
arbitrations concerning reinsurance agreements, internet-based software licences and 
investment treaties.94 While these observations are made with particular reference to problems 
in international commercial arbitrations they can in some respects also be relevant to domestic 
arbitration. 
 
In considering this subject one has in effect to examine the scope of the parties’ consent to 
ascertain and identify the parties who are bound by the consent to arbitrate.  The actual parties 
to the arbitration agreement who have usually signed the arbitration agreement or the contract 
containing the agreement are an obvious first category of parties bound by their consent. 
Identifying such parties poses no special problems for the arbitral tribunal. The problems 
                                                 
92 Hosking (2004) 20 Arbitration International 189. See also generally Sentner J “Who is Bound by Arbitration 
Agreements?” (2005) 6(1) Business Law International; Townsend JM “Non-Signatories and Arbitration” (1998) 
8(3) Newsletter of Dispute Resolution Law and Practice; Hanotiau B “Arbitration and Bank Guarantees” (1999) 
16(2) Journal of International Arbitration 15; Spence SA “Organizing an Arbitration Involving an International 
Organization and Multiple Private Parties”(2004) 21(4) Journal of International Arbitration 309-328; Pryles M 
“Multi-Tiered Dispute Resolution Clauses” (2001) 18(2) Journal of International Arbitration 159-179. 
The question posed by Hosking can usually be answered by the single word “nowhere”, in line with the premise 
that the affiliate assignee has not signed any agreement containing an arbitration clause upon which the consent 
to arbitrate can be founded. 
93 Hosking (2004) 20 Arbitration International 289. 
94 Hosking (2004) 20 Arbitration Internatinal 289. 
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relate to the less obvious category of entities such as non-signatories, third party beneficiaries 
and other affiliates. The subject has generated voluminous literature.95 
 
Indeed in seeking solutions to these problems one may benefit from the substantive domestic 
law theories and concepts by which non-signatories are bound by the arbitration agreement 
such as the concepts of assignment, incorporation by reference, the third party beneficiary, 
agency, equitable estoppel and “the group of companies” doctrine.96 Hosking cautions 
however that “an over-zealous approach to ‘extending’ the arbitration agreement to non-
signatories may undermine the fundamental touchstone of arbitration – consent.”97 
 
Two more complex categories of multi-party arbitrations can be mentioned.98 The first 
concerns the situation where individuals, corporations or state agencies combine in a joint 
venture or consortium and contract with another party or parties and then, when a dispute 
arises, the members of the consortium each desire to appoint their own arbitrator.99 Two ICC 
cases exemplify the problem.100 In Westland Helicopters Limited v The Arab Organization for 
Industrialization, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the Arab Republic of Egypt 
and the Arab British Helicopter Company,101 the claimant had commenced an ICC arbitration 
against six defendants and the ICC Court appointed one arbitrator for all of the defendants as 
part of a three-member tribunal. The Egyptian government’s objection to the composition of 
the tribunal in a way that did not allow each party to appoint its own arbitrator, was rejected 
by a Swiss court in Geneva on the ground that the parties submitted themselves to the Rules 
of the ICC which had been correctly applied in accordance with the Court’s normal practice. 
 
                                                 
95 See eg Vidal D “Extension of Arbitration Agreements to Non-Signatory Parties within Groups of Companies” 
(2005) 16(2) ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin 63-76; “Extracts from ICC Awards Relating to the 
Extension of Arbitration Agreements to Non-Signatories”  (2005) 16(2) ICC International Court of Arbitration 
Bulletin 77-103; “Multiple Parties” in Davidson F Arbitration (2000); Sandrock O “Arbitration Agreements and 
Groups of Companies” (1993) 27 The International Lawyer 941-961; Sandrock O “‘Intra’ and ‘Extra-Entity’ 
Agreements to Arbitrate and their Extension to Non-Signatories under German Law” (2002) 19(5) Journal of 
International Arbitration 423-441; Hanotiau B “Problems Raised by Complex Arbitrations Involving Multiple 
Contracts-Parties-Issues.” (2001) 18(3) Journal of International Arbitration 251-300. 
96 Hosking (2004) 20 Arbitration International 291. 
97 Hosking (2004) 20 Arbitration Int’ernational 290. 
98 Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration para 3-74 – 3-77 at 168-170. 
99 French Cass Civ 7 Jan 1992 (BKMI and Siemens v Dutco),Clunet (1992) 712 Revue de l’arbitrage 470. 
100 These cases are discussed by Schwartz E “Multi-Party Arbitration and the ICC” (1993) 10(3) Journal of 
International Arbitration 5-19.  The author is a former Secretary General of the ICC International Court of 
Arbitration, based in Paris, France. 
101 Cour de Justice, Geneva, 26 November 1982, affirmed by the Tribunal Fédéral Suisse, 16 May 1983. 
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By contrast, in the case of Siemens AG and BKMI Industrienlagen GmbH v Dutco 
Construction Co,102 Dutco commenced arbitration in Paris, as one of three parties to a 
consortium agreement, against its consortium parties, BKMI and Siemens. The consortium 
agreement related to the construction of a cement plant in Oman. Pursuant to the ICC 
arbitration agreement that provided for a panel of three arbitrators, Dutco nominated an 
arbitrator while BKMI and Siemens made a joint nomination of an arbitrator “under protest” 
because they were not allowed separate nominations. Their subsequent application to the Paris 
Court of Appeal to set aside the award was rejected by that court. On further appeal the 
French Supreme Court overruled the ICC Court’s long-standing practice of requiring joint 
nominations of arbitrators by multiple defendants in ICC cases. In the view of the Supreme 
Court, unless the parties agree otherwise after the dispute has arisen, two or more defendant 
parties cannot be required to nominate an arbitrator jointly where the claimant has had the 
opportunity to nominate an arbitrator on its own. 
 
The Dutco decision103 led to changes in arbitration rules and institutional practice. For 
example the 1998 editions of the LCIA Rules and the ICC Rules104 contain specific provisions 
for multi-party arbitrations permitting the institution to appoint the entire tribunal if the co-
claimants or co-respondents, as the case may be, are unable to agree on a joint nomination.  It 
is recognized that this is a helpful way out but not perfect, as in such instances, it is the 
institution and not the parties that has established the arbitral panel and there is some concern 
that recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused under the New York 
Convention because the composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not 
in accordance with the agreement of the parties or, failing such agreement, with the law of the 
country where the arbitration took place.105 
 
The second complex category of multi-party arbitrations is the situation where several 
contracts involve different parties who have an interest in the issues in dispute, as for 
example, a major construction project that involves an employer, the main contractor 
comprising a consortium of companies, several specialized suppliers and sub-contractors all 
                                                 
102 French Cass Civ. 7 Jan 1992, Clunet (1992) 712 Revue de l’arbitrage 470. 
103 For reactions to Dutco see Seppala J “Multi-party Arbitrations at Risk in France” International Financial 
Review (March, 1993) 33; Bond S “Equality is Required When Naming Arbitrators” March 1992 World 
Arbitrations and Mediation Report 70; Jalili M “French Setback to Multiparty Arbitration” February 1992 
Mealey’s International Arbitration Report 20. 
104 See the LCIA Rules article 8 and the ICC Rules article 10. 
105 See Article V 1(d): “The composition of the arbitral authority … was not in accordance with the agreement of 
the parties …”.  The appointment nevertheless takes place in terms of express provisions of Rules to which the 
parties agreed, if indeed there was consent to the Rules by all the parties. 
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of whose contracts contain differing arbitration clauses.106 In the event of a dispute the main 
contractor may desire to join one or more sub-contractors giving rise to problems of 
consolidation, joinder of parties, confidentiality of documents and conflict of arbitration 
clauses. Redfern and Hunter107 discuss a number of possible solutions to this problem. Firstly, 
in commodity disputes involving string contracts, it is possible to agree on a single arbitration 
between the seller and the last buyer, on the basis that the award will bind and be enforceable 
against all the other parties in the string. Secondly, short of consolidation, concurrent hearings 
of separate arbitrations are also possible, with the arbitral tribunal(s) giving separate awards in 
each arbitration.108 Thirdly, national arbitration law at the seat may permit court ordered 
consolidation.109 The fourth and most satisfactory way of resolving such disputes is through 
consolidation by consent, in line with the consensual nature of arbitration.  Whereas it is 
possible to join additional parties or consolidate separate actions in domestic courts it is 
difficult and sometimes impossible to do so in arbitrations that stem from party consent and 
agreement.  This was recognized by the Commission on International Arbitration’s Final 
Report on Multi-party Arbitrations, which stated that: 
 
“[t]he difficulties of multi-party arbitrations all result from a single cause.  Arbitration has a 
contractual basis; only the common will of the contracting parties can entitle a person to bring 
a proceeding before an arbitral tribunal against another person and oblige that other person to 
appear before it.  The greater the number of such persons, the greater the degree of care which 
should be taken to ensure that none of them is joined in the proceeding against its will.”110 
 
A former Secretary General of the ICC Court of International Arbitration has remarked that: 
 
“[n]o generally acceptable solution to the manifold issues arising in multi-party arbitrations 
has yet been found by either the ICC or any of the dozens of other scholars, lawyers, and 
arbitral institutes working on this issue.”111 
 
                                                 
106 See Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 171, who cite Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Co. 
Ltd v Eastern Bechtel Corp [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 425 as an example.  
107 Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 172-175, paras 3-80 - 3-84.  See also Davidson 
Arbitration para 12.06; Orojo & Ajomo Arbitration and Conciliation in Nigeria 63-64. 
108 See the London Maritime Arbitrators Association (LMMA) Terms (2006) para 14(b) for an example. 
109 See for example the Netherlands Arbitration Act article 1046. 
110 Paris, June 1994, (the Delvolvé Report), quoted in Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 
169. 
111 Bond S “Recent Developments in International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration” in Practising Law 
Institute (ed) International Commercial Arbitration: Recent Developments (1988) 55 at 89, quoted in Redfern & 
Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 172. 
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On the quest for consent from multi-parties and multiple contracts it is recognized that these 
are difficult cases for which no one claims to have found easy solutions. The three African 
arbitration statutes are silent on consolidation and neither the Model Law nor the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules provide for consolidation of different arbitrations. But the problem is not 
completely insuperable. Consolidation by consent of the parties is possible by coordinated 
arbitration clauses in the relevant contracts providing in advance for an appropriate multi-
party arbitration. Under the LCIA Rules a request for joinder is possible with the consent of 
the applicant and the party to be joined112 and this is helpful insofar as it enables all parties to 
be heard by the same arbitral tribunal. In this writer’s experience consolidation of arbitrations 
and joinder of additional parties is practicable and can be facilitated by a skilful tribunal and 
achieved with the consent of all parties in major disputes.113 
 
The English Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law rejected a proposal that 
the draft Arbitration Act 1996 should empower the arbitral tribunal or court to order 
consolidation or concurrent hearings because in the view of this committee it would amount 
to a negation of the principle of party autonomy.114  The Committee’s preference that the 
problem be solved by the agreement of the parties is reflected in section 35 of the English 
Arbitration Act 1996. This section allows the parties to agree that the arbitral proceedings 
shall be consolidated with other arbitral proceedings or that concurrent hearings be held on 
such terms as may be agreed. However in the absence of such agreement the tribunal has no 
power to order consolidation of proceedings or concurrent hearings.115 
 
Hong Kong adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law for international arbitration in 1990.116 The 
Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance contains a provision for court ordered consolidation of 
arbitration proceedings, which initially applied to domestic arbitration, but also to 
international arbitration on a contract-in basis.117  The operation of the provision for court 
ordered consolidation was later extended to apply automatically to international arbitrations as 
well.118 This provision is a derogation from the principle of party autonomy and the 
consensual foundation of arbitration in that the power exists even in the absence of consent by 
                                                 
112 See the LCIA Rules (1998) article 22(1)(h). 
113 In an arbitration recently concluded by this writer, a third party company, claiming a financial interest in the 
outcome of the arbitration, sought and was granted leave to enter the proceedings with the consent of both 
claimant and respondent, who had not initially anticipated such intervention. 
114 See the Saville Report (February 1996) paras 178-180; Redfern & Hunter International Commercial 
Arbitration 174. 
115 S 35(1) and (2). 
116 The Arbitration (Amendment) (No 2) Ordinance 1989 of Hong Kong which came into force on 6 April 1990. 
117 S 6B, read with s 2M. 
118 S 2AD, added by Act 75 of 1996 s 6. 
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the parties,119 even though in other jurisdictions120 consent is the only basis for consolidation 
of arbitrations. 
 
It is therefore possible, in the absence of any statutory prohibitions, for parties in common-
law jurisdictions in Africa that readily accept persuasive authorities from England and the 
Commonwealth to agree to confer power on the arbitral tribunal in multiple claims to 
consolidate claims and to order joinder of parties in arbitration proceedings as appropriate.  
Provisions for multi-party arbitrations exist in the London Maritime Arbitrators Association 
Terms 2006,121 the UK Joint Contract Tribunal (JCT) Standard Form Construction 
Contracts,122 The Federation of Civil Engineers (FCE) Sale-Contractors,123 and the Grain and 
Food Trade Association (GAFTA) Arbitration Rules.124 
 
An American lawyer has observed that 
 
“the United States has developed principles, relatively unknown or underdeveloped elsewhere, 
that permit third-party beneficiaries to take advantage of arbitration clauses in contracts they 
did not sign, or that, under some circumstances, bind parties to arbitration clauses in contracts 
to which they were not originally party.”125 
 
It has been suggested that a consensual approach leading to a decision by a single arbitrator or 
the same tribunal is preferable to the coercive approach by legislation.126 This writer does not 
share this view because the two approaches are not mutually exclusive.  It is for the refusal of 
consent where consent is probable and should be forthcoming but could be unreasonably 
withheld that legislation should intervene to concentrate the minds of the parties from the very 
beginning on the nature of the obligations they are about to undertake by their contract. In this 
                                                 
119 S 6B(3). 
120 Such as England: see the discussion of s 35 of the English Arbitration Act of 1996 above. Compare also the 
New Zealand Arbitration Act of 1996, Second Schedule, clause 2 which gives wide powers to the arbitral 
tribunal to direct consolidation in the first instance. See also the SA Law Commission Report Arbitration: an 
International Arbitration Act for South Africa (July 1998) para 2.72, which supported the same approach as that 
of s 35 of the English Arbitration Act for international arbitrations in South Africa. For a discussion of the 
difficult problem of consolidation see Mustill MJ “Multipartite Arbitrations: An Agenda for Lawmakers” (1991) 
7 Arbitration International 393-402 and Mustill MJ & Boyd SC Law and Practice of International Commercial 
Arbitration 141-148. 
121 Para 14(b). 
122 1980 edition, clause 41, 2.1. 
123 September 1978 Revision, clause 18. 
124 Rule 125, Clause 5 regulating “string arbitrations”. 
125 Ball M “Just Do It - Drafting the Arbitration Clause in an International Agreement” (1993) 10(4) Journal of 
International Arbitration 29 36. Decisions cited by him include Art Galleries of Illinois, Inc v Art World, Inc No 
89 C 8940 US Dist LEXIS 5449; Lee v Grandcor Medical Sys 702 F Supp 252, 255 (D Colo 1988). 
126 See the Saville Report (February 1996) paras 178-180; SA Law Commission Report (July 1998) para 2.72.  
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context the advantage of legislation is in enabling to be done that which otherwise cannot 
effectively be done without it. It is submitted that legislation should expressly provide for 
consolidation and joinder of parties to facilitate arbitration and the expeditious disposal of 
disputes.127 
 
It must also be said that while arbitration must serve its legitimate purposes by delivering 
arbitral justice there is no real merit in attributing to arbitration functions it is unable to 
perform or objectives it cannot achieve for lack of powers.  The court system has always been 
available for delivery of “court-room justice”128 where other procedures cannot be depended 
upon to do any better. Arbitration has not come to supplant the courts but to supplement it and 
arbitration enthusiasts should bear in mind that it is when arbitration attempts to become 
“alternative litigation” that it confronts the obstacles that reveal its weaknesses and must then 
yield to the secular superiority of the court system. 
 
Arbitration is valuable but its services are, in essence, additional to those provided by the 
judicial system; and it can best deliver those services if arbitration can develop through 
legislation and good practices its own efficient procedural rules. 
 
3.1.7 Conclusion 
 
It is evident from this discussion and analysis that the requirement and manifestation of 
consent are not theoretical but real and sometimes difficult issues in arbitration practice. The 
consensual basis of arbitration is in some specific instances illusory and arbitration is foisted 
on parties to a contract containing an arbitration clause that does not reflect genuine consent 
to arbitrate the particular dispute that has occurred, despite the existence of the arbitration 
clause or agreement. The concept of party autonomy is neither an abstraction nor cast in 
stone129 and while it serves the useful purpose of enabling arbitral parties in the first instance 
                                                 
127 An example of a provision for court-ordered consolidation is found in the Netherlands Arbitration Act article 
1046.  An arbitral tribunal may also permit the joinder of a third party but the third party must accede by an 
agreement in writing between him and the parties to the arbitration agreement (article 1045(3)).  The joinder is 
therefore consensual.  Compare Diamond A “Multi-Party Arbitrations: A Plea for a Pragmatic Piecemeal 
Solution” (1991) 7 Arbitration International 403 407, who favours a less drastic infringement of the consensual 
basis of arbitration by means of a statutory provision for court-ordered joint hearings as opposed to formal 
consolidation. 
128 The writer’s own term to differentiate “arbitral justice.” 
129 Lord Mustill has remarked that “party autonomy is looking a little frayed round the edges.” See Mustill “Too 
Many Laws” paper delivered at LCIA conference, St. John’s College, Cambridge 1-3 April 2004.  In his address 
to the International Arbitration Conference, Boston USA, September 1996 headed “A Commercial Way to 
Justice” Lord Mustill cautioned that “It is now high fashion to emphasise ‘party autonomy’. It is a catch-phrase-a 
buzz word … but it is important also to realize that party autonomy is an uneasy bed fellow with another article 
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to nominate their preferred arbitrators there are occasions when this is difficult or impossible 
to achieve. In such instances third parties (such as the chairman of a designated arbitral 
institution) are authorized by pre-existing institutional rules to make the nominations and 
appointments. Therefore a balance must be struck between a doctrine that does not always 
work and a practically convenient approach that detracts from the doctrine but is otherwise 
useful in finding procedural solutions that can move the arbitral process forward. 
 
In several instances this writer, as arbitrator, has encountered situations where, despite the 
existence of a formally valid arbitration agreement, an arbitral party states in an affidavit or 
gives acceptable testimony that he did not consciously consent to the arbitration. With that in 
mind, an attempt is made in this study to distinguish the consent to arbitrate that may be 
denied, from an otherwise valid arbitration agreement.  
 
It is submitted that disagreements about consent to arbitrate will be lessened where there is 
clear manifestation of party consent to arbitrate in the document or documents that provide a 
record of the parties’ agreement.  It has been noted that this is a necessary consequence from 
the writing requirements of an arbitration agreement and the broadening of the documentary 
bases of that agreement to include a “reference in a contract to a document containing an 
arbitration clause … and the reference is such as to make that clause part of the contract.”130 It 
is therefore not enough for the all-important consensual foundation of arbitration to be left to 
conjecture or assumption from an inadequate arbitration clause in a contract or a separate 
agreement that does not specifically or adequately disclose party consent in clear words.  If 
arbitration is truly consensual and consent is a sine qua non for arbitration then it must not be 
left to inference but clear words that will put the requirement of consent beyond doubt. It is 
submitted that legislation that provides for the express manifestation of consent to arbitrate 
will assist arbitral parties, the tribunal and even the court in resolving the issue of disputed 
consent. The Belgium Code Judiciaire Article 1677 and its specific requirement of the 
manifestation of consent as an essential requirement is an example of a statutory provision in 
point.131  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
of fashion, commercial pragmatism. How can we follow the commercial way to justice and still honour the right 
of the parties to choose their own way to justice?” 
130 UNCITRAL Model Law (1985 version) Article 7(1) and (2); Kenyan Arbitration Act s 4(1)-(4); Zimbabwe 
Arbitration Act First Schedule Article 7(1) and (2). 
131 See the discussion in para 3.1.3 above. 
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Further, the arbitral consent is not to be taken for granted merely because of the existence of a 
valid underlying contract. It is therefore recommended that arbitral parties and their advisers, 
when scrutinising both the underlying contract and the arbitration clause, pay closer and 
particular attention not just to the choice of arbitration as their preferred mode of resolving 
their differences but also to the forms of wording and modalities of the procedure that will 
best fulfill their expectations.  They must also bear in mind the public policy considerations 
on arbitrability to avoid including in the arbitration clause or agreement what may not be 
arbitrable under the relevant and applicable domestic law.  Nevertheless some writers132 
prefer the arbitration clause or agreement to be drafted as broadly as possible without 
specifying some categories of disputes as referable to arbitration and others to the national 
courts, because this is what the parties usually intend. In practice, most domestic arbitration 
clauses commonly adopt a form of words that refer to arbitration any and all disputes within 
the scope of the agreement.133 
 
Accuracy of wording is important for two reasons. First it defines the scope of the arbitration 
clause or agreement so as to avoid disputes as to its ambit.  Secondly it also defines the scope 
of the arbitral mandate and by keeping the tribunal within bounds the likelihood of challenges 
to the arbitral mandate is thereby reduced. 
 
It is recognized that the absence of specific consent in multiparty arbitrations is a 
difficult problem.  It makes sense therefore where multiple contracts and multiple 
parties can be envisaged at the stage of preparation of such contracts to provide 
expressly for multi-party consent to arbitration in advance of disputes.  Despite judicial 
attempts especially in western countries134 to extend the arbitration agreement to non-
signatories the problem does not go away. This may well be due to the failure to balance 
arbitral expediency against the fundamental requirement of party consent to arbitration in line 
with well established principles of fairness and justice in arbitration practice. It is suggested 
that the reputation of arbitration can be enhanced where the sometimes difficult conflict 
between arbitral expediency and arbitral justice is more often than not resolved in favour of 
                                                 
132 Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 153 para 3-38, with reference to the 
recommendations of the Final Report of the Working Group on the ICC Standard Arbitration Clause, Document 
420/318, 21 October 1991. 
133 This wording will only be effective to the extent that the disputes are arbitrable and the parties are of course 
in principle free to exclude expressly certain types of dispute from the scope of their arbitration agreement, with 
the result that any such disputes must be referred to court. 
134 Especially in construction and consumer contracts. The latter particularly have generated instances of so-
called contracts of “adhesion” of the “take it or leave it” variety. See Trantina TL “Due Process Protocols and 
Consumer Arbitration in the United States” Conference Paper at AAA and LCIA Joint Conference, Lincoln’s 
Inn, London, 19 March 1999. 
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the latter. The point to stress is that difficulties and challenges arise incrementally when the 
agreement to arbitrate lacks demonstrable consent or is poorly drafted so that the intention to 
submit to arbitration is either unclear, non-existent or lost and with it, the jurisdiction upon 
which the arbitration process is founded. 
 
Neither the Model Law nor the Kenyan or the counterpart African national statutes have fully 
grappled with and addressed problems such as the lack of arbitral power to consolidate 
different arbitrations on the same issues or to join additional parties with a legal or beneficial 
interest in the outcome of arbitrations founded on contracts in which they were neither 
signatories nor parties. Therefore, and as the lack of genuine consent is the source of these 
problems in domestic arbitrations, national arbitration legislation can confer the appropriate 
power for the arbitral tribunal, rather than the court, to consolidate disputes and to join 
multiple parties. 
 
3.2 Frequent Challenges to Arbitrators and the Arbitral Jurisdiction 
 
The second problem selected for discussion is the frequency and spate of challenges to which 
the arbitral tribunal is subjected. Challenges to the arbitral jurisdiction arising from disputed 
consent to arbitration and to the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement and 
defective arbitration clauses were discussed in the preceding section of this chapter. Other 
frequent challenges to jurisdiction relate firstly to the qualifications of the arbitrator and 
secondly to the arbitrability of the subject matter in dispute. These two sources of 
jurisdictional challenges and the measures for their abatement will be discussed followed by a 
discussion of proceedings under protest and ex parte proceedings which are additional hurdles 
to the arbitral tribunal. 
 
3.2.1 Qualifications of the Arbitrator 
 
Disputes about the qualifications and qualities of the arbitrator commonly involve 
consideration of his suitability, impartiality and competence and raise the question who is a 
suitable, impartial and competent arbitrator?135 Such challenges are to an extent inherent in 
the flexibility of the arbitral procedure itself and its malleability in the senses discussed under 
                                                 
135 See Onyema E “Empirically Determined Factors in Appointing Arbitrators in International Commercial 
Arbitrations” (2007) 73 Arbitration 199. 
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“arbitration in crisis”.136 As variable and adaptable as the arbitral process is for dealing with 
varieties of disputes so is the diversity of disciplines from which an arbitrator can be 
appointed.  To this can be added the doctrine of party autonomy by which the parties can 
literally appoint anyone as arbitrator.137 Yet a too literal reliance on this doctrinal right leads 
to difficulties that in practice create more problems for all participants in the arbitration.  
Therefore, although it is true that parties are free to choose anyone to arbitrate their dispute, it 
is equally true that an imprudent choice of a person with defects of which the parties should 
have been aware can result in a challenge for the removal of that person. Conversely a prudent 
choice can avoid or reduce the risk of challenges that waste arbitral time and increase costs. 
 
Lane sums up the position by saying: 
 
“We must be astute in discerning who is qualified to arbitrate. The mere fact that a person has 
a legal degree does not qualify him to be an arbitrator or to appear in arbitrations. Arbitrators 
must be skilled in the practice of arbitration and, even where they have some knowledge, he 
[sic] should continue to increase his learning.  It is inadequate for a party, for instance, who 
has passed the Higher Diploma in arbitration regulated by the Association to regard himself as 
being qualified to act as an arbitrator for the rest of his active career.  It is a skill which has to 
be continuously honed.”138 
 
3.2.1.1 Suitability 
 
Good sense would necessitate taking proper advice on the choice of a suitable arbitrator.  In 
an ideal situation if parties succeed in choosing a preferred arbitrator or tribunal they have in 
effect exercised their freedom of appointment and, win or lose, they are more likely to accept 
the award from their chosen arbitrator. In domestic arbitration however two other factors 
engender challenges. These are (i) the fact that the arbitration clause does not usually name an 
arbitrator in advance139 and (ii) in default of agreement the appointment is, not uncommonly, 
made by a third party or an institutional representative whose appointee may not command 
                                                 
136 See para 1.2 above. 
137 As Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 194 para 4-39 remark, the arbitrator should 
nevertheless have legal capacity. 
138 Lane PMM “Cost Effective Arbitration” (1997) 63 Arbitration 5 at 6.  The author is an advocate and 
arbitrator based in Johannesburg. 
139 This is not always practical as in many instances it is the nature of the dispute when it arises that can 
determine the suitability of the arbitrator with the requisite expertise to deal with such dispute. 
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the confidence of one or both parties.  The way is then open for challenges, whatever the 
arbitrator does.140 
 
Nevertheless the law does not prescribe any minimum qualifications for an arbitrator.  It is 
therefore left to the parties to choose a suitable as against an unsuitable arbitrator.  That, of 
necessity and prudence, would require pertinent and relevant advice and guidance from 
appropriate sources such as the experts and professionals closely involved in the area of 
dispute, at best to reduce the risk of choosing an unsuitable arbitrator.141 Beyond this, except 
in the case of the arbitrator’s failure to disclose relevant information,142 party autonomy 
prevails and their chosen arbitrator can assume jurisdiction.  
 
3.2.1.2 Impartiality, Independence and the Duty to Disclose 
 
Regarding impartiality the general proposition is that an arbitrator should be impartial 
although no definition of impartiality is offered by statutes or rules imposing this requirement.  
There are scholarly writings on impartiality143 from which it is understood that impartiality is 
appropriate and expected in several contexts such as alleviating, mediating, resolving or 
refereeing disputes or competitions between other parties.  In such contexts impartiality is 
often taken to be synonymous with neutrality144 and it is a role requirement for those called 
upon to act in this way and not to champion the cause of one party over the other.145 
 
“One feature of the many contexts in which impartiality is in play, then, is that the party 
required to be impartial occupies a particular role, that of mediator, arbitrator or referee. And 
these roles, of course, are only relevant because of a second feature of some contexts in which 
impartiality is expected, namely, that they are conflictual or competitive.  Hence impartiality 
is appropriate where there exists a conflict of interests between two or more parties, with a 
third party being involved to either police the conflict or to resolve it. … It is a mistake to 
                                                 
140 The LCIA and ICC regard the institution’s power to appoint (including approval of party nominations) as a 
way of ensuring quality. 
141See Russell on Arbitration, 23rd ed, 120-122. Institutional panels are of particular value in this regard. 
142 See para 3.2.1.2 below. 
143 Lucy W “The Possibility of Impartiality” (2005) 25(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 3-31.  See also Baron 
M “Impartiality and Friendship,” (1991) 101 Ethics 836; Bentham J “Rationale of Judicial Evidence” in Works 
(1843) vol VI 350. 
144 In international arbitration neutrality extends beyond impartiality and an international arbitrator must be 
neutral not only as between the countries of the parties and their political systems but also as between their legal 
systems and use of legal concepts. See Lalive P “On the Neutrality of the Arbitrator and of the Place of 
Arbitration” in Essays on International Arbitration 23 (1984). See also Redfern & Hunter International 
Commercial Arbitration 201 for distinction between impartiality and neutrality. 
145 Lucy (2005) 25(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 3. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
189 
 
think that impartiality is nothing but a stance or attitude, albeit one embedded in certain roles. 
For it is often the case that in competitive or conflictual contexts impartiality extends beyond 
the attitude of the mediator, arbitrator or referee and the specification of her role: it is also 
incorporated in the very process by which mediator, arbitrator or referee makes 
determinations.”146 
 
Bias or partiality is easy to impute but difficult to prove.  Basically the situations and 
circumstances that may give rise to the perception and imputation of bias so as to justify the 
challenge and removal of an arbitrator vary so much that they defy listing. The Kenyan 
Arbitration Act and the UNCITRAL Model Law attempt to deal with the problem at least in 
part, not by providing a detailed list of all possible connections to the parties or the 
circumstances that might justify a challenge, but by providing two formulas. Section 13(1) 
and Article 12(1) of the Model Law impose a duty on a prospective arbitrator to disclose 
circumstances which are likely to affect his impartiality or independence. The duty is 
continuous from the time when the arbitrator is approached regarding his possible 
appointment until the final discharge of the arbitral mandate. Section 13(3) of the Act and 
Article 12(2) of the Model Law then set out the “only” grounds on which a challenge may be 
made, namely, firstly the existence of justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or 
independence, or secondly if he does not possess the qualifications agreed by the parties. 
Moreover a party who has appointed an arbitrator or made the appointment jointly with 
another party may only challenge the appointment for reasons which were unknown to the 
party at the time of appointment. In addition, a party who by reasonable diligence could have 
become aware of a disqualifying circumstance but failed to do so is probably in no better 
position than a party who knew but did not disclose the disqualifying factor from the very 
beginning. Although the Act and Model Law are silent on this point, the IBA Guidelines on 
Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration also impose a duty of disclosure of relevant 
information on arbitral parties including the duty to perform a “reasonable search of publicly 
available information”.147 
 
Article 12 of the UNCITRAL Model Law , which is modeled on Articles 9 and 10 of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, applies the same standard of impartiality and independence to 
all arbitrators, whether party-appointed, sole or third arbitrators. Some important differences 
between the Model Law provisions and the Rules are: 
                                                 
146 Lucy (2005) 25(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 3. 
147 See General Standard 7(a), (b) and (c) in Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration, Appendix 
F, 559. 
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(i) the disclosure under Article 12 is to the person that approaches the arbitrator 
concerning potential appointment – whether a party, an arbitral institution, an 
appointing authority or a court; and the timing of the disclosure is “when [the 
potential arbitrator] is approached” and the circumstances must be disclosed 
“without delay”; 
(ii) the word “only” in Article 12(2) indicates that the grounds of challenge listed 
thereunder are the exclusive mandatory grounds; and the word “only” is 
omitted in the Rules because arbitration rules, unlike a national arbitration law, 
cannot purport to list exclusive grounds of challenge; 
(iii) the lack of qualification as an additional ground of challenge is another 
difference between Article 12 and the UNCITRAL Rules. 
(iv) the final difference is that Article 12(2) extends the bar on challenging an 
arbitrator on grounds of which a party has knowledge both to arbitrators 
appointed by that party and to arbitrators in whose appointment he has 
participated.148  
 
It may be added that the duty to disclose under the Model Law Article 12, though seemingly 
subjective is not entirely so. This is because whereas Article 12(1) enables the arbitrator 
himself to assess his impartiality and independence he may still be challenged under Article 
12(2) where the “question is not just whether [the arbitrator] is really impartial, but whether a 
reasonable outsider might consider that there is a risk that he is not.”149 
 
The position in England is distinguishable because the English Arbitration Act 1996 imposes 
no duty of disclosure before an arbitrator accepts an appointment; further, an arbitrator cannot 
be challenged under the English Act solely for lack of independence unless this gives rise to 
justifiable doubts as to his impartiality.150 Independence is not the same concept as neutrality 
which is deemed broader, a distinction more discernible in international arbitration where the 
chairman of a tribunal must be neutral both in relation to the countries of the parties and their 
political systems as well as to their legal systems and concepts.151 
                                                 
148 Holtzman & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 390. 
149 Mustill & Boyd Commercial Arbitration 252.  
150 S 24(1) (a); Russell on Arbitration 166; SA Law Commission Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act 
for South Africa (1998) 68 n 206. This is only one of several listed grounds under which an English court can 
remove an arbitrator, other grounds are listed under s 24(1)(b)-(d) inclusive.  In all cases, substantial injustice to 
the applicant must also be shown. 
151 Russell on Arbitration 167. 
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These considerations in relation to Article 12 of the Model Law do have a significant bearing 
on the interpretation of the corresponding provisions of national statutes such as the Kenya 
Arbitration Act 1995,152 the Zimbabwe Arbitration Act 1996153 and the Nigerian Arbitration 
and Conciliation Act.154 In this connection however, the slight differences in wording in the 
relevant provisions of the three statutes should be borne in mind as they can affect the 
interpretation of those provisions. An example of a difference in wording is provided by the 
phrase “only if” which appears in Article 12(2) of the Model Law limiting the grounds for a 
challenge,155 but which is omitted from the equivalent section 8(3) of the Nigerian statute. 
The implication is that under the Nigerian statute the limitation on the grounds of challenge to 
the two in Article 12, referred to above, possibly does not apply.156 
 
A further observation is that the terms “independence” and “impartiality” that appear in the 
African statutory provisions are adopted by the corresponding arbitration rules exemplified by 
Rule 4(1) of the Arbitration Rules of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (Kenya Branch), 
which requires that an arbitral tribunal conducting an arbitration “shall be and remain at all 
times wholly independent and impartial.”157 
 
The concepts of independence and impartiality are imported, with slight differences, by 
various institutional rules used in international arbitration practice, a useful review of which 
has been done by the authors Redfern and Hunter.158 The LCIA Rules require all members of 
the tribunal to remain impartial and not to act as advocates of the parties.159 Under the ICC 
Rules an arbitrator must at all times be independent of the parties160 and may be challenged 
for “alleged lack of independence or otherwise”161 without reference to impartiality. The 
explanation offered is that particularly in the context of disclosure by arbitrators prior to 
                                                 
152 S 13(1), (2), (3) and (4). 
153 First Schedule Article 12. 
154 S 8(1), (2) and (3). 
155 It is also retained in the First Schedule Article 12(2) of the Zimbabwean Act and s 13(3) of the Kenyan Act. 
156 The English Arbitration Act 1996 s 24(1) states that the court on application may remove an arbitrator “on 
any of the following grounds …”.  Although the word “only” is not used, the list of grounds in s 24(1) was 
nevertheless intended by the drafters of the Act as exhaustive (see the Saville Report (1996) para 100). 
157 Articles 9 and 10 of the Nigerian Arbitration Rules (in the First Schedule to the statute) also require that 
arbitrators be impartial and independent. 
158 Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 200-201. 
159 Article 5.2. 
160 Article 7.1. 
161 Article 11.1.  The inclusion of the words “or otherwise” would nevertheless permit a challenge on the basis of 
an alleged lack of impartiality. 
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appointment,162 “independence” is a more objective concept and a function of prior or 
existing relationships that are capable of verification and measurement, while impartiality is a 
state of mind that may not be susceptible to verification at the time of appointment.163 In the 
words of Redfern and Hunter:164 
 
“It is generally considered that ‘dependence’ is concerned exclusively with questions arising 
out of the relationship between an arbitrator and one of the parties, whether financial or 
otherwise. This is considered to be susceptible to an objective test, because it has nothing to do 
with an arbitrator’s (or prospective arbitrator’s) state of mind. … By contrast the concept of 
‘impartiality’ is considered to be connected with actual or apparent bias of an arbitrator – 
either in favour of one of the parties or in relation to the issues in dispute. Impartiality is thus a 
subjective and more abstract concept than independence, in that it involves primarily a state of 
mind.”  
 
While the ICC Court stayed with “independence” the LCIA preferred the test of impartiality 
and independence.165  Redfern and Hunter assert that there is a move towards considering 
“independence” and “impartiality” as a “package” and to use them as parallel tools for 
assessing the potential for actual or apparent bias; and that while the terms are rarely used 
individually they are usually joined together as a term of art.166 
 
It is said that the most important way of trying to ensure compliance with the requirements of 
impartiality and independence is disclosure.167  A difficulty in this context is the subtle 
difference between an objective test (whether the facts disclosed would create doubt in the 
mind of a reasonable third party), and a subjective test (whether they might create doubt in the 
mind of the arbitral parties). The major institutions such as ICC and LCIA provide no 
guidelines on matters that must be disclosed.168 The International Bar Association (IBA) 
therefore produced in 2004 the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest, which set out general 
standards regarding impartiality, independence and disclosure with explanatory notes for the 
                                                 
162 See article 7.2. 
163 Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 200 n 69, recite this explanation offered in Derains 
Y & Schwartz E A Guide to the New ICC Rules of Arbitration (1998) 109 regarding the assessment of 
independence at the time of appointment in the context of article 7 of the ICC Rules. 
164 Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 201. 
165 See the LCIA Rules (1998) article 5.2 and 5.3 regarding the duty of impartiality and independence and the 
arbitrator’s duty of disclosure, which applies to both concepts, and article 10.3, which allows a party to challenge 
an arbitrator on the basis of justifiable doubts regarding the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence.  Compare 
Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 201, who erroneously convey the impression that the 
LCIA Rules only require impartiality. 
166 Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 201. 
167 Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 204. 
168 Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 205. 
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practical application of the general standards.169  After much discussion in the Working Group 
which compiled the Guidelines, it decided that a subjective test should generally apply to 
disclosure but that an objective test should apply to disqualification of arbitrators.170 
 
It seems that while arbitration institutions will be prone to use their own internal criteria for 
the confirmation or disqualification of nominated arbitrators when challenged they also have 
the IBA Guidelines at their disposal on areas of difficulty on this subject. The IBA has 
acknowledged that these Guidelines are not legal provisions and do not override any 
applicable national law or arbitral rules chosen by the parties themselves.171 
 
As challenges contribute to delay and expense the pertinent considerations at this stage are the 
measures for curbing challenges relating to the suitability or otherwise of an arbitrator in light 
of the discussion of the criteria of impartiality, independence and the duty of disclosure. On 
the international plane arbitration institutions such as the ICC Court,172 the LCIA173 and 
ICSID174 provide the standard and example of ensuring that their appointees as arbitrators are 
not challenged for lack of independence by requiring disclosure of possible conflicts of 
interest prior to appointment. In addition, although parties may nominate arbitrators for 
appointment under the rules of both the ICC and the LCIA, the institution must first confirm 
the nomination for a valid appointment.  It will only do so if there has been due compliance 
with the disclosure requirements.175  Domestic arbitration institutions possessing some degree 
of control over their members and appointing authorities who are approached to appoint 
arbitrators may adopt similar standards. In any event the problem of challenges has to be 
confronted rationally but resolutely as some challenges may have merit while others may not.  
 
Particularly where a domestic arbitration is being conducted under ad hoc rules which do not 
contain a challenge procedure, a unilateral challenge176 will usually be raised by the party 
                                                 
169 See the IBA Guidelines On Conflicts of Interest In International Arbitration (2004). Part I deals with the 
General Standards. Part II deals with the Practical Application of the General Standards divided into four 
separate groups of circumstances being (i) the Non-Waivable Red List; (ii) the Waivable Red List; (iii) the 
Orange List and (d) the Green List. The text is contained in Redfern & Hunter International Commercial 
Arbitration Appendix F 552-564. 
170 See the Explanation to General Standard 3 para (a); Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 
556. 
171 See the IBA Guidelines “Introduction” para 6. 
172 ICC Rules article 7(2). 
173 LCIA Rules article 5.3. 
174 ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings rule 6(2). 
175 See the ICC Rules article 9.2 and the LCIA Rules articles 5.5 and 7.1. 
176 That is a challenge made by one party only, without the support of the other party to the arbitration. 
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concerned with the arbitrator.177 Even where an arbitrator from long practice and experience 
can reasonably assess the chances of success or failure of the objection it seems that the better 
approach is for the arbitrator to be seen to have afforded the opportunity for himself and the 
arbitral parties to resolve the challenge fairly and expeditiously by correct procedure. 
Therefore however strong the temptation for the arbitrator to brush aside an objection, it is not 
a rational option. 
 
If faced with a genuine conflict of interest an arbitrator can rely on his own integrity and 
standing to withdraw or resign. However, immediate withdrawal or resignation on the mere 
indication or notification of an objection is not warranted and may even be unfair to a party 
and wasteful of the resources that went into the initial nomination and appointment. 
 
Two recent challenge situations involving this writer as arbitrator illustrate the perception of 
conflicts of interest, partiality and the duty of disclosure. In the first example, in a dispute 
between a contractor and an employer for non-payment of certificates, the arbitrator disclosed 
that the claimant’s counsel once acted professionally for the arbitrator in a civil suit. 
Respondent’s counsel said that he himself had no problem with the facts disclosed but that his 
client was uncomfortable with the arbitrator in the stated circumstances. Although there was 
no genuine conflict of interest, the respondent’s perception of bias or partiality was strong 
enough to influence the arbitrator’s withdrawal from the case. The decision to do so was 
guided by ICC practice that required the prospective arbitrator to take into account whether 
there exists any past or present relationship, direct or indirect, with any of the parties or any of 
their counsel, whether financial, professional or of any other kind and whether the nature of 
such relationship is such that disclosure is called for, that is, it is of such a nature as to call 
into question his independence in the eyes of the parties.178 On the other hand Swiss 
commentators179 have previously decried the need to disclose mere prior acquaintance 
                                                 
177 See for example the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (Kenya Branch) Arbitration Rules (1998).  The Rules 
require an arbitrator to be at all times independent and impartial (rule 4(1)), and provide for the appointment of a 
replacement arbitrator, if an arbitrator appointed by the Chairman of the Branch withdraws after a challenge (rule 
3(2)).  The Rules do not however contain a challenge procedure, with the result that the challenge should be dealt 
with under the Kenya Arbitration Act ss 13 and 14.  S 14(1) allows the parties to agree on their own challenge 
procedure, failing which the arbitrator must decide the challenge.  Should the challenge in either case be 
unsuccessful, the challenging party may take the matter further under s 14(3). 
178 See the ICC “Arbitrator Statement of Acceptance, Availability and Independence” form, which a prospective 
arbitrator must complete and sign for his appointment to be considered by the ICC Secretariat.  The form is 
available at www.iccarbitration.org. 
179 1990(3) Swiss Arbitration Association Bulletin 226-234 and 1991(2) Swiss Arbitration Association Bulletin 
85-89. 
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between an arbitrator and the lawyer for one of the parties and have suggested an amendment 
to the ICC Rules.180 
 
In the second example the arbitrator was challenged with the complaint that his appointment 
was “unilateral” and “unprocedural” as the respondent did not participate in his appointment. 
Evidence that the respondent and its advocate were invited but ignored the invitation to 
participate in the nomination and appointment of the arbitrator put paid to the complaint as to 
the proposed method of appointment to which the respondent had not objected. Further, 
although the legal basis of the complaint was alleged lack of impartiality and independence,181 
no facts were presented in support of that legal ground. The objection was dismissed as 
counsel for the respondent categorically disavowed any imputation of partiality or lack of 
independence on the part of the arbitrator. A further relevant aspect of this case was that 
although the statutory time for objecting to the arbitrator’s appointment had long expired,182 
both counsels nevertheless consented to the hearing and determination of the belated 
objection. The opportunity for doing so was granted by the arbitrator leading to the dismissal 
of the challenge. The refusal to resign was supported by the general principle that an arbitrator 
may be trusted to resign in the face of a genuine conflict of interest and a prospective 
arbitrator should not accept an appointment if there is reason to believe that either party may 
genuinely feel that he is not independent or cannot be impartial. An arbitrator should resign if 
the objection is or appears to be well-founded whether or not the parties agree; but if the 
objection appears to be without merit the arbitrator should not resign, but permit the matter to 
be dealt with by the relevant challenge procedure, as demonstrated in the second example 
above. Timeous resignation will save time and expense; but even though the use of the correct 
challenge procedure may cause some delay it does help to discourage unmeritorious and 
disruptive tactics.183  
 
In a jurisdiction such as Kenya’s in which practitioners and professionals who grew up 
together from school, college and church know each other quite well and interact freely in 
localized communities, the problem regarding independence and conflicts of interest is that 
much harder to deal with and prescriptions from substantially larger foreign jurisdictions must 
                                                 
180 It has been mentioned above that ICC Rules require factors pertaining to independence to be disclosed but do 
not use the term “impartiality” which is deemed a state of mind and difficult to assess. 
181 See the Kenyan Arbitration Act s 13(3). 
182 In terms of s 14(2) the challenge must be made within 15 days of the party becoming aware of the 
circumstances on which the challenge is based. 
183 See Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 208. They provide (207 n 90) an informative 
summary showing the rising and then declining trend of challenges in ICC arbitrations from the 1980s to 2003. 
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be taken with considerable caution or not taken at all. In an African jurisdiction where an 
arbitrator has interacted with the parties in wide ranging circumstances, in church and 
community activities, social clubs and the like, but is nevertheless chosen because of his 
integrity and the respect accorded him in the community, the foreign rules or guidelines on 
conflicts of interest may well break down or be wholly inappropriate. That said, this writer 
has found the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest beneficial. 
 
Ultimately, the point to emphasize is that the appointment of an arbitrator who is suitably 
qualified to arbitrate the particular dispute can eliminate or reduce the risk of challenge on 
grounds of unsuitability.184 
 
3.2.1.3 Competence 
 
The arbitrator’s “competence”, giving the term its dictionary definition,185 has two aspects. 
The first aspect is directed at his aptitude and involves consideration of his personal capacity, 
qualities and professional qualifications.  The second aspect is concerned with his 
jurisdictional competence (Kompetenz-Kompetenz).  
 
On the first aspect domestic arbitration agreements do not, in general, name in advance a 
particular individual as arbitrator. It is sufficient to specify the expected qualifications and or 
profession such as “a legal practitioner of no less than fifteen years experience in law 
practice”, and a special qualification such as membership of a particular association, for 
example, “a member of the bar” or “Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators”. The 
arbitrator so appointed must therefore possess the qualification specified by the arbitration 
agreement as otherwise the appointment can be challenged and the appointee removed.186 
 
Similarly, in the event of party disagreement, the arbitration agreement may specify an 
appointing authority to make the appointment, such as “the Chairman of the East African Law 
Society”. The appointing authority is then under an obligation to follow the procedure agreed 
by the parties in order to complete the cycle of qualities and qualifications prescribed by the 
parties, otherwise the appointment may be set aside. In the English case of Hadjisawas v 
                                                 
184 The Kenyan Act s 13(3), following the Model Law, only permits challenges on the basis of justifiable doubts 
regarding impartiality and independence or if the arbitrator does not possess qualifications agreed to by the 
parties. 
185 See the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, which defines “competence” inter alia as “sufficiency of 
qualification, capacity”. 
186 See the Kenyan Arbitration Act s 13(3) and para 3.2.1.2 above. 
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Zampelas, the failure by an appointing authority to follow an agreed procedure for the 
composition of an arbitral tribunal led to a successful challenge of the sole arbitrator’s award.  
The Chartered Institute of Arbitrators appointed the sole arbitrator without waiting for a 42 
day period to elapse after the notice of arbitration, as prescribed by the arbitration agreement.  
The court stated: 
 
“If the procedure is not followed or is curtailed the party against whom the arbitration clause 
is invoked would be deprived of his contractual right to have the opportunity to participate in 
the selection of the arbitrator … and failure to follow the procedure invalidates the jurisdiction 
of the default appointing body to make a default appointment.”187 
 
The fact that these simple and seemingly straightforward requirements are often the sources of 
protracted discord and avoidable delay at the start of the arbitral process clearly shows the 
scant attention the parties and their advisers give to an arbitration clause prior to the 
occurrence of the dispute.188 
 
With regard to capacity it is probably accurate to state that under most modern jurisdictions an 
adult natural person of sane mind and in good health can be an arbitrator.189 It follows from 
the parties’ freedom of choice that they may consciously and specifically exclude or 
disqualify a particular character or profession from appointment, for example, a negative 
requirement that the arbitrator shall not be a clergyman or one residing in the same 
community as either of the parties. 
 
The second aspect of the arbitrator’s competence, and the more usual meaning of the term in 
arbitration literature,190 relates to his jurisdiction. Challenges to jurisdictional competence 
would usually involve consideration of the jurisdiction exercisable by the arbitrator.191  This 
                                                 
187 Commercial Court (unreported) 29 June 2000, per Judge Dean QC. See also Akseli O “Appointment of 
Arbitrators as Specified in the Agreement to Arbitrate” (2003) 20(3) Journal of International Arbitration 247-
254. 
188 The writer recalls an arbitration involving Kenyan and Ugandan parties conducted in Kampala in which the 
named appointing authority was “the Chairman of the East African Architects Association”, a body that had 
ceased to exist and had been replaced by “the Uganda Architects Association”. The appointment was made by 
the Chairman of the Uganda Architects Association.  The oversight, deliberate or inadvertent, led to protracted 
debate on the validity of the appointment and the arbitration was in the end conducted “under notice of protest” 
filed by the challenging party. 
189 Mustill & Boyd Commercial Arbitration 9-10.  See also para 3.2.1.1 above. 
190 See Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 248 para 5-30; Russell on Arbitration (23rd ed) 
145 para 4-070. 
191 The distinction between “jurisdiction” and “powers” of the arbitral tribunal is clarified further below (see para 
3.2.2 below). Russell on Arbitration (23rd ed) 145 para 4-070 points out the need to distinguish between the 
tribunal’s powers and its jurisdiction (competence). Without jurisdiction it cannot determine the dispute at all. If 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
198 
 
can be gleaned from the terms of the arbitration agreement which is the source of the 
arbitrator’s jurisdiction. In consensual arbitration the competence (authority) of the arbitrator 
comes from that agreement. Variously stated, this means the tribunal must stay within the 
terms of the reference, or must not exceed its mandate or must conform to its mission.  
Whether stated with reference to the arbitrator’s competence, authority or mandate, the 
tribunal must not exceed its jurisdiction or it will face challenges to its jurisdiction, which 
may be a partial or total challenge.192 
 
A partial challenge goes to only some but not all of the claims before the arbitrator and may 
be resolved by agreement.  A total challenge assails the very foundation of the tribunal and is 
therefore more serious and requires a decision as to whether the tribunal is validly created.  
Total challenges arise more particularly from arbitration clauses contained in a contract in 
contradistinction to submission agreements.  Instances of total challenges are where a party 
contends (i) that it is not bound by the clause because it is contained in a document assented 
to by only the opposing party; or (ii) that it was assented to by a different legal entity; or (iii) 
that the agreement was not in writing; or (iv) the dispute is outside the scope of the arbitration 
agreement; or (v) that the claim is time-barred; or (vi) that the arbitration clause is inoperative 
or incapable of performance; or (vi) that the dispute is not arbitrable under the applicable 
law.193 
 
The fact that challenges under items (i) and (ii) involve disputed consent demonstrates to 
some extent the interaction between that subject and challenges to the jurisdictional 
competence of the arbitrator. 
 
The affinity between the concepts of “power”, “jurisdiction” and “competence” is 
demonstrated by the fact that the power of the tribunal to decide upon its own jurisdiction is 
also its power to decide on its own competence.194 How does this power operate, and what is 
its significance? The UNCITRAL Model Law and its national derivatives such as section 
17(1) of the Kenyan Arbitration Act give the tribunal power to determine its own 
                                                                                                                                                        
it has jurisdiction, it must consider the extent of its powers in determining how to conduct the reference. 
Compare too the English Arbitration Act 1996 s 68(2)(b), in the context of the setting aside of the award for 
serious irregularities, which refers to “the tribunal exceeding its powers, otherwise than by exceeding its 
substantive jurisdiction”, with the latter being dealt with under s 67. 
192 See Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 248-249 paras 5.30-5.31. 
193 Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 250 para 5.35. 
194 The French form is Compétence de la Compétence, or more briefly compétence-compétence (see Gaillard & 
Savage International Commercial Arbitration 396-397 for the difference between the original meaning of 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz and compétence-compétence.)  For distinctions between power and jurisdiction see text 
to footnote 220 below.  
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jurisdiction,195 but this power is neither exclusive nor final.196 It has been noted that a total 
challenge to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction is more fundamental and serious because it challenges 
the very validity of the existence of the tribunal. The tribunal that is challenged must exist, or 
have been formally appointed,197 before the legitimacy of its existence can be impugned. 
Therefore the doctrine of competence/competence enables the arbitral tribunal that has been 
purportedly or ostensibly created, and whether validly or invalidly, to entertain the challenge 
of its jurisdiction and rule on it. In effect it is an inherent power that is also formally enacted 
in the Model Law. 
 
3.2.2 Challenges to the Arbitral Jurisdiction: Illustrative Judicial Decisions 
 
Jurisdictional challenges are wide ranging. In the context of the discussion so far, the 
following English illustrative decisions based on the 1996 Arbitration Act relate to disputed 
consent and jurisdictional competence. First it is observed that since the 1996 Act, English 
courts are recorded to have set aside numerous arbitral awards for want of jurisdiction ratione 
personae;198 but secondly, that the courts have not been consistent in dealing with 
jurisdictional challenges.199 
 
In Hussman (Europe) Ltd v Al Ameen Development and Trade Co200 Hussman Europe Ltd 
(“Hussman”) entered into a distributorship agreement in 1990 with Al Ameen Development 
& Trade, based in Saudi Arabia. The latter was a sole proprietorship that operated in the form 
of an “Establishment”.201  In early 1994 the Establishment formally transferred its business to 
a limited liability company, formed by its sole proprietor (“the company”).202 The 
                                                 
195 Model Law Article 16(2) and (3). See too the UNCITRAL Rules Article 21(1) and (2). 
196 Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 479.  The tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction, 
depending on the circumstances, is subject to court review under Article 16(3) of the Model Law or Article 34(2) 
or Article 36(1)(a) and is therefore not final.  A court may also have to establish aspects of the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction when deciding whether or not to stay court proceedings so that a dispute can be referred to 
arbitration under Article 8. The tribunal’s power is therefore not exclusive. 
197 The Model Law Article 16(2) states that a party is not precluded from challenging the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal by the fact that it participated in the appointment of the tribunal. 
198 Shackleton “Annual Review of English Judicial Decisions on Arbitration – 2000” (2001) 4(6) International 
Arbitration Law Review 178-201. 
199 In most significant respects the English Act reflects the Model Law provisions; but there are also significant 
differences in context between Article 16 of the Model Law and the English provisions such as s 31 (“Objection 
to substantive jurisdiction of the tribunal”), s 32 (“Determination of preliminary point of jurisdiction”) and s 67 
(“Challenging the award: substantive jurisdiction”). Note also that s 30 divides challenges to the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction into three categories: (i) where there is a valid arbitration agreement; (ii) whether the tribunal is 
properly constituted; and (c) what matters have been submitted to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration 
agreement. 
200 [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 83; [2000] EWHC 210 (Comm). 
201 See para 3 of the judgment. 
202 Para 6. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
200 
 
distributorship agreement contained an arbitration clause. In early 1997 Hussman commenced 
arbitration proceedings against the Establishment. The company defended the arbitration 
proceedings and brought a counterclaim substantially in excess of the claim.  Hussman’s 
objection at the commencement of the arbitration hearing that the company was not a party to 
the distribution agreement and therefore to the arbitration clause was dismissed by the arbitral 
tribunal. The tribunal then made an award in favour of the company on its counterclaim.203  
Hussman therefore challenged the award in court on the basis that the tribunal lacked 
jurisdiction to make an award in favour of the company,204 contending that it had contracted 
only with the Establishment and that the company was never a party to the contract.  The 
court found that the governing Saudi law required Hussman’s consent to the assignment of the 
Establishment’s business to the company, and held that Hussmann had neither expressly nor 
impliedly consented.205 It therefore allowed Hussman’s jurisdictional challenge.206  
 
Whether or not one agrees with the judge’s factual findings in the particular case, the strict 
enforcement of the requirement of consent is in accord with the approach recommended 
above.207 
 
In contrast, in Astra SA Insurance and Reinsurance Co v Sphere Drake Insurance Ltd,208 the 
tribunal’s substantive jurisdiction was challenged in court,209 on the basis that the contract 
containing the arbitration clause was assigned to a successor company that was not a 
signatory to the original contract. The challenge failed because the court saw no reason why, 
as a matter of English law, succession to a contract should not also entail the transfer of the 
arbitration clause.210 
 
                                                 
203 See paras 7 and 11. 
204 See paras 1 and 14.  The court pointed out that under the English Arbitration Act the tribunal was first entitled 
to rule on its own jurisdiction and that the tribunal had done so.  When that finding is challenged it is then up to 
the court to decide under s 67 whether the tribunal had jurisdiction.  For a detailed discussion of s 67 see Russell 
on Arbitration (23rd ed) 476-484. 
205 See paras 14 and 17.  Although Hussmann mistakenly described the Establishment as a company in its notice 
of arbitration, it used the registration number of the Establishment, which differed from that of the company.  
The court accepted that Hussman was referring to the original party to the distribution agreement (see para 
17(4)). 
206 The court also held that s 5(5) of the English Arbitration Act, in terms of which an arbitration agreement 
exists when its existence is alleged by one party and not denied by the other, had no application, as Hussman 
referred to an agreement with the Establishment, not with the company (para 20). 
207 See para 3.1 above. 
208 [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 550. 
209 Under the English Arbitration Act s 67. 
210 See too Russell on Arbitration (23rd ed) 99 para 3-018, where reliance is also placed on the definition of a 
party to an arbitration agreement in s 82(2) of the Act. 
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An award was set aside on jurisdictional grounds in American Design Associates v Donald 
Install Associates
211 by Judge Bowsher QC because although the standard form contained an 
arbitration clause and work was done, the court was satisfied that the parties’ contractual 
negotiations were inconclusive. The court could find “nothing in any letters passing between 
the parties which I read as either express or implied agreement for arbitration in England”. 
 
English courts appear more liberal and less prone to formalism with regard to challenges to 
jurisdiction ratione materiae.212  For example, in Weldon Plant Ltd v Commissioner for the 
New Towns,213 Judge Humphrey Lloyd QC, in dealing with an application for the partial 
setting aside of an award214 on the basis that the arbitrator had decided an issue not referred to 
arbitration, suggested that the principles in section 1 of the Arbitration Act215 require the 
courts to read an award “supportively” in a manner “which is likely to uphold it rather than to 
destroy it”. On the facts, the judge concluded that the award should be read so as to conclude 
that the arbitrator had not ruled on an issue outside the reference.216 
 
However, in dealing with a jurisdictional challenge regarding the extent of the arbitral 
tribunal’s substantive jurisdiction, that jurisdiction will first have to be established with 
reference to the arbitration agreement, the request for arbitration and the statements of claim 
and defence in order to determine the issues in dispute that were actually referred to the 
tribunal for decision.  In the context of statutory adjudication,217 the English courts have 
adopted a liberal approach to subject-matter jurisdiction that marks an important move away 
from formal textual analysis of reference documents. In Fastrack Contractors Ltd v Morrison 
Construction Judge Thornton QC stated:218 
 
“A vital and necessary question to be answered when a jurisdictional challenge is mounted is 
what was actually referred?  That involves a careful characterisation of the dispute referred to 
be made.  This exercise will not necessarily be determined solely by the wording of the notice 
of adjudication since this document, like any commercial document having contractual force, 
                                                 
211 Unreported, 9 November 2000, TCC. 
212 Shackleton (2001) 4(6) Int ALR 178-201. 
213  [2000] BLR 496 at 503; [2000] EWHC Technology 76, para 22. 
214 Under s 67(1) and (3) of the English Arbitration Act. 
215 S 1 states that Part I of the Act is based on the principles set out in s 1 and that Part I must be construed 
accordingly. See para 2.6 above for these principles. 
216 See paras 23 and 24 of the judgment. 
217 In terms of Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 s108.  The decision of the adjudicator is 
binding on the parties and may be enforced by the court, but after completion of the contract the adjudicator’s 
decision can nevertheless be referred to arbitration or to court (depending on the parties’ preference) for 
reconsideration. 
218 [2000] BLR 168 at 176-177; [2000] EWHC Technology 177, para 20. 
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must be construed against the underlying factual background from which it springs, which will 
be known to both parties.” 
 
Although this statement concerned a challenge to the jurisdiction of an adjudicator, it is 
submitted that a similar approach should be adopted in the context of arbitration, particularly 
bearing in mind that arbitration is intended to be a less technical and formal process than 
litigation in the courts. 
 
Before leaving this topic it must be mentioned that although the terms “powers” and 
“jurisdiction” are sometimes used interchangeably the concepts are distinct.219  There is no 
comprehensive statement of the powers exercisable by the arbitrator beyond those expressly 
or impliedly conferred by the arbitration agreement. On the one hand, where the arbitrator has 
power to fulfill the arbitral mandate or mission he is deemed to be competent and in that 
context may only be challenged for exceeding the authority conferred by that power.  
However the term “powers” can be used, for example in legislation, to refer simultaneously 
both to the power to conduct the reference and to substantive jurisdiction.220  On the other 
hand where the arbitrator lacks jurisdiction he lacks competence and cannot assume the 
authority to exercise the powers that enable him to arbitrate the dispute.221  It is not surprising 
that the correlation between the interchangeable senses of the two concepts creates confusion 
because, simply put, the arbitration agreement which confers jurisdiction also entails and 
confers the power, authority and competence to act as arbitrator. 
 
The difference between the concepts “excess of powers” and “excess of substantive 
jurisdiction” in terms of the English Arbitration Act is illustrated by the English case of 
Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v Impregilo SpA.222 Briefly, in an ICC arbitration 
held in London involving a dispute arising from the contract awarded by the Lesotho 
Highlands Development Authority (“LHDA”) for the construction of the Katse Dam in 
Lesotho, the tribunal awarded the contractors an amount payable in European currencies and 
                                                 
219 These concepts are considered in greater detail in the context of the cases discussed in the text below.  For the 
affinity between the concepts see the text to footnote 195 above. 
220 See the South African Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 s 33(1)(b) where one of the grounds on which an award 
may be set aside by the court is where the tribunal “has exceeded its powers”.  Unlike the English Arbitration 
Act in which exceeding substantive jurisdiction (s 67) and exceeding other powers (s 68(2)(b)) are dealt with 
separately, by necessary implication s 33(1)(b) of the South African Act covers both situations. 
221 Compare the South African case of Vidavsky v Body Corporate of Sunhill Villas 2005 5 SA 200 (SCA).  The 
arbitrator erroneously used his default powers in s 15(2) to proceed with the hearing in the absence of a party, 
when that party had not received proper notice of the hearing.  The arbitrator clearly committed a gross 
procedural irregularity and arguably exceeded his powers, but he was not, as the court appears to decide (para 
12), lacking in substantive jurisdiction as a result of the error. See also the text below on this case. 
222 [2005] UK HL 43. 
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not in Maloti, the Lesotho currency.223 Because the Maloti, then linked to the South African 
Rand, had depreciated sharply against the European currencies the substantial award was 
challenged by LHDA in the English courts. Section 69 of the English Arbitration Act 1996 
allows a limited right of appeal on points of law. Having chosen an ICC arbitration and so 
contracted out of a section 69 appeal,224 LHDA first turned to section 67 which allows an 
award by the tribunal to be challenged for lack of substantive jurisdiction; but this approach 
was subsequently abandoned in the hearing before the Court of Appeal in preference for 
section 68(2)(b) and the challenge was then founded on a serious irregularity resulting in 
substantial injustice through “the tribunal exceeding its powers (otherwise than by exceeding 
its substantive jurisdiction …)”. The statutory distinction between excess of substantive 
jurisdiction (section 67) and excess of powers (section 68) is at this stage poignant.  The 
ultimate issue for determination was whether “an alleged error of arbitrators in interpreting 
the underlying or principal contract be an excess of power under section 68(2)(b) so as to give 
the court power to intervene, rather than an error of law, which can only be challenged under 
section 69 if the right of appeal has not been excluded.”225  
 
It was therefore necessary to decide for purposes of section 68(2)(b) whether the tribunal 
purported to exercise a power which it did not have or whether it erroneously exercised a 
power which it did have.226 On the currency point the court decided that there was no more 
than an erroneous exercise of the power available under section 48(4),227 that is, the erroneous 
exercise of the power that actually existed. Therefore a mere error in law does not amount to 
an excess of power. It seems that “excess of substantive jurisdiction” applies to what the 
tribunal is authorized to decide, in contrast to “excess of powers” which perhaps refers to how 
the decision is made.228 It is also said that: 
 
“[i]f … [the arbitrator] applies the correct remedy, but does so in an incorrect way – for 
example by miscalculating the damages which the submission empowers him to award – then 
there is no excess of jurisdiction. An error, however gross, in the exercise of his powers does 
                                                 
223 See paras 4 and 12 of the judgment. 
224 As a result of ICC Arbitration Rules article 28.6.  See para 3 of the judgment. 
225 The issue as formulated by Lord Steyn, in para 3 of the judgment. 
226 See para 24 of the judgment. 
227 Under s 48(4) “the tribunal may order payment of a sum of money, in any currency”. 
228 Synthesized from conference papers in Amasike CJ (ed) Arbitration & Alternative Dispute Resolution in 
Africa (Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution in Africa, Nigeria 2007) 50 60, citing Park WW “The 
Nature of Arbitral Authority: a Comment on Lesotho Highlands” (2005) 21 Arbitration International 483 486 n 
17.  
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not take an arbitrator outside his jurisdiction and this is so whether his decision is on a matter 
of substance or procedure.”229 
 
While accepting that the statement of principle by the House of Lords in Lesotho Highlands 
that a mere error of law will not amount to excess of power was correct, as a matter of 
statutory construction one commentator, Main, contends that the apparent clarity which the 
principle offers is illusory and the distinction between “mere errors of law” and “excess of 
jurisdiction” is “conceptually weak and impossibly difficult to apply in practice in all but the 
simplest of cases”.230 He argues that: 
 
“[t]he difficulty with the concept is that every order made by a tribunal is premised on a 
judgment as to its lawful powers, and every act in excess of its powers is therefore necessarily 
premised on an error of law. Conversely, whenever a tribunal makes an order which it would 
not otherwise have made had it not committed an error of law, it necessarily acts in excess of 
its powers, because it has no original jurisdiction.”231 
 
The validity of this comment is debatable for blurring the distinction between the arbitral 
tribunal exceeding its substantive jurisdiction and other instances of the tribunal exceeding its 
powers typically in procedural matters. It also ignores the differences in the remedies afforded 
by the applicable law in those two instances. For example, under section 39 of the Kenyan 
arbitration statute, an error of law arising in domestic arbitration can, by agreement of the 
parties, be a ground of appeal; whereas under section 35(1)(iv) an excess of jurisdiction in a 
matter not contemplated by or falling within the terms of the arbitral reference, may be a 
ground for setting aside the arbitral award. 
 
To this writer the problem in Lesotho Highlands is that the respondent’s complaint about an 
error of law by the arbitral tribunal was, as a matter of law, appealable under section 69, the 
right to which was not available by the choice of an ICC arbitration. Challenging the award, 
not for the error of law but for the tribunal’s excess of power, was from the outset an exercise 
in futility. Section 67 dealing with lack of substantive jurisdiction was unavailable because 
the tribunal quite clearly had jurisdiction to determine the substance of the dispute on merits. 
Thereafter to equate an error of law with excess of power under section 68(2) (b) was a 
                                                 
229 Mustill & Boyd Commercial Arbitration 555 quoted by Lord Steyn in Lesotho Highlands, para 25. 
230 Main HA “Court Supervision of Awards and the Interpretation of the Arbitration Act 1996” (2005) 71 
Arbitration 368 371. See also Main HA “Court Ordered Interim Relief: Developments in English Arbitration 
Law” (2005) 22(6) Journal of International Arbitration 505 506. 
231 Main (2005) 71 Arbitration 371. 
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spurious argument rightly rejected by the House of Lords. In hindsight, as the English 
Arbitration Act has defined categories of challenge under specific statutory provisions it is 
necessary for a complainant to place itself within the prescribed statutory categories of 
challenge or lose the fight. In the end the attempt to transpose a section 69 grievance to 
section 68 was for the court an exercise in statutory interpretation. The philological challenge 
of distinguishing between the seemingly interchangeable terms “excess of power” and “excess 
of jurisdiction” was a task the court did not embark upon. Perhaps the explanation, in part, 
was Lord Phillips’ observation that “the concept of an excess of power that is not an excess of 
jurisdiction is not an easy one”.232 
 
Another illustration of problems in distinguishing between the substantive jurisdiction and 
procedural powers is in a South African judicial decision233 in which the court concluded that 
the failure of the arbitrator to give proper notice of the hearing meant the arbitrator lacked 
jurisdiction to proceed with the hearing. On the facts the arbitrator quite clearly committed a 
gross procedural error which, in the light of the clarifications offered by the House of Lords in 
Lesotho Highlands, and Mustill and Boyd, as noted above, was not tantamount to acting 
outside his substantive jurisdiction.234 
 
3.2.3 Arbitrability 
 
Arbitrability is another source of challenges to the arbitral jurisdiction.235  The courts apply 
the doctrine of arbitrability to determine whether the subject matter of a dispute which the 
parties have by agreement referred to arbitration is indeed capable of resolution outside the 
court system in the light of the relevant public policy considerations.236  When the issue of 
arbitrability arises it involves a determination as to whether the tribunal or the court is the 
appropriate forum for resolving the subject matter of the dispute.237  In Kenya the application 
                                                 
232 The Lesotho Highlands judgment para 51. On the various provisions of the English Arbitration Act dealing 
with the tribunal’s substantive jurisdiction, see Aeberli P “Jurisdictional Disputes under the Arbitration Act 
1996:  A Procedural Route Map” (2005) 21 Arbitration International 253-299. 
233 Vidavsky v Body Corporate of Sunhill Villas  2005 5 SA 200 (SCA). 
234 For another notable comment provoked by Lesotho Highlands, see Park (2005) 21 Arbitration International 
483-491. 
235 See generally on arbitrability, Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 138-145; Gaillard & 
Savage International Commercial Arbitration 312-359; Sanders P “The Domain of Arbitration” Encyclopaedia 
of International and Comparative Law vol XVI, ch 12; Hanotiau B The Law Applicable to the issue of 
Arbitrability (1998).  
236 Fortier LY “The Principle and Practice of Arbitrability: Do we have the Ability to Deal with the 
Consequences”: LCIA Colloquium, Cambridge, 3 April 2004. 
237 Arbitrability in this context is sometimes termed “objective arbitrability” to distinguish it from “subjective 
arbitrability”, which is concerned with the capacity of certain persons or entities (particularly state entities and 
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is commonly made under section 6 of the Act.  The issue can arise (i) when a party tries to 
prevent the enforcement of the arbitration agreement in court on the basis that the dispute is 
not arbitrable;238 (ii) on application to stay the arbitration when the opposing party claims the 
tribunal lacks authority to determine a non-arbitrable dispute; (iii) during arbitration 
proceedings when an objection is taken that the tribunal lacks substantive jurisdiction; and 
(iv) on an application to challenge the award or oppose its enforcement.239  Arbitrability, 
which involves the question whether a particular dispute can be arbitrated as a matter of law is 
distinct from the question as to what dispute falls within the scope of an arbitration clause or 
agreement, which is a matter of interpretation of the clause or agreement.240 In the light of this 
clarification it is apparent that a simple arbitration clause of the sort frequently encountered in 
domestic arbitration, such as: 
 
“[a]ny differences or matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred to an arbitrator 
for determination …” 
 
can be misleading, as not every difference or matter in dispute is susceptible to determination 
by an arbitral tribunal in the relevant jurisdiction.  
 
Different jurisdictions use different terminology and definitions to describe arbitrability. 
Asouzu states that most first generation arbitration laws241 in Africa enumerate subject 
matters that cannot be arbitrated. He cites as an example the Ghana Arbitration Act of 1961 
which provides that: 
 
“an arbitration agreement may cover issues between parties which are capable of being the 
subject of civil action but that an award should not be made affecting the status of a person or 
thing or determining any interest in property except as between the parties themselves.”242 
                                                                                                                                                        
local authorities) to submit disputes to arbitration (see Gaillard & Savage International Commercial Arbitration 
312-313).  Asouzu International Commercial Arbitration and African States 146 refers to “subject-matter 
arbitrability” rather than objective arbitrability. 
238 In response to an application under Article 8 of the Model Law for enforcement of an arbitration agreement 
by the court. 
239 Russell on Arbitration (23rd ed) 15 para 1-034; compare Mustill & Boyd Commercial Arbitration 149. 
240 Russell on Arbitration (23rd ed) 15 para 1-033. Some American judges use arbitrability to have a different 
meaning, namely whether the scope of the arbitration agreement is wide enough to cover the particular dispute. 
See Paulsson J “Arbitrability, still through a glass darkly” ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin (1999 
Special Supplement) 95 n 2; compare Park WW “The arbitrability dicta in First Options v Kaplan” (1996) 12 
Arbitration International 137 143-144. 
241 See para 2.4.2 above for the meaning of this term. 
242 See s 5(2) and Asouzu International Commercial Arbitration and African States 147. 
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It is submitted that definitions like this are too broad in their scope and so lacking in precision 
as to leave much interpretative work for the courts, which is not a desirable end in modern 
arbitration. 
 
The English common law position on arbitrability is that 
 
“[a]dispute or difference which the parties to an arbitration agreement agree to refer must 
consist of a justiciable issue triable civilly. A fair test of this is whether the difference can be 
compromised lawfully by way of accord and satisfaction.”243  
 
Mustill and Boyd244 state that in English law as a general principle “any dispute or claim 
concerning legal rights which can be subject of an enforceable award is capable of being 
settled by arbitration”. As an award dealing with a non-arbitrable subject matter is not 
enforceable, this statement of principle is not sufficiently definitive of what is arbitrable under 
the English common law.245  The English Arbitration Act of 1996 simply preserves the 
common law on matters that are not capable of settlement by arbitration, without attempting 
to indicate what those matters are.246 In this writer’s opinion the English common-law 
position on arbitrability as preserved by the 1996 Act lacks precision and in an African 
context would leave even wider the doors that are already open to judicial intervention and 
interpretation of arbitrability.247 
 
The most important constraints on the arbitrator’s powers regarding the substantive issues that 
he may decide on are public policy considerations, the fact that his decision is binding only on 
the parties who appointed him and no one else, and that he cannot impose judicial remedies in 
the form of fines and penalties. Some expert views on the subject are instructive.  Asouzu, 
after a wide-ranging discussion of the provisions on arbitrability in a range of third generation 
arbitration laws in Africa,248 comes to the following conclusion: 
                                                 
243 Halsbury’s Laws of England 4th ed vol 2. 
244 Mustill & Boyd Commercial Arbitration 149. 
245 Russell on Arbitration 15 n 125 states that while the English courts have frequently considered the scope of 
particular arbitration clauses, the issue of arbitrability has received little attention from the English courts. 
246 See s 81(1)(a). 
247 For other commentaries in Commonwealth jurisdictions see Reddy V & Nagaraj V “Arbitrability: The Indian 
Perspective” (2002) 19(2) Journal of International Arbitration 117-149; Morrison J “Defining the Scope of 
Arbitrable Disputes in Australia: Towards a ‘Liberal’ Approach?” (2005) 22(6) Journal of Internatinall 
Arbitration 569-572. 
248 Asouzu International Commercial Arbitration and African States 147-157.  He also discusses in detail the 
proposals of the SA Law Commission on arbitrability. 
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“The trend in third generation arbitration law is to define arbitrable subject matter widely, 
except for those disputes which parties may not themselves settle, especially matters with 
public policy implications or relating to personal status, or those that are otherwise excluded 
as being against public policy or patently contrary to enactments of a fundamental nature.”249 
 
The English commentators Brown and Marriott state: 
 
“There is now a recognized trend in England and in developed jurisdictions elsewhere, to 
broaden the range of disputes which may be submitted to arbitration and to interpret the scope 
and meaning of arbitration clauses and agreements widely and favourably.  There are 
indications that the powers given to arbitrators particularly with respect to interim orders 
including injunctive relief are being clarified and expressly provided for … . This reflects the 
change manifest in England and elsewhere in the relationship between the courts and the 
arbitral process, to permit in the public interest the wider development of arbitration as a 
private and independent system of resolving disputes which otherwise would fall to be 
adjudicated in these courts. … The courts are also increasingly prepared to see issues 
arbitrated which touch and concern vital public and political interests.”250 
 
Part of the problem with arbitration and arbitrators is therefore not so much with the 
demonstrable shortcomings of the arbitral system such as the lack of punitive sanctions,251 
than with conventional fears that adjudication is traditionally the domain of judges.  It is thus 
interesting and informative to read that: 
 
“[j]udges and arbitrators work together as laborers in the same vineyard of justice.  The 
procedural differences are less important than the substantive common purpose.”252 
 
It is this writer’s view that a modern doctrine of arbitrability ought to promote predictability 
by prescribing in advance through legislation, as has been attempted in Zimbabwe,253 what is 
not arbitrable and so reduce jurisdictional challenges founded on individualistic notions of 
arbitrability. 
                                                 
249 Asouzu International Commercial Arbitration and African States 158.  Asouzu 158 notes that in Ghana 
customary law arbitration is being regulated by statute and made applicable to a wider range of disputes and he 
hopes that other African states might emulate this example.  See also Redfern & Hunter International 
Commercial Arbitration 139 on the importance of public policy in the context of arbitrability. See further para 
3.2.4 below regarding how arbitrability has been dealt with in some modern African arbitration statutes. 
250 Brown H & Marriott A ADR Principles and Practice (1999) 65. 
251 See the discussion in para 3.7 below. 
252 Haight “How Judges View Arbitration” (1988) 20 The Arbitrator 1. 
253 See para 3.2.4 below. 
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3.2.4 Reducing Challenges to Arbitrability: Diversity of Approach 
 
It may be thought that with an arbitration clause or agreement which provides that “any or all 
differences between the parties shall be referred to arbitration”, the parties have consciously 
and comprehensively eliminated any possible doubt or disagreement about what may be 
arbitrated in giving effect to their arbitration agreement.  Unfortunately this is not so because 
a clause of this scope is of necessity subject to public policy considerations and the limitation 
on arbitral jurisdiction prescribed by the relevant arbitration law.254  Because national laws 
demarcate the province of arbitration it is left to each state to settle the boundaries of 
arbitrability.  The right of each state to do so, taking into consideration their cultural, 
economic and political inclinations, introduces divergences in the interpretation and content 
of arbitrability and a lack of uniformity in state practice.  Ball observes that: 
 
“[t]he courts of different nations have different views, based on their own interpretations of 
national or international public policy, of whether particular classes of disputes are arbitrable. 
Under the influence of a strong Federal policy favouring arbitration, U.S. courts have found 
wide classes of disputes arbitrable, including disputes under the securities and antitrust laws, 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act (ADEA). Other nations take a less expansive view, or at any rate have a 
less well developed jurisprudence on the subject of arbitrability.”255 
 
From an African perspective, the two main sources for modern arbitration legislation in 
Africa, the OHADA Uniform Act on Arbitration and the UNCITRAL Model law adopt 
different approaches to the issue of arbitrability. The OHADA Uniform Act on Arbitration 
1999, which applies to an arbitration taking place in one of the member states,256 provides: 
 
“Any natural person or corporate body may [have] recourse to arbitration on rights of which 
he has free disposal.  States and other territorial public bodies as well as public establishments 
may equally be parties to an arbitration without having the possibility to invoke their own law 
                                                 
254 In the context of domestic arbitration, the relevant law will normally be the law of the seat, but in 
international commercial arbitration, the law which determines arbitrability will depend on the circumstances in 
which the issue of arbitrability arises.  See Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 138-139. 
255 Ball M “Just Do It – Drafting the Arbitration Clause in an International Agreement” (1993) 10(4) Journal of 
International Arbitration 29 36. 
256 See Articles 1 and 35.  See para 2.4.3 above regarding OHADA arbitration. 
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to contest the arbitrability of the claim, their authority to sign arbitration agreements or the 
validity of the arbitration agreement.”257 
 
The first sentence deals with objective arbitrability. The Uniform Act is not restricted to 
commercial matters and arbitration is possible on any matter that parties may freely dispose 
of.  Matters relating to personal status will not be arbitrable as the intervention of public 
authorities is required on such matters.258  The rest of the provision is concerned with 
subjective arbitrability.  In short, subject matter arbitrability is widely defined under the 
OHADA Uniform Act.259 
 
The UNCITRAL Model Law260 prescribes that it shall not affect any other law of an adopting 
state by virtue of which certain disputes may not be submitted to arbitration or may only be 
submitted to arbitration in accordance with other law. The Model Law therefore yields to 
national laws on arbitrability by not making any dispute arbitrable which would not otherwise 
be capable of arbitration under the relevant national law. The Model Law in its original form 
is limited to international commercial arbitration. One reason for the adoption of the provision 
on arbitrability was to make it clear that the intended broad meaning of international 
commercial arbitration should not be taken as overriding restrictions on arbitrability in other 
laws.261 
 
In effect, the drafters of the Model Law leave it to the legislature of a state adopting the 
Model Law to decide on whether or not it is necessary to incorporate an addition dealing 
specifically with arbitrabilty.  Kenya and the counterpart jurisdictions have each adopted a 
different approach. 
 
As stated above,262 arbitration law in Kenya from the start of the colonial era until the 
introduction of the Arbitration Act of 1995 was based on English arbitration statutes and the 
English common law. But section 81 of the English Arbitration Act 1996, which preserves the 
                                                 
257 Article 2. 
258 See Martor et al Business Law in Africa 262. 
259 See Asouzu International Commercial Arbitration and African States 158. 
260 Article 1(5).  See also Article 34(2)(b) which provides that an award may be set aside by the court at the seat 
if it deals with matters which are non-arbitrable or is contrary to public policy under the law of the seat. 
Similarly a court may refuse enforcement of an award on the same two grounds under Article 36(1)(b), but in 
terms of the law where enforcement is sought. 
261 Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 39. 
262 See para 2.4.1 above. 
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common-law position on arbitrability in England,263 is not part of Kenyan law. The Kenyan 
position on arbitrability is reflected by section 3(1) of the 1995 Act which in relevant part 
defines an arbitration agreement to cover “all or certain disputes which have arisen or which 
may arise … in respect of a defined legal relationship whether contractual or not.”  There is 
no list of arbitrable and non-arbitrable subjects in the Act; but the above provision would 
extend arbitrability in Kenya to contracts, torts and disputes from any relationships deemed 
legal. Moreover the Act is not restricted to commercial arbitration.264 There is also no 
equivalent to Article 1(5) of the Model Law by which the Model Law does not affect other 
laws of the adopting state restricting the arbitrability of specified disputes. The avenue to 
court on arbitrability is therefore wide open and the High Court can set aside an award if it 
finds that (i) the subject matter is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of 
Kenya or (ii) the award is in conflict with public policy.265 
 
The question on the commonly encountered but complex topic of whether fraud is arbitrable 
has not been authoritatively tested or answered in Kenya. In an arbitration case which is still 
pending before the High Court of Kenya this writer as arbitrator ruled that an allegation of 
fraud raised in defence to a claim should be investigated by the tribunal together with the 
other arbitrable matters pleaded by the parties. The respondent objected by means of a court 
application which has not been strenuously pursued. The arbitration was being conducted 
under the Arbitration Rules of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (Kenya Branch), which 
confer jurisdiction on the tribunal to decide questions of bad faith, dishonesty or fraud arising 
in the dispute where the parties have submitted to arbitration under those rules.266 The 
respondent/objector has not denied the application of those rules. It is also persuasive that 
issues of fraud, bribery and civil liability arising from such conduct are arbitrable under 
modern English law.267 
 
The Nigerian position on arbitrability can be summarized as follows. Firstly, the Nigerian 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, like the Kenyan Arbitration Act, does not list arbitrable and 
non-arbitrable matters. Nevertheless, the Nigerian Act, unlike the Kenyan Act, is restricted to 
                                                 
263 See para 3.2.3 n 246 above. 
264 As pointed out above (see para 2.4.4.5(i)), the retention of the expression of “commercial relationship” in s 
3(2)(b) and 3(2)(c) appears to have been an oversight. 
265 S 35(2)(b). 
266 See Rule 16B(5). 
267 See Premium Nafta Products Ltd v Fili Shipping Company Ltd [2007] UKHL 40 paras 15 and 35; Fiona 
Trust & Holding Corporation v Yuri Privalov [2007] EWCA Civ 20 paras 16 and 23.  Criminal liability for such 
acts is of course not arbitrable (see Russell on Arbitration (23rd ed) 16 para 1-035). 
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commercial disputes268 and the statutory definitions of “arbitration” and “commercial” throw 
some light on arbitrability.269 The definition of “commercial” in the Nigerian Act differs from 
that in the footnote to Article 1 of the Model Law270 in that the words “whether contractual or 
not” are omitted.271 Nigerian commentators have deduced from this that in the Nigerian 
statute, commercial relationships mean contractual relationships only, with the result that 
disputes from tortious relationships are apparently not arbitrable.272  
 
Secondly, as case law assists the determination of arbitrability, the judicial doors on 
arbitrability in Nigeria are wide open.273 A judicial list of non-arbitrable matters, that is, 
matters that cannot validly be the subject of an arbitration agreement, was prescribed in Kano 
State Urban Development Board v Fanz Construction Co Ltd.274  
 
Thirdly, the Act does not affect any other law which provides that certain disputes are not 
arbitrable or may only be submitted to arbitration in terms of that other law.275 For example, 
industrial disputes must be resolved by conciliation and arbitration as provided for in the 
Trade Disputes Act.276 
 
Finally, public policy considerations may also enlarge the list of non-arbitrable matters.277  
 
On the question whether fraud is arbitrable in Nigeria, Idornigie argues that where there is an 
arbitration agreement and the issue of fraud arises, the proper procedure is to seek leave of the 
court to revoke the arbitration agreement and the authority of the arbitrator.278 This writer, as 
a matter of principle, does not share this view, where the fraud does not emanate from the 
                                                 
268 See the long title to the Act. 
269 In s 57(1). 
270 That definition commences: “The term ‘commercial’ should be given a wide interpretation so as to cover 
matters arising from all relationships of a commercial nature, whether contractual or not. …” 
271 S 57(1) “commercial”. 
272 See Idornigie PO “The Principle of Arbitrability in Nigeria Revisited” (2004) 21(3) Journal of International 
Arbitration 279 281, citing Ezejiofor G The Law of Arbitration in Nigeria (1997) 179. 
273 Idornigie (2004) 21(3) Journal of International Arbitration 283-284. 
274 (1990) 4 NWLR (pt 142) 1. The non-arbitrable matters are an indictment for an offence of a public nature; 
disputes arising out of an illegal contract; disputes arising under agreements that are void as being by way of 
gaming or wagering; disputes leading to a change of status, such as a divorce petition; and any agreement 
purporting to give an arbitrator the right to give judgment in rem. 
275 S 35, which corresponds to Article 1(5) of the Model Law. 
276 Cap 432 of the Laws of Nigeria (1990). See Idornigie (2004) 21(3) Journal of Internationll Arbitration 283; 
Asouzu International Commercial Arbitration and African States 168. 
277 See Idornigie (2004) 21(3) Journal of International Arbitration 283, citing the court’s power under the 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act s 48(b)(i) to set aside an award as being contrary to public policy. 
278 Idornigie (2004) 21(3) Journal of International Arbitration 284-287, citing BJ Export & Chemical Processing 
Co v Kaduna Refining and Petrochemical Co, Court of Appeal, Kaduna Division, October 2002 (unreported) in 
support of this argument. 
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arbitrator and the arbitrator is in a position to investigate and decide the issue as between the 
parties. Idornigie also disagrees with the view of the authors of Russell on Arbitration279 that 
parties are free to submit all arbitrable issues, including those involving fraud, to the tribunal 
for determination.  He argues that arbitrable issues cannot include disputes involving fraud, in 
view of the authors’ own statement that criminal responsibility is not arbitrable,280 because 
only judges and magistrates can punish criminals. Here Idornigie seems to blur the distinction 
between private-law or civil liability in tort and criminal liability. 
 
Idornigie notes that the repealed English Arbitration Act of 1950 gave the court the power, in 
the case of an arbitration agreement to refer future disputes to arbitration, to order that the 
agreement should cease to have effect if the issue arose as to whether one of the parties had 
been guilty of fraud, so that this issue could be determined by the court.281  He duly notes that 
there is no equivalent provision in the 1996 English Arbitration Act, but regards this omission 
as having no effect on the arbitrability of fraud.282 However, it is submitted that as the framers 
of the 1996 Act were alive to the incidence of fraud in arbitral matters, but omitted the 
provision on fraud contained in the old Act from the 1996 Act, it may be inferred that 
Parliament was not minded to exclude issues regarding fraud from arbitration, a view shared 
by the English courts.283 
 
Regarding Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwean Law Development Commission’s Final Report 
contained the following recommendation regarding arbitrability: 
 
“[I]n adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law as the law of Zimbabwe, it would not be confined 
to commercial arbitration as the Model law was, but would cover any subject that could 
lawfully be arbitrated upon.  (For guidance and clarification, a list of matters that definitely 
could not be the subject of arbitration would be set out.)”284 
 
The Zimbabwe Arbitration Act 1996 duly gave effect to these recommendations and 
admirably avoids doubt and uncertainty on arbitrability by first setting out what may be 
                                                 
279 Citing Russell on Arbitration (21st ed) 17. 
280 Russell on Arbitration (23rd ed) 16 para 1-035 states: “An obvious area where disputes are not arbitrable is 
criminal responsibility.” 
281 S 24(2) and Idornigie (2004) 21(3) Journal of International Arbitration 284. 
282 Idornigie (2004) 21(3) Journal of International Arbitration 284. 
283 See the English cases referred to in n 267 above. 
284 See the Zimbabwe Law Development Commission Final Report on Arbitration (Report No 31, January 1994) 
5-6; Asouzu International Commercial Arbitration and African States 149-150. 
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arbitrated under section 4(1).285  What is not capable of determination by arbitration is set out 
under section 4(2) and these matters comprise the following: 
(i) an agreement that is contrary to public policy;286  
(ii) a dispute which, in terms of any law, may not be determined by arbitration;  
(iii)  a criminal case;  
(iv)  a matrimonial cause or a matter relating to status,287 unless the High Court 
gives leave for it to be determined by arbitration;  
(v) a matter affecting the interests of a minor or an individual under a legal 
disability, unless the High Court gives leave for it to be determined by 
arbitration; and 
(vi) a matter concerning a consumer contract as defined in the Consumer Contracts 
Act unless the consumer has by separate agreement agreed thereto.288 
 
Regarding the second exception, the Act makes it clear that the fact that an enactment confers 
jurisdiction on a court to determine a matter, must not, on that ground alone, be construed as 
preventing the matter from being determined by arbitration.289 
 
It is submitted that these provisions will make it much easier to predict what is and what is not 
arbitrable in Zimbabwe. Subject to these exceptions, it seems that any dispute which the 
parties have agreed to submit to arbitration may be determined by arbitration.290 It is apparent 
from this analysis that domestic law defines the province of arbitration and each state 
determines matters that are arbitrable in accordance with its own public policy on such 
                                                 
285 S 4(1) reads: “Subject to this section, any dispute which the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration may 
be determined by arbitration.” 
286 It is suggested that the content of the agreement must be contrary to public policy.  A dispute as to whether a 
contract containing an arbitration clause is voidable because of fraud or bribery should still be arbitrable.  (See 
the English cases referred to in n 267 above.  In Soleimany v Soleimany [1999] QB 785 (CA) 797 an agreement 
between highwaymen as to how they would split the proceeds of their planned illegal activities is given as an 
example of an agreement contrary to public policy.  The court suggested that an arbitration clause in an 
agreement to split the proceeds of a joint venture to commit offences in Iran would be invalid for the same 
reason. 
287 Because of uncertainty as to the meaning of the term “status”, the SA Law Commission, after having 
consulted provisions in European national statutes on arbitrability, recommended that the term status be omitted.  
Instead the proposed Act should provide that any matter “which the parties are entitled to dispose of by 
agreement may be determined by arbitration”, unless the arbitration agreement is contrary to public policy, or 
another statute excludes arbitration.  See SA Law Commission Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for 
South Africa (July 1998) paras 2.42-2.44 and 2.50. 
288 This provision was necessary in that the Zimbabwe Act is not restricted to commercial arbitration. 
289 See s 4(3).  The position is apparently the same in Nigeria: see Asouzu International Commercial Arbitration 
and African States 155; and the SA Law Commission recommended a similar provision for South Africa (see 
para 2.50 of its Report). 
290 Arbitration Act 1996 s 4(1). 
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matters.  Therefore challenges to jurisdiction on grounds of arbitrability are inexorably linked 
to national concepts and interpretation of public policy.  
 
Obviously then it is not that an arbitral tribunal is necessarily incapable of determining the 
matters excluded from its jurisdiction on the basis of subject matter arbitrability because of 
some inherent deficiency in the arbitrator or in the arbitral process, but that from public policy 
considerations those matters are deemed to be best dealt with by the public courts as 
arbitration is a private process between parties who should not privately arbitrate matters of a 
public nature. 
 
Further it is the dearth of definition of public policy in national laws that keeps the doors of 
challenge open on what may or may not be arbitrable.  The Kenyan arbitration statute or any 
national statute that excludes “an agreement that is contrary to public policy” from arbitration 
is on the face of it clear enough in what it says, but quite imprecise on what constitutes public 
policy.  Kenya may emulate the Zimbabwean example by enumerating in the arbitration 
statute matters that are not arbitrable and the guiding principles on public policy enunciated in 
the noted Kenyan judicial decisions. 
 
Moreover as public policy varies from state to state so will the boundaries of arbitrability 
differ.  In international arbitration the interests of harmonizing the procedures governing 
international trade and commerce preponderate towards expanding the domain of what is 
arbitrable.  National laws and courts therefore have a duty to balance the domestic importance 
of reserving matters of public interest to the courts against the general public interest of 
promoting trade and commerce and the settlement of disputes.291 
 
3.2.5 Proceedings under Protest and Ex Parte Proceedings 
 
Two other pertinent avenues of challenge that affect the course of proceedings and the 
authority of the tribunal are: 
(i) proceedings “under protest”, and 
(ii) ex parte proceedings. 
 
                                                 
291 Mitsubishi Motors Corp v Soler Chrysler Plymouth Inc 473 US 614, (1985). The US Supreme Court, by a 
majority of five to three, decided that antitrust issues arising out of international commercial contracts were 
arbitrable under the Federal Arbitration Act. 
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3.2.5.1 Proceedings “Under Protest” 
 
A party may be so opposed to any form of proceedings by arbitral tribunal or court that he 
may neither respond to arbitral notices nor court summons to participate in either process. But 
as sometimes happens he may do so “under protest”. Boycott of proceedings is ill-advised and 
may prove unrewarding as in practice the tribunal can proceed in the absence of the 
boycotting party to his likely detriment.292 To the extent that the protest or boycott is a 
challenge to the arbitral tribunal and a threat to the process it must be dealt with swiftly and 
effectively in order not to derail, subvert or unduly delay the proceedings. Neither the 
UNCITRAL Model Law nor the Kenyan statute provides guidance for proceedings under 
protest.293 Because of this, a party who files a notice of protest and refuses to participate in the 
proceedings is in no better position than the boycotter as the effect of such notice does not 
prevent the proceedings from continuing to the making of an award. An otherwise meritorious 
case may be lost by a party’s total abstention.  The better approach, it seems, is to file the 
protest notice and cause the merits of the protest to be considered as expeditiously as possible 
and obtain an interim ruling that may, on persuasive grounds, be reviewed by the court.294 It is 
submitted that a demonstrably perverse ruling or a deliberate or flagrant misapplication of law 
by the tribunal and the likelihood of serious or grave prejudice could constitute such grounds. 
 
It seems that the opportunity for such protests is also arguably afforded in some circumstances 
by the provisions of Article 4 of the Model Law and the corresponding provisions of the 
national statutes. Article 4 provides for an implied waiver of the right to object. This may 
occur where a party, while aware that a non-mandatory provision of the Model Law or a 
requirement under the arbitration agreement has not been complied with, proceeds with the 
arbitration without objecting timeously to the non-compliance. The legislative history of 
Article 4 suggests that the waiver will be implied for (i) non-compliance with an arbitration 
agreement or non-mandatory provisions of the arbitration law or, (ii) in situations where the 
waiving party knew of the non-compliance, (iii) the failure to object within any time limit 
provided by the law or arbitration agreement and without undue delay and, (iv) only if, 
                                                 
292 See Letco v Liberia and the Texaco, British Petroleum and Liamco arbitrations referred to by Redfern & 
Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 259 and 103-104. 
293 It is arguable whether Article 4 of the Model Law (“Waiver of right to object”) and the corresponding 
provisions in the African statutes (such as s 5 of the Kenyan statute) indirectly raise the need for such protests. 
294 In an arbitration “under protest” conducted in Uganda by this writer, the protester failed to disclose grounds 
of protest and the tribunal proceeded with the arbitration to the making of an award that was upheld by the High 
Court of Uganda. 
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without the objection, a party proceeds with the arbitration.295 It may be noted further that 
certain mandatory provisions such as Article 7 relating to the inference of a written arbitration 
agreement from exchange of statements of claim and defence, and Article 16(2) requiring 
pleas as to jurisdiction to be raised before the submissions of the defence statement, also 
create opportunity for waiver to be implied in the event of failure to object. However, to 
create a balance between the need to deal with issues of waiver, protests and challenges on the 
one hand and the corresponding need to proceed expeditiously with the arbitration, Article 
25(c) provides that where a party fails to appear at a hearing or to produce documentary 
evidence, the arbitral tribunal may, unless the parties have agreed to the contrary, continue 
with the proceedings and make an award on the evidence presented. Therefore the default 
proceedings of Article 25 of the Model Law and the corresponding national statutory 
provisions should promote and facilitate the reduction of unmerited challenges and delaying 
tactics in appropriate circumstances.  
 
To the pertinent question as to what other remedy does a party have, who is adversely affected 
by a partial negative jurisdictional finding by the arbitrator as a preliminary question, the 
Model Law296 and the Kenyan statute297 are in pari materia that a positive finding may be 
reviewed but silent on a negative finding as to jurisdiction. Article 16(3) of the Zimbabwe 
statute allows a party within 30 days of receiving notice of a ruling on a plea that the tribunal 
does not have jurisdiction298 to request the High Court to decide the matter with no right of 
appeal thereafter. Section 12(4) of the Nigerian statute similarly allows the tribunal to rule on 
such pleas either as a preliminary question or in an award on the merits but, “such ruling shall 
be final and binding”. It seems therefore that under the Zimbabwean statute a negative ruling 
on jurisdiction is reviewable but not so under the Nigerian statute. 
 
In this writer’s view, in a jurisdiction such as Kenya, a tribunal that rules that it has no 
jurisdiction becomes functus officio and the question of jurisdiction thereafter ceases to be 
solely an arbitral issue. An aggrieved claimant in such a situation would need legal advice on 
the particular facts and merits of his case and whether a judicial remedy might be available. 
 
The legislative history of the Model Law Article 16(3) reveals the acknowledgement that the 
law does not provide for court review of a finding by the arbitral tribunal that it lacks 
                                                 
295 Holtzman & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 196-200. 
296 Article 16(3). 
297 S 17(1)(5) and (6). 
298 Pursuant to Article 16(2) 
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jurisdiction; that Article 16(3) refers only to preliminary rulings that the tribunal possesses 
jurisdiction and Article 34 presupposes such a finding in the final award; that a direct review 
of the tribunal’s finding that it lacked jurisdiction was not a matter governed by the Model 
Law but by the general law on arbitration or civil procedure; that while the tribunal’s negative 
finding would not necessarily settle the question whether the substantive claim was to be 
decided by a court or by an arbitral tribunal, the UNCITRAL Commission’s adopted view 
was that such a decision was final as to the arbitrator who made the ruling as arbitrators could 
not be compelled to continue the arbitration.299 This writer shares these views. 
 
Research on the meaning and purpose of “under protest” shows that the phrase has no distinct 
meaning and amounts to nothing unless explained by the proceedings and circumstances.300 In 
court proceedings an appearance to a writ “under protest” is a situation where a party denies 
the obligation to appear at all because objection is taken to the jurisdiction of the court.  A 
party who makes payment under protest thereby signifies his reservation of the right to 
taxation, notwithstanding the payment.301 If this rationale is applied to arbitration practice it 
would mean reservation of the right to raise the objection to jurisdiction at a later stage.  It 
would be prudent to do so earlier rather than later if the applicable law so permits. 
 
3.2.5.2 “Ex Parte” Proceedings302 
 
A proceeding “Under protest” is distinguishable from an “ex parte proceeding”. A protesting 
party may still participate in the proceedings whereas in “ex parte” proceedings the defaulting 
party is absent and does not participate in the proceedings.  The absence of a defaulting party 
can and does place the arbitral tribunal in a quandary in view of the principles of natural 
justice and of equal treatment of the parties that enjoin the tribunal to accord each party an 
opportunity to be heard and to present or defend its case.  The UNCITRAL Model Law and 
national arbitration statutes are not explicit on ex parte proceedings although Article 25(b) 
and (c) in effect authorize such proceedings. Some useful guidance for domestic arbitrators is 
                                                 
299 Holzman & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 486 – 487. 
300 Words and Phrases Legally Defined: Re Massey (1845) 8 Beav 458, 462 per Langdale MR. 
301 Greenberg D Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary (2012). 
302 The term “ex parte” refers to proceedings conducted with one party present but in the absence of an opposing 
or boycotting party (see Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 259 para 5-55). An “ex parte 
application”, strictly speaking, is one in which notice was not in fact given to the other party. The wider meaning 
of the term given to it by Redfern & Hunter is in common use in Kenya. The narrower technical interpretation of 
the term would not cover the situation where a party had due notice but chose to boycott the proceedings. 
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available from the experience of international arbitrations.303 An arbitrator’s mission is to 
determine the dispute submitted to him. The tribunal has no authority to issue an award akin 
to a default judgment in a common-law state court where the award is based purely on the 
default.304 
 
Therefore if an arbitral respondent fails to attend the hearing or to present his case the tribunal 
is nevertheless obliged to consider the merits and determine the substance of the dispute.  
How does the tribunal do so in the absence of a defaulting party? Hunter offers good 
counseling on the problem with which this writer is in respectful agreement: 
 
“Once it becomes clear that a respondent does not propose to appear, the tribunal will 
normally direct that the claimant’s submissions and the evidence are to be placed before it in 
written form. Then it will be justified in holding only a brief ex parte hearing to raise any 
questions. 
 
The tribunal has no duty to act as advocate for any party who has elected not to appear, but it 
must examine the merits of the argument of law and fact and it should proceed on the basis 
that the claimant must prove his case to the satisfaction of the tribunal so that a reasoned 
determination of the issues can be made.”305 
 
It is also important that the defaulting respondent receives notice of the ex parte hearing and 
that the respondent receives the written submissions of the claimant if these are provided in 
advance of the hearing. 
 
An experienced national court in an African common law tradition may be expected to take 
the dimmest view of an arbitral tribunal that proceeds ex parte in the absence of strict 
compliance with the default provisions of the governing statute. For this reason and in 
anticipation of a likely appeal from an ex parte award it will be prudent for the tribunal to 
recite the full facts and circumstances that justified the ex parte proceedings.  There must be 
the not unreasonable presumption that the party who has in effect boycotted the proceedings 
will more than likely challenge its outcome and resist the enforcement of the award. 
 
                                                 
303 For example, Bernini G ” Preventing Delay and Disruption in Arbitration” Working Group ICCA Congress 
Series No 5, (1990) 17.  
304 Compare the Kenya Arbitration Act s 26(d) and Zimbabwe’s Arbitration Act First Schedule Article 25(d). 
305 Hunter M “The Procedural Powers of Arbitrators under the English 1996 Act,” (1997) 13 Arbitration 
International 345 359. 
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Reference has been made to UNCITRAL Model Law Article 25(b) and (c), which while 
allowing the defaulting party to show sufficient cause for failing to communicate a claim or 
defence statement, or appear or produce documentary evidence, make it clear that the tribunal 
may proceed and make an award on the available evidence. It seems however that the danger 
of review arises not so much from the reasons which a defaulting party may have had for the 
default, but through the arbitrator failing to follow the letter of the applicable rules on default, 
such as, giving proper notice of the proceedings or providing a respondent with a copy of the 
claimant’s written submissions and so affording the opportunity to reply. These provisions 
and requirements of due process do not compel an arbitrator to bend over backwards to oblige 
a blatantly uncooperative party but to ensure equal treatment and a fair outcome as to avoid 
undeserving challenges. 
 
3.2.6 Finality of Arbitral Decisions306 
 
The arbitral tribunal’s decision on the merits of a dispute is termed an award, which is 
distinguishable from a procedural ruling by the tribunal.307 “Finality” means there is no right 
of appeal to the courts even where it appears that the tribunal’s award might be incorrect on 
the merits.308 
 
The question as to who should have the final say in arbitration, arbitrator or judge, is 
troublesome but determinable once it is appreciated that the issue is not about ability or 
capability of arbitrator or judge but about enhancing the capacity of the arbitral process and 
tribunal to achieve a final solution. This writer’s view is that, subject to the noted essential 
qualifications and safeguards of public policy and the fact that the arbitrator is appointed by 
private parties and not the state, the arbitrator should finalise all matters in the dispute within 
the arbitral mandate; but as state courts cannot be ousted from public disputes or private 
disputes with public consequences there is, to that extent, and in relation to matters 
                                                 
306 On finality of awards arbitration legislation and judicial decisions differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The 
Kenya Court of Appeal in Kenya Shell Limited v Kobil Petroleum Limited Civ App. No NAI 57 of 2006 upheld a 
right of appeal from the High Court to the Appellate Court in an arbitral matter because the Kenyan Arbitration 
Act 1995 does not expressly proscribe the right. In contrast see Dundas H “The Finality of Arbitration Awards 
and the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal” in (2007) 73 Arbitration 1 in which the point is stressed that where 
the English Arbitration Act 1996 provides, as it does in 18 places, that the decision of a first instance judge shall 
be final, then “final” means “FINAL”. 
307 The formalities for making an award do not apply to a procedural ruling and the status of an award differs 
from that of a procedural ruling. 
308 Jurisdictions differ in the statutory provisions governing appeal from an arbitrator’s decision or award. There 
is, for example, no automatic right of appeal from an arbitral award in Nigeria or South Africa but there is a 
limited right of appeal by agreement of the parties on points of law in Kenya in arbitration law and practice. 
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specifically excluded from arbitrability, room for judicial intervention in arbitration; but that, 
such intervention ought to be exceptional, residual and minimal. While noting that an arbitral 
decision on jurisdiction may not be final in jurisdictions like Kenya and Zimbabwe, it is 
possible that the finality of such decisions in the Nigerian context may prove more preferable 
for users of arbitration who seek an end to disputation so that they can continue with their 
lives and businesses. 
 
3.2.7 Conclusion 
 
Arbitrators can deal effectively with challenges to the arbitral jurisdiction by maintaining a 
degree of firmness in the management of the arbitral process and the conduct of the 
proceedings.  Every challenge has to be considered. Indeed a determination as to whether or 
not a challenge is merited cannot be made without due consideration of the basis of the 
challenge. Meritorious challenges should not, in general, be difficult to rule upon. Unmerited 
challenges require toughness to dispose of ably and swiftly.  Thereafter there is nothing to 
fear if parties choose to have further recourse to court. National arbitration legislation 
recognizes the right of parties to refer questions of law309 and appeals310 to the court.  The 
Model Law also recognizes and endorses the limited and or concurrent role of the courts.311 
 
3.3 The Need for Effective Powers for the Arbitral Tribunal  
 
3.3.1 Classification and Sources of the Arbitral Tribunal’s Procedural Powers 
 
An arbitrator requires substantial procedural powers, conferring a wide procedural discretion 
on the arbitrator, so that where the parties’ agreement is silent, the arbitrator can use 
appropriate procedures to determine the dispute without unnecessary delay and expense, 
while still doing justice between the parties. Before starting to classify the arbitrator’s powers 
and to identify their sources, it is first helpful to distinguish between the arbitrator’s powers 
and the arbitrator’s duties.  “Duties” define the minimum which the arbitrator must do,312 
whereas “powers” define the maximum which he can require the parties to do.313 As powers 
                                                 
309 Kenyan Arbitration Act 1995 s 39(a). 
310 Kenyan Arbitration Act 1995 39(b) and 39(2). 
311 See for example Articles 6, 9 and 16(3). 
312 Certain aspects of these duties are discussed in para 3.3.4 below. 
313 See Mustill & Boyd Commercial Arbitration 291.  There may nevertheless be a degree of overlap between 
powers and duties Russell on Arbitration (23rd ed) para 4-066 mentions as an example that the arbitrator has both 
the power and the duty to make an award. 
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relate to what an arbitrator can or may do, they are discretionary. The extent of an arbitrator’s 
powers therefore depends on the extent of his discretion.314 A further important practical issue 
is whether effective sanctions are available if a party fails to comply with orders given by an 
arbitrator in the legitimate exercise of his procedural powers. 
 
As to the possible extent of the arbitrator’s discretion he has been described by the English 
judge Lord Diplock as a master of the procedure: 
 
“By appointing a sole arbitrator pursuant to a private arbitration agreement which does not 
specify expressly or by reference any particular rules, the parties make the arbitrator a master 
of the procedure to be followed in the arbitration.  Apart from a few statutory requirements … 
he has a complete discretion to determine how the arbitration is to be conducted … so long as 
the procedure he adopts does not offend the rules of natural justice.”315  
 
It will however appear from the discussion below that this alluring reference to the arbitrator 
as “master of the procedure” should not be taken at face value. The arbitrator’s powers are 
subject to statutory limitations, which in modern arbitration statutes are aimed at ensuring that 
the procedure followed by the arbitrator is fair.316 It will also be shown that a provision in 
arbitration rules in use in Kenya317 to the effect that the arbitral tribunal can exercise its 
powers in “its absolute and unfettered discretion” is not only exaggerated but is potentially 
misleading.318 
 
Some works on arbitration classify the arbitrator’s powers with reference to their source, 
distinguishing between powers conferred by the parties and powers conferred by operation of 
law.319 Powers conferred by the parties may be conferred directly by an express provision to 
that effect in their arbitration agreement, or indirectly by choosing a set of arbitration rules, 
                                                 
314 See Mustill & Boyd Commercial Arbitration 292. 
315 Bremer Vulkan Schiffban and Maschinenfabrik v South India Shipping Corporation Ltd [1982] AC 909 at 
985; see also Carlisle Place Investments Ltd v Wimpey Construction (UK) Ltd 15 BLR 109 QB 1980 at 116. 
316 See the UNCITRAL Model Law Articles 18 and 24 discussed in the text below. 
317 See The Arbitration Rules of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (Kenya Branch) (June 1998) rule 16A.  
Hereafter these rules are referred to as “the Kenya Branch Rules”. 
318 Compare the pre-1996 Arbitration Rules of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (1988 edition) in England 
Article 5.1: “In the absence of procedural rules agreed by the parties or contained herein, the Arbitrator shall 
have the widest discretion allowed by law to ensure the just, expeditious, economical and final determination of 
the dispute.”  This rule makes the “widest” discretion enjoyed by the arbitrator subject to three express 
restrictions: those imposed by the parties, those imposed by the rules and those imposed by mandatory rules of 
law. 
319 See Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration paras 5-04 and 5-07.  Compare Russell on 
Arbitration para 4-067 and para 4-068, who classify the second category as powers conferred by statute. 
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which confer procedural powers on the arbitrator.320  Powers are more likely to be conferred 
directly where the arbitration agreement is drawn up after the dispute has arisen.  The parties 
are then able to define the arbitrator’s powers more precisely, having regard to the needs of 
the particular dispute, than is otherwise practical.  In a typical arbitration clause in a contract, 
the powers will be conferred indirectly, with reference to a specified set of rules.321 
 
Regarding the interaction between the arbitration agreement and the applicable arbitration 
law, the primary source of the arbitrator’s powers is the arbitration agreement, which is 
subject to the restrictions imposed by the applicable law.322 To the extent that the agreement is 
silent, the arbitrator’s powers conferred directly or indirectly in that agreement will be 
supplemented by the powers conferred by the regulatory provisions of the applicable 
arbitration statute.323  
 
Powers conferred by the arbitration agreement or by statute may be general or specific.  A 
good example of a general power is that conferred by Article 19(2) of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law, whereby subject to the parties’ agreement and the mandatory provisions of the Model 
Law,324 the arbitral tribunal may “conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers 
appropriate …”.  General powers are conferred in general terms, whereas specific powers are 
to be exercised for specified purposes.325  Even where the general power purports to confer a 
very wide discretion, this discretion is certainly not absolute or unfettered.326 It is appropriate 
in discussing the powers of the arbitral tribunal not to ignore the related duties of the 
tribunal.327 An important duty is imposed by Article 18 requiring the tribunal to treat the 
parties with equality and for each to be given a “full opportunity” to present its case. “Full 
opportunity” derives from Article 15 of the UNCITRAL Rules of 1976 and is understood to 
                                                 
320 See Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration paras 5-05 and 5-06. 
321 For example, the clause recommended by UNCITRAL in the context of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
provides: “Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or the breach, termination 
or invalidity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as at 
present in force.” 
322 See Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration para 5-03 and the discussion of the mandatory 
provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law below.  
323 Mustill & Boyd Commercial Arbitration 292 refer in this context to “implied” powers, because the English 
Arbitration Act of 1950 s 12(1), dealing with the arbitrator’s powers to conduct the proceedings was prefaced by 
the words “Unless a contrary intention is expressed therein, every arbitration agreement shall … be deemed to 
contain a provision …”.  The statutory powers were therefore deemed to be included in the arbitration 
agreement, unless excluded or restricted by the parties. 
324 Particularly Articles 18 and 24(2) and (3).  See further n 341 below. 
325 A good example is provided by s 41(3) of the English Arbitration Act of 1996, concerning the arbitral 
tribunal’s power to dismiss a claim for want of prosecution, where the extent of the tribunal’s discretion is 
carefully circumscribed.  The similar power in the Kenyan Arbitration Act of 1995 s 26(d), while still clearly 
specifying the purpose of the power, is less specific regarding the restrictions on the tribunal’s discretion. 
326 See the discussion below. 
327 A more detailed discussion of the arbitrator’s duties in this context appears in para 3.3.4 below. 
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be subject to the requirement of reasonableness.328 Another procedural duty is imposed by 
Article 24(2) of the Model Law, which requires the tribunal to give the parties sufficient 
advance notice of any hearing. 
 
As will appear from the discussion below,329 modern arbitration statutes typically confer a 
general power, supplemented by a few specific powers.330  Arbitration Rules will usually also 
confer a general power, supplemented by more detailed specific powers than those found in 
legislation.331 Problems will occur in a situation where there is no general power, either in the 
arbitration agreement or in the law, and the question arises whether or not the arbitrator has a 
particular power.332  Where there is only provision for specific powers and the particular 
power is not listed, it will be difficult to imply such a power in the absence of a general 
provision.   As a result an arbitrator, under South African law, has no power to order security 
for costs, unless this power is conferred by the arbitration agreement.  Prior to s 38(3) of the 
Arbitration Act of 1996, the position was the same in England, notwithstanding the general 
power, in section 12(1) of the 1950 Act.333   
 
The distinction between private and public powers is also pertinent to arbitration law and 
practice. An arbitrator exercises private powers334 in consonance with the private nature of 
consensual arbitration. To the extent that the arbitration agreement is silent, some of the 
arbitrator’s powers are conferred by the relevant national arbitration statute, which is a public 
                                                 
328 Article 18 is described as “a key element of the ‘Magna Carta of Arbitral Procedure’”; see the SA Law 
Commission’s Report Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South Africa (July 1998) para 2.192 and 
Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 550-551. 
329 See para 3.3.2. 
330 In the UNCITRAL Model Law the specific procedural powers are contained in Articles 22, 23(2), 24(1), 25, 
26 and 27.  The English Arbitration Act of 1996 confers a general power in s 34(1), with examples of what it 
encompasses in s 34(2).  Specific powers are contained, for example, in s 37, 38 and 41. 
331 See, for example, the LCIA Arbitration Rules (1998) which have a general power in article 14.2 and specific 
powers in article 22, the Kenya Branch Rules, rules 16A-16D and the Arbitration Rules of the Chartered Institute 
of Arbitrators Articles 6.1 and 7.  See further the discussion in para 3.3.3 below. 
332 See s 14(1) of the South African Arbitration Act of 1965 which contains a fairly lengthy list of specific 
powers, but no general power.  Even the English Arbitration Act of 1950 s 12(1) contained a general power by 
requiring the parties to “do all other things which during the proceedings … the arbitrator … may require”. 
333 See Mustill & Boyd Commercial Arbitration 335-336. 
334 It was held in the South African case of Total Support Management (Pty) Ltd v Diversified Health Systems 
(SA) (Pty) Ltd 2002 (4) SA 661 (SCA) paras 24-25 that arbitration did not fall within the purview of 
“administrative action” but arose from the exercise of private (rather than public) powers; and that the hallmark 
of arbitration was that it was an adjudication flowing from the parties’ consent to the arbitration agreement. The 
parties defined the powers of the arbitrator and were equally free to modify or withdraw that power at any time 
by way of further agreement. Furthermore, an arbitration was seen as a form of private adjudication, with the 
result that the function of the arbitrator was not administrative but judicial in nature and decisions made in the 
exercise of judicial functions did not amount to administrative action. See also Lufuno Mphaphuli & Associates 
(Pty) Ltd v Andrews [2009] ZACC 6; 2009 4 SA 7 (CC) para 198. 
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instrument. Even so, whether drawn from a statute or an arbitration agreement, the powers of 
an arbitrator in a consensual arbitration remain private. 
 
Although both have an adjudicative function, the powers of an arbitrator in a consensual 
arbitration differ from those of a judge. The powers of an arbitrator are conferred directly or 
indirectly by the parties’ agreement, whereas the powers of a judge are conferred by the 
state.335 Judges have formidable coercive powers which they may use to ensure compliance 
with their orders. Parties cannot confer on an arbitrator the same coercive powers over 
persons and property as are conferred by the state on judges.336 Moreover, the arbitrator’s 
powers are limited to the parties to the agreement and the arbitrator cannot order a non-party 
to attend a hearing to give evidence or to produce documents. Arbitration legislation may 
alleviate this problem in the context of the arbitrator’s procedural powers either by conferring 
a power directly on an arbitrator which he would not otherwise have,337 or indirectly, by 
providing court support for the arbitration process.338 The court may, for example, assist with 
the production of evidence in the arbitration proceedings.339 
 
It is perhaps appropriate at this stage to mention that improvements in legislation and 
arbitration rules can assist considerably in expanding and clarifying the arbitrator’s powers, 
thereby facilitating the arbitral process and so curbing unmerited interruptions and tactical 
delays. The provisions of the Model Law Article 19(1) and 19(2) and the equivalent 
provisions of the Kenyan and the compatible African national statutes340 provide the 
necessary foundation. Article 19(1) stresses the principle of party autonomy: subject to the 
mandatory provisions of the Model Law341 the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be 
                                                 
335 See Mustill & Boyd Commercial Arbitration 292; Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 
235-236. 
336 Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 236; Mustill & Boyd Commercial Arbitration 292. 
337 See, for example, the English Arbitration Act s 38(5) regarding the power to administer oaths to witnesses 
and Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 236.  The existence of wide statutory procedural 
powers (as in Article 19(2) of the Model Law, referred to above) also makes it less likely that the issue of gaps in 
an arbitrator’s procedural powers will cause serious difficulties during arbitration proceedings. 
338 See Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 236. 
339 See the UNCITRAL Model Law Article 27 and the English Arbitration Act of 1996 s 43.  Another example is 
found in the English Arbitration Act s 42, which empowers the court to order compliance with a peremptory 
order made by the arbitrator.  Non-compliance with the court order would expose the party concerned to the 
penalties available for contempt of court. The court’s powers of support in the context of interim measures and 
the enforcement of the arbitral award in the absence of voluntary compliance are discussed in paras 3.5 and 3.6 
below. 
340 The Kenyan Arbitration Act s 20, the Zimbabwean Arbitration Act First Schedule Article 19 and the Nigerian 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act s 15.  See also para 2.4.4.5(vii) above. 
341 The mandatory provisions are Articles 18, 23(1), 24(1) (2nd sentence) (2) and (3), 27, 30(2), 31(1), (3) and (4), 
32 and 33(1)(a), (2), (4) and (5): see Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 583.  In the 
context of the arbitrator’s procedural powers, the mandatory provisions are Articles 18 (equal treatment of 
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followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting the proceedings. In the absence of such 
agreement, and subject to the same mandatory provisions, Article 19(2) gives the arbitral 
tribunal the general power to conduct the proceedings in such manner as it considers 
appropriate. This general power includes the power to decide on the admissibility, relevance 
and weight of any evidence (unless the parties have agreed otherwise).342 
 
The inference is that on all procedural points or matters on which the parties agree, their 
agreement will be given effect under Article 19(1) as long as it does not conflict with a 
mandatory provision. On other matters, the arbitrators have the discretion under Article 19(2) 
to conduct the arbitration as they consider appropriate. As there appears however to be no 
limitation on when the parties could agree on a procedural point, it can be inferred that the 
freedom of the parties to agree on the procedure is a continuing one.343 Further, the “power 
conferred upon the arbitral tribunal” in Article 19(2)344 is to be understood to be non-
mandatory and as referring to the power conferred by the Model Law itself in the first 
sentence of paragraph 2 and not the power conferred by the parties’ agreement under 
paragraph 1.345 This again emphasizes that the tribunal’s statutory powers are subject to the 
parties’ agreement. 
 
As under some legal systems the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of evidence 
are matters of substantive law346 it may be thought that Article 19 might conflict with Article 
28 which allows the parties, or in default, the arbitral tribunal, to choose the substantive law 
to govern the dispute. It is said however that, as a matter of interpretation, the specific 
provision in Article 19(2) is not affected by Article 28 and the former should prevail over the 
general provision in Article 28.347 Further, as a matter of policy it is deemed desirable for 
arbitration to avoid the application of technical rules of evidence where possible.348 
                                                                                                                                                        
parties), 23(1) (exchange of statements of claim and defence) and 24(1) (2nd sentence), (2) and (3) (hearings and 
written proceedings). 
342 See further para 3.3.3.2 below. 
343 A proposal for the procedural agreement to be reached before the first or sole arbitrator is appointed was 
rejected by the UNCITRAL Working Group; see Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 
565-566. 
344 See the text to n 342 above. 
345 Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 566. 
346 Even in South Africa which has a common-law basis for its law of evidence, the so-called parol evidence rule 
is actually a rule of substantive law. See Schwikkard PJ & Van der Merwe SE Principles of Evidence 3rd ed 
(2009) para 4.6.1 at 38). 
347 Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 567. 
348 Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 567.  Technical rules of evidence would exclude 
those which impact on a party’s right to a fair hearing.  Compare the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in 
International Commercial Arbitration (1999) Article 9(2), which provides guidance on how a discretionary 
power like that contained in Article 19(2) of the Model Law should be exercised.  Evidence should be excluded, 
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As this discussion is concerned with the procedural powers of the arbitral tribunal, the 
distinction between procedural powers349 and the specific powers conferred by the Model 
Law under Article 17 and the national statutes relating to the grant of interim measures and 
the power of the tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction under Article 16 must be borne in 
mind.350 
 
The alluring statement by Lord Diplock in Bremer Vulkan, quoted above,351 must not be taken 
at face value. Firstly, because the mere omission by the parties, whether deliberate or 
inadvertent, to specify in their arbitration agreement any particular rules does not thereby 
translate into conferment of arbitral powers an arbitrator does not otherwise have and cannot 
assume, such as the power to grant security for costs.352  This is because the powers of an 
arbitrator from an arbitration agreement are conferred by the parties expressly or impliedly 
but not by their default.  Secondly, an arbitral discretion can hardly be deemed “complete” in 
the sense of enabling an arbitrator to conduct the proceedings at will where, in practice, such 
discretion is circumscribed by statutory requirements, however few these may be in older 
legislation, and the hallowed precepts of natural justice intended to ensure due process.353  
Indeed the passage is imbued with the lofty resonance in which many English judicial dicta 
are etched; but stripped to its basic elements it can be no authority, especially outside pre-
1996 England, for an arbitrator to assume powers not conferred by the parties or the law or to 
exercise a non-existent unfettered or absolute discretion. 
 
An example of the modern position is provided by the 1998 LCIA Arbitration Rules. While 
these rules confer on the tribunal “the widest discretion” allowed by law to decide on the 
conduct of the proceedings,354 that power is subject not only to statutory limitations,355 but 
                                                                                                                                                        
for example, where it is subject to legal professional privilege or on the basis of compelling considerations of 
fairness (Article 9(2)(b) and (g)). 
349 Besides Article 19, see also Articles 22, 23(2), 24(1), 25, 26 and 27. 
350 The arbitrator’s power to rule on his own jurisdiction is discussed in para 3.2 above and the power to grant 
interim measures is discussed in para 3.5 below.  An order for interim measures regarding security for costs is 
arguably both conservatory and procedural. The classification of these powers and the distinctions between them 
are sometimes blurred by the drafters of legislation or dealt with in the same section as in s 38 of the 1996 
English Arbitration Act. S 41(6) of that Act gives the tribunal a sanction against a claimant’s failure to comply 
with a peremptory order for security for costs, by making an award dismissing the claim, thereby affecting the 
claimant’s substantive rights. In the context of this study, the distinctions are less significant as the focus of the 
dissertation is ultimately on the adequacy or otherwise of the totality of the powers exercisable by the arbitral 
tribunal to conduct the arbitration effectively, so as to deliver an enforceable award. 
351 See the text to n 315 above. 
352 See n 333 above regarding the arbitrator’s power to award security for costs in older legislation. 
353 See Mustill & Boyd Commercial Arbitration 288 and 290 regarding these principles. 
354 See article 14.2. 
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also to the agreement of the parties, and the general duties of the arbitral tribunal in the rules 
regarding due process and the avoidance of unnecessary delay and expense.356 A further 
deliberate fetter is the requirement that the tribunal must give the parties a reasonable 
opportunity to state their views on the matter, before exercising its specific procedural 
powers.357  
 
In the light of the discussion above perhaps Lord Diplock’s dictum can be reformulated as 
follows: 
 
“By appointing a sole arbitrator pursuant to a private arbitration agreement which does not 
specify expressly or by reference any particular rules, or where the parties fail to agree on the 
procedure for conducting the arbitration, the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in 
such manner it considers appropriate in the circumstances, subject to the provisions of the 
relevant arbitration law and the rules of natural justice.” 
 
The problem of the adequacy or otherwise of arbitral powers manifests itself in various ways. 
For example, the powers may be inadequately defined in legislation and rules resulting in 
uncertainty in their application. The same may be said of the corrective measure of providing 
wide discretionary powers without guidance as to their exercise.358 Practitioners may have 
also encountered occasions in practice when an arbitrator yields to the temptation to conduct 
the arbitration like “privatized litigation” by dealing with procedural issues in the same way 
as a judge. Another variation occurs when a timid arbitrator compounds the problem 
regarding the adequacy of the arbitrator’s procedural powers by yielding ground too readily to 
lawyers who would control and dominate the proceedings. The danger of the arbitrator 
exercising procedural powers in an arbitrary way resulting in procedural unfairness and the 
inevitable challenge of the award must moreover be distinguished from the assumption of 
powers by the arbitrator that he may not have.359  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
355 In a Model Law jurisdiction, those restrictions are contained in Articles 18 and 24.  The LCIA Rules are 
intended for use in an international commercial arbitration in any jurisdiction, with London as the default option 
(see article 16(1)). 
356 The general duties, based on those in the English Arbitration Act, s 33, are contained in article 14.1. 
357 See the introduction to article 22.1. 
358 See Park WW “Arbitration’s Protean Nature: The Value of Rules and the Risks of Discretion” (2003) 19 
Arbitration International 279 281-282 and see further para 3.3.3 below at n 413. 
359 Compare Lord Steyn in Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v Impregilo SpA [2005] UKHL 43 para 24 
regarding s 68(2)(b) of the English Arbitration Act of 1996: “This required the courts below to address the 
question whether the tribunal purported to exercise a power which it did not have or whether it erroneously 
exercised a power that it did have.” 
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Opinions may differ among practitioners on whether or not the powers available to an arbitral 
tribunal are indeed adequate for conducting the arbitration effectively from beginning to 
end.360 This discussion is therefore aimed at the investigation of the extent of the procedural 
powers of the arbitrator and the effectiveness of those powers for performing the arbitral 
function. Adequate powers of necessity include the ability to impose effective sanctions in the 
event of non-compliance by a party with the arbitrator’s procedural directions. 
 
Despite the notion that by virtue of the arbitration agreement an arbitrator may possess wider 
powers than a judge, the spate of enforceable sanctions available to a judge but not to an 
arbitrator, tend to diminish arbitral authority with a discernable impact on the effectiveness of 
the arbitral function.361 If this premise is accepted, then perhaps the arbitrator’s problem 
through the perceived diminution of his authority may well be the consequence of inadequate 
coercive sanctions rather than the absence of functional powers.362  
 
In the following paragraphs the powers conferred on the arbitrator by statute and institutional 
rules will be discussed in greater detail, including powers relating to expedited proceedings 
and the reception of evidence. The adequacy of the arbitrator’s powers will then be assessed 
against the background of his duties. This will be followed by a proposal for the provision of 
enhanced coercive sanctions. 
 
3.3.2 Powers Conferred by Law 
 
It has been stated that arbitral powers can also be drawn from law or operation of law.  In this 
way national statutes supplement the powers of the arbitral tribunal which the national courts 
are obliged to recognize and enforce. Statutory arbitral powers are in Kenya, Nigeria and 
Zimbabwe granted by the legislatures of those countries. In all significant respects the powers 
granted to the arbitral tribunal by these legislatures are akin to those set out in the 
UNCITRAL Model Law. The Model Law, while defining and restricting the extent of court 
intervention in arbitration,363 reinforces the authority of the arbitral tribunal by granting it 
power, in the absence of agreement by the parties, to conduct the arbitration in such manner 
                                                 
360 Compare Jarvin S “The Sources and Limits of the Arbitrator’s Powers” in Contemporary Problems in 
International Arbitration (1986) 50. 
361 Compare Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration para 5-07, who state that the parties cannot 
confer on the arbitral tribunal the coercive powers that the state can confer on a national court. 
362 When the writer discussed this problem with Lord Mustill (London, June 2006) he expressed the confident 
view that arbitrators, under improved legislation, now have all the powers they probably need to do the work if 
only they would use them fully and effectively. 
363 Article 5. 
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as it considers appropriate including the power to determine the admissibility, relevance, 
materiality and weight of any evidence.364 The Model Law additionally confers powers on the 
tribunal, in default of agreement by the parties, to determine the place of arbitration and 
meetings for hearing witnesses, experts and parties, or for inspection of goods, property or 
documents365 and the language of the arbitration.366 These provisions, with slight modification 
of wording, are replicated in the national arbitration laws of Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe.367 
 
Although South Africa has not yet adopted the Model Law the powers exercisable by an 
arbitration tribunal granted by the Arbitration Act of 1965 under section 14(1) are 
illustrative.368 These are specific powers and are exercisable subject to their exclusion or 
modification by the parties. Some of these powers are exercised only on application of a 
party, for example, the power to order discovery of documents or delivery of pleadings.369 
Other powers may be exercised on the tribunal’s own initiative, for example the power to 
determine the time and place of hearings, and subject to any legal objection, examine the 
parties and witnesses and require them to produce documents or things within their possession 
or power, or to inspect any goods or property involved in the reference370 One particular 
power, to receive evidence on affidavit, may only be exercised with the consent of the parties 
or an order of court.371 The main problem caused by the absence of a general statutory power 
as omitted in the South African Act is that it is then very difficult to apply the Bremer Vulkan 
principle that deemed the arbitrator master of procedure with “complete discretion” to 
determine how the arbitration is to be conducted. This is because a gap in the list of 
procedural powers, such as the power to call an expert witness, could mean that the tribunal 
has no such power. 
 
What may be stated here is that the powers granted by the parties to the tribunal are not 
equivalent to the powers of the court.  Arbitrators are not judges and do not possess the 
coercive powers available to a court. But by granting powers to both tribunal and court the 
law enables the court to use its coercive powers to assist the tribunal. The court does this 
either by its power to order arbitral parties to comply with the orders of the tribunal on pain of 
                                                 
364 Article 19 (2). 
365 Articles 20 (1) and (2). 
366 Article 22. 
367 Kenyan Arbitration Act s 17-23; Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act s 12-23; and Zimbabwean 
Arbitration Act First Schedule Articles 16-20 and 22. 
368 S 14 (1)(a)(i) – (iv). 
369 S 14 (1)(a). 
370 S 14 (1)(b). 
371 S 14 (1)(b)(v). 
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otherwise being in contempt of court, or by direct orders of court intended to facilitate the 
tribunal’s proceedings as, for example, by orders of seizure of evidence or injunctions.372 
 
In concession to the view that in a jurisdiction with a modern and highly developed arbitration 
statute such as England, an arbitrator draws on a wide range of powers sufficient for 
conducting the arbitration effectively, the approach of the English Arbitration Act as to the 
procedural powers of the arbitrator is instructive.373 To be borne in mind is the fact that the 
extent of arbitral powers is not only indicated by the general and special powers under 
discussion but also by the restrictions on judicial intervention, appeals and the limitation on 
the circumstances of challenging the arbitrator. The general principles under section 1 of the 
English Act are therefore pertinent for bringing to mind that the object of arbitration is the fair 
resolution of disputes by an impartial tribunal without unnecessary delay or expense; that 
parties are free to agree how their disputes are to be resolved subject only to such safeguards 
as are necessary in the public interest; and that a court should not intervene in matters 
governed by the Act except as provided by Part 1 of the Act.374 In this connection the 
restrictions imposed by section 24 of the Act on the removal of an arbitrator are beneficial to 
the tribunal and the parties and can be perceived to contribute to the statutory measures for 
safeguarding the arbitral process and enhancing both the powers and efficacy of the 
tribunal.375 Arbitrators cannot therefore be challenged frivolously or removed at the will of 
merely reluctant parties; and an arbitrator with the agreed qualification can be expected to 
conduct the proceedings with confidence. Section 29 can be seen to boost the confidence of 
the arbitrator by granting an immunity from liability for anything done or omitted in the 
discharge of arbitral duties in the absence of bad faith. 
 
The facilitative provisions of sections 33 (general duty of the tribunal) and 34 (on procedural 
and evidential matters) have been noted and again these can be seen to strengthen the 
tribunal’s hand on the matters covered by these provisions. The procedural powers under 
section 34(2) (e) to (h) inclusive are new and ground-breaking in their reach. The arbitrator 
can now decide whether any and what questions can be put to a party, whether the strict rules 
                                                 
372 The English Arbitration Act 1996: sections 43 and 44 illustrate the use of court powers to assist the tribunal. 
This type of court support to compel compliance can be distinguished, because an order for production of 
evidence against a party is distinct from an injunction for the preservation of evidence which is clearly an interim 
measure of protection. 
373 See generally Hunter M “The Procedural Powers of Arbitrators under the English 1996 Act” (1997) 13 
Arbitration International 345-373. 
374 S 1 (a), (b) and (c). 
375 See s 24 (1)(a)-(d) for these grounds. 
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of evidence or any other rules should apply, whether to take the initiative in ascertaining facts 
and the law, and whether to receive oral or written evidence and submissions. 
 
The significance of these innovations is that it was not in the tradition of common-law 
lawyers to use inquisitorial procedures. English arbitrators have until now been more prone to 
use adversarial methods. These new provisions enable arbitrators to use inquisitorial methods 
in arbitration without doubting their power to do so.376 This makes particular sense where, as 
is often the case, an arbitrator is appointed for his requisite skills. Again, subject to contrary 
agreement by the parties, section 37(1) permits the tribunal to appoint its own experts or legal 
advisers where appropriate; but this the tribunal must do with due regard to the overriding 
duty under section 33 to adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances of the case and to 
avoid unnecessary delay and expense. 
 
The general powers under section 38 with regard to ordering security for costs, giving 
directions regarding the property in dispute, inspection, taking samples, the preservation of 
evidence and examination of witnesses on oath or affirmation377 may be said to complement 
the provisions of section 34 which, as noted, deals with procedural and evidential matters 
which the tribunal must decide. To some extent (except as regards security for costs) these 
powers correspond with those of the court under section 44, the scheme of the Act being so 
far as possible, to enable the tribunal to act rather than require the parties to resort to court 
with the attendant costs, expense and inconvenience entailed.378 The power to make a 
provisional award under section 39 is also new and distinct from an interim award. It is a 
power given by the parties enabling the tribunal to make orders for any relief which could be 
granted in the final award on a provisional or temporary basis. The point therefore is that such 
orders are subject to adjustment on the final adjudication and are brought into account in the 
final award.379 
 
Another enhancement provision is section 41 conferring and defining powers exercisable by 
the tribunal in case of a party’s default including significantly the dismissal of the claim for 
inordinate and inexcusable delay by the claimant and continuation of the proceedings in the 
absence of a defaulting party. Section 41(5) to (7), that set out sanctions for enforcing the 
tribunal’s peremptory orders, are novel. The peremptory order enables the tribunal which, for 
                                                 
376 Harris B, Planterose R & Tecks J English Arbitration Act 1996 – a Commentary 2nd ed (1999) 178. 
377 S 38(1), (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6). 
378 Harris, Planterose & Tecks English Arbitration Act 1996 191. 
379 S 39(3); Russell on Arbitration 221-222. 
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example, has ordered the production of witness statements by a specified date, to make a 
further peremptory order for compliance, in default of which the defaulting party may be 
barred from calling the intended witness. It is helpful to the tribunal that the peremptory 
orders, sanctions and consequences envisaged under section 41 are backed by enforcement 
powers granted to the court under section 42, together with the additional court powers 
granted by section 43 for securing the attendance of witnesses as well as the court powers 
conferred by section 44 to be exercised in support of arbitral proceedings. Because control of 
the arbitral proceedings reverts to the tribunal such intervention by the court is deemed 
supportive rather than an interference. 
 
The tribunal is empowered to determine recoverable costs of the arbitration fees and 
expenses, if the parties do not agree.380 After all, the tribunal has become familiar with the 
course of the proceedings and is best placed to settle any debate as to claims for costs and 
expenses. Determination by the tribunal may be more expeditious and fair to the parties. It is 
submitted that section 64 (on the tribunal’s power to fix its own reasonable fees and expenses, 
subject to court control) and the tribunal’s power to limit recoverable costs under section 65 
are beneficial to the arbitral parties. 
 
Therefore commentators who believe that an arbitral tribunal with its seat in England now has 
sufficient powers under English law may be quite justified, because of the elaborate 
provisions and schemes of the English Arbitration Act in areas where the UNCITRAL Model 
Law and other comparable national statutes are silent on controversial matters. 
 
It is perhaps worth mentioning that the regulatory procedural powers conferred on the 
arbitrator by the Model Law and national statutes influenced by it, apply, unless otherwise 
agreed by the parties. Because of the emphasis on the need for manifestation of consent in this 
dissertation it is appropriate to draw attention to section 5(1) of the English Act 1996 and the 
provision that Part 1 of the Act applies “only where the arbitration agreement is in writing”, 
and any other agreement between the parties as to any matter is effective “only if in writing”. 
This should reduce any arguments on whether the parties, subsequent to their original 
arbitration agreement, have by a further agreement curtailed (or extended) the arbitrator’s 
powers. It is also pertinent that the same approach, based on section 5(1) of the English Act, 
                                                 
380 S 63. 
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was recommended in the South African Law Commission’s Report on Domestic 
Arbitration.381 
 
3.3.3 Powers Conferred by Institutional Rules 
 
Arbitration rules purport to set standards for arbitration practice. As a general observation 
most national arbitration statutes, such as the Kenyan statute, contain mainly general 
propositions such as a provision empowering the arbitral tribunal, if the parties fail to agree a 
procedure, to conduct the arbitration in a manner it considers appropriate382 or enjoining the 
arbitral tribunal to treat each party with equality.383 Conversely, the Model Law384 and 
national statutes do not, and are not expected to, set out detailed rules of procedure that 
condescend to the minutiae of arbitration procedure. Yet the detailed rules, such as those that 
set time frames for various procedural activities including the exchange of statements of claim 
and defence, with or without supporting documents, written submissions, and which provide 
for the conduct of the arbitration on a documents-only basis or with oral hearings, are deemed 
critical to the arbitral process. Such details are more often found in the rules provided by the 
arbitration institutions.  
 
Institutional rules governing arbitration are not the same although they aim at providing a 
comprehensive and cohesive framework within which to manage the arbitral process. 
 
For domestic arbitration385 the rules conferring arbitral powers and discretion provided by the 
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, based in England, (hereafter “CIArb”) that have set 
standards and guidelines for its national branches in Kenya, Zimbabwe and Nigeria are of 
relative importance. But because even such rules need supplementation by other more detailed 
rules there will be references to the rules of the LCIA, the IBA and UNCITRAL, as 
appropriate, because of their wide acceptance and relevance to this study. Before discussing 
the arbitral powers provided by institutional rules, it is perhaps also appropriate to refer in 
                                                 
381 Domestic Arbitration 132 n 14 and s 6(1) of the Draft Bill. 
382 See the UNCITRAL Model Law Article 19 and the corresponding provisions of the selected national statutes. 
383 See the UNCITRAL Model Law Article 18. 
384 Although Model Law Articles 23 and 24 deal with statements of claim and defence and hearings respectively, 
the Model Law is drawn up in relatively broad terms and does not lay down detailed procedural rules on the 
actual conduct of the arbitration. See Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 82. 
385 For international arbitration the best known rules are probably those of UNCITRAL, the ICC, LCIA, ICSID, 
the AAA (American Arbitration Association) and the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce. The IBA Rules, as their full title suggests, are restricted to the taking of evidence in international 
commercial arbitration. 
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passing to the criteria for evaluating institutions386 and their rules. These include consideration 
of the institution’s structure, its procedure for selecting arbitrators, the degree to which the 
institution supervises arbitrators, if at all, and the scale of administrative charges, the 
arbitrators’ fees and requirements for advance payment of deposits.387 The suggested criteria 
for evaluating arbitral rules include whether the rules provide for the tribunal to grant interim 
measures, well-defined standards and procedures for dealing with challenges to arbitrators, a 
procedure for defining the dispute, obtaining access to evidence and for conducting the 
hearing.388 
 
While it is true that an arbitrator has powers and a measure of discretion to conduct the 
proceedings subject to the governing law and rules of natural justice, the rules agreed by the 
parties may also confer extensive discretion on the arbitral tribunal. The “widest discretion” 
allowed by law to arbitrators under the 1988 Arbitration Rules of the Chartered Institute of 
Arbitrators (England) and the 1985 Rules of the LCIA have been noted389 in relation to the 
Bremer Vulkan principle. The later versions of the rules of both institutions now reflect and 
are more in line with the provisions of the 1996 English Arbitration Act. The 2000 CIArb 
Arbitration Rules were drafted to incorporate the provisions of the Arbitration Act 1996390 
and to take cognizance of the new Civil Procedure Rules which became effective on 26 April 
1999.391 Concerning arbitration procedure, in place of the “widest discretion”, article 6.1 of 
the 2000 CIArb Rules gives the arbitrator power to decide all procedural and evidential 
matters (including but not limited to the matters referred to in section 34(2) of the Arbitration 
Act) subject to the right of the parties to agree any matter.392 
 
                                                 
386 The authors Bernstein, Tackaberry & Marriott Handbook of Arbitration Practice 25 point out that an integral 
part of supporting party autonomy is the recognition of the role and importance of arbitral institutions. In 
England the 1996 Act gives full recognition and effect to the agreement of the parties to arbitrate according to 
institutional rules and subject to institutional supervision. The authors identify three potentially problematic 
matters to which institutions ought to give attention in their rules. These are rules designed to give effect to s 39 
(the tribunal’s power to make provisional awards, which can be conferred by agreement (s 39(4)), s 47 (the 
power to make awards on different issues), and s 35 (provision for consolidation of arbitration proceedings by 
prior agreement in appropriate cases). 
387 Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 51-52. 
388 For international arbitration one may look out for rules that contain adequate curbs on dilatory tactics, a 
requirement for arbitrators to furnish reasons for their award unless the parties agree otherwise and a provision 
for consolidation of arbitration proceedings for multi-party disputes. See also Redfern & Hunter International 
Commercial Arbitration 51. 
389 Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Rules article 6.1, LCIA Rules article 5.2. 
390 See Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Rules article 1.1. 
391 Bunni N “The Chartered Institute of Arbitrators” (2000) XXV Yearbook Comm Arb.561 
392 After the appointment of the tribunal any subsequent agreement of the parties to amend the rules is subject to 
the agreement of the tribunal (article 1.2). 
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Regarding powers of the arbitrator, article 7.1 of the 2000 CIArb Arbitration Rules 
incorporates all the powers given to an arbitrator by the Act including those contained in 
section 35 (dealing with consolidation of proceedings and concurrent hearings) and section 39 
(dealing with provisional orders) but specifically in those two cases, subject to the limitations 
imposed by article 7. 
 
Under the 1998 LCIA Rules393 the freedom of the parties to agree on the conduct of their 
arbitral proceedings must be consistent with the arbitral tribunal’s general duties to act fairly 
and impartially and to adopt the procedures suitable to the circumstances of the arbitration, 
avoiding unnecessary delay or expense.394 Further, unless otherwise agreed by the parties 
under Article 14.1 the arbitral tribunal is given “the widest discretion” to discharge its duties 
allowed under such law(s) or rules of law as the tribunal may determine to be applicable.395 
The additional powers granted by the Rules under article 22.1(a) to (h) inclusive are 
extensive. These empower the tribunal, on party application or “of its own motion”, but in 
both cases after first giving the parties a reasonable opportunity to state their views, to allow 
an amendment of pleadings, extend or abbreviate time-limits, conduct inquiries including 
identifying issues and ascertaining relevant facts and law(s) or rules of law applicable to the 
arbitration. The tribunal may also order a party to allow the inspection of any thing relating to 
the subject matter of the arbitration, order a party to produce any documents deemed relevant, 
and decide whether to apply the strict rules of evidence or any other rules as to the 
admissibility, relevance or weight of any material tendered by a party or an expert. Of interest 
also is the tribunal’s power to order the correction of any contract between the parties or the 
arbitration agreement itself, subject to specified limitations and to allow joinder of third 
parties with their consent and then to make a single final award or separate awards. 
 
Under Rule 16 of the Kenya Branch Rules396 the parties confer on the arbitral tribunal the 
jurisdiction and powers set out in the Rules to be exercised by it “in its absolute and 
unfettered discretion if it judges it to be expedient for the purpose of ensuring the just, 
expeditious, economical and final determination of the dispute.” This of course will be subject 
to the mandatory provisions of the 1995 Arbitration Act.  
 
                                                 
393 The LCIA was founded in 1892 and claims to be probably the longest-established of all the major 
international arbitration institutions: see the preamble to the current Arbitration Rules, which took effect on 1 
January 1998. 
394 Per article 14 which is clearly reminiscent of the wording of s 33 of the English Act. 
395 Article 14.2. 
396 The June 1998 edition. 
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Rule 16B sets out under thirteen paragraphs various matters upon which the tribunal has the 
power and jurisdiction to grant orders on matters such as the determination of the existence, 
validity and extent of the arbitration agreement397 and its own jurisdiction,398 the rectification 
of the arbitration agreement,399 and questions of law, bad faith, dishonesty and fraud arising in 
the dispute.400 The tribunal may also order any party to furnish details of its case, in fact or in 
law, grant an injunctive relief and measures for conservation of property. It may also grant 
interim awards and simple interest on sums awarded and order specific performance of a 
contract.401 
 
Further discretionary powers and jurisdiction are set out in twelve paragraphs under Rule 
16C. The significant powers include the powers to allow other parties to be joined in the 
arbitration with their express consent,402 to rely on the arbitrator’s own expert knowledge and 
experience in the field,403 to direct the parties to submit for inspection and to exchange written 
witness statements and to direct which such witnesses must give oral testimony.404 The 
tribunal may also make interim orders for security for any party’s own costs and to secure all 
or part of any amount in dispute.405 Rule 16C (10) reinforces the arbitral power to conduct the 
arbitration in whatever manner the tribunal considers appropriate provided the parties are 
treated with equality and each party is heard and given the opportunity to present its case. The 
arbitrator is given power to award compound interest in an appropriate case if compound 
interest is claimed.406 
 
The important observation is that these institutional rules of procedure have expanded the 
powers and authority of the arbitral tribunal and thereby filled some of the troublesome gaps 
in the statutory provisions governing arbitration practice with particular reference to the 
arbitrator’s powers. 
 
It has to be mentioned that even amongst arbitration enthusiasts and adherents there is some 
reaction against unfettered arbitral discretion. While acknowledging that arbitrators can 
conduct proceedings under institutional rules in almost any manner they deem best they must 
                                                 
397 Rule 16B (1). 
398 Rule 16B (4). 
399 Rule 16B (2). 
400 Rule 16B (5). 
401 Rule 16B (9) and (12). 
402 Rule 16C (1). 
403 Rule 16C (3). 
404 Rule 16C (4). 
405 Rule 16C (9). 
406 Rule 16C (11).  The interest must be claimed as special damages. 
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nevertheless respect the arbitral mission and play according to the rules of natural justice or 
“due process” (as known in some jurisdictions) by which is meant freedom from bias and 
affording each side equal opportunity to be heard and to present their respective cases. If the 
absence of rigid procedural rules is deemed an advantage to the tribunal it is by no means 
apparent that arbitrators invent new rules of procedure as they go along preferring instead to 
follow well-beaten procedural tracks akin to court procedure.  In this connection, Park 
cautions that: 
 
“the benefits of arbitrator discretion are overrated; flexibility is not an unalloyed good; and 
arbitration’s malleability often comes at an unjustifiable cost. Therefore arbitral institutions 
should give serious consideration to adopting provisions with more precise procedural 
protocols to serve as default settings for the way arbitrations should actually be conducted. 
These directives would explicitly address questions such as documentary discovery, privilege, 
witness statements, order of memorials, allocation of hearing time, burden of proof and the 
extent of oral testimony.”407 
 
In view of Park’s comment, which relates essentially to international practice, it is necessary 
to state that there are significant differences between the various sets of rules on the detail in 
which powers are specified. For example, in the international context, the LCIA Rules (such 
as article 22) are considerably more detailed and specific than the ICC and UNICITRAL 
rules. Even so it is recognized as already noted, that even these rules will need to be 
supplemented by more detailed provisions from time to time.408 Notwithstanding the 
increasing popularity of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules they do not arguably deal with 
contentious points of detail regarding the procedure for reception of evidence, both oral and 
written. 
 
The problems regarding presentation of evidence were addressed by the International Bar 
Association by formulating in 1983 the Supplementary Rules Governing the Presentation and 
Reception of Evidence, which were replaced in 1999 by the IBA Rules on Taking Evidence in 
International Commercial Arbitration.409 
 
                                                 
407 Park (2003) 19 Arbitration International 283. Another skeptic of arbitral discretion identified by Park is Uff J 
“Predictability in International Arbitration” International Commercial Arbitration: Practical Perspectives (2001) 
151. 
408 Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration,83 paras 2 – 13; The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
may be supplemented with the IBA Rules for an ad hoc arbitration. 
409 These Rules were adopted by the IBA Council on 1 June 1999. 
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The object of adducing and presenting evidence is to assist the arbitral tribunal to determine 
disputed issues of fact and disputed expert opinion. The methods of presenting evidence 
involve (i) the production of documents, (ii) the testimony of witnesses of fact (iii) the 
testimony of expert witnesses and (iv) the inspection of things comprised in the subject-matter 
in dispute.410 The detailed IBA Rules411 on Taking Evidence in International Commercial 
Arbitration embrace these categories of evidence and demonstrate the use and application of 
procedural powers of the arbitral tribunal to these varieties of evidence. It is submitted that 
these rules can apply to both domestic and international arbitrations. It is apparent in 
examining these rules that the arbitral authority devolves from the interplay of the principle of 
party autonomy and the discretionary powers granted by the rules. 
 
In summary Article 3 of the IBA Rules deals with documentary evidence and Article 4 relates 
to witnesses of fact. Party-appointed experts and tribunal-appointed experts are regulated by 
Articles 5 and 6 respectively while Article 7 deals with on site inspection. The evidentiary 
hearing, and the admissibility and assessment of evidence are dealt with by Articles 8 and 9 
respectively. 
 
Article 3 first gives the arbitral tribunal the power to require, within the time ordered by the 
tribunal, submission to the tribunal by the parties of all documents available to and relied on 
by a party. A party that requires additional relevant documents, which it does not have but 
which it believes to be in the possession or under the control of its opponent, may, within the 
time ordered by the tribunal, file a Request to Produce, with the prescribed contents. Within 
the time ordered by the tribunal, the party to whom a Request to Produce is addressed must 
produce to the tribunal and other parties all documents requested to which no objection is 
taken.412 Where an objection is raised, it must be raised in writing with the tribunal and can be 
based on any of the reasons set out in Article 9(2).413 Additionally, and in exceptional 
circumstances, if the propriety of an objection can only be determined by a review of the 
document, the tribunal has power to decline to review the document itself and, after 
consultation with the parties, to appoint an independent expert to perform this function.414 
                                                 
410 Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 296. 
411 The IBA Rules are generally recognised as reflecting internationally established best practice across common 
law and continental systems: see Legal Business Arbitration Report on Witness Conferencing (2006) 64. Another 
invaluable source of guidance on practical points of detail is provided by the UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing 
Arbitral Proceedings (1996).  See Ceccon R “UNCITRAL Notes on Organising Arbitral Proceedings and the 
Conduct of Evidence” (1997) 14(2) Journal of International Arbitration 67-79.  
412 Article 3(1)-(4). 
413 Article 3(6) and 9(2): see footnote 416 below for the reasons set out under Article 9(2). 
414 Article 3 (7). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
240 
 
Quite clearly therefore Article 3 is concerned with the disclosure of documents within 
carefully prescribed and restricted requests. It provides useful guidance to an arbitrator in a 
common-law system on how to deal with controversial issues regarding discovery of 
documents in a cost-effective manner. However as an arbitral tribunal ordinarily lacks power 
to order the production of documents in the possession of a third party and Article 3 does not 
and cannot confer such power, the assistance of the court would still be necessary for 
subpoenas to compel the attendance of a third party at arbitral proceedings to produce 
documents. 
 
The creation of an international standard on the admissibility of evidence is reflected in the 
provisions of Article 9 which grants the arbitral tribunal the procedural power to determine 
the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of evidence.415 Further, at the request of a 
party or on its own motion the arbitral tribunal may exclude from the evidence or production 
any documents, statement, oral testimony or inspection on any of the grounds specified in 
Article 9(2).416 
 
The arbitral tribunal also has power to order each party within a specified time to submit to 
the tribunal and other parties a written statement (“witness statement”) by each witness whose 
testimony is relied upon; and the witness statement must conform to the prescriptions as to the 
form and content of the statement.417 Article 4 is in effect a codification of the existing 
practice for parties to submit written statements of the witnesses on whose evidence they 
intend to rely; and the common-law practice whereby lawyers interview witnesses and assist 
with the preparation of their evidence is endorsed by the provisions of Article 4(3) that do not 
make it improper for a party, its officers, employees, legal advisers or other representatives to 
interview that party’s witnesses or potential witnesses. 
 
                                                 
415 Article 9(1), which besides conferring the power, is also phrased as a duty: “The Arbitral Tribunal shall 
determine …”. Compare Article 19(2) of the Model Law, second sentence, which is couched as a power, as 
opposed to a duty. 
416 Article 9(2) provides: “The Arbitral Tribunal shall, at the request of a Party or on its own motion, exclude 
from evidence or production any document, statement, oral testimony or inspection for any of the following 
reasons: (a) lack of sufficient relevance or materiality; (b) legal impediment or privilege under the legal or 
ethical rules determined by the Arbitral Tribunal to be applicable; (c) unreasonable burden to produce the 
requested evidence; (d) loss or destruction of the document that has been reasonably shown to have occurred; (e) 
grounds of commercial or technical confidentiality that the Arbitral Tribunal determines to be compelling; (f) 
grounds of special political or institutional sensitivity (including evidence that has been classified as secret by a 
government or a public international institution) that the Arbitral Tribunal determines to be compelling; (g) 
considerations of fairness or equality of the parties that the Arbitral Tribunal determines to be compelling. 
417 Article 4(4) and (5). 
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Article 5 contains the tribunal’s discretionary power to order any party-appointed expert who 
has submitted an expert report on the same or related issues to meet, confer and attempt to 
agree on any differences of opinion. They must thereafter appear to testify at the evidentiary 
hearing unless excused by the parties with the approval of the tribunal. The sanction against 
the expert who fails to appear without a valid reason is the tribunal’s power to disregard the 
expert’s report. Article 5 enables the tribunal to evaluate the conflicting evidence from expert 
reports and provides a useful summary of what the party-appointed expert’s report must 
contain. The interplay of party autonomy and the exercise of the arbitral discretion is evident 
in Article 6 under which the tribunal may, after consultation with the parties, appoint one or 
more independent experts to report on specific issues designated by the tribunal. Site 
inspection can be done at the request of a party or on the tribunal’s own motion. The tribunal 
may inspect or require inspection by a tribunal-appointed expert of any site, property, 
machinery or any other goods or process or documents the tribunal deems appropriate; and 
the tribunal has power, in consultation with the parties to determine the timing and 
arrangements for the inspection.418 
 
The tribunal, at all times has “complete control” over the evidentiary hearing and may limit or 
exclude any question addressed to a witness or exclude the attendance of a witness on any of 
the grounds specified in Article 9(2).419 
 
These standard-setting rules, which are not law, have the attractiveness of combining aspects 
of both civil and common law practices in arbitration and can serve as guidelines for 
practitioners in both jurisdictions for extending or delimiting the powers of the arbitral 
tribunal. 
 
It can be summarized in conclusion that although arbitration rules do set standards, arbitrators 
have the discretion and the parties have the freedom by agreement to exclude rules intended to 
promote best practices in arbitration. Consequently the co-operation of arbitrators, parties and 
their advisers is needed for the attainment of benefits of expeditious and cost-effective 
arbitration. 
 
                                                 
418 Article 7. 
419 Article 8(1).  The grounds in Article 9(2) are quoted in n 416 above. 
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3.3.3.1 Expedited procedure 
 
The reference to the benefits of expeditious and cost-effective arbitration links up with the 
thrust of this dissertation, which is for the removal or minimization of avoidable inefficiencies 
by the effective use of the procedural powers conferred by the law and rules governing 
arbitration. The factors that contribute to arbitral inefficiency include: the ingrained tendency 
of arbitration practitioners and users to emulate litigation, with its own shortcomings and 
imperfections; the failure of arbitral pleadings to define sufficiently the real issues in dispute; 
a document discovery process with a potential to submerge the proceedings under a mass of 
sometimes quite irrelevant documents; the misuse of the opportunity for oral presentation of 
evidence, particularly cross-examination, and legal argument; and the arbitrator’s reluctance 
to intervene and take charge for fear the intervention might be misconstrued and provide a 
ground for setting aside the eventual award 
 
In general, arbitration practice in Kenya emulates litigation too closely with the attendant 
delays and disadvantages. 
 
More traditional adversarial arbitration proceedings might usefully be substituted by the use 
of an expedited procedure,420 with the potential of saving time and costs without diminishing 
the quality and justice of the final result. The use of witness statements in arbitration in 
preference to oral evidence in chief is gradually taking root in Kenya.  In essence an expedited 
procedure would require the arbitrator to start with the suggestion that the disputed issues be 
accurately defined through the exchange of written statements of case by claimant and 
respondent as opposed to court-style pleadings. These statements of case will be accompanied 
by copies of all relevant documents thereby eliminating the need for full discovery as known 
and used in litigation practice. Any additional discovery will be at the discretion of the 
arbitrator and restricted to a specified class of documents or a particular issue.  Issues can be 
heard and determined separately as appropriate and evidence in chief of factual witnesses can 
be by affidavit. Parties may submit their main arguments in writing. The purpose is not to 
abolish the traditional adversarial process as such but to adapt its non-essential features and 
the three main adaptations are: 
                                                 
420 see Uff J “Cost-Effective Arbitration” (1993) 59 Arbitration 31; Thesen D & Smith D “Preliminary Matters 
in Arbitration Practice (1987) 53 Arbitration 16 and 20; and Harris B “Arbitration: a Normal Incident of 
Commercial Life – But for How Long?” (1992) 58 Arbitration 153.  
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- the use of case management at the preliminary meeting to make the procedure 
quicker and more cost-effective; 
- the reduction of the duration of oral hearing; and 
- the division of the hearing of evidence and argument into logical phases so that 
these are not heard at a single sitting. 
 
3.3.3.2 Powers regarding Evidence 
 
This discussion can also usefully be extended to consideration of the applicability of the 
ordinary rules of evidence to arbitration. In this connection the traditional rule that an 
arbitrator is required, as a matter of law, to apply the ordinary rules of evidence, based as it 
was on “somewhat ancient authorities”,421 appears difficult to reconcile with more modern 
English authorities which emphasise the arbitrator as the master of his own procedure. It 
seemed that the traditional rule, based on the recognition of arbitration as a dispute resolution 
procedure that had departed its roots in contract law and had become part of the 
administration of justice, has lost much of its practical significance. This perhaps was due 
principally to the readiness of the courts to imply an agreement to exclude strict compliance 
with the rules of evidence and their reluctance to interfere where the rules are not complied 
with unless there has been a breach of the rules of natural justice. A suggested 
“reformulation” of the old rule is that “unless the arbitration agreement provides otherwise, 
whether expressly or by implication, an arbitrator is not as a matter of law obliged to comply 
with the formal rules of evidence, as long as the procedure he follows complies with the rules 
of natural justice by being fair to both parties” Being the exact reversal of the so called 
traditional rule the suggested reformulation results more in the rejection of the old rule than in 
its reformulation. 
 
In some jurisdictions such as Kenya and Uganda, the Evidence Act of either country does not 
apply to arbitration.422 Nevertheless, as the arbitrator’s power granted by the Arbitration Act 
to conduct the arbitration in the manner it considers appropriate in the absence of party 
agreement includes the power to determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and 
weight of any evidence,423 some guidance in dealing with evidence and any objections to 
admissibility is necessary. Three reasons may be suggested for regarding evidence as 
                                                 
421 Hunter JMH “Arbitration Procedure in England: Past, Present and Future” (1985) 1 Arbitration International 
82 101. 
422 Evidence Act (Kenya) s 2. 
423 Kenyan Arbitration Act s 20(3). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
244 
 
inadmissible. These are: irrelevance, public policy and the adjudicator’s inability to assess the 
weight of evidence properly. The arbitrator is advised to bear these reasons in mind when 
dealing with questions of admissibility whether on his own initiative or when raised by a 
party. Where the problem is irrelevance or public policy, it is suggested that the arbitrator 
should be prepared to exclude the evidence, either in response to an objection, or on his own 
initiative. This applies particularly where the public policy in favour of exclusion is state 
privilege or because the evidence relates to the content of “without prejudice” negotiations. 
 
With regard to hearsay evidence where the problem is more logically weight rather than 
admissibility, the arbitrator may well admit the evidence and consider the weight carefully. 
Dealing with objections to admissibility will require the arbitrator to afford the parties the 
opportunity to present their grounds for and against the objection for due consideration. In 
this writer’s experience written grounds and submissions are particularly helpful for 
identifying the bone of contention more precisely. 
 
It is recommended for Kenya that the provisions of section 20(3) regarding relevance, 
materiality, admissibility and weight need further elaboration to guide the arbitrator more 
fully and effectively including determining whether an argument or submission on any of 
these issues has been adequately addressed. 
 
3.3.4 Substantive Powers 
 
Problems can occur in practice when disputes arise between the parties during an arbitration 
regarding the extent of the arbitrator’s powers to grant substantive relief. For example, in a 
contractual dispute, does the arbitrator have the power to order the rectification of the contract 
where this relief is requested by one party and the arbitrator’s power to order rectification is 
denied by the other party? If the arbitrator rules, as a preliminary question, that he has this 
power, a respondent bent on delay will be able, prior to an award, to challenge this finding in 
court as a matter concerned with the arbitrator’s jurisdiction.424 
 
As in the case of the arbitrator’s procedural powers,425 powers to grant substantive relief can 
be conferred by the parties in their agreement, either directly, or indirectly through their 
choice of institutional rules. Substantive powers can also be conferred by law. Where the 
                                                 
424 See the Model Law Article 16(3) and para 3.2.2 above. 
425 See para 3.3.1 above. 
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agreement, including the chosen rules and the applicable arbitration statute are silent, the 
question then is from where does the arbitrator derive the power unless it can be said to be 
implied by law? 
 
The UNCITRAL Model Law deals only with the arbitrator’s power to determine the 
substantive law applicable to the merits of the dispute.426 The English Arbitration Act of 
1950427 gave the arbitrator the same power as the High Court to order specific performance of 
any contract, other than one relating to land or an interest in land, unless the parties agreed 
otherwise.428  The English Arbitration Act of 1996, true to the principle of party autonomy, 
gives the parties the freedom to agree on the powers exercisable by the tribunal as regards 
remedies.429 Unless the parties agree otherwise, the tribunal may grant declaratory relief, may 
order the payment of a sum of money in any currency, and the tribunal has the same power as 
the court to order injunctive relief,430 to order specific performance of a contract (other than 
one relating to land)431 and to order the rectification, setting aside or cancellation of a deed or 
other document.432 
 
None of the three jurisdictions, Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe, when adopting the Model 
Law, thought it necessary to supplement it, so as to deal with the tribunal’s powers relating to 
remedies, except on the issues of interest and costs.433  The drafters of the Model Law 
possibly considered the issue of remedies as a substantive issue which had no place in a law 
which, in civil-law countries, would normally form part of  a the code on civil procedure.  It is 
therefore significant that Mauritius,434 when adopting the Model Law for international 
arbitration only, incorporated a provision regarding the arbitral tribunal’s powers to grant 
remedies which closely follows the equivalent provision of the English Arbitration Act of 
                                                 
426 See Article 28. 
427 See s 15, which has its origin in an amendment made by s 7 of the Arbitration Act of 1934, inserting para (j) 
in the 1st schedule to the Arbitration Act of 1889.  The current South African Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 contains 
a similar provision in s 27, without the restriction regarding land or interests in land. 
428 See further Mustill & Boyd Commercial Arbitration 389. 
429 See s 48(1). 
430 See the Saville Report (1996) para 234.  S 48(5)(a) refers to ordering “a party to do or refrain from doing 
anything”. 
431 The Saville Committee retained this restriction to avoid changing the existing law.  See the Saville report 
(1996) para 234. 
432 See s 48(2)-(5). 
433 The Zimbabwe Arbitration Act of 1996 First Schedule Article 31(5) and (6) gives the tribunal the powers to 
award costs and interest.  The Kenyan Act of 1995 s 32(6) gives the tribunal the power to award costs but is 
silent on the award of interest. 
434 Mauritius was a French colony before acquired by Britain and the separate Mauritian arbitration law for 
domestic arbitration is based on modern French law. See further the Travaux Préparatoires, drafted by the State 
Law Office, for the Mauritius International Arbitration Act 38 of 2008 para 7, regarding the decision to retain a 
separate statute for domestic arbitration. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
246 
 
1996.435 The South African Law Commission, although influenced by the English Act in its 
proposals for a new Arbitration Act for domestic arbitration, apparently considered it 
unnecessary to expand the provisions on remedies, and merely retained the existing provision 
on specific performance.436 
 
It is submitted that particularly those African jurisdictions which adopt the Model Law for 
domestic arbitration should supplement it to deal comprehensively with the arbitrator’s 
powers to grant substantive remedies, along the lines of the provision in the English 
Arbitration Act.  Such a provision promotes certainty and can thus prevent unnecessary delay 
and jurisdictional challenges. The need for clarification was obviously felt by the drafters of 
the Kenya Branch Rules of the Chartered Institute. These Rules deal reasonably 
comprehensively with the remedies which an arbitrator has the power to grant.  The Rules 
empower the arbitrator to rectify a contract on the application of a party, to decide questions 
of bad faith, dishonesty or fraud arising in the dispute, to order specific performance and to 
award interest.437   As these rules do not seem to deal specifically with declaratory relief it is 
recommended that the omission ought to be considered and provided for the Kenyan 
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators.  This again underlies the need for parties to a domestic 
arbitration to include a reference to appropriate rules in their arbitration agreement as a means 
of ensuring the requisite degree of certainty as to the extent of the arbitrator’s powers. 
 
3.3.5 Duties of an Arbitrator 
 
Apart from the general and specific powers exercised by an arbitral tribunal in the conduct of 
proceedings there are also specific duties, in the performance of which the exercise of arbitral 
powers can be inferred from the parties’ agreement or the governing law. 
 
Because of this the interaction between the powers and duties of an arbitrator deserves 
comment.  In the context of arbitration, duties denote rules the arbitrator must follow, in 
contradistinction to arbitral powers that are discretionary; and whereas duties define the 
minimum the arbitrator must do, powers define the maximum he can compel the parties to 
do.438 In brief such duties include: 
                                                 
435 See the Mauritius International Arbitration Act 38 of 2008 s 33, which however omits the exception regarding 
contracts of land in relation to the power to order specific performance. 
436 See the Commission’s Draft Bill for domestic arbitration, s 47. 
437 See the Kenya Branch Rules rule 16B (2), (5), (12) and (13), and 16C (11) on compound interest.   
438 See Mustill & Boyd Commercial Arbitration 291. 
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(i) The Duty to Take Care 
 
Arbitral parties expect the arbitrator to perform his tasks with due care. Because they pay for 
his services as arbitrator the relationship can be deemed contractual. The arbitrator’s inherent 
duty to exercise due care and diligence is assumed; but whether he is also under a legal duty 
to exercise care may depend on the terms of his appointment.  It is submitted that a legal duty 
may not be assumed in absence of clear provisions in the contract of appointment. Neither the 
Model Law439 nor the national statutes contain any provisions on the liabilities of arbitrators; 
and because arbitrators perform a judicial or quasi-judicial function it is quite appropriate, as a 
matter of public policy, to accord arbitrators immunity from suit440 though they may be 
removed for breaches of duty. 
 
(ii) The Duty to Proceed Diligently and the Duty to Act Impartially 
 
These two duties relate to due process and are recognized by law.  There is clearly a duty on 
the arbitrator to act diligently in the provisions of Article 14(1) of the Model Law and, by 
extension, in the corresponding provisions of the national statutes based on it. The Article in 
relevant part provides that an arbitrator who (i) becomes de jure or de facto unable to act or 
(ii) for other reasons fails to act without undue delay may have his mandate terminated. These 
are ostensibly therefore two alternative grounds on which the mandate could be lost. The 
termination of the mandate does not occur automatically but through either the arbitrator’s 
withdrawal from office or the agreement of the parties. If a controversy remains as to the 
presence of the grounds referred to in article 14, it will have to be resolved by the court, or a 
designated authority.441 The first ground, de jure and de facto inability to act, is derived from 
Article 13(2) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules of 1976. It is doubted whether de jure 
inability to act is wide enough to include apparent bias,442 and as apparent bias is perceived 
logically to give rise to “justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence” 
it is suggested that it is thereby a ground on which the arbitrator may be challenged under 
Article 13 (read with Article 12(2)) rather than an instance of de jure inability to act. The 
practical importance of this point, if any, is rather subtle, but unlike Article 13(3), Article 14 
                                                 
439 The Model Law avoided the topic for being highly controversial; 
440 Redfern and Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 254-256. The English Arbitration Act 1996, s 29 
accords immunity from liability to an arbitrator for anything done or omitted in the discharge of his functions as 
arbitrator unless the act or omission is shown to have been in bad faith. 
441 See Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 438 who infer three grounds of termination 
of the mandate and three methods of doing so. Contrast the SA Law Commission’s Report Arbitration: an 
International Arbitration Act for South Africa 70 which infers two alternative grounds. 
442 SA Law Commission’s Report Arbitration: an International Arbitration Act for South Africa 70. 
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gives the arbitral tribunal no discretion to continue with the arbitration while an application 
for the termination of an arbitrator’s mandate is under consideration by the court.443 
 
The phrase “without undue delay” in the second ground for termination expresses the time 
element inherent in the words “failure to act”; but otherwise it is not intended that the 
efficiency with which the arbitral proceedings are conducted should be a factor, in order not 
to subject the substantive work of the tribunal to a review.444 On the meaning of “fails to act” 
the guidance provided by the UNCITRAL Secretariat445 is that in judging whether an 
arbitrator failed to act the following considerations or questions may be relevant: which action 
was expected, or required by the arbitration agreement and what was the specific procedural 
requirement? If an arbitrator has done nothing in this regard, then is the delay inordinate and 
unacceptable in the circumstances? If he has done something then did his conduct fall below a 
reasonable standard expected? 
 
English law, for example, requires the tribunal (i) to act fairly and impartially as between the 
parties and to give each party a reasonable opportunity to put his case and deal with that of 
his opponent and (ii) to adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances of the particular case 
to avoid unnecessary delay and expense.446 The duty to treat the parties with equality and to 
give each a full opportunity to present his case is enacted by Article 18 of the Model Law as 
replicated in the corresponding national statutes of Kenya (section 19), Nigeria (section 14) 
and Zimbabwe (First Schedule Article 18). Nothing significant seems to turn on the difference 
of wording with reference to “reasonable opportunity” under the English Act and “full 
opportunity” under the Model Law regarding the duty of impartiality as in practice the two 
terms could be given the same or similar interpretation.447 
 
3.3.6 The Adequacy of an Arbitrator’s Procedural Powers 
 
The logical question from the discussion so far is whether the procedural powers conferred by 
parties, the law and the rules are adequate for the performance of the arbitral function? 
                                                 
443 SA Law Commission’s Report Arbitration: an International Arbitration Act for South Africa 70. 
444 SA Law Commission’s Report Arbitration: an International Arbitration Act for South Africa 70. 
445 Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 439. 
446 Arbitration Act 1996, s 33. 
447 The ICC Rules (1998), Article 15.2 adopt the “reasonable” opportunity approach; see Harris, Planterose & 
Tecks English Arbitration Act 1996 – a Commentary 174-175. Interestingly Holtzmann and Neuhaus Guide to 
the UNCITRAL Model Law 557 suggest that the terms “treated with equality” and “full opportunity” in the 
Model Law Article 18 should be interpreted “reasonably” in regulating the procedural aspects of the arbitration. 
The UNCITRAL Secretariat’s Explanatory Note gave no guidelines on the interpretation of those terms. 
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As noted above there are differences of opinion among practitioners regarding the adequacy 
or otherwise of the arbitrator’s powers.448  On the one hand it is necessary for the proper 
discharge of the arbitral mandate for an arbitrator to have full powers to perform his tasks.449  
The justification is that it is quite inconsistent with the performance of those tasks for an 
arbitrator, chosen for his expertise in the field of dispute, to be hampered by inadequate 
powers to do so.  Not uncommonly, an arbitrator may be apprehensive about the extent of his 
procedural powers because of frequent challenges to his authority and occasional intimidation 
by the very parties who conferred his mandate or by persons acting on their behalf in the 
proceedings. From such concerns it might be thought that arbitrators should be seised with 
full procedural powers to conduct the arbitration with confidence, efficiency and expedition.  
 
On the other hand it is felt by others that the power of the arbitral tribunal conferred by the 
parties themselves within the limits of the applicable law and the additional powers conferred 
by the operation of law are, in practice, sufficient for the tribunal to perform its tasks fully and 
effectively.450 
 
To this writer the question whether or not arbitrators have sufficient procedural powers does 
not commend a uniform or straightforward response and depends largely on the powers 
granted by arbitration regimes in different jurisdictions. It is apparent from the discussion 
above that English arbitrators have substantially more express procedural powers than those 
in Model Law jurisdictions.451 An explanation given for not giving arbitrators more powers is 
that even judges with state power in their armoury and formidable coercive powers do not 
enjoy unlimited powers and their decisions are commonly appealable.452 Other explanations 
                                                 
448 See para 3.3.1 n 360 above. 
449 Herrmann G “The Role of the Courts under the UNCITRAL Model Law Script” in Contemporary Problems 
in International Arbitration 166. 
450 Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 234-257; Mustill & Boyd Commercial Arbitration 
279. The view of Lord Mustill that the arbitral powers are adequate and that it is for arbitrators to utilize fully 
those powers has been noted earlier in this study. See too Hunter M “The Procedural Powers of Arbitrators under 
the English 1996 Act” (1997) 13 Arbitration International 345-360. 
451 See paras 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 above.  Because arbitral procedural powers are more explicitly set out under ss 34, 
38 and 41 of the 1996 English Act, there is less need to rely on a general power such as in the Model Law Article 
19(2). Additionally s 41 on the tribunal’s powers on a party’s default contains a substantially wider battery of 
sanctions aimed at a wider range of situations than the Model Law Article 25. See also the Saville Report (1996) 
paras 206-211 on s 41 and Russell on Arbitration (23rd Edition) paras 5-181 – 5-185. Russell on Arbitration para 
7-198 states that in most cases the tribunal’s own powers under s 41 to enforce its orders will suffice. The section 
is commented on in paragraphs 3.3.4 and 3.6.9 of this dissertation. 
452 Asouzu International Commercial Arbitration and African States 170-171; Reisman MW Systems of Control 
in International Adjudication and Arbitration: Breakdown and Repairs (1992); Park WW “National Legal 
Systems and Private Dispute Resolution (1988) 82 American Journal of International Law  616; Park WW 
“Private Adjudicators and the Public Interest” (1986) 12 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 629; Asouzu AA 
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are based on the dictates of public policy and public interest and the obligation of states to 
ensure conformity with international standards of due process and the rule of law. As public 
policy and public interest differ from state to state and the province of public policy is not 
uniformly defined, this is an explanation that is not readily attractive as it raises more 
questions than answers. A further reason for limiting the powers of arbitrators is the need to 
control wrongful conduct or the excesses of the arbitral tribunal.453 Although a court cannot 
under the UNCITRAL Model Law review an arbitrator’s procedural rulings prior to the 
award, it could in an extreme case, on the application of a party, intervene to remove the 
arbitrator.  In Kenya, procedural rulings are challenged in court and, not infrequently, as a 
ploy or delaying tactic by an unco-operative party and it is one of the concerns that prompted 
this research.  Arbitrators, it can be argued, must be subject to the requirements of due process 
for the sake of the integrity of the arbitral process.454 
 
However, arbitrators whose procedural orders or directives on time limits, for example, have 
been ignored or whose orders for production of documents are not complied with, might think 
differently about the adequacy of their powers. The same could be said about arbitrators who 
might have encountered unwarranted and offensive behaviour from participants in arbitral 
proceedings and have felt powerless to do anything about it, or have suffered intimidation 
from lawyers, who can get away with it because of the lack of coercive arbitral powers. 
 
A firm and fair stance by the tribunal might be suggested as a means of dealing with difficult 
and awkward participants before the tribunal. It is submitted however that such an approach 
does not really go far enough to meet the gravamen of offensive and contemptible conduct 
from the perpetrators. Moreover, a “fair and firm stance” is a subjective concept and, not 
being a standardized practice, its application can be expected to vary from arbitrator to 
arbitrator. Even if it is accepted that the powers conferred by the parties, the law and 
institutional rules may be sufficient for an arbitrator, in normal circumstances, to direct the 
course of the arbitral proceedings, it is nevertheless submitted that additional statutory powers 
are still necessary in the armoury of the arbitral tribunal. These should take the form of 
coercive sanctions to compel compliance with arbitral orders, directives and rulings as well as 
punitive damages against aggravated misconduct and malicious conduct. The availability of 
such power and sanctions can deter bad behavior, prevent unwarranted disruptions and 
                                                                                                                                                        
“A Threat to Arbitral Integrity” (1995) 12(4) Journal of International Arbitration 145; Asouzu AA “Arbitration 
and Judicial Powers in Nigeria” (2001) 18(6) Journal of International Arbitration 617-640. 
453 See para 3.3.2 above. 
454 Asouzu (1995) 12(4) Journal of International Arbitration 145. 
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flippant disobedience to arbitral orders by those inclined to see arbitrators as lesser mortals 
than judges. Their availability will also protect and safeguard the integrity of the process, and 
ultimately the award.   It is to be noted that in South Africa any person who willfully insults 
an arbitrator or umpire or willfully misbehaves during arbitral proceedings is guilty of an 
offence and is liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding R100 or to imprisonment for a 
period not exceeding three months (Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 s 22(1). The adequacy or 
otherwise of such penalty is food for thought for those who seek a new domestic arbitration 
law for South Africa.  In its report Domestic Arbitration (2001), the SA Law Commission 
recommended that the penalty should be linked to section 30(4) of the Supreme Court Act 59 
of 1959.455    A foundation for punitive damages456 and an arbitral Code of Sanctions457 is 
proposed below. It is recommended that national and international committees could be 
constituted under the auspices of institutions such as the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators and 
the IBA to investigate the need for punitive damages and arbitral sanctions, and to formulate 
proposals for a Code of Sanctions and Damages. 
 
3.3.7 Exemplary and Punitive Damages458 
 
Exemplary and punitive damages are a substantive remedy and therefore distinct from 
procedural remedies or sanctions. In the context of this study however it is deemed 
appropriate to deal with the topic here because underlying the recommendation for a Code of 
Sanctions to facilitate arbitration, there is also the need to deter persistent or malicious and 
objectionable conduct by a party in arbitration by the award of punitive damages, also known 
as exemplary damages.459 Punitive damages are available in private actions in common-law 
countries but, generally, it seems, not in civil-law countries.460 This makes it a controversial 
topic, especially in the international arena. Punitive damages are sums awarded over and 
above any compensatory or nominal damages for aggravated misconduct of the defendant and 
the most generally acknowledged justification for it is to deter and punish willful or malicious 
                                                 
455 See s 41(1) of the Draft Bill. 
456 See paragraph 3.3.7 below. 
457 See paragraph 3.5.7 and 3.6.7 below. 
458 For a major contribution on punitive damages see Gotanda JY Punitive Damages in Private International 
Law (2005) ch 4.  See too on exemplary damages Russell on Arbitration 6-103-6-106. 
459 Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 357. On the award of punitive damages in 
arbitration see (2003) 3(2) International Arbitration News 5. 
460 The prohibition on punitive damages in private actions in countries like France, Germany and Switzerland 
reflects the strict separation of “damages” in civil law and “punishment” in criminal law. The repealed Swedish 
Arbitration Act of 1929 para 15 expressly prohibited an arbitrator from awarding penalties and fines. However, 
Norway, a civilian jurisdiction, appears to allow punitive damages (II International Encyclopedia, ch 10 84).  
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conduct and repetition.461 The objection to punitive damages is that they unfairly constitute a 
windfall to the plaintiff, subject the defendant to double jeopardy and may far exceed the 
maximum criminal penalty for the same conduct. 
 
The award of punitive damages is rooted in English common law,462 which restricted punitive 
damages to suits involving (i) oppressive action by government servants; (ii) conduct 
calculated to make profit in excess of the compensation available to the plaintiff; and (iii) 
cases in which punitive damages are expressly authorized by statute.  It seems that in the 
Republic of Ireland, punitive damages extend to oppressive conduct by both government 
servants and private individuals.463 
 
Punitive damages are commonly awarded in the United States, although differing views have 
emerged as to whether or not an arbitrator has the authority to award punitive damages.  One 
view is that arbitrators have no power to award punitive damages.464 This is based on the 
rationale that such award is an exemplary remedy that can only be granted by judicial 
authority. A second view is that an arbitrator cannot grant such relief unless expressly 
provided by the arbitration agreement.465 
 
The arguments in favour of arbitrators granting punitive damages as a sanction for a party’s 
procedural misconduct are as follows. Firstly, in the specific instances that the issue arises in 
arbitration the arbitrator is perfectly capable of determining whether a particular conduct is 
unacceptable and the amount that can deter or punish such misconduct. Secondly, denying 
this punitive power to arbitrators diminishes the arbitrator’s authority and undermines the 
value and efficacy of the arbitral process as a dispute resolution procedure. Thirdly, the 
resultant procedural inefficiencies frustrate the public policies and purposes served by 
punitive damages. Finally, arbitrators must have the flexibility to determine appropriate 
remedies. The governing law in the United States on the issue is the Federal Arbitration Act 
which applies to actions involving interstate commerce466 and to international arbitrations.467 
 
                                                 
461 This writer has awarded substantial damages for wilful breach of contract in an arbitral decision that was 
upheld by the Kenya Court of Appeal in Kobil Petroleum v Kenya Shell Ltd Civ App. No NAI 57 of 2006. See 
also Dobbs DB Handbook on the Law of Remedies (1973) 204. 
462 Wilkes v Wood 98 Eng. Rep 489 (CP 1763); Rooks v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 (HL). 
463 Conway v Irish Nat’l Teachers Org [1991] ILRM 497 (SC). 
464 The “Garrity Rule” from Garrity v Lyle Stuart Inc 353 NE 2d 793 (NY 1976). 
465 Baltimore Regional Joint Bd, Amalgamated Clothing Workers v Webster Clothes 596 F2d 95 98 (4th Cir1989). 
466 Chapter 1 9 USC para 1 (1994). 
467 Chapter 2 9 USC para 202. 
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In his extensive research on punitive damages from which this writer has greatly benefited, 
Gotanda468 observed that jurisdictions that prohibit the award of punitive damages in 
arbitration do so because of their perception that such damages are an extraordinary sanction 
that may be awarded only by a state authority (i.e. a court) and are thus subject to judicial 
review; while those that allow arbitrators to award punitive damages view the award as an 
important deterrent.  This writer supports the award of punitive damages in arbitration in line 
with his advocacy of a Code of Arbitral Sanctions that will include punitive damages.  But 
because such an award is not readily available in the common-law jurisdictions and it is 
controversial in actions for breach of contract, it will be prudent for an arbitrator first to 
ascertain whether or not there exists an arbitration agreement or clause that includes or 
excludes punitive damages from the issues in the arbitration. 
 
A clause permitting punitive damages should be enforced unless it violates an applicable 
mandatory rule of law. This approach would firstly recognize both the doctrine of party 
autonomy and its limitations.  Secondly, if no such clause exists, an arbitrator should 
determine whether the parties intended to give the arbitrator the authority to award punitive 
damages bearing in mind the obligation to render an enforceable award. Thirdly, it ought to be 
apparent on the face of the award that such relief is separate and distinct from the award of 
other damages. Fourthly, where the arbitrator has such a power, it may be prudent first to ask 
the parties or their representatives for their views on the matter before exercising the power.469  
Finally, the arbitrator would still have a duty to give reasons for the decision. 
 
In conclusion on this topic, this writer submits that the fact that an award of damages may be 
penal in nature should not, in and of itself, be a ground for not permitting the award or for 
refusing to enforce it where the circumstances justify such an award. 
 
Despite the age-old resistance of English law to the award of exemplary or punitive damages 
by arbitrators in actions for breach of contract, it may well be that the door is not closed on 
the subject. Perhaps the prospect of change, in this respect, is held out by the provisions of 
section 48 of the Arbitration Act 1996 to the effect that 
 
“[t]he parties are free to agree on the powers exercisable by the arbitral tribunal as regards 
remedies.” 
                                                 
468 Gotanda Punitive Damages in Private International Law ch 4. 
469 In this respect, the power is analogous to the arbitrator’s power to award costs. 
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The Act provides that unless the parties otherwise agree, the arbitral tribunal may grant 
injunctive relief as a substantive remedy.470 Therefore, the possibility of the arbitrator 
applying the substantive remedy of damages as a sanction for a party’s flagrant procedural 
misconduct is not as radical as it may first appear. 
 
3.3.8 Conclusion 
 
As the use of arbitration gathers greater momentum nationally and internationally and the 
arbitral procedure achieves wider acceptance worldwide, the chances are that the problematic 
areas of practice, on which the provisions of the Model Law and national statutes derived 
from it are inadequate or silent, will receive greater attention. This will hopefully lead to the 
enhancement of arbitral powers in jurisdictions that value arbitration. 
 
Arbitration law has come a long way from when it was thought that an arbitrator had greater 
latitude than the court to do complete justice between the parties resulting in the need for 
strict judicial control of arbitral powers.471 Today the English Arbitration Act, which gives 
even wider latitude to arbitrators, is praised for restating and improving the law that has 
moved further away from judicial restrictions and for its recognition and blend of the 
principles of party autonomy, the autonomy of the arbitral tribunal and the immunity of 
arbitrators.472 
 
Party freedom, and in default of its exercise, the freedom of the arbitrator to determine the 
rules of procedure, as entrenched by the Model Law and some national arbitration statutes, 
are, indubitably, significant statutory enhancements to arbitration. But perhaps the arbitrator’s 
real power lies, together with the law or the rules of arbitration, in the authority the arbitrator 
possesses as the person who will make the ultimate decision on the parties’ dispute. 
 
                                                 
470 See the Saville Report (1996) para 234 and Russell on Arbitration 6-107 regarding s 48(5)(a). 
471 Knox v Symmonds (1791) 1 Ves Jun369, 30 ER 390; Zarnikow v Ruth Schmidt & Co [1922] 2 KB 478 at 484-
485 and at 488: “There must be no Alsatia in England where the King’s writ does not run”. 
472 Hong-Lin Yu “Five Years On: A Review of the English Arbitration Act 1996” (2002) 19(3) Journal of 
International Arbitration 209-225; Reid A “The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration and the English Arbitration Act: Are the Two Systems Poles Apart?” (2004) 21(3) Journal of 
International Arbitration 227 238. Okekeifere AI “Appointment and Challenge of Arbitrators under the 
UNCITRAL Model Law Part 2” (2000) 3(1) International Arbitration Law Review 13, 16 states: “The Model 
Law grants an arbitrator a wider latitude to act with impunity”, but “the failure of the Model Law to include 
avoidable delay or lack of commitment to the case as grounds for dismissal of the arbitrator has been criticised as 
a serious lacuna.” 
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3.4 Taking Charge of the Arbitration and Minimizing the Frequency of Adjournments, 
Postponements and Delay  
 
3.4.1. Adjournments and Postponements 
 
Adjournments and postponements are common features of domestic arbitration practice. The 
problem, in the context of this study, is their frequency and the noticeable perception or 
misconception that the flexibility and informality of arbitration make an adjournment or 
postponement easier to get away with than in litigation.473 The topic is chosen for 
consideration in order to investigate the underlying causes and the means of controlling the 
frequency of unwarranted interruptions in arbitral proceedings and consequently minimizing 
the delay occasioned by the incidence of adjournments.  
 
A further and more ambitious justification is the dearth of written material on the subject 
despite the daily encounters with requests for adjournments and postponements and their 
frequency. It is conceivable that, as a procedural matter, adjournments are deemed to be 
within the procedural discretion of an arbitrator as “master of procedure”474 to be dealt with as 
the arbitral tribunal considers appropriate. Perhaps this also explains the almost total absence 
of guidelines on dealing with applications for adjournments despite their disruptive propensity 
and the potential for protracting arbitral proceedings and hearings. 
 
The terms “adjournment” and “postponement” tend to be used synonymously and 
interchangeably in relation to legal proceedings. This is not surprising because “to adjourn” 
can mean to bring to an end or postpone a meeting, session or proceeding,475 and “to 
postpone” can likewise mean to put off a session or meeting to a later time.476 Further, an 
adjourned meeting is in the ordinary sense a mere continuation of the original meeting with no 
need for a fresh notice of it to be given.477 The hearing of a case can be adjourned at the 
discretion of a judge.478 It is probably safe to say that the context and object of an 
                                                 
473 In this writer’s experience most legal practitioners in arbitration tend to look at arbitration as an informal 
affair and conducted without wig and gown in an atmosphere more relaxed and less rigorous than the courtroom.  
474 Bernstein et al Handbook of Arbitration Practice  para 2-302. Such thinking might appeal to those who are 
won over by the idea of an arbitrator as master of procedure. Arbitrators who do not share this view might feel 
the need for stricter guidelines on adjournments and postponements. 
475 Bryan AG Black’s Law Dictionary 8th ed (1999). 
476 Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th edition. See also Chambers Concise 20th Century Dictionary for the ordinary 
meaning of these words. 
477 See Burke J Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law, 2nd edition, citing Scadding v Lorrant (1851) 3 HLC 418. 
478 Jowitt’s Dictionary; Rules of Supreme Court, Order 35 rule 3 (England). 
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adjournment or postponement will determine the sense and meaning to be accorded to each 
term.479 
 
The purely technical or subtle differences in meaning attributed to or suggested by the two 
terms, if any, are of little or no significance in this study as the consequences of either 
approach or process are more or less similar. The concern here is the frequency of 
interruptions to arbitral proceedings occasioned by an unwarranted adjournment or 
postponement which delay the arbitral process. For this reason, in what follows the terms 
“adjournment” and “postponement” will be used interchangeably in connection with arbitral 
proceedings and hearings or together as appropriate for the sake of emphasis. It is also 
intended to examine the causes of adjournments and postponements and the management of 
time as a technique for curbing avoidable delay. 
 
As noted, an adjournment or postponement puts off an arbitral meeting or proceeding to 
another day thereby delaying the progress of the proceedings and the day of reckoning and 
consequently the delivery of the award. Yet because such an interruption may in some 
instances be justified an arbitrator cannot ignore a request for postponement and in any event 
he cannot determine the reasonableness or otherwise of the request until he allows time and 
opportunity to hear and consider the reasons offered for putting off or interrupting the 
proceedings. The reference to time is appropriate. This is because as time, to an extent, is of 
the essence in the conduct of arbitrations, time-management is a relevant consideration with 
regard to how much of it can be allocated to the entire arbitral proceedings and the 
intervening interruptions that occasion delay. Be that as it may, it is submitted that excusable 
delays can and ought to be minimized while inexcusable delays including tactical ploys are 
discouraged, deterred and even penalized. 
 
Before commenting further on time-management and delays it is appropriate to identify the 
causes of adjournment and postponements. These are usually found in the requests for 
adjournments and postponements and the grounds upon which such requests are based. Not 
                                                 
479 For example, in relation to public enquiries under the English Election Commissioners Act 1852, enquiries 
cannot be held without meetings and when the power of holding meetings is given, “adjourn” has the popular 
sense of “deferring or postponing” an inquiry to a future day: see Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words and 
Phrases, 6th edition volume 1, citing Mellor J in Fitzgerald’s Case, LR5QB1 at 10. The term “postpone” also 
takes differing meaning in relation to differing subject-matter, such as the sale of interests in real estate, 
investments and tenancies. The similarity of meaning in “adjourn” and “postpone” is also reflected in legal 
terminology like “adjourn sine die” (i.e. ending a session without setting a time to reconvene; and “postpone 
indefinitely” meaning disposing of a motion without a decision on merits and preventing its further consideration 
during the same session: Black’s Law Dictionary. 
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surprisingly the request for adjournments is often at the instance of the respondent and the 
numerous and varied grounds offered include family bereavement or the sudden illness of a 
relative, or the call of public duty necessitating the presence of a participant elsewhere than at 
the place of arbitration.   In Kenya, the need to attend the funeral of an “uncle” (curiously, 
more so than the funeral of any other relative) would top the list of commonest excuses given 
for seeking an adjournment. Uncles abound in African folk-life and they may not be 
necessarily blood-relatives.  Again, with reference to Kenya, if a state advocate is involved in 
arbitration he or she is likely to be booked for other professional duties at the same time as the 
arbitration proceedings.  Frequently in Kenya, the precedence accorded to state courts over 
arbitral tribunals is used as a ground of adjournment to enable counsel to appear in court 
either to take a judgment or ruling or to make an urgent application in a criminal case.480 
 
Other common grounds are the need to amend pleadings; the unavailability of a prospective 
witness who has allegedly traveled; or that an expert witness requires more time to complete a 
report required by the tribunal.481 The point is that more often than not the application is 
nothing more than a delaying tactic or strategy to buy more time and the arbitrator may be 
apprehensive about the prospect of court intervention and more delay if the application is 
denied. In the simplest and obvious instances an arbitrator will correctly grant an adjournment 
without more on appropriate conditions. In suspicious cases he is placed in a dilemma where 
the application is unexpected and unprovoked by any immediate antecedent event. Either way 
some delay will occur with possible prejudicial consequence for the innocent party. It is also 
suggested that the arbitrator’s dilemmas and hesitations with suspect applications and his fear 
of court intervention may be due more to his own timidity than to the inherent weakness in 
the arbitral procedure. 
 
                                                 
480 When an alleged short and unexpected notice for counsel to appear in court is proffered as the reason for a 
postponement it is troublesome for the arbitral tribunal bearing in mind that the arbitral hearing date might have 
been fixed by consent several weeks or months earlier. The monetary value of the arbitral dispute may far 
outweigh the value of the litigation, and the reception of the evidence of a busy expert or an overseas witness 
may have to be postponed for the convenience of the absenting counsel. 
481 Ghikas G “A Principled Approach to Adjourning the Decision to Enforce under the Model Law and the New 
York Convention” (2006) 22(1) Arbitration International 53 57 draws the analogy of court adjournments by 
stating: “Courts often are asked to grant adjournments or postponements of domestic legal proceedings. One 
party or the other may ask for more time to prepare, or it may be that insufficient time for the hearing has been 
reserved, or there may be other practical or logistical reasons to justify an adjournment.” He suggests with regard 
to the adjournment of enforcement proceedings under Article 36(2) of the Model Law and the New York 
Convention (Article VI) that “regardless of their customary approach to granting adjournments in domestic 
matters, in enforcement proceedings courts must scrutinise the grounds for seeking adjournments with great care 
to ensure that they are not being asked to exercise their discretion in a manner that circumvents the Convention 
or the Model Law.” Ghikas is a Canadian QC and barrister. 
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Where the arbitrator entertains doubts as to the bona fides of the application he is faced with 
two conflicting considerations, first, to give due consideration to the application and second, 
to give due consideration to the delay to be occasioned by the application. How does an 
arbitrator proceed? The mischief engendered by the application is delay.  The stage at which 
the application is made is a significant factor.  In a genuine case, applicant counsel will offer 
an acceptable explanation and or some proof of the cause of adjournment enabling the 
arbitrator to grant the adjournment readily, with or without an award of the wasted costs, as 
appropriate.  Indeed the offer of wasted costs also makes it easier for the application to be 
granted even if grudgingly; but because even wasted costs do not fully cure the prejudice 
caused by delay482 the application may be granted only where the arbitrator is persuaded by 
the reasons offered. The arbitrator’s duty to ensure fairness and justice between the parties in 
this regard is as important as the accompanying need for expeditious disposal of the 
dispute.483 
 
It is submitted that an arbitrator ought not to be intimidated by suspicious stratagems 
particularly because a court will be less likely to upset an arbitrator’s rational decision to 
allow or disallow an adjournment following the due hearing and consideration of the grounds 
and merits of the application and without any serious procedural irregularity or breach of any 
rule of natural justice by the arbitrator. 
 
The national arbitration statutes of Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe do not provide guidelines 
for dealing with requests for adjournments or for stemming their frequency. This is no cause 
for despair or for an arbitrator to succumb to disdainful treatment of the proceedings by one of 
the parties. Parties present themselves differently to the tribunal. The Model Law recognizes 
the differences in parties and indeed arbitrators by requiring the tribunal to treat the parties 
with equality and to accord each party a full opportunity for presenting his case.484 The 
hearing and determination of applications may well facilitate the proceedings. Some parties 
lose interest soon after the initiation or commencement of proceedings and become inactive or 
dilatory; others become aggressive, uncooperative or deliberate defaulters, who fail or refuse 
to comply with arbitral orders and directives. The conduct and performance of parties and 
                                                 
482Monetary compensation is what an adjudicator may deem sufficient for a particular kind of prejudice or 
injury; but it is never a full or complete atonement or remedy for an unquantifiable prejudice or injury suffered. 
For a tactful applicant the offer of wasted costs may be a cheaper price to pay for the benefit of an advantageous 
postponement.   
483 See Du Plessis PW “Procedural Rules: the Supreme Court and the Rules for the Conduct of Arbitrations” 
(1987) 5(6) The Professional Builder 22 for the criteria for evaluating arbitral procedures. 
484 Article 18. 
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their advisers from the very beginning to the time of the application may shed light on how to 
treat them and the degree of consideration and firmness necessary to deal with adjournments 
at their behest.  The prudent arbitrator will be guided by such factors and the reasons 
proffered for the adjournment in determining the request within the terms of the arbitration 
agreement, the permissible rules of practice and the governing law. On the other hand an 
arbitrator can be firm in rejecting a frivolous request or one unsupported by rational 
explanation or excuse, without pampering to exaggerated notions of fair play or turning the 
otherwise helpful rules of practice into absolute articles of faith. 
 
It may be added that an application for an adjournment or postponement calls for a procedural 
ruling which is distinguishable from an interim award. The former deals with the procedure to 
be followed by the tribunal and parties towards the determination of their dispute. The latter, 
an interim award, determines an issue or matter in dispute while postponing other issues to be 
determined in the final award. The essence of the distinction is that a court may interfere with 
a procedural ruling by an arbitrator during the arbitration only in exceptional circumstances. 
Therefore an arbitrator on the right track, so to speak, need not fear court interference with his 
ruling on a request for an adjournment or postponement. In Tuesday Industries (Pty) Ltd v 
Condor Industries (Pty) 1978 4 SA 379 (T) 383F-384E a South African court declined to 
interfere with an arbitrator’s refusal to grant a postponement. 
 
The widening of the range of available procedural powers as done, for example, by the 
English Arbitration Act 1996,485 would enable an arbitrator to deal confidently with requests 
for adjournments to enable parties to gather more evidence or produce particular documents, 
or prepare additional witnesses for the hearing. This is because under the new powers given 
by the English Act the tribunal can, after identifying the issues in the dispute, refuse 
adjournments based on the grounds noted above by opting to determine some issues without 
receiving any evidence or determine other issues on documents only without a hearing, or 
hold a hearing confined to the determination of specific issues only. Such an approach is very 
likely to save time and expense and an arbitrator who exercises the variety of options offered 
by law can hardly be expected to incur the wrath of a court for refusing an unnecessary 
adjournment. 
 
The same considerations would apply to the refusal of a request for an adjournment that 
hinges on an alleged need for full discovery of documents. On the same or similar principles 
                                                 
485 S 34(2)(g). 
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to those enacted by the English Arbitration Act and the need to perform the duties listed under 
section 33 of the Act, a degree of robustness will be necessary for an arbitrator to deny 
requests for full discovery. This ought to be encouraged not only to curtail the circumstances 
in which discovery may be sought but also in the interests of saving time and expense. 
 
It was noted earlier that the scant literature on the subject of adjournments and postponements 
may in part be explained by the fact that procedural rulings on applications for adjournments 
and postponements are conceivably within the procedural discretion of the arbitral tribunal, 
without more, to deal with such incidents as appropriate. This would naturally require an 
arbitrator to take charge of the arbitral process from the very beginning with regard to the 
allocation of time for the parties to do all things necessary for the effective conduct of the 
arbitration. Adjournments are therefore not confined to actual proceedings or hearings but 
also to preliminary and other arbitral meetings before the hearing. It is therefore not 
uncommon for major arbitral meetings to be adjourned, or for several short adjournments to 
occur so that in appropriate circumstances members of the tribunal can confer in private or for 
party representatives to engage in private discussions.486 The opportunity so afforded by 
legitimate adjournments which enable the parties, with the guidance of the tribunal, to agree 
on the basic framework and organization of the proceedings can save time and costs for all 
concerned. The legitimacy of “comfort-breaks”487 during actual proceedings is recognized by 
the authors Redfern and Hunter as necessary for elderly arbitrators “who (unlike the parties 
and their representatives) cannot slip out for a few minutes while the hearing is in progress!” 
It boils down to a flexible approach by the tribunal that is capable of being adapted to the 
circumstances of a particular case or a particular hearing. The authors therefore recommend 
an occasional half-day or even full day adjournment to afford sufficient time for lawyers to 
prepare their cases and speeches in the course of the proceedings. A tribunal should take 
charge of the proceedings488 and proceed firmly but fairly in the expectation that the parties 
will respond accordingly in making the best use of the time allotted for presentation of their 
cases. 
 
A conscientious arbitrator would frown upon the waste of arbitration time whether generally 
or through tactical requests for adjournments and postponements and the ensuing delay in the 
                                                 
486 Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 279. 
487 Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 223. 
488 Although the authors are primarily concerned with international commercial arbitration, their views are also 
pertinent to domestic arbitration. “The Arbitral Tribunal shall be in full charge of the hearings” per ICC 
Arbitration Rules article 21.3. 
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conduct of the proceedings and the delivery of the award. Comparing the incidence of wasted 
time in litigation and arbitration it has been said that 
 
“[u]ntil recent years, if the matters in dispute in a civil action had been referred to arbitration 
rather than to the courts, the probability was that the procedure would have been the same, the 
waste of time the same, and the waste of costs even greater (in that the arbitrator’s time would 
have been paid by the parties whereas the judge’s time was in large part paid by the state). An 
arbitrator should be free of all this.”489 
 
And further that 
 
“[i]n a large proportion of arbitrations he (an arbitrator) is himself an expert in the field in 
which the dispute arises. In consequence he can read the documents with greater 
understanding than most lay judges, because he does not have to be led like a child through 
500 or 5,000 pages of documents, having elementary trade or technical expressions 
explained.”490  
 
The changes made by the English Arbitration Act 1996 enabling an English arbitrator to take 
charge and control of all aspects of arbitration proceedings including adjournments can be 
immediately appreciated in the light of these comments. This is because, in the words of the 
authors quoted above, 
 
“[t]he Act enables the arbitrator to be bold and innovative in deciding new procedures and not 
merely to continue to use the traditional procedures modeled on litigation. The idea that 
litigation or arbitration, even of complex technical disputes, needs to take weeks or months of 
hearings is being seriously questioned. … The Woolf proposals for case management have as 
an objective the reduction of the time spent in hearings with a view to saving both time and 
money.491 
 
The authors conclude their observations on time-saving techniques, which are relevant in both 
litigation and arbitration, with the statement that 
 
“[t]here are many procedural devices for expedition and in the absence of agreement of the 
parties, arbitrators must opt for the most expeditious and economic procedural solution. That 
                                                 
489 Bernstein et al Handbook of Arbitration Practice 106. 
490 Bernstein et al Handbook of Arbitration Practice 106. 
491 Bernstein et al Handbook of Arbitration Practice 106. 
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should be the objective in programming the arbitration and in particular in deciding the 
timing, length and purpose of hearings.”492 
 
Another commentator observes, with regard to how time can be wasted, that 
 
“[t]ime is a particularly precious commodity in international arbitral proceedings … that it is a 
curiosity of the legal process, and particularly so in its arbitral manifestation, that work tends 
to expand to exceed available time. This is what the timely arbitrator must prevent. … The 
purpose of hearings is to help the tribunal resolve the dispute. Counsel are to be given a 
reasonable opportunity to put in their evidence, and to persuade the arbitrators; but it is for the 
tribunal, not counsel to determine what is reasonable. Another frequent cause of wasted time 
is the failure to achieve an understanding on the part of all participants as to what will happen 
in the course of hearings. … In most cases, this kind of misadventure is easy to avoid. What 
the presiding arbitrator needs to do is to consult with counsel in order to understand their 
desiderata and expectations, and to explain those of the arbitral tribunal. This is how a clear 
schedule may be established. It provides the discipline within which the advocates are called 
upon to exercise their talents.”493 
 
One cannot but be impressed by the persuasive force and effect of these salutary remarks by 
the distinguished authors quoted above. Surely there is some foundation for arbitrators in the 
African jurisdictions that have drawn from the Model Law provisions of Articles 18 and 19 as 
well as English arbitration culture to move in the same or similar direction as English 
arbitrators. This may have the desirable result of curtailing wasted time otherwise occasioned 
by conservative and excessively cautionary methods of dealing with applications for 
adjournments and postponements. 
 
3.4.2 Delay 
 
Delay is so closely tied up with adjournments and postponements because it is a direct 
consequence of those arbitral processes. Moreover the effect of adjournments, postponements 
and delay are the same – the prolongation of proceedings, increased costs and expenses and 
postponement of the delivery of the award. Therefore having exemplified some of the 
                                                 
492 Bernstein et al Handbook of Arbitration Practice 106. 
493 Paulsson J “The Timely Arbitrator: Reflections on the Böckstiegel Method” (2006) 22 Arbitration 
International 19-20. This article is written with reference to the arbitration of Tradex Hellas SA v Republic of 
Albania award rendered on 29 April 1999, (1999) 14 ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal 161. 
Paulsson suggests that this arbitration provides an interesting illustration of the Böckstiegel approach to the 
avoidance of time-wasting in arbitration practice  
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commonest causes and excuses for adjournments and postponements it would be appropriate 
also to discuss the incidence of delay with particular reference to adjournments and 
postponements, drawing upon the experiences of other jurisdictions in combating inexcusable 
delay.  
 
The reasons for delay vary due to the different sources from which delays emanate, such as, 
the arbitral parties, the arbitrators themselves and the intervention of the courts, whether 
warranted or not. It seems that since adjournments and postponements are primarily at the 
instance of the arbitral parties and to a lesser extent at the instance of the arbitral tribunal, it is 
on those particular sources that this discussion should focus. Thereafter the discussion will 
extend briefly to expedition494 and sound management of time in arbitration as the corollary 
of delay. 
 
3.4.3 Delay by a Party 
 
Delay by parties is the commonest form and originating source of prolongation of 
proceedings. 
 
The apprehension of limitations of time may prompt a claimant to initiate arbitration 
proceedings quickly by, for instance, nominating an arbitrator or inviting the respondent to 
concur in the appointment of an arbitrator, after which nothing happens. Signals of time-
wasting and delay begin to surface even at this early stage.  The claimant may not have the 
financial resources to go further than this; or he may have real difficulties in providing his 
counsel with the necessary information for preparing the points of claim or supporting 
evidence from prospective witnesses or having access to essential documents to be relied on 
in advancing the claim.  The respondent may have a multiplicity of reasons for slowing down 
the arbitral process, including principally the not unreal expectation that the claimant may run 
out of steam financially or be so frustrated by his own slow progress or some obfuscation by 
the respondent that he gives up altogether. Either way the arbitral tribunal cannot move until 
the initial hurdles are overcome and the tribunal is empanelled and takes charge of the 
process. A different source of delay may then set in by the tribunal’s inability to act.  The 
                                                 
494 Bernstein et al Handbook of Arbitration Practice 113-114, in their section “On Expedition and How to 
Achieve it”, identify four possible situations: (i) where both parties want speed, (ii) where both parties want 
delay, (iii) where the claimant wants delay and the respondent wants speed, and (iv) where the claimant wants 
speed and the respondent wants delay. This study is primarily concerned with the last-mentioned category 
because it is mainly here that the problem considered in this discussion lies. 
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assistance that may be required from the court to break the impasse may in turn be held up by 
the court’s delay in finding and fixing the time to entertain the request for assistance.  That is 
why the incidence of delay by parties, arbitrators and the court system is in each case 
susceptible to separate categorization and consideration. What is emphasized here in this 
connection is that arbitrators must have enforceable powers to keep the arbitration on course 
with neither party having the opportunity to delay matters or refuse their cooperation. 
 
Some particular instances in which a claimant who has initiated arbitral proceedings may 
subsequently desire to slow down and delay the process have been identified.495 The claimant 
may want to delay an arbitration upon realizing subsequently after starting the arbitral process 
that his claim does not have the value he had anticipated. In another instance, the claimant 
may be discouraged from pursuing the claim after being confronted with a counter-claim with 
ostensibly better chances of success. In a third instance the claimant may want delay on 
realizing that he has more to gain from the mere existence of the claim than from its early 
resolution.496 
 
The strategies adopted by the respondent to delay arbitration and enforcement of awards can 
be divided into pre-award and post-award categories.497 The former included the respondent’s 
refusal to reply to the claimant’s communications inviting the nomination of arbitrators, 
refusal to accept the claimant’s nominees, causing delay by invoking the mechanism, if 
available under the arbitration agreement, of resorting to a third party (such as an institutional 
head) to appoint the arbitrator. Again where the arbitration clause permits each party to 
appoint its own arbitrator, the respondent may simply refuse to do so or delay doing so. 
Resort to court for the appointment of an arbitrator can be the deliberate choice of the 
respondent to take advantage of the several months it might take from the start to the 
completion of that process. In cases where the respondent is a non-resident the claimant might 
be put through the cumbersome and protracted process of serving the respondent abroad with 
the necessary application. The use of any ploy or a combination of them can delay the 
arbitration by several months. 
 
                                                 
495 Harris C “Abuse of the Arbitration Process – Delaying Tactics and Disruptions” (1992) 9(2) Journal of 
International Arbitration 87-88. 
496 Bernstein et al Handbook of Arbitration Practice 114. The authors give as an example of this unusual 
situation that of a company in financial straits which is depending on its bank for financial facilities to keep 
going while the bank has over-optimistic expectations from the claim. 
497 Harris (1992) 9(2) Journal of International Arbitration 88. 
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Even after the tribunal is empanelled the respondent’s clever choice of a busy arbitrator and 
busy lawyers may also slow down the arbitration process. The fixing of time-tables several 
months ahead for each of the arbitral processes with a “liberty to apply” provision for any 
eventualities may add to the respondent’s store of delaying tactics. 
 
Change of lawyers mid-stream, failure to pay lawyers leading to their withdrawal and the 
need for their replacement to ensure fair representation and equal treatment are additional 
ploys available to the respondent. Other procedural irritants inflicted on the claimant might 
take the form of converting at an advanced stage a hitherto informal exchange of submissions 
towards an amicable settlement into a full-blown formal arbitration, notwithstanding several 
months of preceding and lengthy negotiations. Late applications for production of additional 
evidence necessitated by the course of events during the hearing, applications for discovery of 
documents, security for costs, and references of questions of law to court where permitted by 
the relevant law are manoeuvres available to a respondent bent on delay before the award.498 
 
Post-award strategies for delay would include challenges to the validity of the award. The 
alleged grounds for doing so may be that the tribunal has admitted a mistake that must be 
corrected, or that fresh evidence has been unearthed subsequent to the award, or for 
“misconduct” in the form of some technical error in the conduct or procedure of the 
arbitration. An appeal from an award, where permitted by law, can be a source of delay in 
enforcing the award. The respondent’s resistance to enforcement of the award by refusing to 
pay up and so necessitating resort to court enlarges the scope for delay.499 
 
As English procedures are influential in arbitration law and practice in Kenya and some 
African jurisdictions, an elaboration of English trends and approaches to delay is appropriate. 
It was long recognized that although a claimant might be inactive after initiating the 
proceedings, a respondent who desired the termination of the proceedings was unable under 
the English Common Law to have the claim dismissed. This was because neither the tribunal 
nor the court had the power to dismiss a claim for want of prosecution.500 The absence of the 
power of a tribunal or court to dismiss an arbitral claim for (i) lack of diligent prosecution; or 
(ii) an implied repudiatory breach of contract by an indolent claimant; or (iii) frustration of the 
agreement to arbitrate because a satisfactory trial of the dispute was no longer possible; or (iv) 
                                                 
498 Harris (1992) 9(2) Journal of International Arbitration 88-91. 
499 Harris (1992) 9(2) Journal of International Arbitration 91-94. 
500 Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau und Maschinenfabrik v South India shipping Corp (the Bremer Vulkan) [1981] 1All 
ER 289; Food Corporation of India v Antclizo Shipping Corporation (The Antclizo), [1988] 2 All ER 513. 
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lapse of the right to arbitrate for not being exercised within a reasonable time; or (v) the 
abandonment of the intention to arbitrate by both parties – was therefore a product of judicial 
precedent of the English Common Law.501  
 
Since “Bremer Vulkan” in 1981 respondents have sought the dismissal of an arbitration on 
ground of excessive delay by the claimant. But it was not until the changes introduced by 
section 102 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 that the dismissal of an arbitration for 
want of prosecution or for inordinate and inexcusable delay in pursuing an arbitral claim 
became possible or at any rate was put on the same footing as similar proceedings in court. It 
seemed nevertheless that the position in English arbitration law started changing before the 
1990 Courts and Legal Services Act and the 1996 Arbitration Act because the Arbitration Act 
1979502 did grant arbitrators whose directions had not been followed, powers to apply to the 
court for an order authorizing them to continue with the arbitration.503 
 
The old common law position is therefore no longer tenable or maintainable in the light of the 
progressive changes in English law by the Arbitration Act 1966.504 For jurisdictions like 
Kenya that follow trends in English law the provisions of section 41 are instructive.505 Under 
section 41(1) the parties can agree on the arbitral tribunal’s powers in case of default by a 
party to do something necessary for the proper and expeditious conduct of the arbitration. 
Under section 41(2) “unless otherwise agreed by the parties”, the provisions of section 41(3) 
would apply, so that, 
 
“if the tribunal is satisfied that there has been inordinate and inexcusable delay on the part of 
the claimant in pursuing his claim and that the delay –  
gives rise, or is likely to give rise, to a substantial risk that it is not possible to have a fair 
resolution of the issues in that claim, or  
has caused, or is likely to cause, serious prejudice to the respondent 
the tribunal may make an award dismissing the claim.” 
 
                                                 
501 The Bremer Vulkan above; Paal Wilson & Co. A/S v Partenreederei Hannah Blumenthal (The Hannah 
Blumenthal) [1983] 1 All ER 34; World Pride Shipping Ltd v Daiichi Chuo Kisen Kaisha [1984] 2 Lloyds Rep 
489; The Antclizo above. 
502 See the Arbitration Act 1979 s 5. 
503 It was recognised however that this power was ineffective as it rested upon the arbitrators having first made 
an order which had been disobeyed. 
504 See the Arbitration Act 1996 ss 41, 42 and 48(3). 
505 Under s 41(6) if the claimant fails to comply with a peremptory order of the tribunal to provide security for 
costs, his claim may be dismissed. 
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What must be noted is that subsection (3) operates subject to contrary agreement in 
accordance with sub-section (2). Therefore it is possible for the parties to agree in writing to 
exclude this power from the tribunal.  There may also be no need for the respondent to make 
an application to the tribunal for striking out as, it seems, the arbitrators may do so of their 
own volition.  The significant point here is that the arbitrator can prevent the arbitration from 
becoming dormant by issuing the required warnings to the claimant.506 
 
The dilatory respondent who may delay in concurring in the appointment of an arbitrator, or 
in filing Points of Defence or producing documents will now be caught by the provisions of 
sections 41(4), (5) and (7) of the 1996 Act. It will suffice to set out the provisions of section 
41(4) which are prefixed by the words “if without showing sufficient cause” and then goes on 
to provide 
 
 “a party, 
(a) fails to attend or be represented at an oral hearing of which due notice was given, or  
(b) where matters are to be dealt with in writing, fails after due notice to submit written 
evidence or make written submissions, the tribunal may continue the proceedings in the 
absence of that party or, as the case may be, without any written evidence or submissions on 
his behalf, and may make an award on the basis of the evidence before it.” 
 
The point to observe here is that the above provisions are in the nature of peremptory orders 
and that the making of such orders by arbitrators is subject to the arbitration agreement or 
other agreements by the parties.  In effect therefore the power may be excluded by written 
agreement of the parties.  But assuming it is not excluded, if the peremptory order is not 
complied with, arbitrators then have enforcement powers under section 41(7), including 
drawing an adverse inference from the act of non-compliance, proceeding to an award on the 
materials before the tribunal, and making orders as to the costs of the arbitration incurred 
through the non-compliance.  Where necessary, section 42 of the Act empowers the court to 
order compliance with the arbitrator’s peremptory orders. 
                                                 
506 Guidelines in striking out cases for want of prosecution by the court and tribunal are propositions of law and 
not discretion: see Allen v Sir Alfred McAlpine & Sons Ltd [1968] 2 QB229; Birkett v James [1978] AC 297; 
Department of Transport v Chris Smaller (Transport) Ltd [1989] 1 All ER 897; Roebuck v Mungovin [1994] 1 
All ER 568. Arbitrators must therefore take those judicial guidelines into account in determining whether they 
have jurisdiction to exercise the discretion to strike out or not.  There is also judicial authority for the general 
assumption that a striking-out within the limitation period should not lightly or readily be ordered in both judicial 
and arbitration cases. See James Lazenby & Co. v McNicholas Construction Co Ltd [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 30. 
The logic is that a plaintiff or claimant whose suit or claim is struck out before the expiry of the limitation period 
is always able to start a fresh action until the action is dismissed for want of prosecution or determined on the 
merits. 
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Article 25 of the Model Law deals with the types of default specified under the article, 
including failure to communicate a statement of claim507 or defence508 or to appear at a 
hearing or produce documentary evidence. In such instances the tribunal may continue the 
proceedings and make the award on the evidence before it.509 As with the position under 
English law the parties may by agreement exclude the default provisions; if not excluded, the 
party against whom the article is invoked has an opportunity to show sufficient cause to 
negate its operation. 
 
The scheme of the default provisions of Article 25 does not fully unfold without reference to 
the provisions of Article 23 governing the time agreed by the parties or determined by the 
tribunal for delivery of pleadings, submission of documents or other evidence to be relied on 
in the proceedings, amendments and supplements to claims and defences.510 The fact that the 
framers of this law had the incidence of delay in their contemplation is manifested by the 
discretion conferred upon the tribunal to disallow an amendment during the course of the 
proceedings if it considers it inappropriate to allow such amendment having regard to the 
delay in making it.511 
 
There are significant differences in the default provisions of the national statutes of Kenya, 
Nigeria, Zimbabwe and England.  Under section 26 of the Kenyan Arbitration Act 1995, 
Article 25 of the First Schedule of the Zimbabwean Act 1996 and section 41 of the English 
Act 1996 there is an additional provision empowering the tribunal to make an award 
dismissing the claim for failure of prosecution.512 The Model Law and the Nigerian statute do 
not provide for dismissal of the claim but for the termination of the proceedings or its 
continuation to an award.513 In spite of the absence of the specific statutory power of 
dismissal one Nigerian jurist has submitted that, “though hewn from the rock of English law, 
Nigerian law rejected the old English common law approach even before the making of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law in 1985, and that if a claimant was indolent and did not pursue the 
claim, it could be dismissed.”514 He states additionally that 
                                                 
507 Under Article 25(a) the tribunal is empowered to terminate the proceedings. 
508 Under Article 25(b) the tribunal must continue the proceedings without treating such failure in itself as an 
admission of the claimant’s allegations. 
509 Article 25(c). 
510 Article 23(1). 
511 Article 23(2). 
512 Section 26 (d) Kenya; article 25 (d) Zimbabwe; section 41 (3) England 
513 Model Law Article 25 (a), (b) and (c); Nigerian statute section 21 (a), (b) and (c) 
514 Okekeifere AI “The UNCITRAL Model Law and the Problem of Delay in International Commercial 
Arbitration” (1997) 14(1) Journal of International Arbitration 125-139. He cites as authority in support of his 
submission Commissioner of Lands v Edo-Osagie and Others, (1974) 9 NSCC 562. 
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“[i]n countries like Nigeria where this provision [Model Law Article 25] has been enacted the 
problem of deliberate delay is substantially removed.” 
 
Three recurrent causes of delay by a party in a Kenyan context deserve brief comment. 
 
(i) Failure to appear or participate in the proceedings as a cause of delay 
 
A party’s failure or refusal to appear or participate in the arbitration, when it occurs, is 
troublesome for an arbitral tribunal.  This is because a good arbitrator, like a good judge, 
would prefer to do justice between the parties rather than be compelled into ex parte 
proceedings with their attendant shortcomings and hazards.  Steering a correct middle course, 
in the absence of a party who has deliberately refused to recognize the arbitrator, is a skilful 
exercise requiring judicious circumspection. 
 
It is submitted that the duty of an arbitrator, who is faced with the prospect of ex parte 
proceedings, is to give due notice to the defaulting party and to proceed with the arbitration. 
Caution, not timidity, would require the arbitrator to give notice of any steps intended to be 
taken in the ensuing proceedings and so to afford the defaulter an opportunity to react to the 
notice. Where the reason for the defaulter’s refusal to participate is a challenge to the 
arbitrator’s jurisdiction, the arbitrator can give an opportunity for the issue of jurisdiction to 
be tried and determined.  In this writer’s view, failure by the defaulter to appear to deal with 
or to respond in some appropriate way to the arbitrator’s notice of hearing that issue is more 
likely to put the defaulter, rather than the arbitrator, at risk of damnation by the court. 
In the absence of Model Law or national law guidelines on the subject, the provisions of the 
English Arbitration Act sections 41(4), (5) and (7), discussed above, can be emulated in 
developing Kenyan legislation on the subject.  It is submitted section 41(4) will enable the 
tribunal to continue the proceedings in the absence of a party after due notice and make an 
award.  Alternatively, under section 41(5) a peremptory order stating an intention to proceed 
ex parte unless there is compliance with an arbitral order within a specified period would, if 
disobeyed by the defaulting party, enable the tribunal, under section 41(7) to make an award 
on the basis of such materials available to it. It is then not open to a defaulting party to a 
peremptory order, to complain thereafter that the arbitrator failed to give due notice of the 
proceedings or that they were conducted in his absence. 
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(ii) Lack of a Genuine Defence 
 
Delay may also be caused by a party, who has no genuine defence to an arbitral claim, filing a 
pre-emptive action in court arising from the same cause or facts to delay or frustrate the 
arbitration.  Here the Model Law provides a mandatory stay of court proceedings by the court 
before which the action is brought, thus referring the parties to arbitration unless the court 
finds the arbitration agreement null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.515 
Delay is also eliminated or minimized by the power of the tribunal to commence or continue 
with the proceedings, including the making of an award, while the issue is pending before the 
court.  As noted earlier, in Kenya it is rare for an arbitrator to exercise the power to continue 
the proceedings while an aspect of the dispute is before the court, as the tendency is for the 
court to stay the arbitration pending its decision.  This power is abused by parties who take 
advantage of the slowness of litigation to frustrate their opponents. The abuse can be 
eliminated by an amendment to the Kenyan statute and the imposition of strict time-limits for 
the court’s decision, substantial costs and even punitive damages against a party found guilty 
of such abuse. 
 
A party may also adopt the delaying tactic of making repeated applications to the arbitral 
tribunal. Practical common sense would suggest that a party does so at the risk of running-up 
wasted costs and, for fear of court interventions, a timid arbitrator may be inclined to keep on 
entertaining and hearing repeated applications by a party who has the resources for making 
such unmeritorious applications.  The Model Law and UNCITRAL rules have no provisions 
for barring a party from presenting many applications. Here the arbitrator has his integrity, 
firmness and credibility on his side to stem the tide of spurious applications by remembering 
that he is chosen for his reputation and experience and the ability to do justice between the 
disputes. 
 
                                                 
515 Article 8 (1). 
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(iii) Resort to Court as a Delaying Tactic 
 
Court intervention is a source of delay in arbitration.516 Whether warranted or not applications 
to court on preliminary rulings of the tribunal, the case stated procedure in jurisdictions that 
provide for that procedure or for referral of points of law to the court and appeals–all of these 
processes can be abused or deployed as delaying strategies by the reluctant party.517 Harris, 
appearing to have it both ways, by first suggesting delaying strategies to the respondent, at the 
same time offers the claimant the remedy of instituting legal proceedings for summary 
judgment based on the award and seeking the conversion of the award into a judgment for 
enforcement in the normal way.518 Bernstein et al519 suggest that in most cases the practical 
sanction against delay or default is the reluctance of a party who seriously intends to pursue a 
claim or defence to incur the displeasure of the arbitrator. Therefore a party should obtain 
clear directions for progressing the arbitration and, in default of compliance by the other 
party, should promptly apply to the arbitrator for assistance towards speedy compliance. 
 
Article 5 of the Model Law and the national statutes that replicate its provisions assist 
arbitration by limiting court intervention to matters in which the power of intervention is 
specifically conferred by the Model Law. The case stated procedure received no mention in 
the Model Law and Kenyan arbitration legislation permits appeals under very restricted 
circumstances with the consent of the parties;520 and the reference of matters of law to the 
court is governed by the parties’ agreement as prescribed by the domestic statute.521 Article 5 
is arguably useful for curbing the delays that might be prompted by unwarranted applications 
for adjournments. Its effectiveness ultimately depends on the willingness of the courts to limit 
and not to expand judicial intervention. 
 
                                                 
516 Delay in the adversarial system is said to be due largely to the nature of the judge’s role: see Landsman S (ed)  
Readings on Adversarial Justice: The American Approach to Adjudication 1988  25. See also Redfern & Hunter 
International Commercial Arbitration 288 para 6-46 on “Avoiding delay and disruption”, where the authors state 
that arbitration relies on speed and cost-effectiveness for its survival. They add that it is therefore important that 
the procedure adopted by the tribunal should be fair and that a balance be struck between speed and fairness, so 
no absolute time-limits can be prescribed. Furthermore, the parties have their own role to play, keeping in mind 
the issue of delay. 
517 As recognised and listed in Harris (1992) 9(2) Journal of International Arbitration 92-93. 
518 Harris (1992) 9(2) Journal of International Arbitration 93. 
519 Bernstein et al Handbook of Arbitration Practice 115. 
520 S 39(b) of the Kenya Arbitration Act 1995 is limited to domestic arbitration and, unlike for example ss 45 and 
69 of the English Act 1996, which are contract-out provisions, is a contract-in provision. 
521 Kenya Arbitration Act 1995 39(a). 
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Apart from unwarranted applications delay may also be caused, as noted earlier, by 
unwarranted challenges to the award itself.522 In so far as judicial intervention is not outlawed, 
resort to court remains the right of arbitral parties as long as it is not abused. Sometimes the 
parties unintentionally delay the proceedings by their incomplete agreement leaving it to be 
interpreted by the tribunal or the court through preliminary hearings that might have been 
avoided. Arbitral parties in a Kenyan arbitration must be duty-bound by legislation to do what 
is necessary for the proper and expeditious conduct of the proceedings, as specifically done in 
England by the provisions of section 40 of the Arbitration Act 1996. 
 
3.4.4 Delay by the Arbitrators 
 
Parties are not the only source of delay. Arbitrators may wittingly or unwittingly contribute to 
delay. This may arise through inefficient case management and by prescribing unrealistic 
time-frames for activities to be done by the parties resulting in avoidable applications for 
extensions of time. Thus it has been said that 
 
“[f]inding the right balance between giving a party the time that he requests for preparing his 
case, and the date that he requests for presenting it, without imposing on the proceedings a 
delay unacceptable to the other party, requires judgment.”523 
 
Good judgment in arbitration practice with regard to case management and prudent allocation 
of time for things to be done can only come through consultation between all concerned – 
arbitrators, lawyers and other participants involved in the arbitration. In acknowledgment of 
the need for arbitrators to consult counsel and the consequences of failing to achieve a modus 
operandi et vivendi for the arbitration one commentator observes that 
 
“one comes up against another curiosity which seems inherent in the nature of lawyers, 
namely that our ignorance of what is about to happen does not seem to inhibit our holding 
strong opinions on the subject. And thus one finds time and again, that each side has made 
different assumptions about the unfolding of events, and prepared itself in consequence, while 
the tribunal has a third idea and therefore promptly frustrates both sets of litigants. The sadly 
                                                 
522 See also para 3.2.2 above on the abatement of challenges. 
523 Bernstein et al Handbook of Arbitration Practice 113. Because fixing dates well in advance may raise 
difficulties, the authors suggest that it is sensible, when fixing dates in circumstances where the arbitrator 
suspects the time estimates are “seat of the pants” estimates, to invite the parties to summarise what they expect 
the issues to be. At least this will give the arbitrator a draft agenda against which to test any application for a new 
(and therefore probably longer and later) date. 
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frequent result is a muddled discussion at the outset of the hearings (time wasted already!), 
whereupon some half-thought-out modus vivendi is worked out – and those who care about 
expeditiousness are left to hope, nervously, that the thing will somehow be concluded on time, 
and that at least some of their preparation will turn out to have served a purpose.”524 
 
An arbitrator who has in fact accepted appointment but fails to communicate the fact to the 
parties or his co-arbitrators can also cause delay as does an arbitrator who fails to act with 
dispatch and without undue delay. The busy arbitrator is another source of avoidable delay. In 
his “Respondent’s Guide” to the possibilities of delay Harris, tongue-in-cheek or, perhaps 
more accurately, mischievously, recommends to a respondent seeking delay to “appoint an 
arbitrator known to be extremely busy, accompanying this appointment by the choice of busy 
solicitors, counsel, expert witnesses and the like.”525 This is possible, but one wonders 
whether a reputable arbitrator, worthy of that description and deserving such recognition, 
would knowingly act along with such a respondent deliberately to delay an arbitration. It is 
easy to suggest that a busy arbitrator would decline an appointment but for the understandable 
human condescension to being sought out and flattered by the appointment and hoping to be 
available to arbitrate the dispute. There is also the possibility of the appointer’s legitimate 
preference and insistence on a particular arbitrator, however busy, for his known skills and 
expertise and of that arbitrator feeling obliged to accept the appointment in order not to 
disappoint a perhaps valuable appointer. 
 
The Model Law has no prescription for the length of time taken for making awards; but 
although the Kenyan Arbitration Act, for example, does not prescribe time-limits for making 
an award it is not unusual for parties to agree a time frame for adoption in an appropriate 
arbitral directive prescribing a specified period within which to produce the award. Domestic 
rules of practice can fill the gap by stipulating times for communicating acceptance of 
appointment and for making an award. Indeed, domestic arbitration institutions and 
associations tend to do so to expedite arbitration.   The South African Arbitration Act 1965 s 
23 prescribes four months from the date of entering the reference for an arbitrator to make an 
award, unless the parties otherwise agree or such time is extended by the parties or the court. 
Rule 36.4 of the Standard Procedure Rules of the Association of Arbitrators (Southern Africa) 
6th edition, 2009, requires delivery of the award “as soon as practicable but in any event 
within 20 days after the conclusion of the hearing, or the submission of the last document to 
                                                 
524 Paulsson (2006) 22 Arbitration International 20. 
525 Harris (1992) 9(2) Journal of International Arbitration 89. 
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the Arbitrator”, if no hearing is required. The parties can nevertheless extend the time at the 
request of the arbitrator. This rule is partly necessitated by the above-mentioned provision of s 
23, in order to avoid problems created by the section. The Centre for Arbitration and Dispute 
Resolution (CADER) of Uganda prescribes 60 days from appointment of the arbitrator to the 
delivery of the award.526 As noted earlier the English Arbitration Act 1996 is explicit on the 
duty of the arbitral tribunal to act fairly and impartially as between parties and to adopt 
suitable procedures to avoid unnecessary delay and expense.527 The exercise of this 
discretionary power is part of the statutory scheme for expediting arbitration but obviously 
cannot be a license for an arbitrator to indulge himself in exceeding his powers. The duty to 
avoid unnecessary delay and expense is also tempered by the duty to act fairly and 
impartially. 
 
On the need for arbitrators to take charge of the proceedings and be firm about unwarranted 
adjournments, postponements and the ensuing delay the words of Lord Roskill to arbitrators 
come to mind: 
 
“Rule 1 is – keep control of the proceedings and don’t let cases drift. Remember you are the 
masters of your own procedure, then never try to fit every case into the same procedural strait-
jacket because some won’t fit. Be flexible, as flexible as you can in trying to meet the wishes 
of the parties, but above all be firm, politely firm, especially about delay. Why is it that some 
arbitrators seem frightened to grasp the nettle and take control of the cases and show that 
delay will not be tolerated. We all, I think, have some inbuilt fear of doing an injustice if we 
refuse to accept an excuse for seeking further time for pleading or discovery or a request, 
attractively if unjustifiably advanced, for an adjournment of the hearing. A judge may feel 
inclined to take the risk because there is always the Court of Appeal to direct him if he has 
gone too far in a particular direction. But in matters like this an arbitrator has for all practical 
purposes both the first and last word and I often think he fears that if he is firm someone may 
thereafter accuse him in the courts of ‘misconduct’, that dreadful word. I can understand the 
fear though I sincerely believe it to be unjustified. It has, I think, an historical basis and stems 
from the days when the courts were hostile to arbitrators, but I do not believe that any court 
would presume to criticize an arbitrator who was firm in dealing with disobedience to his 
orders, so long as he acted fairly.”528 
 
                                                 
526 See CADER Rules. 
527 S 33(1). 
528 The Third Alexander Lecture, 8 March 1977 published in (1977) Arbitration 4, and quoted in Bernstein et al 
Handbook of Arbitration Practice 93. 
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So there it all was and is - the challenge to arbitrators, fashioned in exuberant, exalted and 
hortatory rhetoric, and it may be added, to be firm, fair and “timely arbitrators”.529 
 
3.4.5 Conclusion 
 
It is apparent from this discussion that adjournments are a regular feature of arbitrations.  This 
means some adjournments and resultant delays will be inevitable and unavoidable. An 
arbitrator will be obliged to grant such adjournments to facilitate the proceedings.  It is also 
apparent that many adjournments resulting in considerable delay of the proceedings and the 
delivery of the award can be avoided if the arbitrator enters upon the reference, takes fullest 
control of the procedures and utilizes the mix of powers granted by the arbitration agreement, 
the practice rules and governing law. The apprehension of court intervention and the setting 
aside of an award should not deter an arbitrator from applying himself properly to the task and 
from rejecting frivolous or spurious applications and challenges intended by crafty parties and 
their advisers to frustrate an opponent or to postpone or unduly protract the proceedings. An 
arbitrator has to bear in mind the conceptual foundation of arbitration and the principle that in 
electing to submit their dispute not to a court of law presided over by a judge the parties are 
not looking for perfection in legal erudition but to an arbitrator who can resolve the dispute 
efficiently and effectively. 
 
It can be concluded that the UNCITRAL Model Law and the complementary UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, and the domestic statutes inspired by the Model Law have gone some 
length to provide a working framework for effective arbitration. It is therefore left to 
arbitrators to utilize the provisions of law and the terms of the reference to fulfill the arbitral 
mandate by engaging their best endeavours to curb unnecessary adjournments and delays that 
render arbitration unduly expensive.  Justice is unfairly delayed and denied by the defaulting 
party who flagrantly and freely obtains extensions of time, one after the other, because an 
arbitrator is afraid to reject an unmerited request for adjournment or to deter an avoidable 
delay. The tribunal must not hesitate to demonstrate its displeasure with unreasonable 
requests. The recommendation of this writer is that adjournments delays and prolongation of 
arbitration can be more effectively controlled and curbed by specific improvements in the 
                                                 
529 In Paulsson’s phrase. See Paulsson J“The Timely Arbitrator: Reflections on the Böckstiegel Method” (2006) 
22 Arbitration International 19. 
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African statutes taking advantage of the lessons learned from other jurisdictions such as the 
English Arbitration Act 1996.530 
 
3.5 Interim Measures of Protection: Nature, Purpose, Powers and Constraints 
 
3.5.1 Introduction 
 
In considering interim measures of protection it is appropriate first to explain the terminology 
on the subject. This is necessitated by the diversity of arbitration phraseology incorporating 
the word “interim” and the differing senses and meaning they assume in different 
jurisdictions. Thereafter the discussion will proceed with the consideration of the nature and 
purpose of interim measures, the powers available to an arbitral tribunal and court for granting 
them and the constraints on such powers. This topic is selected for discussion because of its 
recurrence in arbitration practice in Kenya, the controversies associated with interim measures 
and the disinclination of arbitrators to grant interim orders, if they can be avoided, before the 
final award. Perhaps the diversity of terminology and meaning contributes to the problem 
with interim measures. 
 
3.5.2 Terminology, Nature and Purpose of Interim Measures  
 
The word interim literally means “meantime”.531 In common usage it means “temporary”. 
Some national statutes recognize a distinction between an “interim” and “final” award and 
define an arbitral award to include an interim arbitral award.532 Others, such as the Zimbabwe 
Arbitration Act 1996 First Schedule Articles 17(2) (a) and 31(7), confer an arbitral power to 
grant an “interim order” and an “interim, interlocutory or partial award”. 
 
The Model Law, prior to its amendment in 2006, some national statutes based on it and the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules use the term “interim measures of protection” without 
                                                 
530 See for example the Mauritius International Arbitration Act 38 of 2008, s 24, which expands the duties and 
powers of the tribunal contained in Articles 18 and 19 of the Model Law, by incorporating additions from ss 33 
and 34 of the English Arbitration Act 1996. 
531 Chambers Concise 20th Century Dictionary wherein appears the explanation that in Reformation history the 
term “interim” referred to certain edicts of the German emperor regulating religions and ecclesiastical matters, 
until they could be decided by a general council. 
532 Kenya Arbitration Act 1995 s 3(1) “arbitral award”. 
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definition.533 The ICC Arbitration Rules refer to “interim or conservatory measures”.534 They 
are also known as “interim relief” or “provisional or conservatory measures”535 
 
It has been said from the perspective of English procedural law that  
 
“the phrase ‘interim measures’ covers a number of possibilities… (and)…. most commonly it 
is understood as referring to orders such as the Mareva injunction and an Anton Piller 
order.
536
 But interim measures might also include orders for the detention of property, or an 
order for the sale of property, or an order requiring the respondent to do or refrain from doing 
a particular act”.537  
 
Such orders are seen as having in common the characteristic of requiring the respective 
positions of the parties to be preserved pending the resolution of their dispute. This is deemed 
necessary to prevent the ends of justice being frustrated by an intervening event that would 
render a fair determination of the dispute impossible.538 But by whatever name they are called 
“interim measures” and “interim relief” are convenient abbreviations and arise from the 
requirement of a party for immediate and temporary protection of rights or property pending a 
decision on the merits by the arbitral tribunal. In other words they are holding orders while a 
decision on the merits is awaited.539 
                                                 
533 Model Law Articles 9 and 17; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Article 26.  Article 17(1) of the Model Law, as 
amended in 2006, refers to an “interim measure”, which is comprehensively defined in the new Article 17(2). 
534 ICC Arbitration Rules article 23. 
535 Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 345-358; Gaillard & Savage International 
Commercial Arbitration 709-734; Wagoner DE “Interim relief in international arbitration” (1996) 62 Arbitration 
131-136. 
536 These are explained below. See further Gee S Mareva Injunctions and Anton Pillar Relief 3rd ed (1995). 
537 Johnson A “Interim Measures of Protection Under the Arbitration Act 1996” (1997) International Arbitration 
Law Review 9. 
538 Johnson A (1997) International Arbitratioin Law Review 9. 
539 Wagoner DE, ‘Interim Relief in International Arbitration’ (1996) 62 Arbitration 131. Trittmann R “When 
Should Arbitrators Issue Interim or Partial Awards and/or Procedural Orders?” (2003) 20(3) Journal of 
International Arbitration 255-265 distinguishes, from a German perspective, between: (i) a final award, which 
contains the final decision on the matter in dispute which cannot be appealed; (ii) a partial award, which is a final 
decision by the arbitral tribunal at its discretion on a question that can be dealt with independently of other issues 
in the dispute either because of its nature or because it concerns an identifiable and quantifiable part of the claim 
that can be separated from the rest of the dispute; (iii) an interim award, which relates to a particular matter or 
aspect of the proceedings which is binding but not enforceable under German law; and (iv) a procedural order 
dealing exclusively with matters regarding the conduct of the proceedings and cannot cover any issues of fact or 
law. Examples of the last-mentioned category include orders fixing dates for hearings, submissions and 
disclosure of documents. 
In view of the interchangeable but also differing senses of the terms “interim award”, “partial award”, 
“preliminary award”, “interlocutory” and “provisional award” Redfern & Hunter International Commercial 
Arbitration 353-354 n17 and n 18 recommend, for avoidance of confusion, that any decision that is not finally 
determinative of the issues with which it deals should not be called an award. S 39 of the English Arbitration Act 
1996 grants arbitral power to make provisional awards. Compare the UNCITRAL Rules Article 32(1) regarding 
the power to make interim, interlocutory or partial awards. 
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Gaillard and Savage explain additionally that although “interim” or “provisional measures” 
and “protective or conservatory measures” are used interchangeably the former terms refer to 
the nature of the decision and the latter to the purpose of the decision.540 The authors also 
classify and distinguish between (i) interim measures intended to prevent irreparable harm, 
(ii) those designed to preserve evidence and (iii) those that facilitate the enforcement of the 
award.541 
 
Orders for interim relief by a tribunal may also be distinguished from procedural rulings by 
the tribunal. In the Model Law the former are dealt with by Article 17 and the latter by 
Articles 18-27 under the heading “Conduct of Arbitral Proceedings”. An order for 
preservation of evidence is clearly an order for interim relief whereas an order for production 
of evidence at the hearing is more in the nature of a procedural ruling.  The distinction is 
significant in that under Article 17 of the Model Law the tribunal may, at the request of a 
party, grant an interim measure of protection and appropriate security in connection with such 
measure whereas under Article 27 the tribunal or party, with the approval of the tribunal, may 
request the assistance of the court in taking (i.e. producing) evidence. In contrast, under 
Article 9 a party may request an interim measure of protection from the court without the 
need for approval by the tribunal. 
 
After thorough deliberation, UNCITRAL adopted the following definition of “interim 
measure” in 2006: 
 
“2. An interim measure is any temporary measure, whether in the form of an award or in 
another form, by which, at any time prior to the issuance of the award by which the dispute is 
finally decided, the arbitral tribunal orders a party to: 
(a) Maintain or restore the status quo pending determination of the dispute; 
(b) Take action that would prevent, or refrain from taking action that is likely to 
cause, current or imminent harm or prejudice to the arbitral process itself; 
(c) Provide a means of preserving assets out of which a subsequent award may be 
satisfied; or 
(d) Preserve evidence that may be relevant and material to the resolution of the 
dispute.”542 
                                                 
540 Gaillard & Savage International Commercial Arbitration 709. 
541 Gaillard & Savage International Commercial Arbitration 709. 
542 See the UNCITRAL Model Law (2006) Article 17(2). 
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Sub-paragraph (c) is arguably wide enough to cover security for costs. Paragraph (b), which is 
not explicitly included in the categorisation of Gaillard and Savage referred to above, 
although it is arguably included in their first category, refers not only to anti-suit injunctions 
in support of arbitration but also to other injunctions against the large variety of actions that 
exist and have been used in practice to obstruct the arbitral process.543  Given the difficulties 
experienced in practice with defining the term, it is recommended that Model Law 
jurisdictions in Africa such as Kenya should supplement their arbitration legislation to include 
this definition of interim measure. 
 
3.5.3 The Power to Grant Interim Measures 
 
3.5.3.1 Applications to the Arbitral Tribunal 
 
The ability of the arbitral tribunal to grant an interim measure depends upon, and is 
circumscribed by, the powers given to it by the arbitration agreement, the applicable law and 
arbitration rules chosen by the parties. The exercise of such powers also presupposes that the 
tribunal has been duly constituted and is thereby in a position to act. This statement is 
important in relation to interim measures as in some instances the need for an interim 
protection order may arise before an arbitral tribunal is established which can entertain the 
application. This discussion is therefore premised on the existence of a valid arbitration 
agreement and a competent arbitral tribunal that is able to receive and determine the 
application for an interim measure. Regarding the powers of the arbitral tribunal relating to 
interim measures, the starting point is the Model Law and the derivative national statutes, 
such as the Kenyan arbitration statute.  As these statutes are based on the original 1985 
version, the discussion focuses, at least initially, on this version. 
 
Article 17 of the Model Law (1985) provides: 
 
“Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may, at the request of a party, 
order any party to take such interim measure of protection as the tribunal may consider 
necessary in respect of the subject matter of the dispute. The arbitral tribunal may require any 
party to provide appropriate security in connection with such measure.” 
 
                                                 
543 See UNCITRAL’s Report on its 39th Session (June 2006) (UN doc A/61/17) para 94. 
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There are limitations on the tribunal’s power to grant interim measures under this provision. 
The granting of interim relief is premised on the application of a party.  This means the 
provision does not envisage the grant of a measure on the tribunal’s own motion.544 Secondly, 
the order granted is directed only to a party to the arbitration agreement and will therefore 
exclude non-parties.545 Thirdly, the phrase “in respect of the subject-matter of the dispute” 
implies that the order will affect only a particular subject-matter. The phrase is not defined but 
it has been suggested that the interim measures covered by Article 17 would include the 
preservation, custody or sale of goods which are the subject-matter of the dispute as well as 
measures designed provisionally to determine and stabilize the relationship of the parties in a 
long-term contract. It could also include an order for the maintenance of machines or works or 
the continuation of a certain phase of construction if necessary to prevent irreparable harm. 
Additionally the measure could conceivably also serve the purpose of securing evidence 
which would otherwise be unavailable at the date of hearing.546 
 
A further point on the limitations of Article 17 of the Model Law is that, consistent with party 
autonomy, it may be excluded altogether by agreement of the parties as evident from the 
preceding phrase “unless otherwise agreed by the parties”. Where Article 17 has not been 
excluded, the tribunal still needs to consider whether it can impose any effective sanctions to 
back its interim orders. 
 
It follows that the national arbitration statutes, such as that of Nigeria,547 which replicate the 
Model Law provision without more will likewise be subject to similar constraints unless 
varied by agreement of the parties or their chosen arbitration rules. In this connection the 
modifications and refinements548 introduced by the Kenyan and Zimbabwean arbitration 
statutes to Article 17 of the Model Law are of considerable importance. 
 
Section 18(1) of the Kenyan Arbitration Act 1995 adopts the wording of Model Law Article 
17. But section 18(2) and (3) are additional provisions, which read as follows: 
                                                 
544 The Arbitration Rules chosen by the parties may alter this position by permitting the tribunal to grant relief on 
its own motion: see Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Arbitration Rules (2000) rule 7.9. 
545 This follows from the consensual and contractual bases of arbitration. Attempts to bring non-parties into 
arbitration are controversial: see the Saville Report (1996) para 214. 
546 Compare UN Doc A/CN.9/264, 43 para 2. 
547 Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act s 13. 
548 Kenyan Arbitration Act s 18(1); Zimbabwe Arbitration Act First Schedule Article 17. 
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“18(2): The arbitral tribunal or a party with the approval of the arbitral tribunal may seek 
assistance from the High Court in the exercise of any power conferred on the arbitral 
tribunal under subsection (1); 
 
18(3): If a request is made under subsection (2) the High Court shall have, for the purpose of 
the arbitral proceedings, the same power to make an order for the doing of anything 
which the arbitral tribunal is empowered to order under subsection (1) as it would 
have in civil proceedings before that Court, but the arbitral proceedings shall 
continue notwithstanding that a request has been made and is being considered by the 
High Court.” (My italics.) 
 
While the provisions of section 18(3) including the italicized parts might have been intended 
to boost arbitration practice in Kenya, some complication is introduced by the fact that in 
assisting the tribunal with requests on interim measures, the High Court exercises the same 
power that it has in ordinary civil proceedings, which are more extensive than those conferred 
on the tribunal in Article 17 (section 18(1)). In Kenya this includes the power to stay the 
arbitral proceedings pending consideration of the request for assistance which invariably 
involves delay. In consequence a situation is thereby created that runs counter to the power of 
the tribunal to continue the arbitral proceedings while the request for assistance is pending 
before the court 
 
The Zimbabwe Arbitration Act introduces elaborations under Article 17(2) enabling the 
arbitral tribunal to grant an interdict or other interim order,549 and to order the parties to 
deposit the fees and costs of the arbitration. Under Article 17(3) the tribunal itself or a party 
with the tribunal’s approval may request executory assistance from the High Court. For this 
purpose, under Article 17(4), the Court has the same powers as in civil proceedings. 
 
The inclusion of these additional provisions in the arbitration laws of Kenya and Zimbabwe 
has three consequences. First it keeps open the door from tribunal to court on interim 
measures; second, it enables the court to assist with the execution of arbitral interim measures; 
third, it brings arbitral orders on interim measures in line with those of the court in civil 
proceedings. 
 
                                                 
549 Compare the arbitral tribunal’s power under Article 31(7) of the First Schedule of the Zimbabwean Act to 
make an interim, interlocutory or partial award. 
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It has been noted that the purview of Article 17 of the Model Law is however narrower than 
that of Article 9 also dealing with interim measures by the court. But it is because Article 17 
(1985 version) neither grants the tribunal the power to enforce its orders nor provides for the 
judicial enforcement of such orders, that the Kenyan and Zimbabwean statutes have expressly 
included the additional provisions noted above to enable such orders to be recognized for 
enforcement.550 
 
Additionally, in Kenya, the problem of recognition and enforcement of interim orders and 
awards encountered in other jurisdictions, does not really arise in domestic arbitration as the 
definition of an arbitral award includes an interim arbitral award enabling both types of 
awards to be recognized for enforcement.  The SA Law Commission in its report Arbitration 
an International Arbitration Act for South Africa paras 2.183-2.186, discusses this problem 
and makes a recommendation for the inclusion of Article 17(3) in the First Schedule of the 
Draft Bill to provide for the enforcement of an interim order as if it were an award. The 
Report clarifies however that the effect of Article 17(3) is not to turn an interim order by a 
tribunal into an award but merely to enable it to be recognised and enforced in South Africa as 
if it were an award, subject to the defences available under Article 36.  This approach must be 
contrasted with that of UNCITRAL in the 2006 amendments, Articles 17 H and 17 I, referred 
to below. 
 
Partly because of the influence of the Model Law but also because of the problems 
experienced551 with interim measures in practice, the English Arbitration Act 1996 introduced 
important changes to the law on the subject. It is probably accurate therefore to state that once 
the parties have agreed to resolve their dispute by arbitration, the English Act adopts a general 
approach requiring them to look first to the arbitrators, and then to the court when the 
arbitrators have no power to act or are unable to act effectively.552 Therefore on interim 
measures section 38(1) of the Act allows the parties the freedom to agree on the powers 
exercisable by the tribunal for the conduct of the proceedings. Here also, as with parties under 
national arbitral statutes that allow them the freedom to choose arbitration rules, the parties’ 
choice of the procedural rules would enable them to confer power on the tribunal to make any 
                                                 
550 The enforcement of an interim order as an award is controversial especially in international arbitration, as the 
New York Convention governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards recognises as awards only 
decisions that determine finally one of the issues in dispute. See Kojovic T “Court Enforcement of Arbitral 
Decisions on Provisional Relief” (2001) 18(5) Journal of International Arbitration 511-532. 
551 The Ken-Ren case is an example (see n 589 below). 
552 Arbitration Act 1996 ss 1(c) and 44(5). 
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interim measures it deems necessary in respect of the subject-matter of the dispute.553 In the 
absence of party agreement, the default powers of the tribunal to grant interim measures under 
sections 38(4) and (6) assist the tribunal to make appropriate orders over a wide variety of 
matters including the inspection, preservation and custody or detention of property.  The wide 
discretion enjoyed by the tribunal is constrained by (i) the fact that the tribunal can only act 
after it has been constituted; (ii) the tribunal’s orders apply only to the parties in arbitration; 
therefore an order intended to extend to third parties will still necessitate recourse to court; 
and (iii) under section 39 of the Act the power to make provisional awards is exercisable by 
the tribunal only by agreement of the parties.  Section 39 therefore does not confer default 
powers and the power will not exist in the absence of specific agreement by the parties. 
 
As mentioned above,554 UNCITRAL’s 2006 amendments to the Model Law contained a 
detailed definition of “interim measures. The amendments also stipulate requirements which 
must be met before the tribunal grants such measures and provide court assistance for their 
enforcement.  Article 1 A specifies conditions that the applicant must meet before interim 
measures can be granted.  One of these is the reasonable possibility that the party requesting 
interim measures will succeed on the merits of the claim.555  This provision was considered as 
a necessary safeguard for the granting of interim measures.556  The tribunal may also require 
the party requesting an interim order to provide appropriate security.557 
 
An interim measure granted by the tribunal is binding,558and unless the tribunal otherwise 
directs, is enforceable upon application to a competent court, irrespective of the country in 
which it was issued.559  The court may refuse to enforce the interim measures on limited 
grounds only, which broadly correspond to the grounds on which enforcement of an award 
may be refused, with some additional “tailor-made refinements”.  The court when deciding 
whether or not to enforce the interim measure must not undertake a review of its substance.560  
In practice, it seems that a party will normally comply voluntarily with a tribunal’s order for 
                                                 
553 See for example the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules article 26 and the LCIA Rules article 25. 
554 See para 3.5.2 above. 
555 See Article 17A(1)(b).  In terms of Article 17 A(2), this condition only applies to a request for the 
preservation of evidence to the extent that the arbitral tribunal considers it appropriate. 
556 See UNCITRAL’s Report on its 39th Session, June 2006, (UN doc A/61/17) para 101. 
557 See the Model Law Article 17 E(1).  The applicant can also incur statutory liability for costs and damages in 
certain circumstances (see Article 17 G). 
558 Unless modified, suspended or terminated by the tribunal under Article 17 D. 
559 See the Model Law Article 17 H (1).  The court may require the applicant to provide security, after first 
taking into account any determination by the tribunal in this regard (see the Model Law Article 17 H(3). 
560 See the Model Law Article 17 I (1) and (2). 
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interim measures out of respect for the arbitrators’ authority and a desire not to antagonize 
them.561 
 
Kenya and other African jurisdictions which have already adopted or which are considering 
adopting the Model Law would be well advised to incorporate the provisions on interim 
measures from the 2006 amendments, including the provisions on court-assisted enforcement 
into their arbitration legislation. 
 
3.5.3.2 Security for Costs 
 
A specific issue which arises in the context of Article 17 is the possibility of an arbitral 
tribunal ordering security for costs. This matter is dealt with specifically in some institutional 
rules.562 These rules restrict the tribunal, on the application of a party, to making an order 
against “any claiming or counterclaiming party” to provide security for the applicant’s costs. 
The reason for this limitation is that a claimant or counterclaimant, in instituting the claim, 
must assume the risk that its opponent may not be able to pay a costs award. The purpose of 
security for costs is to protect a respondent against incurring heavy costs in successfully 
defending a claim brought by an impecunious claimant.  Article 17 (1985 version), as noted 
above, confers on the tribunal power to order a party to provide appropriate security in 
connection with interim measures ordered by the tribunal, but this is obviously not the same 
as an order for security for costs as an interim measure. 
 
The need for provision of security for costs may arise at the commencement or during the 
arbitration and it is always a difficult issue even in litigation.  In arbitration the order for 
security for costs may be necessary to ensure that the losing claimant when ordered to pay the 
costs of the successful respondent will be able to do so from secured or guaranteed funds. It 
also enables the winning party to recover at least a portion of his costs in cases where costs 
prove to be irrecoverable through the losing claimant’s insolvency. It is recognized that in 
some jurisdictions the tribunal does not have the power to order security for costs563 and 
further that when the power exists an arbitrator may not have the stomach for it, so to speak, 
                                                 
561 See UNCITRAL’s Report on its 39th Session, June 2006 (UN doc A/61/17) para 114. 
562 See the LCIA Rules 25.2; Association of Arbitrators (Southern Africa) Rules for the Conduct of Arbitrations 
(6th edition 2009) rule 23. 
563 For example, South Africa, unless the power is conferred on the arbitral tribunal in the arbitration agreement 
or the applicable rules. 
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because of its adverse and financially prejudicial impact on the claimant so early in the 
proceedings. 
 
Coppée Levalin NV v Ken Ren Chemicals and Fertilisers Ltd
564 was a good illustration of the 
difficult problem posed by security for costs.  The House of Lords was divided on the issue 
and by a majority of three to two decided in favour of the award of security for costs.  The 
minority were acutely aware that the impecunious claimant had had to pay the full deposit to 
the ICC in an ICC arbitration, in circumstances where the respondents had refused to pay the 
portion of the deposit to the ICC payable  by the respondents under the rules. The practice is 
for a court or tribunal ordering a claimant to provide security to stay the claim until security is 
provided, which could effectively deny the claimant a remedy. The English Arbitration Act 
does not now allow the court to award security for costs in arbitration, leaving it to the 
tribunal to do so (ss 38 and 44).565  The same approach was recommended by the SA Law 
Commission.566 
 
The power to order security is rarely invoked in domestic arbitrations, not only because of its 
adverse financial impact, but also because of the potential effect of restricting access to justice 
especially to a claimant with a triable claim who may not be financially able to comply with 
the order, resulting in the claim being stayed indefinitely. 
 
No specific guidance is given by the legislatures that have empowered arbitral tribunals to 
order security for costs. In England, it seems that where a power could just as properly be 
exercised by a tribunal rather than the court, provision is made for this in order to reduce the 
expense and inconvenience of resorting to court during arbitrations.567 To that end section 
38(3) of the English Arbitration Act confers the power to order security for costs on the 
arbitral tribunal, unless the power is excluded in the arbitration agreement; and the Chartered 
Institute of Arbitrators has published guidelines for arbitrators on exercising this power.568 It 
would be prudent before ordering security for costs for the tribunal to consider its likely effect 
so as not to restrict unduly the right of access to justice. The South African Law Commission 
Report notes the concern in England that the discretionary power to order security for costs 
                                                 
564 [1995] 1 AC 38. 
565 See also Remond C “Security for Costs in International Arbitration” (1994) 110 Law Quarterly Review 501-
506. 
566 SA Law Commission Report Arbitration: an International Arbitration Act for South Africa paras 2.187-2189. 
567 The 1996 Saville Report para 189. See also para 190 on the complete removal of court’s power to order 
security for costs. 
568 Chartered Institute of Arbitrators guidelines in (1997) 63 Arbitration 166-167; see also (1998) 64 Arbitration 
84-85 for the guidelines on the exercise of the powers under s 38(4) for preservation of evidence.  
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may be regarded by arbitrators as a “delightful new instrument, a wonderful new toy”. It may 
take some time before the position as to how the power is exercised is stabilized.569 
 
3.5.3.3 Applications to Court for Interim Measures 
 
An arbitrator is entitled to think that once he is appointed and has accepted the appointment 
and entered upon the reference his power to manage the preliminary stages as well as the 
conduct of proceedings should not involve the national court at all until his task is completed.  
Indeed in most cases this is what happens and the arbitration is undertaken and completed 
without the intervention of the court. The question that arises in the context of this discussion 
is: why should the domestic court be involved and intervene in a dispute the parties have 
assigned to an arbitral tribunal and do not those instances concerning interim measures (under 
Model Law Articles 9 and 17) when the court may intervene, constitute interference in the 
arbitration proceedings? Alternatively if the court intervenes because the tribunal ostensibly 
has no powers to grant interim orders of preservation or protection, should not the tribunal 
itself assume those powers necessitated by the terms of reference? Now it begs the question to 
say that the courts intervene because in those instances the tribunal has no power to act, 
because the argument here is that the tribunal should be given powers it lacks to do what it 
must do to discharge the arbitral mandate without “involvement”, “intervention” or 
“interference” by the court, whichever terminology is used to describe the court’s role in such 
situations.  It is submitted therefore that the lack of arbitral power is not a genuine answer as, 
in some instances, it provides an unnecessary and undesirable opportunity for court 
intervention. The test surely must be whether an arbitrator can take action that is likely to be 
effective. The self-evident answer is that, having been appointed, the arbitrator does have the 
power to act and his orders have to be effective to justify the legal support for arbitration.570 
 
It is also unconvincing to say that the tribunal cannot grant interim orders or measures of 
protection because its orders affect or apply only to parties in the reference.  This is clearly an 
erroneous argument because legitimately it is a party in the arbitration who is seeking the 
interim order against the other party in the reference, over both of whom the tribunal has 
authority to grant appropriate orders. To that extent the provision in Article 17 of the Model 
                                                 
569 SA Law Commission Report Arbitration: an International Arbitration Act for South Africa para 2.189.  
570 See too para 2.4.4.5(iv)-(vii) above on the interplay between the powers of the court and those of the tribunal 
and also SA Law Commission Report Arbitration: an International Arbitration Act for South Africa paras 2. 
140-2.158 for their proposed additions to Article 9 of the Model Law. 
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Law (1985) that the tribunal may “order any party to take such interim measure of protection 
…” must be understood as confined to an arbitral party and to exclude non-parties. 
 
Regarding the possible need to approach the court for an interim assistance “before 
commencement of arbitration” it is necessary to investigate what this expression means. 
“Commencement of arbitration” is sometimes incorrectly understood in a sense synonymous 
with the origination of arbitral pleadings or even the actual hearing itself.  The technical 
meaning ascribed to the term “commencement of arbitration” by the Model Law and the 
national laws drawn from it is that arbitration proceedings commence on the date agreed by 
the parties or on the date on which the request for arbitration is received by the respondent.571 
This awkward provision enables the parties to pre-determine or vary the commencement date 
from when the respondent received the request for arbitration.  For purposes of this 
clarification, if the date of receipt of the request is taken as the commencement date of arbitral 
proceedings then there would be no tribunal in existence to act before the receipt of the 
request. This must be so because the tribunal only comes into existence and can only act after 
and not before it is created. In these circumstances there would logically be no arbitral party 
either to apply for interim measures of protection before the legal commencement date of 
arbitral proceedings. In other words the date of origination of pleadings or actual hearing must 
not be confused with the date chosen by the parties as the commencement date or that on 
which the request for arbitration was received.  In this latter connection it must also be 
pointed out that the critical date is not the date on the notice of arbitration but the date of 
receipt of the notice by the respondent.  These errors are common in the practice of arbitration 
in Kenya. 
 
Viewed in this light it is apparent that the only rational basis for court assistance is before the 
creation of the tribunal, for the reason that a tribunal cannot issue interim measures until it has 
itself been established.572 That, it is submitted, is a logical constraint on a tribunal that has not 
come into existence and therefore can exercise no powers at all, including powers pertaining 
to interim measures.  
 
An application to court for interim measures before commencement of arbitral proceedings is 
recognized by Article 9 of the Model Law which allows a party to request “before or during 
                                                 
571 See the Model Law Article 21; and the Kenyan Arbitration Act 1995 s 21 and s 42 (3). 
572 In ICC arbitrations interim measures are not grantable by the tribunal until the file opened by the Secretariat 
on the arbitration has been transmitted to the tribunal: see the ICC Rules article 23(1) and Redfern & Hunter 
International Commercial Arbitration 334 n 25. 
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arbitral proceedings from a court an interim measure of protection”. The separation of Article 
9 from Article 17,573 two ostensibly connected provisions on the same subject-matter is 
perhaps explainable by the observation that Article 9 deals with the grant of interim relief by 
the court in relation to the arbitration agreement, with which Chapter II of the Model Law is 
concerned, while Article 17, involving the grant of relief by the tribunal, is located under 
Chapter IV which is concerned with the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.574 A more critical 
observation is that the purpose of Article 9 is not readily discernible without reference to its 
legislative history.575 From this emerges the explanation that Article 9 combines two distinct 
statements. The first is that a request for a protective measure from a court is not inconsistent 
with the arbitration agreement. Therefore a party does not waive the right to arbitration by 
requesting a protective measure from the court. This explanation is given more poignancy by 
the commentary on the purpose of Article 9, namely that it is intended 
 
“to give express recognition to the principle that a request to court for interim measures of 
protection which may be available under a given legal system and the granting of such 
measures by the court are not incompatible with an agreement to settle the dispute by 
arbitration.”576 
 
It is therefore a declaratory statement to correct the otherwise possibly rational perception that 
an arbitration agreement by its nature and purpose excludes the court’s jurisdiction to grant 
interim measures regarding the arbitration.577 Arbitration rules, such as the ICC Rules,578 
explicitly confirm that the application to court for interim measures is not incompatible with 
the arbitration agreement. 
 
                                                 
573 As appears from the text below, Article 9 is under Chapter II of the Model Law and Article 17 is under 
Chapter IV of the 1985 version. 
574 In terms of the 2006 amendments, the revised Article 17 became the first in a separate chapter, Chapter IV A, 
with the heading “Interim measures and preliminary orders”. 
575 Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 332. 
576 SA Law Commission Report Arbitration: an International Arbitration Act for South Africa para 2.141citing 
UN Doc A/40/17 para 96. 
577 Indeed the US case of McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v Seat SpA, 501 F 2d 1032 (3rd Cir 1974) 1038 illustrated 
a judicial decision in favour of incompatibility which it appears is no longer followed in the US. See Redfern & 
Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 336 citing Carolina Power & Light Co. v Uranex 451 F. Supp 
1044, 1051 (ND Cal 1977). In Channel Tunnel Group Ltd v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd [1993] 1All ER 664 
(HL) at 688e, Lord Mustill commented incisively with reference to the McCleary case: “I prefer the view that 
when properly used such measures serve to reinforce the agreed method, not to bypass it”. Lord Mustill’s view 
corresponds with that underlying Article 9. 
578 Article 23(2), second sentence. 
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Another pertinent observation on the first statement of Article 9 is that, when read together 
with Article 1(2), Article 9 acquires an extraterritorial dimension and applies to a request to a 
court for an interim measure, even if the seat of the arbitration is in another state.579 
 
The second statement (or half statement) in Article 9 is that the existence of an arbitration 
agreement does not bar a national court from granting an interim measure of protection in 
support of the arbitration. But this is in any event a matter for national law and requires no 
further elaboration other than that it is a statement more specifically directed to the courts of a 
Model Law state. The additional clarification of Article 9 is that it is not limited to any 
particular kind of interim measure, being applicable to a wider variety of measures, such as 
for the conservation of the subject-matter of the dispute, the preservation of evidence, the 
protection of trade secrets, measures for the seizure of assets and any measures involving third 
parties.580 It is for this reason, as already noted under Chapter 2 above, that Article 9 is 
considered to be broader in scope than the original Article 17 of the1985 version, which 
apparently confines the tribunal to ordering interim measures of protection “in respect of the 
subject matter of the dispute”.581 
 
As pointed out above, Article 9 must also be read with Article 5 prescribing the extent of 
court intervention and Article 27 which deals with court assistance to the arbitral tribunal in 
taking evidence.582 
 
It seems however that the right conferred by the same Article 9 for resort to court also “during 
arbitral proceedings” for a protection order, introduces concurrent jurisdictions583 for tribunal 
and court with respect to interim measures. It is submitted that such concurrent jurisdiction 
                                                 
579 Article 1(2) creates certain exceptions to the general principle that the Model Law only applies if the place or 
seat of the arbitration is in that state, one of these exceptions being Article 9.  However, the court to which the 
application is made would either have to be in a state which has adopted the Model Law, or at least be one 
prepared to order a measure in support of an arbitration being held elsewhere in the particular circumstances. 
580 Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 333. 
581 See para 3.5.2 above regarding the extended definition of “interim measures” in Article 17(2) of the 2006 
version of the Model Law. 
582 For an informative elaboration on Articles 9 and 17 see SA Law Commission Report Arbitration: an 
International Arbitration Act for South Africa paras 2.140-2.158 and 2.183-2.189, particularly the 
recommendation to spell out court powers on interim measures on the models of New Zealand and Scotland. 
583 Gaillard & Savage International Commercial Arbitration 715 identify three consequences of concurrent 
jurisdiction as follows: 
i. the parties are entitled to apply to the courts, despite the existence of an arbitration agreement, to 
obtain provisional or protective measures; 
ii. the application to the courts is not a waiver of the arbitration agreement on the merits of the 
dispute; and 
iii. the tribunal has jurisdiction to grant the provisional or protective measures. 
It is not apparent that these are “consequences” rather than the authors’ own interpretation and explanation of 
concurrent jurisdiction. 
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opens an avenue for court intervention which perhaps fosters the perception of incompatibility 
with the parties’ choice of arbitration as their preferred mode for dispute resolution. One 
forceful argument against such perception is that the need for urgency justifies the concurrent 
jurisdiction of state courts both legally and practically especially before a tribunal is 
established, just as it justifies their residual jurisdiction at a later stage.584 
 
To summarise this part of the discussion it can be said that Articles 9 and 17 and their 
derivatives in Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe demonstrate two important principles of modern 
arbitration practice.  The first is that when the occasion arises it is permissible and may be 
essential to the effective conduct of the arbitration for a party to resort to court to obtain an 
interim measure.  The second is that, wherever practicable, the power to grant an interim 
measure should be exercisable by the arbitral tribunal rather than the court,585 bearing in mind 
that as there are differences in national arbitration law and practice, a measure of controversy 
would surround the application of those principles in some jurisdictions. 
 
National arbitration statutes that have amplified Article 9 to enable the court to act more 
decisively on interim relief include those of Kenya, Zimbabwe and England. The grant of 
interim measures of protection under Article 9(1) of Zimbabwean version of the Model Law 
is subject to additional provisions under Article 9(2) by which the High Court to which the 
request is made may grant 
 
“(a) an order for the preservation, interim custody or sale of goods which are subject-matter of 
the dispute, or 
(b) an order securing the amount in dispute or the costs of the arbitral proceedings,586 or 
 (c) an interdict or other interim order, or  
(d) any other order to ensure that any award which may be made in the arbitral proceedings is 
not rendered ineffectual.” 
 
As resort to court is less and less warranted in modern arbitration practice, it may be 
appreciated that such amplification could reduce judicial intervention. There is no equivalent 
amplification in the Kenyan arbitration statute. Besides defining the extent of court’s powers 
                                                 
584 Delvolvé J-L “Interim Measures and International Arbitration” (2003) 8(2) LCIA News 4 . 
585 See for example the LCIA Arbitration Rules article 25(3), which proceeds from the premise that where an 
interim measure is available from the tribunal, a party should only approach the court for that measure after the 
formation of the tribunal “in exceptional circumstances”. 
586 Compare the power of the arbitral tribunal (not the court) to grant an interdict or other interim order under 
Article 17(2) and to apportion the costs and expenses of an arbitration, including legal and other expenses of the 
parties and tribunal, in an award under Article 31(5)(a). 
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under Article 9(2), Article 9(3) in the Zimbabwean statute imposes general restrictions on the 
court’s power to grant interim relief: either the tribunal must not yet have been appointed, or 
the tribunal must lack the power to grant the particular relief, or the urgency of the matter 
must make it inappropriate to approach the tribunal. The court is furthermore prevented from 
granting an order or interdict where a competent arbitral tribunal has already determined the 
application. The corresponding restriction in the Kenyan Act is mild in comparison. Section 
7(2) of the Kenyan statute587 requires the Kenyan court, when considering an application to 
the court for an injunction or other interim order, to treat as conclusive any ruling or finding 
of fact upon which an arbitral tribunal has already ruled. 
 
There is little arbitration law and practice that has not received the attention of the English 
courts and the subject of interim measures is no exception.  It has been noted that once the 
parties have chosen to resolve their dispute by arbitration, the English Arbitration Act 1996 
requires them to look first to the arbitrators and only to resort to the court when the arbitrators 
cannot act or are unable to act effectively.588 Moreover, regarding interim measures, section 
38(1) of the Act allows the parties the freedom to agree on the powers exercisable by the 
arbitral tribunal for the conduct of the proceedings. 
 
When the English court intervenes on interim measures its powers are prescribed by section 
44 of the Act.  The courts powers in this section apply unless the parties otherwise agree. 
Most importantly, the court’s powers in relation to arbitration proceedings are restricted to the 
matters listed in section 44(2), and regarding these matters only, the court has the same 
powers as it has in relation to court proceedings.589  The English provisions as well as those of 
Zimbabwe in specifying the court’s powers, differ from the 2006 amendments to the Model 
Law.  Article 17 J of the Model Law (2006) provides that the court “shall have the same 
power of issuing an interim measure in relation to arbitration proceedings, irrespective of 
whether their place is in the territory of [the enacting] State, as it has in relation to 
proceedings in courts.”  The court is nevertheless obliged when exercising the powers to 
consider “the specific features of international arbitration”. It is submitted that the approach in 
Zimbabwe and England, in first specifying the powers of the court in relation to arbitration, 
and then further seeking to prescribe the circumstances in which a party may approach the 
                                                 
587 The Kenyan Arbitration Act s 7(1) enacts Article 9 of the Model Law and s 7(2) is an addition to the Model 
Law. 
588 Arbitration Act 1996 s 1(c) and s 44(5). 
589 These powers include the preservation of evidence, the making of certain orders regarding property which is 
the subject of the proceedings, the granting of an interim injunction and the appointment of a receiver.  The 
power to order security for costs is conspicuously absent from the list. 
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court as opposed to the tribunal, is preferable to the approach in Article 17 J for jurisdictions 
in Africa using or adopting the Model Law.590 
 
It is in the operation of section 44 of the English Arbitration Act and the restriction on the 
court’s powers therein that the mechanism of the Act for achieving a balance between the 
arbitral process and the powers of the court emerges. But the limitations imposed by section 
44(4) of the English Arbitration Act involving the requirement of notice to the other party 
does not apply in urgent applications. In such instances English practice has evolved the 
Mareva injunction591 and Anton Piller orders592 in response to urgent ex parte applications 
(that is without service of notice on the respondent) for court assistance for the preservation of 
the subject matter of a dispute pending the award. Because section 44 is a non-mandatory 
provision the parties may agree to exclude it. The interesting question that arises, where the 
arbitral parties incorporate a Scott v Avery clause593 in their arbitration agreement is, whether 
they have thereby precluded recourse to court for interim relief? It is submitted that a clause 
making arbitration award a condition precedent to legal proceedings should not be construed 
to oust recourse to court for interim relief in appropriate circumstances because the Scott v 
Avery clause operates to prevent the court from exercising jurisdiction over the substance of 
the dispute and not to bar the court from assisting the tribunal where the interest of justice 
demands. 
 
Other restrictions within section 44 are that, if the matter is not one of urgency, the court may 
only act if the tribunal cannot grant an interim measure;594 and it may only act on the 
application of a party after notice to the other party and the tribunal and the application is 
made with either the permission of the tribunal or the agreement in writing of the other 
party.595 
                                                 
590The relevant provisions of the Zimbabwean Arbitration Act First Schedule Article 9(2) and (3) have been 
discussed above. The circumstances in which the English court may be approached to exercise one of its 
specified powers are circumscribed by s 44(3)-(5) of the Arbitration Act 1996.  The Mauritian International 
Arbitration Act 38 of 2008 follows the principle of Article 17 J and defines the scope of the measures which may 
be ordered in general terms as those which can be granted in court proceedings (s 23(1)), but nevertheless 
imposes prerequisites before the powers may be exercised (s 23(3)-(6)), based on those in the English Act. 
591 An anti-dissipation order directed to the defendant to stop him dealing with or diminishing the value of his 
assets pending judgement or award. See Gee S Mareva Injunctions and Anton Piller Relief and Supreme Court 
Practice (1997) vol 1 525-539. 
592 Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Limited [1976] Ch. 55. It is a search and seizure order requiring 
the applicant to be given access to search the defendant’s premises for incriminating documents and other 
relevant material likely to be destroyed by the defendant before or during the hearing. See Johnson (1997) 
International Arbitration Law Review 14-15. 
593 See Mustill & Boyd Commercial Arbitration 161; Johnson A (1997) Int’l ArbLR 11. 
594 S 44(5). 
595 S 44(4).  See further on s 44 Russell on Arbitration 23rd edition 428-439. 
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Section 44 has extraterritorial aspects through the definition of the scope of application of the 
Act, which provides in section 2(3) that the powers conferred on the English court by section 
44 are exercisable even if the seat of the arbitration is outside England and Wales or where no 
seat has been designated or determined. The court may nevertheless refuse to order interim 
measures if the fact of the seat being outside, or the likelihood of it being outside England 
makes it, in the court’s opinion, inappropriate to order such measures. So it smacks of having 
it both ways through statutory ambivalence, reminiscent of common-law conundrums. 
 
The issue arose in the Channel Tunnel case596 on the question whether the English court had 
power to grant an interim injunction in support of the foreign arbitral proceedings.  The court 
acknowledged the existence of power to order an injunction, but on the facts, refused an 
injunction because the type of injunction sought would have pre-empted the decision of the 
arbitrators sitting in Brussels.  Therefore section 2(3) of the Act has to an extent dealt with the 
limitations on the grant of injunctive relief encountered in the Channel Tunnel case.  It seems 
the House of Lords in that case shied away from affronting a neighbouring European power in 
whose territorial jurisdiction the seat of arbitration was located.  Whether the august judicial 
House would have hesitated in granting an injunction affecting British interests in a distant oil 
or mineral rich country deemed a rogue state or politically incorrect state must be left to 
conjecture.  If the court had a discretion in the matter then Lord Mustill offers an indication 
on how the discretion was exercised in the following words: 
 
“There is always a tension when the court is asked to order by way of interim relief in support 
of an arbitration, a remedy of the same kind as will ultimately be sought from the arbitrators: 
between, on the one hand, the need for the court to make a tentative assessment of the merits 
in order to decide whether the plaintiff’s claim is strong enough to merit protection, and on the 
other, the duty of the court to respect the choice of tribunal which both parties have made, and 
not to take out of the hands of the arbitrators (or other decision-makers) a power of decision 
which the parties have entrusted to them alone.  In the present instance I consider that the 
latter consideration must prevail.”597 
 
To conclude on the extraterritorial aspect of interim relief it may be observed that 
enforceability of interim orders across borders is a major concern in international arbitration. 
The reason for this difficulty appears to be that their extensive use was probably not foreseen 
                                                 
596 Channel Tunnel Group Ltd v Balfour Beatty Ltd [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 291 (HL). The House of Lords 
considered that it had the inherent power to grant an injunction but thought it inappropriate to do so. 
597 [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 310. 
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by the drafters of the New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards.  The Convention was designed for final awards and under it the recognition 
and enforcement of an award may be refused where the award has not yet become binding on 
the parties.598  The Convention did not address interim “awards” which could be varied in a 
subsequent final award. In Model Law jurisdictions which have adopted the 2006 
amendments, this problem is now addressed by the provisions of Articles 17 H and 17 I 
referred to above. These Articles provide for court enforcement of interim measures ordered 
by arbitral tribunals, even if the seat of the arbitration is in another jurisdiction, subject to 
limited “tailor-made” defences.599 
 
3.5.4 Ex Parte Proceedings and Applications for Interim Measures 
 
Applications for interim measures tend to be made in urgent circumstances by one party, often 
without notice to the other party, and therefore assume the characteristics of “ex parte” 
proceedings. For this reason what has been said on ex parte proceedings above is relevant 
here, without the need for repetition.600 
 
With reference to applications for interim measures of protection, the practice differs from 
country to country and the complexity of the issue is demonstrated by the protracted duration 
of the discussions by the UNCITRAL Working Group on arbitration topics regarding interim 
measures, particularly in the context of ex parte applications to the tribunal.601 In Kenya 
despite the power conferred by section 7(1) of the Arbitration Act for the grant of interim 
relief and Rule 16 B(9) of the Kenya Branch Rules for the making of interim awards, 
including injunctive relief and conservation measures, arbitrators rarely avail themselves of 
these powers. This writer recalls granting a conservation order in respect of the subject-matter 
of an arbitration from which the respondent immediately sought a review in the High Court. 
Thereafter it seems that the constraints of time, expense and inconvenience that ensued, 
combined to discourage both parties from proceeding with either the review or the arbitration. 
The arbitrator is not without recourse however as section 26(d) of the Kenyan Arbitration 
                                                 
598 See Article V(1)(e). 
599 See para 3.5.3.1 above. 
600 See para 3.2.5 above for comments on “ex parte proceedings” as distinguished from “proceedings under 
protest” and Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 259 para 5-55 and 323-325 paras 6-119-
121. 
601 See UNCITRAL’s 2006 Report (UN doc A/61/17) para 87, from which it appears that the first draft was 
under discussion by the Working Group in March 2000. 
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statute offers the tribunal the option where the claimant fails to prosecute his claim, to make 
an award dismissing the claim. 
 
An example of the grant of interim relief in the form of an injunction under section 7 of the 
Arbitration Act of Kenya602 was the case of Pan Africa Builders & Contractors Ltd v 
National Social Security Fund Board of Trustees.603 The injunction was intended to restrain 
the respondent from paying a third party M/s Centurion Engineers & Builders Ltd the sum of 
KShs. 30,315,600 because the payment related to a contract between the applicant and 
respondent containing an arbitration clause.  In reliance on section 10 of the Arbitration Act 
the court held that there was a dispute that could not be dealt with summarily; that section 6 of 
the Act was mandatory which, read together with section 10, justified a reference to 
arbitration.604 In granting the injunction the judge stated: 
 
“I find and hold that as to who is entitled to the sum of Kshs.30,315,600 or Kshs.8,090,619 
and whether or not it ought to be paid or how much should be paid, this should form the 
subject-matter of the reference to arbitration and ought to be ruled on by an arbitral tribunal 
appointed under the relevant clause.”  
 
As the arbitral tribunal had not been established it could not have granted interim relief, which 
might have been possible under section 18 of the Kenyan Arbitration Act on interim 
measures, which is the equivalent of Article 17 of the Model Law. 
 
One of the most controversial aspects regarding the drafting by UNCITRAL of revised 
provisions on interim measures was the question whether or not an arbitral tribunal should be 
able to grant interim measures ex parte.605  Current arbitration rules and statutes do not 
usually grant ex parte authority to arbitrators.606  The provisions on the subject in the 2006 
amendments to the Model Law represent a compromise.607  Ex parte orders in this context are 
styled in the 2006 amendments as “preliminary orders”.  The arbitral tribunal has a contract-
                                                 
602 S 7 is the Kenya equivalent of Model Law Article 9. 
603 Civil Case No 32 of 2002. 
604 S 6 of the Act deals with stay of legal proceedings and corresponds to Article 8 of the Model Law. S 10 deals 
with the extent of court intervention and is the equivalent of Article 5 of the Model Law. 
605 “Ex parte” in this context is used in the sense of an application without notice to the other party.  Compare the 
discussion in para 3.2.5 above. 
606 See the LCIA Rules article 25 read with article 19(2) and the ICC Rules article 23 read with article 21(1). 
607 See UNCITRAL’s Report on its 39th Session, June 2006, (UN doc A/61/17) para 88.  In terms of this 
compromise, the provisions on preliminary orders apply unless otherwise agreed by the parties and the 
“preliminary orders” have the nature of procedural orders and not of awards. Further, there is no court assistance 
for the enforcement of such orders. 
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out power to grant a preliminary order, if prior disclosure to the party against whom it is 
directed risks frustrating the purpose of the measure.608  Immediately after deciding on a 
request for a preliminary order the tribunal must disclose the prescribed information, 
including the contents of any oral communication, to all parties.609  At the same time the 
tribunal must give an opportunity to the party against whom a preliminary order is directed to 
present its case at the earliest practicable time.610  The preliminary order is binding on the 
parties but is not subject to court enforcement and expires after 20 days, unless converted into 
an interim measure after the affected party has had an opportunity to present its case.611  The 
tribunal must normally require the party applying for a preliminary order to give security.612 
 
One commentator has suggested that UNCITRAL Model Law jurisdictions in Africa should 
omit these provisions on preliminary orders, when giving effect to the 2006 amendments in 
their arbitration legislation, as being too controversial, bearing in mind that a party requiring 
interim measures ex parte, can always approach the relevant court.613  However, in line with 
the general approach in this chapter of the dissertation of advocating strong and wide powers 
for arbitrators in the interests of effective arbitration,614 it is submitted and recommended that 
the provisions on preliminary orders should be adopted, along with the other provisions of the 
2006 amendments on the granting of interim measures by the tribunal. 
 
3.5.5 Arbitration Rules on Interim Measures 
 
It was stated above615 that apart from legislation on interim measures, the arbitration rules 
chosen by the parties also regulate interim measures. More specifically the procedural rules 
chosen by the parties may indicate what powers the arbitral tribunal may exercise in respect of 
interim measures. The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules governing interim measures of 
protection provide: 
 
                                                 
608 See the Model Law Article 17 B(1) and (2).   
609 See the Model Law Article 17 C(1). 
610 See the Model Law Article 17 C(2). 
611 See the Model Law Article 17 C(4) and (5). 
612 See the Model Law Article 17 E(2). See also Article 17 F(2) regarding the duty of disclosure imposed on the 
applicant. 
613 The provisions were also intentionally omitted from the Mauritian International Arbitration Act 38 of 2008 ss 
21 and 22, while generally adopting the other 2006 amendments on the granting of interim measures by the 
tribunal. 
614 See para 3.3 above on the arbitrator’s powers as well as para 3.7 below on the need for a Code of Sanctions. 
615 In para 3.5.3(1). 
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“At the request of either party, the arbitral tribunal may take any interim measures it deems 
necessary in respect of the subject matter of the dispute, including measures for the 
conservation of the goods forming the subject-matter in dispute, such as ordering their deposit 
with a third person or the sale of perishable goods.616 
 
This Article also allows such interim measure to be established as an interim award to 
facilitate enforcement and the tribunal is empowered to require security for costs of such 
measure.617 In line with Article 9 of the Model Law, a request to court for interim measures 
under Article 26 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules is not deemed to be incompatible with 
the agreement to arbitrate, or a waiver of that agreement.618 The Rules of the Chartered 
Institute of Arbitrators619 confer power on the arbitral tribunal to grant relief on a provisional 
basis on the matters itemized under Article 7.8 and, in particular, to grant a provisional order 
for “any relief claimed in the arbitration”, a very wide discretionary power in respect of 
interim relief.620 The LCIA Rules grant power “to order the preservation, storage, sale or other 
disposal of any property or thing under the control of any party and relating to the subject-
matter of the arbitration”.621 
 
For African examples, the Kenya Branch Rules622 allow the tribunal to “make one or more 
interim awards including injunctive relief and measures for conservation of property.623 
 
In Nigeria the arbitration statute requires arbitral proceedings conducted under it to be in 
accordance with the procedure contained in the Arbitration Rules set out in the First Schedule 
of the Act.624 Article 26 of the Rules governs the granting of interim measures relating to the 
subject-matter of the dispute.625  Significantly Article 26(3) provides: 
 
“[A] request for interim measures … to court shall not be deemed incompatible with the 
agreement to arbitrate, or as a waiver of that agreement.” 
                                                 
616 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules Article 26(1). 
617 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules Article 26(2). 
618 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules Article 26(3).  
619 Arbitration Rules (2000 edition), for use in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, Article 7.8. 
620 Article 7.8(c). 
621 Article 25.1(b); see also the ICC Rules (1998) article 23 on interim or conservatory measures. 
622 These 1988 Rules are based on the English Chartered Institute Rules of 1988 updated by the 2000 edition, 
having regard to the differences between the English and Kenyan Arbitration Acts. 
623 Rule 16B (9) deals with interim relief. Compare Article 7.8-7.11 on provisional relief in the updated English 
Rules (2000). 
624Arbitration and Conciliation Act s 15(1). These arbitration rules are virtually identical to the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules. 
625 These include measures for conservation of goods, deposits with third persons and the sale of perishable 
goods. 
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For international commercial arbitrations the parties have the option to adopt these Rules or 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or any other international arbitration rules of their choice. 
In that connection the UNCITRAL Rules,626 the LCIA Rules627 and the ICC Rules628 all make 
clear that an agreement to arbitrate under these rules is not inconsistent with an application to 
Court for interim relief, subject to the limitations imposed by those rules. 
 
3.5.6 Control of Arbitration: Tribunal or Court 
 
The distribution and balance of power between the arbitral tribunal and court in the context of 
interim measures are matters of major importance in arbitration practice. While a measure of 
judicial control of arbitration seems inevitable, the achievement of the correct balance is 
elusive. Two polarized positions have been identified: 
 
“On the one side if parties agree to resolve their disputes through the use of a private rather 
than a public tribunal, then the court system should play no part at all, save perhaps to enforce 
awards in the same way as they enforce any other rights and obligations to which the parties 
have agreed. To do otherwise is unwarrantably to interfere with the parties’ right to conduct 
their affairs as they choose. 
 
The other extreme position reaches a different conclusion. Arbitration has this in common 
with the court system; both are a form of dispute resolution which depends on the decision of 
a third party. Justice dictates that certain rules should apply to dispute resolution of this kind. 
Since the state is in over-all charge of justice, and since justice is an integral part of any 
civilized democratic society, the courts should not hesitate to intervene as and when 
necessary, so as to ensure that justice is done in private as well as public tribunals.”629 
 
It is recognized therefore that, as in all relationships, the correct approach should be to strike 
the appropriate balance between the duty of the courts to supervise arbitrations and the rights 
of parties to seek court assistance in times of need.630 It seems that a measure of judicial 
control of arbitration is unavoidable. Moreover, as noted above, Articles 9 and 17, when read 
                                                 
626 Article 26(3). 
627 Article 25.3. 
628 Article 23.2. 
629 Saville M (Lord Saville) “The Denning Lecture 1995: Arbitration and the Courts” (1995) 61 Arbitration 157, 
quoted by Redfern and Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 349-350.  See also para 1.4 above. 
630 Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 350. 
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together, envision a degree of overlapping jurisdiction.631 It has further been noted in the 
context of interim measures that what an arbitral tribunal may order depends on the national 
law and the arbitration agreement. In this connection it is apparent from the jurisdictions 
based on the Model Law (1985 version) that the scope of the arbitral tribunal’s authority in 
such cases is limited to the subject-matter of the dispute. But the existence of concurrent 
jurisdiction raises the critical question as to who should more properly grant the interim relief: 
tribunal or court? 
 
It is submitted that a court should not readily or lightly assume the jurisdiction to grant 
interim measures which should more properly be sought from the arbitral tribunal, when 
established and once it can be deemed to have control of the arbitration. Again the tribunal 
can more expeditiously entertain the application and deal with it on the merits from facts that 
are either already available or that can be swiftly made available to the tribunal, compared to a 
court where such application may encounter considerable delay before the hearing.632 In this 
connection an arbitrator’s reluctance to entertain an application for interim measure for fear of 
intrusiveness or an accusation of taking sides or pre-judging the result, would be due more to 
his lack of confidence than to a serious concern for a just result.633  After all inferior courts 
also risk the same accusations yet they proceed to grant interim orders as and when they are 
approached for assistance.  
 
It is therefore submitted that those statutes634 which impose prerequisites before a party can 
approach the court instead of the tribunal for an interim measure are preferable to the 
approach in the 2006 version of the Model Law, which appears to provide no such 
prerequisites.635 
 
3.5.7 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion this discussion can be summarized on the core points as follows: 
                                                 
631 Article 9 declares that it is not incompatible with an arbitration agreement for a court to grant interim 
measures at the request of a party during arbitral proceedings, while Article 17 empowers the tribunal to grant 
interim measures relating to the subject-matter of the dispute.  See para 3.5.3 above. 
632 Wagoner (1996) 62 Arbitration 131-132; Johnson (1997) 1 International Arbitration Law Review 9. 
633 See the UNCITRAL Model Law (2006) Article 17 A (1)(b), in terms of which an applicant for interim 
measures must normally satisfy the tribunal that there is a reasonable possibility that the requesting party will 
succeed on the merits of the claim.  This provision demonstrates that it is not considered improper or unfair that 
the tribunal should form a provisional view on the merits for this purpose. 
634 See the English Arbitration Act s 44(3)-(6) and the Zimbabwean Arbitration Act First Schedule Article 9(3). 
635 A positive feature of the 2006 amendments is nevertheless the formulation of factors that the tribunal must 
take into account when considering an application for interim measures. 
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i. Modern arbitration practice that embraces the Model Law recognizes that in some 
circumstances it may be necessary and compatible with arbitration for arbitral 
parties to seek court assistance in the context of interim measures in situations 
when an arbitral tribunal cannot act or cannot act effectively. 
ii. However, whenever possible, the parties should seek interim relief from the 
arbitral tribunal; and the parties themselves play a crucial role in empowering the 
arbitral tribunal through a mix of laws and rules that enable them to do so. 
iii. Modern arbitration legislation can and does assist the arbitral process through 
default powers and discretion conferred on the tribunal under such legislation.  The 
English Arbitration Act 1996 is exemplary in this regard. 
iv. Courts will also benefit from clear and elaborate provisions on the extent of 
judicial intervention in which regard the Model Law, even under the 2006 
amendments, has not gone far enough. The scope of the court’s powers to grant 
interim measures could be defined more restrictively and the circumstances in 
which a party may approach the court rather than the tribunal could be spelt out. 
v. Courts in jurisdictions like Kenya and others that have embraced the Model Law 
should not feel threatened by the expansion of the scope of the tribunal’s powers 
regarding interim measures, as this is intended to ensure effective arbitration. 
vi. Finally, in all cases where parties seek court assistance because an arbitral tribunal 
cannot act or act effectively, the courts should give fullest support in ways that 
facilitate the enforcement of the arbitration agreement and the eventual award. 
 
3.6 The Problem of Enforcement and Execution of the Arbitral Award 
 
3.6.1 Introduction 
 
When an arbitrator has made and delivered a final award he is functus officio.636 His duty is 
done and his obligations are discharged. In the relatively few but still significant number of 
cases where the award is unacceptable to the losing party the successful party needs further 
assistance for securing compliance with the award. It is in that particular connection that the 
term “enforcement” assumes significance and is considered in this part of the dissertation. 
 
This topic is included in this study because the value and effectiveness of arbitration as an 
attractive means of resolving commercial disputes in a domestic context can be measured by 
                                                 
636 Mustill & Boyd Commercial Arbitration 404-405; Russell on Arbitration (23rd edition) 334-335 para 6-166. 
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the successful implementation of the arbitral award. The problem is that whereas arbitration 
law governs the making, delivery,637 recognition and enforcement638 of the arbitral award, its 
actual execution as the final act in the arbitration process is either not mentioned or not 
specifically regulated by arbitration statutes.639 This problem is known to arbitration 
practitioners who are also aware that the expectation of a binding and enforceable award is a 
principal goal of arbitration and that an arbitration agreement and award without an effective 
system of enforcement are practically useless. The issue for consideration here therefore is 
whether arbitration law and practice have actually put in place an adequate mechanism for the 
implementation of the award, or whether more must be done to clarify and strengthen the 
procedures for the effective enforcement and execution of the arbitral award. 
 
Because of the role of the national court in the implementation of the arbitral award, this 
discussion will first examine the adequacy of the law governing the recognition and 
enforcement of awards and their implementation through the court system. The analysis will 
include the distinction in arbitration practice between (i) the enforcement of a final award 
(that is, an award on the merits); and (ii) the enforcement of arbitral orders and “awards” 
regarding interim and provisional measures. The discussion will extend to the enforcement of 
foreign awards under the New York Convention for two reasons.  Firstly, Articles III and IV 
of that Convention may impact on domestic arbitration law, particularly in a monistic 
system.640  Secondly, the losing party in a domestic arbitration may have assets outside the 
jurisdiction, necessitating enforcement proceedings in the place where those assets are 
situated. 
 
The discussion on the actual execution of domestic awards as opposed to a court order for 
enforcement is exemplified by Kenyan practice, the shortcomings of which provoked the 
                                                 
637 It is clear from Article 31(4) of the Model Law that the making of the award and its delivery are two separate 
acts. 
638 See para 3.6.2 below for the distinction between recognition and enforcement. 
639 Compare Article 36(2) of the Model Law, which provides for the possibility that a court from which 
enforcement is sought, may require appropriate security from the party opposing enforcement as a condition for 
adjourning the enforcement proceedings so that an application for setting aside can be dealt with.  Outside of 
applications for interim measures under Article 9, this appears to be the only provision in the Model Law where 
the court is directly concerned with the ability of a party to comply with an order for enforcement of an award. 
640 Article III states: “Each contracting state shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in 
accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid 
down in the following articles. There shall not be imposed substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees 
or charges on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards to which this Convention applies than are 
imposed on the recognition or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards.” 
Article IV requires the party applying for recognition and enforcement to supply (i) the duly authenticated 
original award or a duly certified copy and (ii) the original agreement or a duly certified copy, and a translation 
of these documents into the official language of the country in which the award is relied on. The translation shall 
be certified by an official or sworn translator or by a diplomatic or consular agent. 
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writer’s interest and in this problem. The topic is not covered by arbitration law.  Its inclusion 
here may therefore be controversial insofar as award execution involves legislation other than 
arbitration law and so ostensibly outside the study field.  In context, award enforcement and 
execution through the administrative system of the domestic courts is the same in the three 
African jurisdictions as evidenced by the provisions of statutes such as, for Kenya: The Civil 
Procedure Act and Rules of Court and the Licensing of Auctioneers Act; for Nigeria: The 
Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (Chapter 407) and the Civil Procedure Rules 2004 of the High 
Court of Lagos State; and for Zimbabwe: The High Court Act Chapter 7:06.  In effect the 
procedure is for the enforcement of an arbitral award in the same manner as a judgement or 
court decree.  Yet the fact that existing arbitration law does not cover award execution should 
not preclude a discussion of an expeditious method of award execution in Kenya.  The point 
of departure therefore is the innovative proposition that arbitration law should cover the whole 
field including the execution of the arbitral award, and the originality of this proposition as 
well as its controversy can be seen as relevant challenges for research and new law.  Kenyan 
practice adequately exemplifies the problem and its investigation concludes with a proposed 
simplified enforcement and execution procedure for Kenya.  
 
The enforcement of an award against a defiant opponent can be a harrowing experience for 
the successful party.  Yet opposition to the enforcement and execution of a favourable award 
is not unique to arbitration as successful litigants also encounter practical problems of 
enforcement and execution of judgments. The difference is that for the successful litigant, the 
processes of the court trial, delivery of the judgment, the issuance of a decree for enforcement 
and levy of execution are played out in one continuum under the panoply of state authority.  
For the successful arbitral party there is what seems like the end of one often lengthy process 
with the arbitral tribunal leading to a favourable award, only to have to start again with 
another in a different venue in court. This brings the prospect of additional costs and the 
possibility of losing the benefits of the favourable award through a successful challenge. In 
the words of a commentator from the common-law tradition: 
 
“If an agreement or award which is not voluntarily carried out cannot be coercively enforced 
against a recalcitrant party, then a rationale for arbitration is eroded and confidence in the 
arbitral process would be shaken. … Thus, in recognising and enforcing arbitral agreements or 
awards, courts assist parties in realising their legitimate expectations and thereby supporting 
the arbitral process, as well as reinforcing its efficacy and integrity.  The court’s duty has as an 
implication the assurance that the arbitral proceeding was conducted, or that a resultant award 
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was procured, in a manner compatible with procedural fairness or otherwise not in conflict 
with other public policy considerations.  In those respects, the court may also be carrying out 
international arbitral obligations.”641 
 
From the civil-law tradition another commentator observes: 
 
“Enforcement … ‘constitutes, for the arbitral award and for arbitration as a whole, the moment 
of truth or … “the acid test”.’ Should the award be enforced, the arbitrator’s efforts are 
thereby honored, and arbitration as an institution strengthened.  Should the award be vacated 
or enforcement denied, the result casts a dark shadow over the proceeding.  To date, the record 
of award enforcement has been a good one.  No doubt, this is in large part due to the 
seriousness and commitment with which arbitrators and arbitral institutions undertake their 
respective tasks. … Nonetheless, the risk of non-enforcement remains looming like a ‘sword 
of Damocles’ over the entire system, and the costs of non-enforcement, even when rare, are 
enormous for the parties, the arbitrators, the institutions, the States and the system as a 
whole.”642 
 
In sum, the ability to enforce the carrying out of an award, in the absence of voluntary 
compliance, is therefore crucial because in the end this determines whether or not the entire 
arbitration exercise has been worth the resources put into it. If a party who has received a 
valid and binding award cannot enforce it effectively and expeditiously against a party with 
the means but not the will to comply, then arbitration does not merit recognition as an 
effective means of resolving disputes. It should also be noted that the focus of the discussion 
is on problems relating to the enforcement of an award, rather than on the procedure and 
grounds for setting an award aside, which is only referred to in order to provide the necessary 
background for the discussion. 
 
                                                 
641 Asouzu AA “The adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law in Nigeria: Implications on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards” [1999] Journal of Business Law 185. 
642 Horvath G “The Duty of the Tribunal to Render an Enforceable Award” (2001) 18(2) Journal of International 
Arbitration 135, quoting with approval Lalive P “Enforcing Awards” in International Arbitration, 60 years of 
ICC Arbitration (ICC 1984) 317 321. 
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3.6.2 Requirements of a Valid Final Award643 and Grounds for Setting Aside 
 
It has been said that perhaps the arbitrator’s most important duty is to render an enforceable 
award.644 It would seem to follow logically that the arbitrator should therefore ensure that the 
award satisfies the applicable formal and substantive requirements for a valid award. As 
appears from the discussion below, the UNCITRAL Model Law, although specifying the 
formal requirements for a valid award, is less specific than several other modern arbitration 
statutes as to the consequences of non-compliance. 
 
The Model Law under Article 22(1) requires that the award must be made in the language 
used in the arbitration proceedings. The parties are free to agree on the language of the 
proceedings and in default of agreement the language is determined by the tribunal.  This 
Model Law requirement is replicated in the arbitration statutes of the three jurisdictions under 
review, such as the Kenyan Arbitration Act s 23.  Article 22(1) envisages that the proceedings 
could be conducted in more than one language.  In a multi-lingual African jurisdiction, it is 
conceivable that the parties would agree that the proceedings should be conducted in more 
than one language but that the award should be made in English, to facilitate court 
enforcement, if necessary. The Model Law requires the award to be in writing and signed by 
the arbitrator or arbitrators.  Where the tribunal comprises more than one arbitrator, the 
signatures of the majority are sufficient, provided that the reason for any omitted signature is 
stated.645 The award must state the reasons upon which the award is based, unless the parties 
agree otherwise or the award records a settlement on agreed terms.646 The date and place of 
arbitration must also be stated647 and signed copies of the award are to be delivered to the 
parties.648 
 
Other requirements deemed substantive by commentators require the arbitrator to convey his 
decision in a language that is clear, explicit and without ambiguity, and to ensure that the 
award is certain, final, lawful and capable of enforcement.649 An important legal consequence 
                                                 
643 See the explanation of “final award” in para 3.2.6 above. The term “final award” is used without explanation 
in the Model Law Article 32(1); “final arbitral award” is used in s 33(1) of the Kenyan statute also without 
explanation; see also the Zimbabwe statute First Schedule Article 32(1) and s 27(1) of the Nigerian statute. 
644 See Horvath (2001) 18(2) Journal of International Arbitration 135. 
645 Article 31(1). 
646 Article 30 deals with the tribunal’s power to make an award on agreed terms.  The formal requirements of 
Article 31 apply and the award must state that it is an award on agreed terms. 
647 This refers to the place of the arbitration as determined in accordance with Article 20, rather than the place at 
which the award was actually signed.  See Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 838-839. 
648 See Article 31(3) and (4). 
649 Mustill & Boyd Commercial Arbitration 384-388; Russell on Arbitration (23rd ed) 301 para 6-072. 
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of a valid final award is that in terms of the parties’ arbitration agreement, it brings an end to 
their dispute. 
 
Regarding the legal requirements for a valid award, an arbitrator should also bear in mind the 
grounds on which an award can be set aside by the court, as non-compliance with the 
requirements underlying those grounds would mean that the award would be at the risk of 
being set aside by the court.650 
 
Developing and drafting the standards against which courts of a Model Law jurisdiction are to 
judge the arbitral award, which is the final product of the arbitral proceedings, presented 
unusually sensitive and difficult problems to the drafters of the Model Law.651 This is 
possibly illustrated by the fact that the travaux préparatoires of the relevant provision, Article 
34, are longer than those of any other Article of the Model Law, other than Article 1.652 From 
the outset, the drafters of the Model Law dealt with the problem in two ways. Firstly, they 
prescribed limited grounds for setting aside the award under Article 34. Secondly, although 
various national laws at the time provided “a great variety” of methods to assail an arbitral 
award, the Model Law prescribes a single exclusive method of doing so (other than resisting 
enforcement), that is, by judicial process involving an application to the court for the setting 
aside of the award.653 The court may set aside the award only if the applicant proves the 
incapacity of a party to conclude the arbitration agreement, or the invalidity of the arbitration 
agreement, or the absence of notice of an arbitrator’s appointment or of the proceedings or 
inability to present its case or that the award deals with extraneous matters.654 The award may 
also be set aside if the court finds the subject-matter not arbitrable under its own law or that 
the award is in conflict with public policy of that state.655 The national statutes of Kenya, 
Nigeria and Zimbabwe, in the main, replicate the provisions of Article 34.656 
 
The drafters of the Model Law decided not to define the term “award” either for purposes of 
Article 34 or for purposes of other provisions of the Model Law, because considerable 
difficulty was encountered in “finding an acceptable general definition that would have the 
                                                 
650 Compare the argument in Russell on Arbitration 301 para 6-072. 
651 See Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 911. 
652 Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 911.  Article 1 deals with the scope of the Model 
Law’s application. 
653 See Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 911-912 and Article 34(1): “Recourse to a 
court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside in accordance with 
paragraphs (2) and (3) of this article.” 
654 Article 34(2)(a). 
655 Article 34(2)(b). 
656 See the text below.  
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effect of properly regulating court control of arbitral decisions”.657 However, an award in 
Article 34 by implication includes a partial award.658 
 
The statutory provisions on recourse to court to set aside an award in Kenya appear under 
section 35 of Part VI of the 1995 Arbitration Act. Apart from the specific reference to the 
High Court as the judicial authority to which an application for setting aside an arbitral award 
can be made, the provisions of section 35 of the Kenyan statute are in pari materia659 with 
those of Model Law, Article 34. As the Kenyan statute is monistic, the same provisions will 
govern the application to the High Court to set aside a domestic and international award under 
the same grounds prescribed by Model Law, Article 34. Article 34 in the First Schedule to the 
Zimbabwe statute, on grounds for setting aside, is in similar terms to the Model Law. For 
avoidance of doubt however there is an additional declaration under Article 34(5) to the effect 
that an award would be in conflict with the public policy of Zimbabwe if it was “induced or 
effected (sic) by fraud or corruption”, or a breach of natural justice occurred in making the 
award. The position in Nigeria is different. Section 48 of the Nigerian statute, containing 
provisions similar to the Model Law Article 34 for setting aside an award, is part of the 
“Additional Provisions Relating To International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation” 
under Part III of the statute. However for domestic arbitrations three grounds for setting aside 
an award are provided: (i) where the award contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of 
the submission;660 or (ii) the arbitrator has misconducted himself or the proceedings or (iii) 
where “the arbitral proceedings, or the award, has been improperly procured” (sic).661 
 
3.6.3 Recognition and Enforcement under the Model Law and Grounds for Refusal   
 
The Model Law does not define the terms “recognition” and “enforcement”. However it 
appears from the legislative history of Article 35 of the Model Law that the drafters drew a 
distinction between “recognition” and “enforcement” because the wording of Article 35(1) 
                                                 
657 See Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 153-154.  There was broad agreement that 
an award included any decision in which a matter of substance was finally determined, but problems were 
encountered with the situation where a tribunal described a decision on a procedural matter as an award. 
658 In the sense of an award that finally determines one or more, but not all, of the substantive matters in dispute.  
This is implicit in Article 32, which refers to a “final award” as one of the ways in which arbitral proceedings are 
terminated.  The possibility of awards, other than a final award, is clearly contemplated. 
659 Except for an obvious error in the provisions of s 35(3) which must have been intended to be read together 
with s 34 and not with s 36 in order to be in line with the Model Law Article 34(3). 
660 S 29(2). 
661 S 30(1)).  The last two grounds are reminiscent of s 23(2) of the English Arbitration Act of 1950, although the 
latter provision refers only to the award (not the proceedings) being improperly procured as a ground for setting 
aside. 
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suggests that recognition may occur independently of enforcement and therefore it is only for 
enforcement purposes that a written application to court must be made.662 The explanation of 
the Working Group was that “recognition was an abstract legal effect which could obtain 
automatically without necessarily being requested by a party.663 Nevertheless it has been 
suggested that paragraph 2 of Article 35 does prescribe a procedure for requesting recognition 
by the provision that a party relying on an award “shall supply” the award and the arbitration 
agreement.664 It is also observed that the distinction between recognition and enforcement is 
one of the changes between the New York Convention and the Model Law without being in 
conflict with each other.665 
 
The tenor and content of Chapter VIII of the Model Law on recognition and enforcement of 
awards reflects the significant policy decision of applying the same rules in this context to 
arbitral awards whether made in the country of enforcement or abroad, and to follow as far as 
possible, the provisions of the New York Convention towards the uniform treatment of all 
awards, both as regards the grounds for active challenge under Article 34 and resistance to 
enforcement under Article 36. Secondly the new line of demarcation is therefore between 
“international” and “non-international” awards and not between “foreign” and “domestic”666 
awards; and the new distinction is based on substantive grounds rather than territorial 
borders.667 In consequence the recognition and enforcement of “international” awards, 
whether “foreign” or “domestic” is governed by the same provisions. Thirdly by modeling 
recognition and enforcement on the equivalent provisions of the 1958 New York Convention 
the UNCITRAL Model Law can be said to supplement, rather than conflict with, the relevant 
provisions of the Convention. 
 
Article 35(1) of the Model Law prescribes the procedural requirements of recognition and 
enforcement by providing that an arbitral award, irrespective of the country in which it was 
                                                 
662 See Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 1011.  The intended distinction appears 
clearly if one compares the wording of Article 35(1) and (2) with that of the equivalent provisions of the New 
York Convention, namely Articles III and IV(I). 
663 Fifth Working Group Report. A/CN9/246, para 146; Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model 
Law 1011. 
664 Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 1011. 
665 Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 1011. 
666 There is the complicating fact that awards issued in international commercial arbitrations that take place in 
the enforcing or recognising state are domestic awards. Further, with the exception of investment disputes 
arbitrated by ICSID under the Washington Convention an international commercial arbitration is conducted 
under a national arbitration law of the seat of arbitration. 
667 The significant observation is that the place of arbitration is now of limited importance as it is often chosen 
for the parties’ convenience, as the dispute may have little or no connection with the state where the arbitration 
took place. 
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made, shall be recognized as binding and enforceable subject to the provisions of Article 
35(2) and 36 which prescribe the grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement.  The 
application668 for enforcement is made in writing to “the competent court”, together with an 
authenticated original award or duly certified copy, the original arbitration agreement or a 
duly certified copy, and a duly certified translation of the agreement and award if not written 
in the official language of the State where enforcement is sought.669 What may also be noted 
from the perspective of international arbitration practice is that reciprocity is not included as a 
condition for recognition and enforcement, no doubt, because of the limited importance of the 
place of arbitration in international cases and the desire to do away with territorial restrictions. 
There is also the fact that reciprocity is a more logical requirement in a national statute that is 
giving effect to a Convention. 
 
But, given the acclaimed success of the New York Convention on the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, was a re-enactment of its core provisions in the Model 
Law necessary? The legislative history reveals a division of opinion on the inclusion of the 
provisions on recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in the Model Law.670 The most 
important argument in favour of inclusion was the need for a single set of provisions for both 
foreign and domestic awards and for the Model Law to de-emphasize the importance of the 
place of arbitration in international commercial arbitration.671 This was perceived as a means 
of harmonizing arbitration law globally and enhancing the vitality of international commercial 
arbitration.672 It was also acknowledged that the Model Law would be incomplete without 
provisions to govern awards not governed by the New York Convention or other multilateral 
or bilateral treaties. For domestic awards the justification was the need for a single unified 
treatment of arbitral awards as a means of facilitating international commercial arbitration 
world wide. In addition to this is the observation that the conditions specified under paragraph 
2 of Article 35 are intended to set maximum standards. Therefore it was not seen to be 
contrary to the harmonizing impact of the Model Law for a state to set less onerous 
conditions. 
 
                                                 
668 Compare the provisions of s 53 of the proposed South African Bill for Domestic Arbitration: Any party may 
apply for the award to be made an order of court. 
669 Article 35(2). Article 35(2) was amended in 2006 to abolish the requirement to furnish the original or an 
authenticated copy of the arbitration agreement.  This amendment is to be welcomed as it removes a formal 
barrier to enforcement, when the applicant does not have the original arbitration agreement. 
670 The arguments for and against inclusion are found in the five Working Group Reports, the Sixth and Seventh 
Secretariat Notes, the Summary Record A/CN9/SR320 paras 30-57 and the Commission’s Report A/40/17 paras 
308-310. See also Holtzmann & Neuhaus Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law 1006-1007. 
671 Seventh Secretariat Note, A/CN.9/264 Art 35; para 3. 
672 Seventh Secretariat Note, A/CN.9/264 Art 35; para 3. 
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Article 35 is replicated by the statutes of the three African jurisdictions for both domestic and 
international arbitrations and the adequacy or otherwise of these provisions for the 
enforcement of arbitral awards will be considered  below. It is appropriate at this stage to turn 
to the grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement under the Model Law. 
 
It is because enforcement of the award can be declined by the court at this stage that the role 
of the court and its relationship with the arbitral tribunal is under constant scrutiny in 
arbitration law and practice to ensure that an award is not lightly remitted or set aside or its 
enforcement improperly or incorrectly denied.  The legal grounds for rejecting an award are 
therefore in this respect of particular importance. 
 
The Model Law grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement are set out under Article 
36.  The opponent of the award must prove that (i) an arbitral party was under some 
incapacity, or the arbitration agreement is not valid; or (ii) no proper notice of the arbitrator’s 
appointment or of the proceedings was given or the opponent was unable to present his case; 
or (iii) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of 
submission; or (iv) the composition of the tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in 
accordance with the parties’ agreement or, where the agreement is silent, the law of the situs; 
or (v) the award has not yet become binding on the parties or has been set aside or suspended 
by a court at the seat.  Additionally enforcement will be refused if the court finds that the 
subject-matter of the dispute is not arbitrable under its own law or enforcement would 
contradict public policy of the state. 
 
It is to be observed that the grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement under Article 36 
are identical to those under Article V of the New York Convention, with the significant 
difference that under the Model Law these grounds are relevant not merely with regard to 
foreign awards but to all awards in international commercial arbitrations irrespective of the 
country in which the award was made. 
 
It seems therefore that Article 36 which prescribes the grounds for a court to refuse 
recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award is intended to correlate with Article 35. 
Article 35 provides a procedure to be followed by a party seeking the recognition and 
enforcement of the award. Article 36, on the other hand, prescribes for the other party and the 
court what must be proved for recognition and enforcement to be denied. 
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As noted above, both Articles 35 and 36 are modeled on the New York Convention, although 
unlike the Convention Article 36 extends not only to foreign awards, that is, arbitral awards 
made outside the state in which recognition or enforcement is sought, but also to domestic 
awards, that is, those made in international commercial arbitrations that take place in the 
enforcing or recognizing state. The unified treatment of domestic and foreign awards seems to 
have been the deliberate policy choice by UNCITRAL. Another kind of unity is that Article 
34 is in almost every respect a reflection of Article 36. 
 
The important question relating to the interpretation of Article 36, that is, whether minor and 
non-material defects in arbitral procedure should result in the refusal of recognition or 
enforcement brings into consideration the issue of waiver of procedural errors. Arbitration 
practice seems to accept waiver of errors in arbitral procedure, and in some circumstances, 
even jurisdictional defects by the failure of a party to object timeously. In such an instance it 
can be reasonably inferred that such a waiver would extend to proceedings for the recognition 
and enforcement as well. More specifically, and with regard to waivers of procedural errors 
under Article 4 it seems that the UNCITRAL Commission was agreed that such waivers were 
not limited to arbitral proceedings only but also extended to subsequent court proceedings in 
the context of Articles 34 and 36.673 
 
The analytical commentary draws a distinction between Articles 34(2)(a)(iv) and 36(1)(a)(iv) 
as an exception to the general policy of harmony between the two Articles.674 The explanation 
is that the need to synchronise the Model Law with the New York Convention on the 
recognition and enforcement of awards was necessary to create a unified system worldwide 
for that purpose. But the alignment between Articles 34 and 36 also served the different 
purpose of diminishing the importance of the place of arbitration in international commercial 
arbitrations as between domestic and foreign arbitrations.675 
 
 
                                                 
673 See the Commission’s Report A/40/17 para 57. 
674 Article 34(2)(a)(iv) states that the award may be set aside by the court only if, “(iv) the composition of the 
arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such 
agreement was in conflict with a provision of this law from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such 
agreement, was not in accordance with this law”. Article 36(1)(a)(iv): recognition or enforcement may be 
refused on proof that “the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance 
with the agreement of the parties or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country 
where the arbitration took place;” 
675 Seventh Secretariat Note A/CN 9.264 Article 34 para 11 and Sixth Secretariat Note (Government Comments) 
A/CN 9/263 Article 36 para 8. 
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3.6.4 Court Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the Three African 
Jurisdictions Compared to English Law. 
 
Under the provisions of the Kenyan statute, the duty of a party applying for enforcement to 
furnish the original award and arbitration agreement or duly certified copies, is apparently 
subject to the discretion of the court to dispense with strict compliance with these 
requirements.676 The English language is substituted for the “official language” of the Model 
Law provision. 
 
For Nigeria, the recognition and enforcement provisions for domestic awards appear under 
section 31677 and for international commercial arbitration, under section 51, but in the latter 
case the enforcement of the award is subject to both the provisions of sections 51 and 52 of 
the statute.678 
 
On Recognition and Enforcement the Zimbabwe statute replicates the Model Law Article 35 
except the substitution of the “English language” for the “official language” under Article 
35(2).679 
 
Refusal of recognition and enforcement of awards in Zimbabwe is governed by Article 36 of 
the First Schedule to the Act in terms similar to Article 36 of the Model Law and section 37 
of the Kenyan statute, plus an additional Article 36(3) to the effect that an award will be 
contrary to the public policy of Zimbabwe for fraud, corruption or breach of the rules of 
natural justice. The equivalent provisions for the refusal of a Nigerian award are elaborated 
under section 52 for international commercial awards. For domestic awards section 32 merely 
allows any of the parties to request the court to refuse recognition or enforcement of the 
award680 but specifies no grounds for requesting the refusal. 
 
It has been mentioned above that the requirement for a party in Kenya, that is relying on an 
arbitral award or applying for its enforcement, to follow the procedure outlined under section 
                                                 
676 See s 36(2) “Unless the High Court otherwise orders”; but note the comment below regarding the opportunity 
thereby afforded to the court to impose additional conditions. 
677 Under s 31(3) an award may, with the leave of the court or a judge, be enforced in the same manner as a 
judgment or order to the same effect. 
678 S 51(1). It seems that the reference to s 32 in the provision is a typographical error. It should refer to s 52 
instead of s 32. 
679 See the Zimbabwean Arbitration Act First Schedule Article 35. 
680 See Asouzu (1999) Journal of British Law 185 regarding the implications of the adoption of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in Nigeria; also Idornigie (2002) 19(5) 
Journal of International Arbitration 443-459. 
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36(2) regarding the production of authenticated original copies of the award and the 
arbitration agreement in the English language, is subject to the discretion of the High Court to 
order otherwise. This affords an opportunity for the court to impose conditions or procedures 
more or less stringent than those of the Model Law. It may be argued that this provision 
allows the court a desirable flexibility to take into consideration local peculiarities in 
considering whether or not to grant recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award. On the 
other hand, it is a provision that militates against predictability. For this reason it is submitted 
that an application for recognition or enforcement that fulfills the specified basic requirements 
of section 36(2) as to authentication of the award and arbitration agreement and subsection (3) 
as to translation into the English language, should not be refused or lightly refused. 
 
3.6.5 Enforcement and Execution of the Final Arbitral Award 
 
3.6.5.1 Enforcement 
 
The route to enforcement of an arbitral award in Kenya is provided by section 36(1)681 of the 
Kenyan Arbitration Act which states merely that an arbitral award shall be recognized as 
binding and “shall be enforced” upon an application in writing to the High Court. The manner 
of enforcement is not stated. Rule 9 of the Arbitration Rules 1997 made under the Kenyan 
statute requires the application to be made by summons in chambers but again, gives no 
indication of the manner of enforcement. In Kenya when judgment is granted in terms of an 
arbitral award the award is understood to have merged with the judgment, and the ensuing 
decree is therefore a decree of the court, not of the arbitral tribunal. Any challenge or 
proceedings in connection with such judgment or decree is therefore a challenge or 
proceedings against the judgment or decree and not the arbitral award.682 It is recommended 
therefore that a further clarification of the Kenyan statute and Rule 9 is desirable as to the 
status of an arbitral award that is taken to court for enforcement as a judgment or decree of 
court and on the manner of its enforcement. 
 
Recognising the need for the extension of arbitration law, a senior Kenyan practitioner683 
expresses the view that the award enforcement and execution system should respect and give 
greater force and effect to the phrase “binding, enforceable and final” in an arbitration clause; 
                                                 
681 The equivalent of the Model Law Article 35(1). 
682 This is drawn from the writer’s experience in arbitration matters while a judge of the High Court of Kenya. 
683 Justice Aaron Ringera, former Senior Lecturer at the University of Nairobi, former Solicitor General of 
Kenya and Judge of Appeal, now a practicing arbitrator. 
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that parties having chosen arbitration to resolve their dispute must abide by the finality clause; 
and that the Kenyan Court Registrar should be empowered by legislation to summarily 
dismiss challenges to an award containing such a clause and decree its execution forthwith.  
In his words “the buck should stop with the Registrar”.  Absent a finality clause the Registrar 
should nevertheless scrutinize unmerited challenges strictly and award punitive costs. 
 
The enforcement684 of a domestic award685 in Nigeria is possible through a summary 
procedure, on application to the court with notice to the other party.686 Leave is normally 
granted unless the respondent requests that recognition and enforcement be refused.687 
Nigerian arbitration law provides a partial statutory explanation on the manner of enforcement 
by stating: 
 
“An award may, by leave of the court or a judge, be enforced in the same manner as a 
judgement or order to the same effect.”688 
 
If the application for enforcement is granted, the award is enforced as if it were a judgment of 
the court.  
 
The phrase “in the same manner as a judgement or order to the same effect” came under 
consideration in Ras Pal Gazi Construction Co. Ltd v Federal Capital Development 
Authority.689 At the end of the arbitration the arbitrator forwarded his award to the court that 
made the referral order to arbitration.690 The defendant’s application to set aside the award 
failed in the High Court which went on to make the award a judgment of the court. The 
                                                 
684 S 31(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. 
685 The enforcement of awards in an international arbitration, irrespective of the country where the award is made 
is dealt with by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act ss 51 and 52, based on the Model Law Articles 35 and 36.  
The enforcement of New York Convention awards is regulated by s 54 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.  
See Idornigie PO“The Relationship between Arbitral and Court Proceedings in Nigeria (2002) 19(5) Journal of 
International Arbitration 443 456-457.  See also Asouzu International Commercial Arbitration in African States 
204-205 regarding problems with the wording of s 54. 
686 See the Arbitration and Conciliation Act s 31; Idornigie (2002) 19(5) Journal of International Arbitration 
454-455.  See further on the relationship between the court and the arbitral tribunal in Nigeria Duru 
Fundamentals of Arbitration Law and Practice in Nigeria; Okekeifere A “The Enforcement and Challenge of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards in Nigeria” (1999) International Arbitration Law Review; Okekeifere A “International 
Commercial Arbitration and the UNCITRAL Model Law under Written Federal Constitutions” (1999) 16(2) 
Journal of International Arbitration 49-71; Asouzu AA “Arbitration and Judicial Powers in Nigeria” (2001) 
18(6) Journal of International Arbitration 617 – 640. 
687 See s 32 and Idornigie (2002) 19(5) Journal of International Arbitration 454. Idornigie 452-453 points out 
that s 32, unlike s 52 concerning the recognition of international awards, does not set out the grounds on which 
enforcement can be refused by the court. 
688 S 31(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. 
689 (2001) 10 NWLR (Part 722) 559. 
690 See the Arbitration and Conciliation Act s 4(1), which corresponds to Article 8(1) of the Model Law. 
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defendant again lost the subsequent appeals in both the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court held that 
 
“a valid award on a voluntary reference operates between the parties as a final and conclusive 
judgement upon all matters referred. This is because arbitration as an alternative mode of 
dispute resolution has for years been given legal backing. Thus an arbitrator’s award under the 
provisions of section 4(2) of ACA691 is as binding between the parties, and when filed in court 
should for all purposes have the force and effect of a judgement.” 
 
However the Supreme Court criticized the High Court for converting the arbitral award into 
its own judgment, adding that “the role of the High Court in an arbitral award is mainly to 
enforce when the award is not challenged.” In other words, the arbitral award in Nigeria 
always remains an award of the arbitral tribunal and is enforced in the same manner as a 
judgment but without turning it into a judgment of the court. Therefore it is the manner of 
enforcement that is akin to a judgment, not the award itself. The manner of enforcement was 
not considered or explained by the Supreme Court. It seems to this writer that upon the 
arbitral award becoming a decree of court bearing the registrar’s signature and imprimatur as 
happens in Kenya the decree is thereby an order of court and so something more than an 
arbitral award and its execution as an instrument of court is therefore appropriate. 
 
The provisions on the enforcement of arbitral awards in the Zimbabwean statute are silent on 
the manner of enforcement and so require no further comment beyond the discussion of the 
equivalent provisions of the Model Law above.692 
 
In this writer’s submission, and for avoidance of doubt, it will be very helpful for award 
holders, in say Kenya, for the actual manner in which an award is enforced and executed 
through the court system to be set out in either the relevant law or in rules on the subject.693 
 
Because of the similarity of English arbitration practice and that of Kenya, the developments 
in English arbitration law and practice on the enforcement of arbitral awards are relevant to 
this study. Enforcement of awards is dealt with by section 66 of the English Arbitration Act 
                                                 
691 S 4(2) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, following Article 8(2) of the Model Law, permits the arbitrator to 
commence with the arbitration and make an award while the court proceedings are pending. 
692 The Zimbabwe Arbitration Act of 1996 1st Sch Article 35, following the Model Law, provides for the award 
to be enforced pursuant to an application in writing to the High Court, subject to the provisions of Articles 35 
and 36, which are concerned with the conditions for granting enforcement and grounds on which enforcement 
may be refused.  See further para 3.6.3 above. 
693 See the proposals in para 3.6.6 below. 
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1996. In essence section 66 provides for three alternative options for enforcing an award, 
although the second is actually a variant of the first.694 First, with the leave of the court, the 
award may be enforced in the same manner as a judgment or order to that effect.695 Secondly, 
in the alternative, where leave is given, “judgment may be entered in terms of the award”.696 
The choice between these two options may well be determined by the need for enforcement in 
another jurisdiction.  In some it will facilitate the process to have an award, whereas in others it 
may be preferable to have an English court judgment.697 The third procedure is for the 
enforcement of an award by “an action on the award”.698 The enforcement of an award by 
way of an action may be considered where the first procedure is not available. For example, 
the first procedure is only available where there is an “arbitration agreement” within the 
meaning of the Arbitration Act of 1996.699 
 
The procedure most used in practice is the first procedure and what is particularly important 
from a Kenyan or an African perspective, is the fact that there are special rules of court to 
enable leave of court for enforcement to be obtained expeditiously.700 The application for 
leave is usually made without notice to the other party,701 by an arbitration claim form 
supported by a written witness statement and either the originals or copies of the award and 
arbitration agreement. Permission to enforce the award is usually given,702 but leave will not 
be given where the person against whom enforcement is sought, shows that the tribunal 
lacked substantive jurisdiction.703 Even where jurisdiction is not in issue the court has a 
discretion not to grant leave for enforcement summarily. 
 
The drafters of the English Arbitration Act decided against including a list of cases (even if it 
were not a closed list) as to when leave to enforce should be refused, preferring to leave this 
                                                 
694 Compare Russell on Arbitration (23rd ed) 450 para 8-002. 
695 S 66(1). 
696 S 66(2). 
697 See Russell on Arbitration (23rd edition) 453 par 8-008. 
698 See s 66(4), which also refers to the enforcement of awards pursuant to certain Conventions.  In England an 
enforcement of an award under the New York Convention is provided for by ss 101-103 of the Arbitration Act of 
1996. 
699 See Russell on Arbitration (23rd ed) 455 para 8-014. 
700 The original rules made when the Arbitration Act took effect have been replaced by the Civil Procedure Rules 
Part 62, Arbitration Claims (“CPR Pt 62”; see Russell on Arbitration (23rd edition) 530 para 8-181), which are 
contained in Appendix 1 of Russell on Arbitration 621-645.  The Appendix includes the relevant Practice 
Directive and Claim Form.  See Russell on Arbitration (23rd ed) 542-544 paras 8-219-8-224 for a brief 
discussion of the procedure. 
701 See Russell on Arbitration (23rd ed) 451 para 8-003 and CPR Pt 62.18. 
702 See Russell on Arbitration (23rd ed) 452 para 8-004. 
703 S 66 (3). 
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to the court’s discretion.704 Leave is only refused in exceptional cases. Where leave is given, it 
is usually given on “terms that the award may be enforced in the same manner as a judgment 
or order of court to the same effect”.705 It will also be possible to obtain an injunction freezing 
the assets of the party against whom enforcement is sought.706 The claimant must serve the 
order for leave for enforcement on the defendant. Unless the order is served out of the 
jurisdiction, when a longer time will be stipulated, the defendant has 14 days from the date of 
service to apply for the order to be set aside.  The award may not be enforced before the 
expiry of this period or until any application by the defendant within that period has been 
finally disposed of.707 The grounds for challenging the order are certainly no wider than those 
on which an award may generally be challenged under the 1996 Act.708 When granting leave 
to enforce, a court may stay enforcement for a limited period pending an application to 
challenge the award. In granting a stay, the court will take into account the chances of success 
of the challenge and may require the applicant for a stay to make a payment into court as 
security.709 
 
In summary, the English Act, supplemented by the Civil Procedure Rules Part 62, provides a 
clear, expeditious and effective procedure for the enforcement of awards, with safeguards to 
prevent an unsuccessful challenge being abused so that enforcement will subsequently 
become impossible. The special summary procedure for the enforcement of arbitral awards, 
without notice to the other party, ensures that enforcement will not be delayed because of the 
unavailability of a court date or a judge to hear the application for enforcement. This is in 
sharp contrast to the position regarding the enforcement of awards in Kenya, discussed above. 
The English Arbitration Act as well as English text books710 on arbitration assume the 
availability of an effective execution process for the enforcement of civil judgments generally 
and do not deal with the execution of awards once leave to enforce has been obtained. Again, 
it will appear from the discussion below711 that the successful party in Kenya who has 
                                                 
704 See the Saville Committee’s Supplementary Report on the Arbitration Act of 1996 (January 1997) paras 32-
34 (published in Russell on Arbitration (23rd ed) 720).  Examples given by Russell 452 para 8-005 include when 
the award is so defective in form so as to be incapable of enforcement or where enforcement would be contrary 
to public policy. 
705 Russell on Arbitration (23rd ed) 452 para 8-005, citing s 66(1). 
706 Russell on Arbitration (23rd ed) 453 para 8-006. 
707 Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) Pt 62 18(7)-(9). 
708 Russell on Arbitration (23rd ed) 454 para 8-010.  The grounds for challenging an award are contained in ss 67-
69 of the Arbitration Act of 1996. 
709 Russell on Arbitration (23rd ed) 453 par 8-009. 
710 The discussion on enforcement of awards in Russell on Arbitration, ch 8, is focused on the special features for 
the enforcement of an award under s 66 and CPR Pt 62. The authors clearly see no need to discuss execution in a 
book on arbitration. 
711 See para 3.6.5.2 below. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
317 
 
managed to obtain a court order for enforcement of an award after a protracted and difficult 
process, is then confronted with further substantial difficulties in trying to have the order for 
enforcement executed. 
 
The South African Law Commission’s proposed Bill for domestic arbitration for South Africa 
provides that any party may apply to court after notice to the other party for the award to be 
made an order of court. Unless one of the specified grounds for refusing enforcement applies, 
the award must be made an order of court before being enforced “in the same manner as any 
judgment or order to the same effect”.712 “Court” in this context includes a magistrate’s court 
with jurisdiction.713 It is desirable that this definition of “court” is adopted for this purpose by 
Kenya to enable customary law arbitration awards in particular to be enforced, by a 
magistrate’s court as well as by the High Court.714 It is also noteworthy that the Law 
Commission also recommended the need to create an expedited enforcement procedure for 
arbitral awards by means of appropriate court rules.715 
 
3.6.5.2 Execution 
 
The reasons for including a discussion of this topic have been set out above.716 In addition, it 
emerged from this writer’s interviews with arbitration practitioners and members of the legal 
profession and court officials in Kenya that, not only is the manner of enforcing an arbitral 
award as a judgment somewhat obscure and capricious but even the procedure for enforcing a 
court judgment is not common knowledge.717 From the perspective of a successful award and 
decree-holder,718 the effectiveness or otherwise of enforcement and execution procedures is of 
importance as it impacts on the choice of arbitration as a preferred, competent and complete 
mode of dispute resolution. 
 
                                                 
712 See SA Law Commission Report on Domestic Arbitration (May 2001) Annexure B s 53. 
713 S 53(6). 
714 By virtue of a provision like the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1988 s 31(3). 
715 See SA Law Commission Report on Domestic Arbitration para 3.259. 
716 See para 3.6.1 above. 
717 For this reason the writer is particularly grateful to Mr Joseph Getauke of the High Court Registry and Mrs 
Maureen Odero of the Milimani Commercial Court Registry for the insights they gave the writer on this topic.  
The Milimani Commercial Court serves as the commercial section of the High Court in Nairobi. 
718 In Kenya, decree-holder means “any person in whose favour a decree has been passed or an order capable of 
execution has been made, and includes the assignee of such decree or order” (Civil Procedure Act, Cap 21, s 2). 
A decree is a formal expression of an adjudication which conclusively determines the rights of the parties with 
regard to all or any matters in controversy in a suit and may be either preliminary or final. For purposes of appeal 
a decree includes a judgment (Civil Procedure Act s 2). 
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The ultimate objective of arbitration is compliance with the award, if necessary, with the 
assistance of the court. The successful execution of an award can therefore be considered the 
heart of the matter. Yet arbitration law, as observable from the laws discussed in this study, 
does not deal with the execution of awards, which is part of the ordinary law of civil 
procedure. Because an arbitrator cannot compel the parties to comply with his award the need 
for enforcement and execution arises in the absence of voluntary compliance. As the arbitrator 
becomes functus officio on the publication of the award the problem of execution is more for 
the successful party than for the arbitrator. The law applying to the execution of awards 
should clearly define the procedure for execution. The procedure must effectively deliver the 
fruits of the award. However, in Kenya, which is the main focus for consideration of this 
topic, the law regarding the applicable procedure is both unclear and unsatisfactory, leaving 
successful arbitral parties wondering what to do next with the award. 
 
What is clear is that the execution of an award in Kenya is through a process of the domestic 
court. But as will become apparent, there may be several obstacles on the way. Assuming 
however the absence of any technical hitches a summary procedure can be used. Commonly 
this requires the successful party to file the award in court with a request or an application for 
judgment to be entered according to the award.719 
 
Although the court may not be expected to turn this process into a full-blown inquiry or 
hearing it can lead to exactly that due to the lack of precise guidelines and a misapprehension 
of the court’s powers, enabling the uncooperative opponent of the award to deploy delaying 
tactics at this stage to prevent the process moving forward to a conclusion.720 In the event that 
the application proceeds smoothly with no recourse to the merits of the arbitral dispute, then 
the court, by making the award a judgment or order of court, thereby adopts the decision of 
the arbitrator for execution as a court decree. 
                                                 
719 The phrase to “enter judgement according to the award” appearing in Order XLV Rule 17 of the Civil 
Procedure Rules under the Civil Procedure Act is distinguishable from the enforcement of an award “in the same 
manner as a judgment or order to the same effect” under s 31(3) of the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act 
of 1988. Under the Kenyan regime the award so entered merges with the judgment whereas under the Nigerian 
regime the award remains an award of the arbitral tribunal throughout but is enforced in the same manner as a 
judgment (see comments on the Ras Pal Gazi Construction case in para 3.6.5.1 above). 
720 See para 3.6.6 below.  Similar problems occur in South Africa, where a respondent resists an application to 
have an award made an order of court under s 31 of the Arbitration Act of 1965, in circumstances where it 
should have brought an application to set aside the award under s 33.  The problem is aggravated by the fact that 
s 31 does not identify grounds on which the court may withhold enforcement. In Vidavsky v Body Corporate of 
Sunhill Villas 2005 5 SA 200 (SCA) the court regarded the award invalid on the basis that the arbitrator had 
exceeded his jurisdiction.  On the facts, although the arbitrator had jurisdiction to decide the dispute, he omitted 
to give the respondent proper notice of a hearing, thereby committing a gross procedural irregularity.  There was 
therefore a valid award, until set aside by the court. 
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Whether an arbitral award is made pursuant to a referral order of court721 or under the 
Arbitration Act of 1995 (the two principal but distinct arbitration regimes in Kenya), there is 
one primary route to its enforcement and execution.722 For an award obtained under a court 
referral order or under the Arbitration Act, the Civil Procedure Rules723 provide in relevant 
part that 
 
“[t]he Court shall on request enter judgement according to the award;”724 
 
and 
“Upon the judgement so entered a decree shall follow and no appeal shall lie from such decree 
except in so far as the decree is in excess of, or not in accordance with the award.”725 
 
The first observation is that this provision is concerned only with the conversion or merger of 
an arbitral award into a judgment and decree of court, with nothing said about its enforcement 
in the same manner as a judgment or decree. Secondly an award made pursuant to a referral 
order of court may be set aside under the Civil Procedure Rules726 for corruption or 
misconduct of the arbitrator or umpire or on the ground that either party has fraudulently 
concealed any matter which ought to have been disclosed, or has willfully misled or deceived 
the arbitrator or umpire.727 It is immediately clear that these Civil Procedure Rules728 are not 
compatible with, and could not have been intended to be consistent with, the grounds for 
setting aside an award under the Arbitration Act729 that came into force in 1995 long after the 
1985 revision of the Civil Procedure Act. The risk of confusion in attempting, as sometimes 
happens, to fill the gaps730 in the Arbitration Act and Rules by the application of the Civil 
                                                 
721 Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Rules pursuant to the Civil Procedure Act Cap 21 in effect sets up a 
separate arbitration system which is set in motion by a court referral order.  The arbitration is conducted outside 
the Arbitration Act of 1995.  (Although the arbitration may have taken place pursuant to a court referral order 
under Order XLV, an application for the enforcement of the resultant award is done on a new court file.)  In 
practice, according to files at the Deputy Registrar’s office, parties applying for enforcement of awards made 
pursuant to a referral order occasionally do so under s 36 of the Arbitration Act of 1995.  See n761 below. 
722 Other awards emanate from proceedings before the Business Premises Tribunal and the Rent Restriction 
Tribunal. 
723 Rule 17(1) and (2) of order XLV of the Civil Procedure Rules pursuant to the Civil Procedure Act, Cap 21. 
724 Rule 17(1). 
725 Rule 17(2). 
726 See rules 15(1)(a) and (b) of Order XLV. 
727 Compare the differing grounds under s 35 Arbitration Act 1995 for setting aside an arbitral award, which 
makes no explicit reference to “misconduct”.  
728 Rules 15(1) and 17(1) and (2). 
729 See the Arbitration Act s 35.  The rules are also not compatible with the contract-in right of appeal to the 
courts on a question of law in s 39, which is available in a domestic arbitration. 
730 Rule 11 of the Arbitration Rules of 1997 made under the Arbitration Act of 1995 allows the Civil Procedure 
Rules to be applied where appropriate to all court proceedings under the Arbitration Rules. 
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Procedure Act and Rules is that the execution of awards made under the Arbitration Act may 
be thwarted by the application of the Civil Procedure Rules that were made for litigation 
practice, but not specifically for awards under the Arbitration Act. Rule 11 of the Arbitration 
Rules of 1997, which allows the considerable lacuna in the Arbitration Rules to be filled by 
the Civil Procedure Rules, needs to be revisited and amended to remove the incongruity. 
 
In the absence of any special or distinct rules governing the execution of arbitral awards made 
under the Arbitration Act, the general rules of execution of court decrees apply to such awards 
once they transmute to court decrees. The route to the High Court is provided by the 
Arbitration Act,731 which allows the arbitral award to be recognized as binding and an 
application in writing to be made to the High Court for its enforcement. It has been noted that 
the application must be accompanied by the authenticated original arbitral award or a certified 
copy and the original arbitration agreement or a certified copy.732 Thereafter the Arbitration 
Act, like the Model Law on which it is based, is silent on the procedure for the conversion of 
the award into a judgment and decree. 
 
In the words of the Deputy Registrar of the Milimani Commercial Court, Nairobi,733 the 
“award becomes sucked into the ordinary Civil Procedure Rules.” Order XX thereof deals 
with Judgments and Decrees and Order XXI deals with Execution of Decrees and Orders. The 
Civil Procedure Act itself contains general provisions on execution of decrees.734 More 
specifically a “Procedure in Execution” is prescribed by section 38 of the Act, which 
empowers the High Court, on the application of the decree holder, to order execution of the 
decree by various methods. The methods specified are (i) by delivery of any property 
specifically decreed; (ii) by attachment and sale, or by sale without attachment of any 
property; (iii) by attachment of debts; (iv) by arrest and detention in prison of any person; (v) 
by appointing a receiver; or (vi) in such other manner as the nature of the relief granted may 
require.  
 
                                                 
731 See the Arbitration Act of 1995 s 36. 
732 See para 3.6.4 above on s 36.  If the award or agreement is not in English, s 36(3) requires a duly certified 
translation. 
733 The Milimani Commercial Court serves as the commercial section of the High Court, and is located at Upper 
Hill, Milimani, Nairobi. 
734 See ss 28-57 of Part III of the Act. 
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The procedure to commence the execution of an arbitral award which has merged with a 
judgment order or decree is set out in rule 6 of Order XXI of the Civil Procedure Rules.735 
The holder of a decree who desires to execute it must apply to the court which passed the 
decree or its proper officer, on the prescribed form.736 
 
Describing the entire process for the enforcement and execution of an arbitral award as 
cumbersome, the Deputy Registrar observed that it typically started with the service of a 
Notice of Filing the Award, a Chamber Summons (that is the application) with a supporting 
Affidavit for the Arbitral Award to be adopted by the High Court as a Judgment and for its 
enforcement as a Decree.737 The term “adopted” is emphasized, being the official term used 
by the court officials to describe the process. 
 
A Hearing Notice is then issued by the Court and an Affidavit of Service is subsequently 
filed. All being well, an Order for the adoption of the arbitral award with leave for its 
enforcement as a decree is granted by the court. A formal Decree is then issued. In addition a 
practice, without a clear legal basis, seems to have evolved whereby in an arbitration 
involving the government, a “Certificate of the Order Against the Government” is also issued 
by the court.738 
 
Various concerns come to mind. Because there is no particular distinction between the 
execution of an arbitral award made under a court referral order and an award made under the 
Arbitration Act 1995 and there are no special rules governing the execution of decrees from 
an arbitral award made under the Act, the provisions of Order XXI Rule 17 concerning the 
merger of an award with a judgment tend to be applied, also to arbitral awards made under the 
Arbitration Act.739 The attendant risk of so doing is that the court executing the decree may 
grant itself the liberty conferred by section 34 of the Civil Procedure Act to raise and 
determine any questions relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree even 
                                                 
735 Order XXI, made pursuant to the Civil Procedure Act, is headed “Execution of Decrees and Orders” and sets 
out the detailed rules of practice under some ninety-one paragraphs, including rule 6. 
736 See rule 6.  The application must be made in accordance with Form 5 of Appendix D. Rule 7 requires the 
application to be in writing, signed by the applicant or his advocate or a person acquainted with the facts of the 
case. The application must also contain the mode in which the assistance of the court is required in terms 
corresponding to the methods listed (i) to (vi) as set out in the text above from s 38 of the Civil Procedure Act. 
737 The Notice of Filing the Award is not covered by any rule; but the Chamber Summons is pursuant to s 36(1) 
of the Arbitration Act 1995 and Rule 9 of the Arbitration Rules 1997. 
738 See Shiv Construction Co Ltd v Ministry of Health, Misc Appl No 1150 of 2006. 
739 In Kihoro v Kihoro Misc. Appl No 885 of 2005, the application was made under both s 36 of the Act and 
Order XLV Rules 17 & 19. Several other cases were brought to the writer’s attention in which the applications 
were made under the combined legal regimes. 
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at the stage of entertaining the request to turn the award into a decree. Of greater concern is 
the fact that the executing court may within certain limitations “treat a proceeding under 
section 34 as a suit or a suit as a proceeding, and may, if necessary, order payment of any 
additional court fees”.740 As the Kenyan Arbitration Act, based on the UNCITRAL Model 
Law, could not have been intended to grant such liberties to the court beyond those prescribed 
by the Act, it is therefore necessary to provide clear guidelines for the execution of arbitral 
awards made under the Arbitration Act to prevent that kind of risk. As things stand the risk is 
even greater because the liberty of the executing court to apply any provisions of the Civil 
Procedure Rules as appropriate is underpinned by Rule 11 of the Kenyan Arbitration Rules of 
1997 made under the Arbitration Act 1995.741 
 
It must also be borne in mind that the Rules governing the execution of decrees under the 
Civil Procedure Act of 1985 as revised in 1998 principally envisaged and govern decrees 
emanating from suits between plaintiffs and defendants in litigation rather than between 
arbitral parties under the Arbitration Act of 1995. The need to effect amendments to the 
execution rules in order to bring the execution of awards made under the Arbitration Act in 
line with the tenor and intention of the provisions of that statute becomes apparent. It was 
strongly felt by this writer and the Kenyan registry officials that arbitration practice under the 
1995 Act will be boosted if the execution of arbitral awards under that Act was freed from the 
shackles of the current Civil Procedure Rules applying to the execution of court decrees. 
 
3.6.6 Impediments to Enforcement and Execution of Arbitral Awards. 
 
The above concerns aside, there are significant further practical obstacles to the execution of 
arbitral awards in Kenya. The expeditious execution of an arbitral award through the Kenyan 
judicial system is neither guaranteed nor readily achievable. The court process is known to be 
sluggish. The simplest application can take several months before receiving attention in the 
court registry, not to mention the range of excuses an opponent may deploy to further delay its 
determination in the event the matter in contention necessitates reference to a judge as the 
process of case allocation to a judge can itself take several months.  In the course of a field 
study interview with the Deputy Registrar of the Milimani Commercial Court, Mrs M Odero, 
she was unable to indicate a minimum time period for the completion of execution. On the 
                                                 
740 Civil Procedure Act s 34 (1) and (2). This Act which dates back to 1975, was revised in 1985 and 1998. 
741 Rule 11 states: “So far as is appropriate, the Civil Procedure Rules shall apply to all proceedings under these 
Rules.” The executing court only has to treat an executing application as a proceeding or a suit to involve itself 
in a full-scale inquiry or hearing in an ostensible quest for judicial satisfaction. 
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other hand she referred to an instance in which execution took up to five years. A further 
observation was that cases in which the judgment-debtor would collude with an objector to 
execution to frustrate or delay the levy of execution are of common occurrence. England used 
the opportunity afforded by the enactment of the 1996 Arbitration Act to overhaul and 
streamline the court rules governing applications in respect of arbitration. (See the discussion 
in para 3.6.4 above.). The need for this matter to be considered in South Africa was raised by 
Justice MJ Hlophe, Cape Judge President who stressed the need for rules to make adequate 
provision for applications to court arising from arbitrations to avoid unnecessary delay with 
such applications.742   
 
Arbitral awards are received and treated as miscellaneous applications by the High Court 
Registry. There is no separate arbitration registry as such in the civil division of the High 
Court of Kenya. Not only are arbitral awards not accorded any kind of precedence in the 
queue for applications for enforcement and execution but also the administrative staff who 
receive the awards for registration, with no special training, are not conversant with or minded 
to be compliant with time-limits prescribed by the Arbitration Act. Therefore despite the 
timeliness of the request or application for enforcement743 the ensuing delay can be a 
challenge to the common assumption that arbitration, from commencement to the execution of 
the award, is invariably quicker than litigation. 
 
For awards made under the Arbitration Act 1995 the initial hurdles of delay to be surmounted 
on the way to enforcement and execution are inherent in the temporal provisions of section 34 
which allow a party thirty days after the receipt of the award to request its correction and 
interpretation744 and the tribunal has an additional thirty days after the receipt of the request to 
make the correction or give the interpretation requested.745 A period of sixty days or more can 
be consumed after the delivery of the award including such additional period of time 
necessitated by the exigencies of resort to court. Further the three-month waiting period that 
must elapse before the right under section 35(3) to set aside an arbitral award can be 
extinguished is, in this writer’s experience, often queried by successful award-holders. The 
                                                 
742 See SA Law Commission Report Arbitration: an International Arbitration Act for South Africa 105 para 
2.286. 
743 Under the Arbitration Act s 35(3), an application for setting aside an award may not be made after 3 months 
of receiving the award or from the date a request for correction was disposed of by the arbitral award. The 
reference in this provision to s 36 as noted is an error. It should read s 34 (not s 36) to be in line with Model Law 
Article 34(3), as read together with Article 33. 
744 The power of interpretation only applies under s 34(1)(b) if the parties so agree. 
745 In the case of a request under s 34(4), for an additional award on a matter omitted from the award, the request 
must be made within 30 days of receipt of the award, and the tribunal has 60 days to make the additional award. 
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complaint being that the waiting period is unjustifiably too long, it seems to this writer that 
the provision can be amended and a shorter period of say fifteen or at most thirty days 
substituted in the interest of consistency. In other words an award that may be corrected or 
interpreted within thirty days can also be set aside within the like period. 
 
As the enforcement and execution of an arbitral award are matters of urgency and importance 
to an award-holder it may be thought and indeed suggested that the UNCITRAL Model Law 
and the national derivatives such as the Kenyan Arbitration Act could and should provide 
guidelines to expedite and facilitate the final act in the arbitration process. This will not only 
clarify and remove the anomalies noted above in the Kenyan practice but also streamline as 
far as practicable a uniform execution procedure for the benefit of contracting states.  
 
The point of emphasis is that a simple request for an arbitral award to be made a court order 
for enforcement and execution can be overwhelmed by unexpected issues such as an 
opponent’s complaint that the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction or that the award is made 
outside the time allocated for doing so. In so far as such issues are not covered by the 
governing statute a judge may well be inclined or persuaded to invoke the inherent 
jurisdiction of the High Court, as is frequently done in Kenya,746 to receive the complaint and 
conduct a hearing for its investigation. As it is not open to a judge to consider the merits of 
the dispute at this stage it is submitted that a judge may not at this stage readily embark upon 
receiving and hearing complaints that ought to have been made, considered and disposed of 
before the request for enforcement and execution orders. The frequent use of the inherent 
jurisdiction of the court in questionable cases amounts to misuse of an otherwise important 
legal mechanism. The consequence can be a considerable period of frustrating delay. It seems 
to this writer that both judge and arbitrator in their respective capacities can contribute to the 
efficacy of the arbitration procedure by confronting and removing the obstacles herein 
identified to the expeditious enforcement and execution of the arbitral award for arbitration to 
merit the just expectations of arbitral parties who deliberately chose the arbitral route to 
justice in preference to other procedures. 
 
More than that both court and arbitral tribunal should lend support and provide guidance for 
the formulation of procedural and administrative guidelines to expedite the enforcement and 
                                                 
746 S 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, Cap 21 provides: “Nothing in this Act shall limit or otherwise affect the 
inherent power of the court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse 
of the process of the court.” 
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execution of awards. This is because an effective enforcement procedure is the surest means 
of delivering justice between the parties.  It seems a self-serving exercise for an arbitrator to 
comply with his mandate within the law and rules of practice up to the making of his award 
and collection of his fees and, thereafter, leave the successful party to encounter problems of 
enforcement and execution and risk losing the fruits of the award.  The various reasons for 
this unhappy situation, in the main, relate to the dogma of functus officio. One strand is that 
after turning an award into a court decree the winning party stands in no better or worse 
position than a successful party in litigation who has to enforce a favourable judgment 
without the involvement of the judge.   In Kenya judges are involved in execution issues and 
disputes requiring judicial decisions and directions until the entry of the court bailiff, who 
serves the decree or warrant of attachment on the auctioneer mandated to levy execution. 
Even thereafter objection proceedings, involving third parties who claim to be the actual 
owners of the goods seized in execution, are entertained by judges.  Another reason is that the 
levy of execution does not involve a judge any more than it does an arbitrator. A further 
reason is that execution is an administrative process with the authority of the state involving 
entities such as security officers and auctioneers in the company of commercial men and 
women looking for bargains at auctions. A yet further point in the same direction is that in 
looking at ways and means of facilitating the enforcement and execution of an award in the 
form of a court decree, one is in effect looking at the execution of a court decree under 
domestic law. 
 
It is a trite assertion that as the arbitration process ends with the award the arbitrator should 
not be concerned with the procedures after delivery of the award.  But should the function of 
the arbitrator end with the delivery of the award? And precisely what, it may be asked, does 
an arbitration achieve if the last act in the process is jeopardized by the lack of effective 
means of implementing the award? 
 
It is submitted that the users of arbitration should be concerned with its enforcement 
procedures because the attraction of arbitration is not confined to a final decision on the 
dispute but must extend also to the speedy recovery of compensation for the loss or damage 
suffered by the successful party. The Model Law Article 35 and its national equivalents could, 
with more precision, provide the procedure for enforcement and execution of arbitral awards. 
This is not an argument against or in denial of a party’s right to challenge an award.  It is 
accepted that arbitrators can and do make mistakes, for which reason the unsuccessful party 
should not be shut out from the defences and justifiable grounds for challenges or the proper 
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exercise of the right to set aside an improper award.  But as fairness decrees equality of 
treatment and administration of justice between the parties, the successful party should be 
able to enforce and execute a favourable award more easily through an expedited procedure 
provided by the law. Jurisdictions that do not have clearly formulated procedures for 
enforcement of arbitral awards should aim at doing so. 
 
It may be asked whether the procedure for enforcement and execution of an arbitral award 
should differ from that for a court judgment. It is a difficult question if one sees an “award 
holder” as standing in the same position as a “judgment holder”, both of whom seek to 
enforce a favourable decision. But then there are significant and indisputable differences 
between the processes of arbitration and litigation, as noted in Chapter One of this study, as 
well as the quantum of resources and expenses committed by the parties in either process. 
Whereas the litigant stays within the court system from beginning to end and is facilitated to 
an extent by public funds and other resources, the award holder would normally have borne 
his own expenses privately. When he moves from the private to the public system to enforce 
and execute the award, there is the perception that the arbitral party is disadvantaged by the 
likelihood of additional costs and expense he might have been spared had he gone to litigation 
in the first place. This perception, which is not entirely accurate, can be countered by offering 
such party an enforcement and executory mechanism that is simple, inexpensive and quick, 
which after all are some of the advantages claimed for arbitration. From time to time, when 
this writer is asked, as arbitrator, as to what the next step is after delivery of the award, the 
response that it can be enforced in the same way as a judgment did not seem satisfying, 
enlightening or inspiring to the award-holder.747 Such a person is not assisted by what seems 
to be an evasive response from the arbitrator that he is functus officio and can do nothing more 
beyond delivering the award. 
 
3.6.7  Simplified Enforcement and Execution Procedure 
 
The following simplified procedure is proposed primarily for the enforcement of awards made 
under the Arbitration Act 1995.748 It is premised on the principle and approach that 
enforcement and execution of an arbitral award should be easy and capable of being done by 
                                                 
747 What is clear and consistent with Article III of the New York Convention is the principle that enables 
domestic arbitral awards to be enforced under the same provisions as foreign awards (Shalimar & Others v Saz 
Caterers Ltd HCCC Misc. Cause No 59 of 2003). What is urged here is the application of this principle and a 
simplified and clearly defined procedure for enforcement and execution of an arbitral award. 
748 Domestic awards and foreign awards, excluding awards made pursuant to a referral order of court (as to 
which see para 3.6.5.2 above). 
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the successful party without the necessity of legal representation; alternatively, if legal 
representation is unavoidable, then only the reasonable costs for such service should be 
recoverable. 
 
(i) The court registry should open and maintain a separate register for arbitral 
awards pending the completion of the administrative tasks necessary for the 
enforcement and execution of the award. 
 
(ii) A time limit of no more than 15 days from the filing of the award is proposed 
for any objections to the enforcement of the arbitral award to be raised. The 
objection is to be disposed of summarily by the court also within 15 days from 
the filing of the objection.749 This means a total of no more than 30 days is 
made available for such administrative and judicial measures as may need to 
be undertaken and completed in readiness for execution of the award. 
 
(iii) The approach to court can be by a written request or application. A simple 
“request” is preferable to a formal “application” especially of the sort that 
involves the use of technical legal language and formal supporting affidavits. 
A simple request may also reduce expense. The request should be for the 
arbitral award to be made an order or decree of the court.750 Leave of court 
need not be a pre-requisite as it will be sufficient for the request or application 
to be granted or refused for a compelling reason. 
 
(iv) In line with the existing requirements of Article 35 of the Model Law and its 
national equivalents, the request will be accompanied by the arbitral award.751 
The arbitrator can assist the process by providing certified copies of the award. 
 
(v) As arbitration is on the increase, an enforcement official can be assigned to the 
court registry with responsibility for arbitration matters.  The duties of the 
official will include receiving and registering the awards. The official will 
                                                 
749 If an objection cannot be dealt with summarily the court must direct accordingly.  
750 The confusion surrounding the status of an arbitral award to be enforced as a judgment can be avoided by 
such definite request. 
751 As pointed out above, Article 35(2), as amended by UNCITRAL in 2006, no longer requires the original or 
authenticated copy of the arbitration agreement. This will also take care of situations where the arbitration was 
conducted on the basis of a defective agreement with regard to which the right of objection may have been 
waived or lost or an oral agreement is endorsed by the participation in the arbitration or where the pleadings 
constituted the agreement. 
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allocate arbitration index numbers and monitor the enforcement and execution 
processes.  The Registrar of the High Court of Kenya engages the services of 
registered auctioneers to serve the decree and levy execution under the 
Registrar’s direction. 
(vi) Some basic training in the management and administration of arbitration 
procedures for court clerks would better equip them to deal with arbitration 
matters and to facilitate compliance with, for example, time-limits imposed by 
the Arbitration Act and the relevant rules of practice. 
 
An important objective will be to separate purely tactical objections from those that, upon 
investigation, may have merit. 
 
As noted, the UNCITRAL Model Law does not prescribe procedural guidelines for the 
execution of awards, which is left to the national procedural law and practice.  It is this 
writer’s view that the omission is based on the unfortunate misconception that there is no 
practical need for unifying national procedural practice on recognition, enforcement and 
execution of awards.  The misconception that resulted in the omission does not facilitate 
award enforcement. It also detracts from the notion of uniformity of national practice for the 
enforcement of an award “irrespective of the country in which it was made”. In this writer’s 
opinion, the provision of guidelines by UNCITRAL for the enforcement and execution of 
awards will greatly assist states willing to follow UNCITRAL’s lead in this regard. Moreover, 
UNCITRAL’s experience gained through examining various national systems of enforcement 
can throw more light on what can be done further by national jurisdictions to strengthen the 
execution of arbitral awards. 
 
Successful, expeditious and cost-effective enforcement of the award will respond to the 
legitimate expectations of the arbitral parties for choosing and using arbitration instead of and 
in preference to other procedures, and also maximize confidence in the arbitral system of 
justice. 
 
3.6.8 Conclusion 
 
In concluding this discussion it is recalled that both domestic and foreign awards, wherever 
obtained, are enforced in a domestic jurisdiction. There is therefore all the more reason for 
ensuring that the procedure for enforcement and execution of an arbitral award is clearly 
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defined and harmonized as far as possible. It is this writer’s opinion that the harmonization of 
enforcement rules for international arbitration awards can promote the national processes for 
the recognition, enforcement and indeed the execution of arbitral awards generally. The 
question posed at the start of the discussion of this topic as to whether arbitration law and 
practice have done enough in this regard was itself prompted by another question from an 
award holder who wanted to know what happened next after a favourable award. That party 
was neither satisfied nor impressed with the response that he could use the award like a 
judgment.  
Obviously the prospect of traipsing down court corridors, and the apprehension of more 
waiting time and further expenses to be incurred, while still unsure of what the enforcement 
of an arbitral award like a judgment entailed, was not attractive. 
 
It has been demonstrated that arbitration law752 does not go far enough in the enforcement of 
arbitral awards. It is practically silent on the execution of the award, the final act in the 
arbitral and judicial processes. In this writer’s view a response such as that an arbitrator is no 
more concerned with the execution of an award than a judge is concerned with the execution 
of judgment is somewhat complacent and unhelpful. The successful arbitral party and those 
representing him from beginning to end have an interest in the recovery of the full benefit of 
the award. Such party must be assisted with well defined and precise rules for achieving the 
declared goals of arbitration that include the achievement of a just result, expeditiously and 
with less expense. The simple procedure proposed in this study753 is, at the very least, an 
attempt to call attention to the need to explore further ways and means of achieving the sated 
purpose.  It does not help that under section 35 of the Kenyan statute for example an objector 
to the award has as much as 3 months to apply to set aside the award. This writer cannot resist 
adding that practitioners, who prefer arbitration to litigation and others minded to draw 
sharpest distinctions between arbitration and litigation in favour of the former, must also be 
mindful, when advising clients, of the union between the two systems of justice in the final 
act when the arbitration award has merged with the judgment of the court for uniform 
enforcement and execution under the court system. 
 
As pointed out above, UNCITRAL and its Working Group can potentially play a vital role in 
providing harmonised and effective procedures for the execution and enforcement of foreign 
                                                 
752 In particular, the provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law Article 35 and its national derivatives. 
753 See para 3.6.6 above. 
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and international commercial arbitral awards, which could influence and hopefully enhance 
domestic arbitration practice and procedure. 
 
3.7 A Code of Sanctions 
 
If it is acknowledged that the arbitrator’s frustration and the occasional lack of a sense of 
urgency are due in turn to the lack of effective sanctions to compel parties and their advisers 
to get to grips with the dispute and to take procedural steps timeously, then it is submitted, a 
Code of Sanctions might be necessary to assist the tribunal in the performance of the arbitral 
function. It has been noted that the six problems discussed above in this study are intertwined 
by their causes and consequences. Further, and in much the same way, the roles played by the 
principal stakeholders in arbitration – the parties, lawyers and arbitrators - are 
complementary, each to the other, in achieving the arbitral goal and the correct result.  It is 
not doubted that the experienced arbitrator is able to manage these problems through a 
combination of his adjudicative and professional skills, personal standing and integrity, as 
well as his authority and self-confidence. But there is always the ever lingering perception and 
suspicion that however good an arbitrator is, he stands on a much less steady ground than the 
professional judge, in so far as the dimensions of the arbitrator’s skill, dedication and the 
weight of his authority are personal to him. Some arbitrators respond to the awareness of this 
limitation with timidity, others with aggressiveness. Both responses are somewhat suspect and 
too malleable to ensure general acceptance or to sustain sound arbitration culture.  
 
It has been said that 
 
“[u]ltimately, of course, arbitrators’ greatest source of coercive power resides in their position 
as arbiters of the merits of the dispute between the parties.  Parties seeking to appear before 
the arbitrators as good citizens who have been wronged by their adversary would generally not 
wish to defy instructions given to them by those whom they wished to convince of the justice 
of their claims.”754 
 
                                                 
754 Schwartz EA Conservatory and Provisional Measures in International Arbitration ICC Publication No 519 
(1993) 128. For the expansion of the arbitrator’s powers in South Africa, compare the Association of Arbitrators 
(Southern Africa) Standard Procedure Rules (6th edition 2009) rule 12 (power to rule on jurisdiction), 23 
(security for costs), 32(3) (interim measures), 35(2) weight of evidence) and 38 (correction to the award) with s 
14(1) and s 30 of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965. See also the Law Commission’s Draft Bill (2001) ss 26, 31(2)-
(4) and 50. 
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This may indeed be so. Again, and although this statement was made with reference to interim 
measures, its impact and implications could be extended to other arbitral orders and 
procedural directives.  Nevertheless it is suggested that because it is an observation based 
more on psychological disposition rather than any normative standard, it cannot be relied on 
to provide the coercive sanctions arbitrators could apply to enforce compliance with arbitral 
orders and directives. Something more is needed which, it is submitted, is not provided by the 
modest sanctions of the Model Law. The thrust of the submission is that an arbitrator must be 
given an extended range of sanctions perhaps comparable to those available under section 41 
of the 1996 English Act, and that this could be done by legislation and institutional rules. It is 
proposed therefore that what is needed, beside the modernization of arbitration law and 
practice, is a Code of Sanctions in support of arbitral authority for the fulfillment of the 
arbitral mandate, and to promote compliance with arbitral orders and deter non-compliance. 
 
3.7.1 Remedies and Sanctions 
 
In a literal sense a remedy implies reparation or redress for a wrongful act or omission while a 
sanction connotes a penalty expressly attached to non-observance of a law or a lawful order or 
prescription.755 Arbitral remedies for breaches of contractual relationships and legal duties in 
the common-law system are, in the main, the same as or akin to judicial remedies. Commonly 
these remedies consist of (i) an award of damages or monetary compensation; (ii) specific 
performance; (iii) restitution or restoratory awards; (iv) declaratory relief; (v) interim 
measures of protection; (vi) interest on awards and (vii) the successful party’s own costs and 
the costs of the award.756  In general the principles governing these civil remedies are the 
same in both litigation and arbitration. 
 
The thrust of this part of this study is, however, on sanctions, that is, coercive sanctions to 
compel compliance with arbitral orders and directives. Although, and depending on a 
particular context, the terms “remedies” and “sanctions” may be employed synonymously, it 
is probably accurate to suggest that sanctions tend to come into play where there is non-
compliance with judicial or arbitral remedial orders.757 In what follows the term “remedy” or 
“sanction” takes its meaning from the context of its usage. 
 
                                                 
755 Chambers Concise 20th Century Dictionary; Dobbs DB Handbook on the Law of Remedies (1973); also 
McCormick CT Handbook on the Law of Damages (1935). 
756 Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 356-400; English Arbitration Act 1996      s 49. 
757 See the English Arbitration Act s 48. 
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Sanctions are necessary in the administration of justice.  That is why in the public domain, 
judges, the police authority and other law enforcement agencies of the state are empowered by 
law to impose, apply and enforce legal sanctions in the administration of justice. Arbitration, 
it is submitted, can benefit from a set of sanctions available to the arbitral tribunal in support 
of its orders, rulings, decisions, directives and awards. The justification, on one theory, is that 
arbitration is part of the justice system of states and unless arbitral orders are backed by 
clearly defined coercive sanctions, the effectiveness of arbitration will remain dimmed. It may 
indeed be argued that as regards sanctions, arbitration is constrained by its private nature. Yet 
it is also a fact that private arbitral awards can have public consequences and they are 
enforceable at law because the award is a contractually and legally binding decision on the 
dispute between the parties. Further, if a final arbitral award that is not voluntarily complied 
with can be merged with and enforced as a court judgment and decree, it makes sense for the 
arbitral tribunal that makes the award to be equipped with effective and enforceable sanctions 
in the process that leads to the making of the final award. 
 
 3.7.2 Sanctions for Effective Delivery of Arbitral Justice 
 
In the discussion below, sanctions are proposed to support the arbitrator’s authority in the 
context of each of the six problems discussed earlier in this chapter. 
 
3.7.2.1 Sanctions to Compel Compliance with the Arbitration Agreement 
 
The agreement to arbitrate is an enforceable contract. Yet the reluctant party is prone to avoid 
its enforcement.  The ability and opportunity to wriggle out of it stem from the lack of 
genuine consent to arbitrate which is the first of the six problems discussed in this study. It 
has been suggested that the arbitration agreement is an imperfect obligation for which the 
award of damages or specific performance are impractical remedies because such damages 
are difficult to quantify and a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate against his will.758 These 
arguments are neither compelling nor attractive because (i) a valid arbitration agreement is 
enforceable like any other agreement; (ii) the difficulty of quantifying damages has never 
been accepted as an excuse for not awarding damages; and (iii) once a party has validly 
consented to arbitration, he cannot unilaterally withdraw that consent. Additionally the fact 
that under modern domestic arbitration law the court before whom an arbitration matter is 
brought is empowered to stay the proceedings and refer the matter to arbitration is an 
                                                 
758 Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 7-8. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
333 
 
additional boost to arbitration and an endorsement of the tribunal’s authority to enforce the 
arbitration agreement. 
 
It is proposed that an arbitration law should incorporate a Code of Sanctions that expressly 
and specifically provides an arbitral power to compel party compliance with the arbitration 
agreement.759 In this connection the adoption of the second optional definition of arbitration 
agreement under the revised Article 7 of the Model Law760 is recommended. It is submitted 
this could in the first instance facilitate the determination of the validity or otherwise of the 
arbitration agreement. Once the validity is determined and upheld, the arbitral tribunal must 
enforce the agreement. It may start by notice and direction or order to the parties for the 
continuation of the arbitration. The proposed sanction is that, without prejudice to the 
generality of the exercise of the court’s supervisory powers in appropriate circumstances, 
there shall be no appeal or recourse to court against the arbitral directive or order for the 
resumption and continuation of the arbitration or for the speedy determination of the claim. 
Specifically the court shall not entertain an application to stay the arbitral proceedings or 
grant an order to that effect. In the event of non-compliance, the tribunal shall proceed to a 
summary determination or dismissal of the claim on the evidence before it. Punitive costs, 
rather than party and party costs, shall be awarded against the frivolous challenger of the 
arbitration agreement, if so found.761 
 
3.7.2.2 Sanctions to Stem Unwarranted Challenges to the Arbitral Jurisdiction 
 
A party who initiates jurisdictional challenges found to be frivolous and unmerited should be 
mulcted in punitive costs. The idea behind substantial and punitive costs, it is submitted, is 
                                                 
759 For recent examples of how the English court makes parties stick to their agreement to arbitrate in relation to 
challenges to awards and appeals under ss 67, 68 and 69 of the English Arbitration Act 1996 see Closter E 
“Attempts to Thwart the Arbitration Process: Current Examples of How the Court Makes Parties Stick to their 
Agreement to Arbitrate” (2007) 73 Arbitration 407-412. After analyzing recent judicial decisions, the author 
concludes that, in all, the courts remain extremely keen to  maintain the autonomy of the arbitral process, 
notwithstanding challenges on human rights grounds; but that, in certain factual situations, it may be possible to 
challenge, at the Court of Appeal level, a High Court judge’s refusal to intervene under either s 68 or s 69 to 
address alleged contraventions of human rights by the arbitrators themselves in the arbitral process (pursuant to 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (Article 6) and the English Human Rights Act 
(section 3). 
760 See para 2.4.4.5(ii) above. The critical issue is then whether or not there was consent, rather than compliance 
with formalities. 
761 These sanctions should specifically relate to the enforcement of the arbitration agreement under Article 7 as 
distinct from the tribunal’s power to rule on its own jurisdiction under Article 16 or the exercise of the default 
power under Article 25. The sanction proposed here for the dismissal of the claim or for its speedy determination 
is more akin to that contained in s 26(d) of the Kenyan Arbitration Act, for which there is no equivalent in the 
Model Law, and which empowers the arbitral tribunal to make an award dismissing the claim or to give 
directions, with or without conditions, for the speedy determination of the claim. 
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that it will act as a deterrent to parties who knew they have consented to arbitration but are 
wont to test the waters, so to speak, by feigning surprise or ignorance or by just being 
downright dishonest in denying the arbitral jurisdiction. Once arbitral parties become 
sensitized to the existence and reality of arbitral sanctions and the severity of punitive costs 
they may have second thoughts about and or wholly desist from unmerited jurisdictional 
challenges. 
 
3.7.2.3 Sanctions to Boost the Powers of the Arbitral Tribunal 
 
The general and special powers of the arbitral tribunal have been discussed in paragraph 3.3 
above. The sanctions advocated here are intended to augment the authority of the arbitral 
tribunal, to impose punitive measures for acts, particularly willful acts, of commission or 
omission by parties during the proceedings. An example is the specific power to order a 
defaulting party to pay substantial wasted costs within a strictly limited period of time, of say 
seven to ten days, before further participation in the proceedings. In default, the proceedings 
shall continue without the non-compliant party to the making of an award. What is 
emphasized here is the sense of strictness and gravity conveyed by the existence of the Code 
of Sanctions by the requirement of immediate and substantial atonement for any disobedience 
to arbitral orders including the real risk of forfeiting the right of further participation in the 
proceedings. Non-attendance at proceedings without reasonable and acceptable excuse should 
not invariably result in automatic adjournment or postponement of proceedings as most 
defaulters take for granted. On the contrary, it should attract monetary loss and the real risk of 
disentitlement from further participation in the proceedings. Parties and lawyers in Kenya 
wait incredibly long hours in court corridors for their cases to be called (and often only to be 
adjourned to another date) in the knowledge that their cases might be dismissed for non-
appearance. The Code will concretize arbitral sanctions and put all concerned on notice of the 
coercive measures at the disposal of the arbitral tribunal.  Arbitration, arbitral parties and their 
representatives will benefit if they and the courts come to know and expect that arbitration 
sessions are likely to proceed as fixed and not adjourned as frequently done by the courts, 
when choosing arbitration as their preferred mode of dispute resolution. 
 
3.7.2.4 Sanctions against Frequent Adjournments 
 
Requests for adjournments in domestic arbitration are common but not always genuine. At the 
drop of a hat so to speak lawyers who are not prepared or have not received fee deposits or 
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lack adequate instructions from their clients will enshroud the request for adjournments with 
principles that make the adjournments technically difficult for the tribunal to decline. 
Sanctions for securing compliance with strict time limits are necessary to aid the tribunal to 
overcome delays occasioned by dubious requests for adjournments. The likelihood of 
attracting substantial costs of an adjournment should deter unwarranted adjournments. 
Predetermined and fixed costs for unmerited postponements at various stages of the 
proceedings may be a possible sanction in this context. 
 
The sanction proposed here against unmerited postponements and adjournments is again 
separate and distinct from the default powers under section 26 of the 1995 Kenyan Arbitration 
Act that empower the arbitral tribunal to, inter alia, dismiss the claimant’s claim for failure to 
prosecute it or to direct the speedy determination of the claim.762 The party responsible for 
unmerited postponement or adjournment must be ordered by the tribunal to pay the full 
predetermined costs occasioned by it. 
 
3.7.2.5  Sanctions to Compel Compliance with Interim Measures 
 
Orders for interim measures by the tribunal have been discussed extensively above.763 What 
must be added here are the sanctions to be applied where orders for interim measures are 
disobeyed or ignored. Firstly, the grant of interim measures is almost invariably accompanied 
by conditions and time limits. Secondly, the nature of interim measures is such that they are 
understood to be temporary in duration except on interlocutory issues whose determination 
can be final. Here as in paragraph 3.7.2.3 above, effective arbitration will benefit from the 
imposition of monetary sanctions that may promote adherence to fixed time limits and the 
strict application by the tribunal of default provisions accompanying its orders for interim 
measures. Again, a claimant who is in default with payment of security for costs will risk the 
consequential dismissal of his claim.  A respondent in default of compliance with interim 
measures will similarly risk the rejection of his defence, leaving the claimant to prove his 
claim. National laws that already apply such standards can be boosted by more clearly defined 
and effective coercive sanctions including more stringent prescriptions on appeal. 
 
                                                 
762 This power under s 26(d) of the Kenyan, as noted above, is not part of Model Law Article 25 and is 
conducive to effective arbitration but not enough by itself. 
763 See para 3.5.3.1 above. 
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3.7.2.6 Sanctions against Non-Compliance with the Award  
 
It is submitted that sanctions in aid of enforcement and execution of the arbitral award are 
also essential for effective arbitration. It has been noted that once the tribunal has delivered its 
final award its existence and function are deemed at an end,764 and that if the award is not 
voluntarily implemented the successful party will seek court assistance with its enforcement 
and execution. The recommendations made to promote and expedite award enforcement and 
execution under paragraphs 3.6.5.2, 3.6.6 and 3.6.7 are apposite.  The sanctions that must be 
stipulated by arbitration law and applied by the court would include time-limits to be 
observed in the process of enforcement and execution. It may be of some assistance to the 
successful arbitral party if the manner of enforcement and execution is elaborated in the Code 
of Sanctions. This may well reduce unmerited challenges to the award and the need to resort 
to court for enforcement, with the agonizing process and delay to which an otherwise 
successful party is subjected at the stage of enforcement and execution of the award.  Public 
and general awareness that arbitration works can promote its use.765 
 
3.7.3 Proposals for implementation 
 
The need for enforceable sanctions against the infringement of arbitral orders deserves greater 
recognition and attention than has been given to it so far by the law, the arbitral tribunal, 
practitioners and the national courts. Yet the inadequacy or lack of coercive sanctions is a 
known source of frustration and a drawback to the arbitral process. It is submitted that more 
can be done by the drafters of arbitration statutes, arbitral tribunals, arbitration practitioners 
and the courts to prescribe and ensure the enforcement of effective arbitral sanctions. 
 
The multiplicity of advantages attributed to arbitration such as speed, flexibility, expert 
adjudication, cost-effectiveness, confidentiality and so on preponderate towards expeditious 
and effective disposal of arbitration disputes unhindered by frivolous and unmeritorious 
challenges and the trappings of technicalities. 
 
Expansion of the arbitral jurisdiction, powers and sanctions is not in conflict with the 
purposes of arbitration or with well established notions of fairness and justice. Unfortunately 
                                                 
764 See para 3.6.1 above. 
765 The views of a senior Kenyan practitioner on the finality of a binding and enforceable award have been noted 
in the text to footnote 683 above. 
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it is part of the crisis of arbitration766 that the more powers are sought and ceded to arbitrators, 
the greater the need to ensure probity and fairness in the use of such powers. It is therefore a 
question of balance and the need for all actors in the field to respect and maintain the highest 
standards of arbitration practice. 
 
Effective sanctions depend on the powers available to arbitrators and their willingness to 
enforce the range of sanctions that will include (i) strict adherence to fixed time limits; (ii) 
dismissal of unpursued claims; (iii) facilitation of ex parte proceedings before arbitral 
tribunals; (iv) costs awards which ensure that the non-complying party pays the full costs 
occasioned by its conduct or omission; (v) default orders; (vi) injunctive measures; and (vii) 
the award of punitive damages, as appropriate, so as to strengthen and reinforce the authority 
of the arbitral tribunal and enhance respect for the arbitral process.767 This is desirable as it 
will constrain the parties to prosecute or defend the claim with expedition, leading to the 
making of a timeous award and consequently its timeous enforcement and execution, in the 
absence of prompt voluntary compliance. 
 
It is proposed as a start that the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators in Kenya should draw up a 
Code of Sanctions on the proposed lines as part of its institutional Rules. In Kenya it will be 
open to the institute to draw up and forward the recommendations to the Chief Justice for 
consideration by the Rules Committee for enactment as Arbitration Rules pursuant to section 
40 of the 1995 Arbitration Act. 
 
The point to emphasize is that it is not enough to liberalise the arbitral process by merely 
divorcing it, to the maximum extent possible, from any interference by the national court. It is 
an irresistible consequence also to take the corresponding further step to empower the 
liberated arbitral process to stand as fully as possible on its own feet – with effective and 
enforceable sanctions and all that this entails – as a viable alternative system of justice. 
 
3.8  Conclusions to the Research Questions 
1. The investigation of the first research question on the need for genuine party consent to 
arbitration shows that the arbitral consent inferred from or established through compliance 
with the formal requirements of an arbitration agreement termed here “legal” or 
                                                 
766 See para 1.2 above. 
767 On the award of punitive damages in arbitration see para 3.3.7 above. 
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“technical” consent, is frequently contested in Kenyan arbitration practice by parties who 
have not consciously given their consent to arbitrate, despite the existence of a valid 
arbitration agreement; that unless consent is expressly manifested in the arbitration 
agreement it is illusive and provides an avoidable opportunity for its denial and time-
consuming investigation.  Therefore arbitration legislation should expressly provide a 
requirement for the manifestation of consent to arbitrate to eliminate illusiveness.  A 
comparative example is provided by Article 1677 of the Belgian Code Judiciaire.768  The 
integration of Customary Law Arbitration and Statutory Arbitration is proposed and 
statutory recognition of the verbal form of the arbitration agreement is recommended as 
done in New Zealand.769   
On the question whether an arbitral party can unilaterally withdraw its consent once it has 
been given, an example of national legislation on the point is found in section 2 of the 
Nigerian Arbitration Conciliation Act by which consent is irrevocable except by 
agreement, or leave of court or a judge.  This can be emulated in Kenya.  The language of 
Article 7(2) of the Model Law on the incorporation of other documents by reference 
stemmed from the application of the requirement of writing in Article 11 of the 1958 New 
York Convention as adopted by Article 7(2) of the Model Law and the derivative national 
arbitration statutes of Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe.  The language is somewhat obscure, 
and should not be interpreted as requiring reference by incorporation of a specific 
arbitration clause as long as the intention to incorporate general conditions including the 
arbitration clause is manifest.  A comparative example offered to Kenya are the provisions 
of Article 1021 of the Netherlands Code of Civil Procedure.770  The problems of multi-
parties and non-signatories to the arbitration agreement can be resolved by domestic law 
theories and concepts such as the doctrines of assignment, incorporation by reference, the 
third party beneficiary, agency, equitable estoppel and the “group of companies” doctrine.  
It should be possible for parties to agree to consolidation of multi-party contracts and, 
short of consolidation, concurrent hearings of separate arbitrations should be a permissible 
option.  National arbitration law at the seat of arbitration should permit court ordered 
consolidation, the most satisfactory solution however being consolidation by consent.  
Comparative examples recommended are provided by the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 
LCIA Rules (1998) Article 22(1) (h) and the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance as 
discussed in paragraph 3.1.6.  
                                                 
768 See para 3.1.3 above. 
769 As in the New Zealand Arbitration Act 
770 See para 3.1.5 above. 
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2. Exploration of the challenges to arbitrators and the arbitral jurisdiction, involving 
consideration of the arbitrator’s qualifications, suitability, impartiality and independence 
led to the comparative study of the provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law and the 
derivative African jurisdictions, the English approach, the Institutional rules of the LCIA, 
ICC, IBA Guidelines, and the views of commentators.  What emerges are proposals for 
the arbitral party to seek specialist advice on the appointment of the arbitrator, the need 
for disclosure of conflicts of interest, the imposition by rules of a duty of disclosure of 
relevant information on arbitral parties including a duty to perform a reasonable research 
of publicly available information as recommended on the model of the IBA Guidelines, 
and Articles 9 and 10 of the UNCITRAL Arbitral Rules.771  The contrasting English 
approach which imposes no duty of disclosure before the arbitrator accepts an 
appointment and cannot be challenged for lack of independence unless justifiable doubts 
existed about the arbitrator’s impartiality – is another approach worthy of consideration by 
the African jurisdictions of Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe.   
The IBA guideline for a subjective test to be applied generally to disclosure and an 
objective test to apply to disqualification is also recommended.772 
African jurisdictions are however cautioned not to follow blindly foreign rules and 
prescriptions from the substantially larger foreign jurisdictions because the problem of 
independence and conflict of interest are much harder to deal with in African jurisdictions 
where the available arbitrators grew up together in small communities, through schools 
and churches and interact freely with the arbitral parties in wide ranging circumstances.  A 
balance between the unique circumstances in African societies and the foreign 
prescriptions must be struck by African legislation.  The competence and powers of the 
arbitrators are investigated with examples from UNCITRAL and English judicial 
experience.  Regarding subject matter arbitrality the Zimbabwe example of enumerating 
by legislation what is and what is not arbitrable in section 4 of the Arbitration Act is 
exemplary and recommended for Kenya.  Approaches for the reduction of challenges to 
arbitrability are discussed in paragraph 3.2.4 with the comparable and contrasting 
positions of the OHADA Uniform Act and the UNCITRAL Model Law.773  The impact of 
fraud and public policy are discussed in the light of judicial decisions from Kenya and 
                                                 
771 See para 3.2.1 – 3.2.1.2 
772 See para 3.2.12 
773 See para 3.2.4 
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Nigeria.774  A recommendation is made for national arbitration laws and courts to balance 
the domestic importance of reserving matters of public interest to the courts against the 
general public interest of promoting trade and commerce and the settlement of disputes by 
arbitration.  Regarding who should have the final say in arbitration, arbitrator or judge, 
this writer’s view is that, subject to the noted essential qualifications and safeguards of 
public policy and the fact that the arbitrator is appointed by private parties and not the 
state, the arbitrator should finalise all matters in dispute within the arbitral mandate.775 
3. Regarding the third research question, the need for effective powers for the arbitral 
tribunal involving consideration of the classification of sources of the tribunal’s 
procedural powers, led to the recommendation for improvements in legislation and 
arbitration rules to expand and clarify the arbitrator’s powers and ability to curb unmerited 
interruptions and tactical delay.776  The comparative study involved references to the 
Model Law provisions of Articles 19(1) and 14(2), the equivalent provisions of the 
Kenyan and the compatible national statutes,777 and the reformulation of Lord Diplock’s 
dictum778 for the tribunal to conduct the arbitration subject to the provisions of the 
relevant arbitration law and the rules of natural justice.  The Kenyan, Nigerian and 
Zimbabwean positions on the subject are considered in the comparative context of the 
Model Law, English Law, the South African experience779 and the institutional rules of 
the LCIA, IBA and UNCITRAL.  Because of the importance and differences in 
institutions and their rules there is a suggested criteria for evaluating arbitration rules to 
include consideration of the institution’s structure, procedure for selecting arbitrators, the 
degree to which the institution supervises arbitrators, if at all, the scale of administrative 
charges, the arbitrator’s fees and requirements for advance payment of deposits.780  The 
recommended criteria also include whether the rules provide for the tribunal to grant 
interim measures, well-defined standards and procedures for dealing with challenges to 
arbitrators, a procedure for defining the dispute, obtaining access to evidence and for 
conducting the hearings.  Rule 16 of the Kenyan Branch of the Chartered Institute of 
Arbitrators granting unfettered discretion to the arbitral tribunal is made subject to the 
mandatory provisions of the Kenyan Arbitration Act. 
                                                 
774 Para 3.2.4 
775 Para 3.2.6 
776 Para 3.3.1. 
777 Sections 20 Kenyan statutes, First Schedule Article 19 of the Zimbabwean statute and section 15 Nigerian 
statute.  See also para 2.4.4.5 above. 
778 Para 3.3.2. 
779 Para 3.3.2 
780 Para 3.3.3. 
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The expansion of arbitration rules for arbitrators and the creation of uniform standards for 
the admissibility of evidence on the lines of the IBA Rules for Taking Evidence is 
recommended for Kenya.781  An expedited procedure is also recommended.782  Guidance 
for the arbitrator in dealing with evidence and any objections to admissibility is deemed 
necessary in jurisdictions such as Kenya, where the Evidence Act does not apply to an 
arbitration.783  The comparative content includes references to the Model Law, the English 
Act, the national statutes of Kenya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and Mauritius784 whose 
jurisdictions are influenced by the Model Law.  There is the observation that English 
arbitrators have substantially more express procedural powers than those of the Model 
Law jurisdictions.  The inclusion of exemplary and punitive damages in arbitration law 
and rules is recommended for Kenya to deter and prohibit unwarranted conduct.785 
4. The investigation of the fourth research question led to a recommendation for the 
arbitrator to take effective charge of the arbitration in order to minimise the frequency of 
adjournments, postponements and delay.786  As the African jurisdictions provide scant 
guidance on how to do this, the comparative examples from English Law are offered for 
consideration.787  The views of commentators are brought into the discussion on the issue 
of delay, while drawing attention to the significant differences in the default provisions of 
the national statutes of Kenya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, England and South Africa, and the 
time limits for making of an award – four months under the 1965 South African Act, or 
“as soon as practicable” under rule 36.4 of the Standard Procedure Rules of the 
Association of Arbitrators (Southern Africa).  The Centre for Arbitration and Dispute 
Resolution (CADER) of Uganda prescribes 60 days. 
The recommendation is that adjournments, delays and prolongation of arbitration ought to 
be more effectively controlled and curbed by specific improvements in the African 
statutes taking advantage of the experiences of other jurisdictions. 
5. On the fifth research question regarding interim measures, the tribunal’s powers to grant 
such measures, considered in paragraphs 3.5.3 led to consideration of Article 17 of the 
Model Law (1985), section 18(1) of the Kenyan Arbitration Act 1995, section 17(2) of the 
                                                 
781 See IBA Rules Articles 3 and 9. 
782 Para 3.3.3.1. 
783 Para 3.3.3.2. 
784 Para 3.3.4. 
785 Para 3.3.7 
786 Para 3.4 
787 Para 3.4 
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Zimbabwe Act 1996, section 13 of the Nigerian statute, the South African Law 
Commissions report on international arbitration (paras 2.183 – 2.186), and a 
recommendation to provide by legislation for the enforcement of an interim order as if it 
were an award.  The contrasting position under UNCITRAL’s 2006 amendments (Articles 
17H and 17 I) prescribes the conditions to be met before the tribunal grants such measures 
and court assistance for their enforcement.  The recommendation is that an interim 
measure granted by the tribunal must be made binding unless modified, suspended or 
terminated by the tribunal under a prescribed provision.  On security for costs the 
comparative experiences of jurisdictions other than Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe are 
introduced.788  It is emphasised that Articles 9 and 17 and their derivatives in Kenya, 
Nigeria and Zimbabwe demonstrate two important principles of modern arbitration 
practice – namely, that resort to court must be available to obtain an interim measure, and 
that wherever practicable, the power to grant an interim measure should be exercisable by 
the arbitral tribunal rather than the court.789 
Regarding the extraterritorial aspect of interim relief, Model Law Articles 17 (H) and 17 
(I) providing for court enforcement of interim measures ordered by the tribunal 
irrespective of the seat of arbitration can be emulated by Kenya and the counterpart 
jurisdictions. 
Paragraph 3.5.7 contains a summary of recommendations for Kenyan national practice on 
this subject. 
6. The final research question on the enforcement and execution of the arbitration award 
involved setting out the requirements of a valid final award,790 the recognition and 
enforcement of the award under the Model Law,791 the New York Convention, court 
recognition and enforcement of the award in the three African jurisdictions,792 
enforcement of the final award in paragraph 3.6.5.1 as distinct from its execution in 
paragraph 3.6.5.2.  The recommendation for a national arbitration statute to cover the 
whole field is innovative, the methods for removing impediments to enforcement and 
execution of awards are set out in paragraph 3.6.6.  A simplified enforcement and 
execution793 procedure based on the Kenyan experience and perspective is original, 
                                                 
788 See para 3.5..3.2 
789 See para 3.5.3.3 
790 Para 3.6.2 
791 Para 3.6.3 
792 Para 3.6.4 
793 Para 3.6.7 
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innovative and a contribution to knowledge on a controversial topic.  The same can be 
said for the Code of Sanctions proposed for Kenya.  As a start, it is recommended that the 
Kenyan Branch of the Institute of Arbitrators should work on and draw up a Code of 
sanctions as part of its institutional rules and recommend its enactment to the Chief Justice 
pursuant to section 40 of the Arbitration Act. 
 
3.9 Concluding Comments on the Future of Arbitration in Africa 
 
“It would be a pity to miss the opportunity to enrich our social and legal culture by 
some imaginative fusion of distinctly African models of, for example, dispute 
settlement.”794 
 
The vision of arbitration as a complete and competent dispute resolution system is neither 
strained nor fanciful.  It is achievable and so supportable.  This vision, founded on this 
writer’s experience and appraisal of arbitration practice is shared, with qualifications, by 
others.795  One may recall Lord Wilberforce’s796 optimism for arbitration not to be viewed as 
“a kind of annex, appendix or poor relation to court proceedings” but, subject to statutory 
guidelines, as “a freestanding system, free to settle its own procedures and free to develop its 
own substantive law”.797   
 
An attempt is made towards the realization of this goal in the discussion of arbitration in the 
three chapters of this study: first, by the presentation of an overview of arbitration as a 
procedure in a crisis of evolution, transformation, modernization and progress, in the face of 
surmountable challenges, and some of the major procedural dilemmas that reveal arbitration 
                                                 
794 Nhlapo RT “The Status of Customary Law in Africa: From the Age of Law and Modernization to the Era of 
Human Rights and Constitutionalism” in  Ajibola B and Van Zyl D (eds)  The Judiciary in Africa (1987) 226. 
795 In separate interviews and discussions with Dr Gerold Herrmann (President of ICCA) and Prof Martin Hunter 
(co-author of Redfern & Hunter) at an LCIA seminar at Tylney Hall, Hampshire, England, 7-9 May 2010, both 
eminent arbitrators felt international commercial arbitration, after the adoption of the UNICTRAL Model Law, 
was practically a complete system; but that it remained state responsibility to ensure the effectiveness of the 
arbitral process by the introduction and use of procedural regulations to fast-track the enforcement and execution 
of arbitral awards. 
796 Lord Wilberforce, a former senior English judge, is credited with playing a major role in the enactment of the 
English Arbitration Act 1996 when the Bill was considered by the House of Lords.  (See also para 1.9 n 212 
above.) 
797 See para 1.7 above; Bernstein et al Handbook of Arbitration Practice 90.  Unstinted support for arbitration 
was evident in this writer’s interviews and discussions with a broad spectrum of the eminent practitioners and 
participants in attendance at the abovementioned LCIA arbitration seminar at Tylney Hall, England, (7-9 May 
2010) that included: Dr Serge Lazareff (Chairman ICC Institute of World Business Law), Jan Paulsson 
(President LCIA), (France); Dr. Laurent Levy (Switzerland); Justice Ken Handley (Australia); Prof William 
Park, Jose Astigarraga and David Rivkin (USA); Toby Landau QC, VV Veeder QC, Peter Leaver QC (England); 
Dr Gerold Herrmann (Austria); D. Bernard Hanotiau (Belgium); Prof Filip de Ly (The Netherlands) and several 
other seminar participants. 
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as a procedure in a continuum of change.798  Secondly, and upon this foundation is presented 
the legal framework in which arbitration operates in Africa, being principally the statutory 
systems derived from OHADA and the UNCITRAL Model Law, as well as customary-law 
arbitration.799  Thereafter follows the discussion of the six selected problems that commonly 
beset arbitration practice, forming the central focus of this study.800 
 
Some essential criteria for effective arbitration have been discussed.801  The first is 
appropriate arbitration law and supportive judges. In this respect the adoption of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law in Kenya and other African jurisdictions for domestic arbitration can 
be regarded by the promoters of the Model Law in Africa as an advance on the previous 
colonial-style arbitration legislation.  However as the Model Law is demonstrably incomplete, 
UNCITRAL’s 2006 amendments to that Law and the pertinent aspects of the 1996 English 
Arbitration Act discussed in this study are, in this connection, noteworthy as a basis for 
further statutory additions and  refinements.802 Continuous reappraisal and development of the 
legal framework of Kenyan and African arbitrations in both the statutory and customary law 
forms are specific challenges. Balanced judicial support for arbitration, with appropriate 
supervision, continues to be important, as is recognised in the Model Law.803 
 
Secondly, proactive arbitrators are required. In this connection, the need for qualified and 
suitable arbitrators, the competent discharge by them of their duties, the adequacy or 
otherwise of their powers and the enhancement of those powers by effective sanctions, have 
been discussed.804  Thirdly, a positive contribution by the parties’ lawyers is needed.  
Attention has been drawn to the role of lawyers in arbitration and the need for the coercive 
sanctions to compel compliance by parties and the cooperation of their representatives, for the 
avoidance of delay.805  Fourthly, willing participants, with a preference for arbitration in 
contrast to litigation is commonly canvassed by pro-arbitration commentators and institutions.  
This support in practice has contributed significantly to the gradual emergence of arbitration 
generally as a preferred mode for settling disputes.  In Kenya the Chartered Institute of 
Arbitrators (Kenya Branch) (CIArb) plays a leading role in the training of arbitrators.  In an 
                                                 
798 See para 1.2 above. 
799 See chapter Two. 
800 See paras 3.1-3.6 above. 
801 The legal framework for arbitration is discussed in Chapter 2 
802 See Chapter Two, paras 2.4.4(7), 2.6 and Chapter Three paras 3.3.4 and 3.3.7. 
803 See Article 5 (Extent of Court Intervention), Article 6 (Court assistance and supervision required by Articles 
11(3), 11(4), 13(3), 14, 16(3), 34(2)), and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards under Articles 35 
and 36 of the Model Law and its national equivalents.  See also para 2.4.4.5(iii) above. 
804 See particularly paras 3.3 and 3.7 above. 
805 See paras 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 and 3.7.3 above. 
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interview with Simon Ondiek, Acting Chief Executive of the CIArb he comments that parties 
have become aware of arbitration through their lawyers who lead them to arbitration, such 
that applications for appointment of arbitrators have tripled in the last three years averaging 
from two to six appointments per month in work areas involving construction disputes, civil 
and commercial arbitration, family disputes, IT and intellectual property disputes and land 
matters.  While lauding the role of lawyers Ondiek also criticizes them for their delaying 
tactics and inefficient use of arbitration time.  The Institute is therefore conducting “advocacy 
cases” to teach lawyers how to manage arbitration cases.  Judges who support arbitration, 
Ondiek says, refer arbitration disputes to the CIArb for appointment of arbitrators; but judges 
who are unfamiliar with the arbitration process see no need to refer disputes to arbitrators.  
Therefore the Institute plans to market arbitration to raise awareness of its advantages and the 
contribution of the Institute to dispute resolution by both arbitration and mediation.  
Obviously, improvements to arbitration legislation and institutional rules would benefit the 
successful party.  Conversely the opponent may prefer the opportunities for delay inherent in 
litigation.  This consequence is not inevitable if, as suggested, arbitration law is strengthened 
by sanctions to enable arbitrators to enforce effectively the parties’ agreement to arbitrate 
their dispute and the resulting award.806 
 
The role and use of effective sanctions in aid of arbitration require greater recognition and 
development.  The importance attached to sanctions in this study is reflected in the 
recommendation of a Code of Sanctions with remedies not only to compel, inter alia, 
compliance with the arbitration agreement but also to boost the powers of the arbitral 
tribunal.807  Dispute resolution practitioners cannot be unaware that the advantages commonly 
claimed for arbitration such as, flexibility of the procedure, speed and cost-effectiveness, have 
been wearing thin over the years and that these very advantages that once gave prominence 
and pride of place to arbitration over litigation are not only becoming more and more 
dubious,808 but are also now being claimed by other ADR methods.  In effect, arbitration in its 
present form is facing increased competition from other ADR procedures such as mediation, 
early neutral valuation, expert determination and their hybrids.  It is competition that 
challenges the future of arbitration as a preferable dispute resolution option. 
 
A perspective on the future of any human endeavour is inevitably speculative.  Nevertheless, 
informed speculation based on performance indicators of the past and present could provide 
                                                 
806 See para 3.7.3 above. 
807 See para 3.7 above. 
808 See para 1.3 above. 
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valuable insights and useful guidance for future conduct and action.  The future of 
arbitration809 is and ought to be of continuing interest to users of the techniques for resolving 
disputes and conflicts on the African continent.  The point then is that in the face of 
competition, arbitration cannot and ought not to remain stagnant or complacent, particularly 
because disputes in modern times are often multi-faceted, more complex and technical than 
ever before, requiring participants with the relevant knowledge, training and expertise to deal 
with them.  
 
Modernization and harmonization of the dispute resolution laws and practice rules across 
Africa therefore pose huge challenges for law makers, not least because of the existence of 
plural societies and the diversity of cultures and practices on the continent.  Quite clearly 
therefore, and for the future, the reservoir of knowledge and source material that influence the 
formulation of  arbitration and ADR laws in Africa cannot but include the expanded 
contribution of experts and others from the spectrum of disciplines that inform law making.  
This statement is not made lightly in view of the tendency to resist change in conservative 
quarters.  In the words of a distinguished scholar: 
 
“There has been a crossing of the Rubicon; disciplines are blurring.  Not long ago only the few 
were interested in anthropologists’ esoteric works on African customary law.  Today those 
interested in traditional peacemaking in Africa include professionals from disparate fields – 
psychology, law, political science, globalization studies, and military studies, as well as the 
study of pan-African nationalism.”810 
 
It has been demonstrated that current arbitration law811 does not go far enough in the 
enforcement of arbitral awards.  It is practically silent on the execution of the award, the final 
act in the arbitral and judicial processes.  In this writer’s view, a response to the effect that an 
arbitrator is or should be no more concerned with the execution of an award than a judge with 
the execution of judgment is somewhat complacent, platitudinous and unhelpfully evasive.  
                                                 
809 On the future of arbitration, see Leahy ER & Bianchi CJ “The Changing Face of International Arbitration” 
(2000) 17(4) Journal of International Arbitration 19-61; Böckstiegel K-H “Major Criteria for International 
Arbitrators” in Shaping an Efficient Procedure in Arbitration in the Next Decade (1999); Smit H “The Future of 
International Commercial Arbitration: A Single Transnational Institution” (1986) 25 Columbia J of 
Transnational Law 9, 18.  On the future of ADR see Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration 44 
para 1.93; also Short D “E-Discovery and International Commercial Arbitration: A Convergence of Realities 
from a Canadian Perspective”, presentation at the Commonwealth Law Conference, September 2007, Nairobi, 
Kenya. 
810 Nader L The Life of the Law University of California Press, 2002, 1-2.  
811 For example, the provisions of the Model Law Article 35 and its national derivatives. See paras 3.6.3-3.6.5 
above. 
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The successful arbitral party and those representing him from beginning to end have an 
interest in the prompt recovery of the full benefit of the award.  Such party must be assisted 
with well defined and precise rules for achieving the declared goals of arbitration including 
principally a just result.  The simple procedure proposed in this study is, part of the attempt to 
explore further ways and means of making the enforcement and execution of arbitral awards 
less onerous.812  
 
A firm recommendation is that arbitration should not stop with the making of an award that 
merely dangles the fruit of the award before the successful party, who is then left to embark 
on a fresh and often harrowing exercise to execute the award.  Arbitration law ought to cover 
the whole field,813 from commencement of proceedings to the execution of the award, to 
facilitate the prompt delivery of the final outcome to the deserving party in consonance with 
the vision of arbitration as a competent, complete and freestanding system. 
 
It can be said finally that African states, which hitherto had been clients of a bipolar world, 
have had to face numerous challenges, one of which is the adoption of a new set of responses 
to impulses coming from the wider world.  Autocracies have been dismantled.  Frozen 
centralized economies are opening up while whole commercial and trading relationships with 
multilateral institutions are similarly being realigned and redefined.  Recent natural resource 
finds in East, West and Southern Africa (coal, gas and oil) have renewed global interest in 
Africa with a role to play for dispute resolvers in the continent.  In the wake of such 
momentum, Africa has to, as it were, reinvent itself and learn new ways of doing business and 
resolving disputes and conflicts peaceably in a changing world.  That challenge lingers and is 
one of the defining characteristics of the present and future of effective arbitration in 
particular, and conflict resolution generally, in Africa.814 
 
 
 
                                                 
812 See para 3.6.7 above. 
813 This arguably novel view received substantial support from some of the notable seminar participants at 
Tylney Hall (see n 799 above). 
814 The reflections in the concluding paragraph are developed from the twin challenges of fostering harmonious 
economic relations through peaceful resolution of disputes (extrapolated from “African Insight”. Daily Nation, 
Kenya, 6 January, 2006) and underscoring the value and contribution of arbitration in facilitation of wholesome 
economic relations (extrapolated from UN General Assembly Resolution 4072 of 11 December 1985, UN doc 
A/40/53).  In essence the contribution of arbitration in promoting harmonious economic relations is not confined 
to business enterprises.  In an increasingly interdependent world, beneficial economic relations are vital building 
blocks in the structure of world peace.  See also Okefeifere AI “Enhancing the Implementation of Economic 
Projects in the Third World through Arbitration” (2001) 67 Arbitration 240-253.  
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